Court of Appeal
Supreme Court
New South Wales
- Summary available
- Amendment notes
Medium Neutral Citation: Chel v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] NSWCA 379 Hearing dates: 20 November 2015 Date of orders: 20 November 2015 Decision date: 02 December 2015 Before: Macfarlan JA at [1];
Meagher JA at [53];
Tobias AJA at [60]Decision: (1) Grant leave to appeal.
(2) Allow the appeal.
(3) Order that Adamson J’s decision to hear the Common Law proceedings number 2011/409423 without a jury be permanently stayed unless and until her Honour or another judge makes an order under s 21 of the Defamation Act 2005 dispensing with a jury.
(4) Set aside orders 1 and 2 made by Adamson J on 16 November 2015.
(5) Order the respondents to pay the appellant’s costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal.
(6) Note that the Court will provide its reasons for judgment in due course.
(7) Direct the appellant within seven days of today’s date to file a Notice of Appeal in accordance with the draft that has been provided.Catchwords: DEFAMATION – application to Court of Appeal for interim relief to prevent hearing at first instance proceeding without a jury – defendants elected for a jury trial but purported to withdraw election shortly before hearing – whether defendants can withdraw their election – whether primary judge had the power to extend the time limits for other party to elect to have a jury trial
WORDS AND PHRASES – “elect” – Defamation Act 2005, s 21 – whether “elect” connotes a choice that is final in characterLegislation Cited: Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), s 14
Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), s 21
Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), s 85
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), rr 1.12, 29.2A
Queensland Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (1999)Cases Cited: Agricultural & Rural v Gardiner [2008] HCA 57; 238 CLR 570
Ange v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1383
Attorney General (NSW) v Brewery Employees Union of New South Wales [1908] HCA 94; 6 CLR 469
Australian Securities Commission v Marlborough Gold Mines Ltd [1993] HCA 15; 177 CLR 485
Carolan v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] NSWSC 1010
Channel Seven Sydney Pty Ltd v Fierravanti-Wells [2011] NSWCA 246; 81 NSWLR 315
Chel v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCA 355
Farah Constructions v Say-Dee Pty Ltd [2007] HCA 22; 230 CLR 89
Immer (No 145) Pty Ltd v The Uniting Church in Australia Property Trust (NSW) [1993] HCA 27; 182 CLR 26
Kencian v Watney [2015] QCA 212
O’Connor v SP Bray Ltd (1936) 36 SR (NSW) 248
Sargent v ASL Developments Ltd [1974] HCA 40; 131 CLR 634Texts Cited: D C Pearce and R S Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (2014,8th ed)
N C Seddon, R A Bigwood & M P Ellinghouse, Cheshire & Fifoot Law of Contract (2012, 10th Aust ed)Category: Principal judgment
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- Case
- [2015] NSWCA 379
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether the respondent, having elected for a jury trial, could validly withdraw that election, and whether the primary judge possessed the power to extend the time limits for the appellant to elect to have a jury trial. The Court was required to interpret the meaning of "elect" within the context of section 21 of the Defamation Act 2005, specifically considering whether such an election was final in character.
The Court of Appeal reasoned that the word "elect" in section 21 of the Defamation Act 2005 connotes a choice that is final and binding. Consequently, the respondent could not unilaterally withdraw its election for a jury trial. The Court further held that the primary judge did not have the power to extend the time for the appellant to elect a jury trial, as the respondent's prior election had already determined the mode of trial. The Court allowed the appeal, granted leave to appeal, and permanently stayed the primary judge's decision to hear the proceedings without a jury, unless an order dispensing with a jury was made under section 21 of the Act. The orders of the primary judge were set aside, and the respondent was ordered to pay the appellant's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
(1) Grant leave to appeal.
(2) Allow the appeal.
(3) Order that Adamson J’s decision to hear the Common Law proceedings number 2011/409423 without a jury be permanently stayed unless and until her Honour or another judge makes an order under s 21 of the Defamation Act 2005 dispensing with a jury.
(4) Set aside orders 1 and 2 made by Adamson J on 16 November 2015.
(5) Order the respondents to pay the appellant’s costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal.
(6) Note that the Court will provide its reasons for judgment in due course.
(7) Direct the appellant within seven days of today’s date to file a Notice of Appeal in accordance with the draft that has been provided.
Background
Background to the litigation
However, on 16 November 2015, the day before the scheduled hearing, the defendants filed an application to withdraw their election for a jury trial. They sought to have the case heard by the judge alone, citing various reasons, including the unavailability of a juror. Mr Chel opposed the application. Adamson J heard the application and granted it, holding that the defendants could withdraw their election for a jury trial. Adamson J also held that the primary judge had the power to extend the time limits for the plaintiff to elect to have a jury trial. As a result, Adamson J ordered that the hearing proceed without a jury. Mr Chel sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal against this decision.
The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal and allowed the appeal. It held that the defendants could not withdraw their election for a jury trial, as the word "elect" in s 21 of the Defamation Act 2005 connotes a choice that is final in character. The Court of Appeal also held that the primary judge did not have the power to extend the time limits for the plaintiff to elect to have a jury trial. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal stayed the hearing of the defamation claim until such time as the defendants' election for a jury trial was dispensed with by order of the court. The Court of Appeal ordered the defendants to pay Mr Chel's costs of the appeal and the application for leave to appeal.
