Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: Cherkupalli v Commonwealth of Australia [2012] NSWSC 997 Hearing dates: 28 August 2012 Decision date: 31 August 2012 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: Harrison J Decision: 1. The plaintiff's application to amend the statement of claim in the respects opposed by the defendant is dismissed.
2. Otherwise grant leave to the plaintiff to file an amended statement of claim within 14 days.
3. The costs of this application should be the plaintiff's costs in the proceedings.
Catchwords: PLEADINGS - application for leave to amend - whether proposed pleading based on a cause of action known to the law - whether delay - whether prejudice to the defendant - application to amend refused Legislation Cited: Civil Procedure Act 2005, ss 64, 65
Limitation Act 1969, ss 14, 52(1)(d)
Migration Act 1958, s 47Cases Cited: AON Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University: [2009] HCA 27; (2009) 239 CLR 175
Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor [1996] HCA 25; (1996) 186 CLR 541
Byrne v Australian Airlines Limited [1995] HCA 24; (1995) 185 CLR 410
Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee [1999] HCA 59; (1999) 200 CLR 1
Scott v Pedler [2003] FCA 650; (2003) 74 ALD 424
Sullivan v Moody [2001] HCA 59; (2001) 207 CLR 562Category: Interlocutory applications Parties: Prashant Reddy Cherkupalli (Plaintiff)
Commonwealth of Australia (Defendant)Representation: Dr A S Morrison SC with E Romaniuk (Plaintiff)
P S Jones (Defendant)
Carroll & O'Dea (Plaintiff)
DLA Piper (Defendant)
File Number(s): 2010/375513
Judgment
HARRISON J: These proceedings were commenced by statement of claim filed on 11 November 2011. By notice of motion dated 5 June 2012, the plaintiff has sought leave to rely instead upon an amended statement of claim. Leave is required in accordance with s 64(1)(b) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005. The defendant opposes the application, but only with respect to certain nominated portions of the proposed amended pleading. These are referred to in more detail below.
Background
On 30 July 2003 the plaintiff arrived in Australia on a Subclass 574 Visa, which was valid until 13 August 2004. On 6 August 2003 he was granted a Subclass 574 Visa with limited work rights, also valid until 13 August 2004. On 19 April 2004 the plaintiff ceased studies without completing his course. He was later reinstated but did not pay fees for enrolment and his enrolment was later cancelled. On 9 September 2004 the plaintiff applied for a Subclass 572 Vocational Education and Training Sector Visa. As he was then unlawfully in Australia, the plaintiff was granted a Bridging "C" Visa with a "no work" condition pending determination of his application.
On 26 November 2004 the plaintiff was found to be working in breach of conditions attached to his visa. He was taken to Villawood Immigration Detention Centre for questioning. Later that evening his bridging visa was cancelled. The plaintiff did not seek a review of the decision to cancel his…
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- Case
- [2012] NSWSC 997
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether the proposed pleadings were based on a cause of action known to the law and if the amendments were justified. The Commonwealth argued that the plaintiff's application was not based on a valid cause of action, as the decision to grant or deny a visa is a matter of legislative discretion, not one that could give rise to a private right of action. The court considered the Commonwealth's reliance on precedents that suggest a statutory regime providing review mechanisms indicates an intention to exclude private rights of action. The Commonwealth also argued that the plaintiff's application to amend was futile and made in bad faith, given the delay in prosecuting the case and non-compliance with court directions.
The court found that the proposed amendments did not disclose an arguable cause of action, as the decision to grant a visa is a matter of legislative discretion and not one that could give rise to a private right of action. Additionally, the court held that the plaintiff's delay in prosecuting the case and failure to comply with court directions were factors that supported the defendant's opposition to the amendments. The court concluded that the plaintiff's application to amend should be refused.
The Federal Court refused the plaintiff's application to amend his statement of claim, finding that the proposed amendments were not based on a valid cause of action and were made in bad faith. The court held that the decision to grant a visa is a matter of legislative discretion and not one that could give rise to a private right of action. Additionally, the court found that the plaintiff's delay in prosecuting the case and failure to comply with court directions supported the defendant's opposition to the amendments. The court's decision effectively dismissed the plaintiff's application to amend his statement of claim.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The defendant submitted that no private right of action would arise from a failure to grant the plaintiff a student visa promptly as alleged or indeed at all. That decision depended upon the satisfaction of the decision maker concerning whether an applicant for a visa meets the requirements prescribed by the Migration Act 1958 and the Migration Regulations. The defendant contended that the existence of a statutory regime that provided mechanisms for review of a decision to not grant a student visa exhibited a legislative intention to exclude any private right of action for damages. The defendant relied upon what was said by Gray ACJ in the Federal Court in Scott v Pedler [2003] FCA 650; (2003) 74 ALD 424 at [45] and [60] as follows: The following portion of paragraph 65 should also be noted: The defendant also referred to Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd [1995] HCA 24; (1995) 185 CLR 410 at 424-426, Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee [1999] HCA 59; (1999) 200 CLR 1, and Sullivan v Moody [2001] HCA 59; (2001) 207 CLR 562. The defendant submitted that the proposed amendments did not disclose an arguable cause of action and ought not to be permitted. They were in fact no more than a reconfiguration, in the form of a pleading, of similar matters that had been included in the original statement of claim as particulars of exemplary and/or aggravated damages. The amendments were not proposed for what was described as "a proper purpose". Although not specifically addressed in these terms, I take the defendant's submissions to include a contention that the plaintiff's application to amend his statement of claim in the ways opposed by the defendant is in effect futile and that it should be refused on that basis alone. The defendant also contended with respect to proposed particular (ai) that no cause of action is pleaded based upon the release of the plaintiff from detention on 19 April 2006. It is not alleged that there was any duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff following his release. It is not alleged that the defendant had a duty to provide for his needs after his release from detention, or that it knew, or should have known that he would "live on the streets for approximately one week". It is the detention of which the plaintiff complains, not the circumstances or consequences following his release. Accordingly, anything that may have occurred to the plaintiff after release is not relevant to his cause of action or damages. In those circumstances the defendant submitted that particular (ai) should not be allowed. The same principles should apply in relation to an amendment of particulars as apply to the amendment of substantive parts of the pleadings. The incident alleged to give rise to the cause of action occurred on 9 September 2004. The proceedings were commenced as earlier indicated. The defendant complains that the plaintiff has attended to the prosecution of the proceedings with less than commendable alacrity. The defendant has formally submitted that the plaintiff has not been "timely" in the conduct of the proceedings generally and has consistently failed to comply with the Court's directions. The defendant submits in these circumstances that there is no basis upon which the plaintiff can expect, or should be afforded, any further indulgences.