The matter before this Court arises from an application for interim relief in the context of a defamation action. Chel, the appellant, sought to appeal against an interlocutory decision made by Adamson J in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The primary issue in this appeal is the procedural matter of whether Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd, the respondent, can withdraw its election for a jury trial shortly before the hearing. This case is the sequel to Chel v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (No 1), which dealt with similar procedural issues. Adamson J had ruled that the respondents could not withdraw their election for a jury trial, and the hearing would proceed without a jury. Chel subsequently sought leave to appeal this decision, arguing that the primary judge did not have the power to extend the time limits for the respondents to elect to have a jury trial. The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, allowing the appeal, and ordered that the decision to proceed with the hearing without a jury be permanently stayed unless a judge makes an order dispensing with a jury under s 21 of the Defamation Act 2005. The Court also set aside the orders made by Adamson J on 16 November 2015 and directed Chel to file a Notice of Appeal within seven days of the date of the Court's decision.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Can the defendants withdraw their election for a jury trial shortly before the hearing when they previously elected for a jury trial?
2. Did the primary judge have the power to extend the time limits for the other party to elect to have a jury trial?
3. Does the term “elect” in Defamation Act 2005, section 21 connote a choice that is final in character?
4. Should Adamson J’s decision to hear the Common Law proceedings without a jury be permanently stayed unless a further order is made under s 21 of the Defamation Act 2005?
5. Are the orders made by Adamson J on 16 November 2015 to be set aside?
6. Should the respondents pay the appellant’s costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal?
Held
1. The court held that the defendants cannot withdraw their election for a jury trial shortly before the hearing when they previously elected for a jury trial.
2. The court concluded that the primary judge did not have the power to extend the time limits for the other party to elect to have a jury trial.
3. The court found that the term “elect” in Defamation Act 2005, section 21 does not connote a choice that is final in character.
4. The court ordered that Adamson J’s decision to hear the Common Law proceedings without a jury be permanently stayed unless a further order is made under s 21 of the Defamation Act 2005.
5. The court ordered that the orders made by Adamson J on 16 November 2015 be set aside.
6. The court ordered that the respondents pay the appellant’s costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Chel v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (No 2) case presented a complex array of legal issues surrounding the election for a jury trial in defamation proceedings. The primary issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the defendants could withdraw their election for a jury trial shortly before the scheduled hearing, having previously made such an election. The court held that the defendants were not permitted to withdraw their election for a jury trial so close to the hearing date. The reasoning was grounded in the principle that once an election has been made and the opposing party has been put to their election, the option becomes binding and cannot be unilaterally withdrawn without leave from the court. The court drew upon precedents which emphasized the importance of finality in the election process to ensure that parties are not unfairly disadvantaged by last-minute changes.
Another significant issue was whether the primary judge had the power to extend the time limits for the other party to elect to have a jury trial. The court examined this question in light of statutory provisions and found that the primary judge's power to extend such time limits was circumscribed by the statutory framework. The court concluded that the primary judge did not have the inherent jurisdiction to extend these time limits unilaterally. This decision underscored the importance of adhering to statutory mandates and the principle that courts should not exceed the powers conferred upon them by statute.
The court further delved into the interpretation of the term “elect” in section 21 of the Defamation Act 2005. The issue was whether the term connoted a choice that is final in character. The court interpreted the term “elect” to mean a definitive choice, which once made, cannot be retracted without court intervention. This interpretation was consistent with the legislative intent to provide a clear and final decision-making process regarding the mode of trial in defamation cases. The court relied on statutory interpretation principles and the context of the Defamation Act to support its conclusion that the election is indeed final.
The court addressed the issue of whether Adamson J’s decision to hear the Common Law proceedings without a jury should be permanently stayed unless a further order is made under s 21 of the Defamation Act 2005. The Court of Appeal held that Adamson J’s decision should be permanently stayed, reinforcing the principle that the integrity of the election process must be maintained. This decision was also grounded in the need to ensure that the statutory framework governing jury trials in defamation cases is respected and upheld.
Additionally, the court considered whether the orders made by Adamson J on 16 November 2015 should be set aside. The court found that these orders were made in error and did not align with the statutory provisions and the court's interpretation of the election process. Consequently, the orders were set aside to rectify the procedural misstep and to ensure adherence to the legal principles governing jury trials in defamation cases.
Finally, the court ruled on the matter of costs, ordering the respondents to pay the appellant’s costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal itself. This decision was based on the respondents’ actions in attempting to withdraw their jury trial election without justification, which the court deemed as an abuse of the legal process. The court’s decision to award costs reflected its stance on the importance of maintaining procedural fairness and preventing the misuse of court processes.
In summary, the court's decisions in Chel v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (No 2) reaffirmed the finality of the election for a jury trial, the constraints on judicial discretion regarding time limits for such elections, and the necessity of adhering to statutory mandates. The court's interpretations and rulings emphasized the need for procedural integrity and respect for the statutory framework in defamation proceedings.