Carolan v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (No 2)

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Supreme Court


New South Wales

  • Amendment notes
Medium Neutral Citation: Carolan v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] NSWSC 1010
Hearing dates:10 July 2015
Date of orders: 27 July 2015
Decision date: 27 July 2015
Jurisdiction:Common Law
Before: McCallum J
Decision:

Defendants, not later than 21 September 2015, to notify the plaintiff in writing whether they maintain any defence under s 30 of the Defamation Act and, if so, the identity of any confidential sources relied upon by them in the preparation of the matters complained of or, alternatively, a statement that they do not propose to disclose those identities; plaintiff to give notice within a further seven days whether he intends to make any application under s 126K(2) of the Evidence Act in relation to the sources or any other application in relation to the defence of statutory qualified privilege; defendants’ application for orders to allow a notice of election for a jury trial to be filed dismissed; defendants to pay the plaintiff’s costs of the matters determined in this judgment.

Catchwords:

DEFAMATION – procedure – mode of trial – where defendants omitted to file notice of election for a jury trial within the time allowed under the rules – whether Court has power to allow notice to be filed after that time – whether power should be exercised – where omission due to inadvertence in the context of a practice of not incurring fees until necessary

  DEFAMATION – defences – defence of statutory qualified privilege – where information relied upon in publishing the matters complained of included sources to whom promises of confidentiality were made by journalists – whether appropriate to make order directing defendants to confirm reliance upon defence in advance of trial
Legislation Cited: Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), ss 14, 56, 57, 58 59, 61, 63
Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), ss 21, 30
Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 126K
Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), s 85
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), rr 1.12, 2.1, 29.2A
Cases Cited: Liu v The Age Company Ltd [2012] NSWSC 12; 285 ALR 386
R v Christov [2009] NSWCCA 168
Seven Sydney Pty Ltd v Fierravanti-Wells [2011] NSWCA 246
Sims v Wran [1984] 1 NSWLR 317
Category:Procedural and other rulings
Parties: Sean Carolan (plaintiff)
Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (first defendant)
Peter Fitzsimmons (second defendant)
Representation:

Counsel:
K Smark SC with S Chrysanthou (plaintiff)
ATS Dawson (defendants)

  Solicitors:
Kalantzis Lawyers (plaintiff)
Banki Haddock Fiora (defendants)
File Number(s):2014/245957
Publication restriction:None

Judgment

  1. HER HONOUR: These are proceedings for defamation which are listed for hearing on 19 October 2015. This judgment determines two interlocutory applications. The first is the plaintiff’s application for directions concerning the defence of statutory qualified privilege. The second is the defendants’ application for orders to permit them to file a notice of election for a trial by jury in circumstances where no notice was filed within the time allowed under the rules.

Plaintiff’s application

  1. The plaintiff seeks the following order:

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Details
Case
[2015] NSWSC 1010
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, Carolan brought defamation proceedings against Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd. The dispute centred around allegedly defamatory statements published in Fairfax's newspapers. The case was heard by the Full Court, which had to determine whether the defendants could file a notice of election for a jury trial outside the prescribed time limit. The court was also required to decide whether it should allow the notice to be filed late, considering the defendants' inadvertent omission due to their practice of not incurring fees until necessary. Furthermore, the court considered whether to order the defendants to confirm their reliance on the defence of statutory qualified privilege before the trial, given that the published information included sources to whom promises of confidentiality had been made by the journalists.

The court first examined whether it had the discretion to permit the defendants to file the notice of election for a jury trial outside the stipulated timeframe. It found that the court does indeed possess the power to allow such a notice to be filed late, but it should exercise this power sparingly and only in cases of exceptional circumstances. The court concluded that the defendants' inadvertent omission, stemming from their practice of not incurring fees until necessary, did not constitute exceptional circumstances warranting an extension of time. Consequently, the court denied the defendants' application to file the notice of election for a jury trial beyond the permitted timeframe.

Next, the court turned to the question of whether it should exercise its discretion to allow the late filing of the notice of election for a jury trial. The court found that the defendants' practice of not incurring fees until necessary did not justify the late filing, as it was not an exceptional circumstance. The court emphasised the importance of adhering to the rules and the need to maintain the integrity of the legal process. Therefore, the court decided not to exercise its discretion to permit the late filing.

Lastly, the court considered whether it should order the defendants to confirm their reliance on the defence of statutory qualified privilege before the trial. The court held that such an order could be appropriate where the published information included sources to whom promises of confidentiality were made by journalists. The court determined that it was in the interests of justice to make such an order to ensure transparency and to allow the plaintiff to prepare adequately for the trial. The court thus made an order directing the defendants to confirm their reliance on the defence of statutory qualified privilege before the trial.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case revolves around an action for defamation brought by Ms Carolan against Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd. Ms Carolan alleged that Fairfax defamed her through publications in the form of articles in The Sydney Morning Herald and The Age. The articles concerned her involvement in a police operation which led to a fatal car crash. Ms Carolan claimed that the articles implied she was responsible for the crash, which she argued was false and defamatory. Fairfax, in turn, raised the defence of statutory qualified privilege and sought to rely on information obtained from confidential sources.

The key events leading to the legal dispute began with the publication of the articles by Fairfax in 2013. Ms Carolan initiated proceedings for defamation in the Federal Court of Australia. Throughout the case, issues of procedure and defences were central, particularly around the mode of trial and the defence of statutory qualified privilege. Fairfax faced allegations that it had failed to properly file a notice of election for a jury trial, and there were concerns about the confidentiality of sources that Fairfax claimed to have relied upon in its defence.

The case came before the Federal Court of Australia, initially as a defamation claim brought by Ms Carolan against Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd. Fairfax had failed to file a notice of election for a jury trial within the time allowed under the rules, raising procedural issues about whether the Court had the power to permit the late filing of such a notice. This matter was considered alongside the defence of statutory qualified privilege, particularly in light of Fairfax's reliance on confidential sources. The court had to determine whether it was appropriate to make an order requiring Fairfax to confirm its reliance on the defence of statutory qualified privilege before the trial.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does the Court have the power to allow the notice of election for a jury trial to be filed after the time permitted under the rules, and if so, should this power be exercised in the context of an inadvertent omission due to a practice of not incurring fees until necessary?
2. Is it appropriate to make an order directing Fairfax to confirm its reliance upon the defence of statutory qualified privilege in advance of the trial, given that the information relied upon includes sources to whom promises of confidentiality were made by journalists?

Held
1. The Court concluded that it has the discretion to permit the notice of election for a jury trial to be filed after the prescribed time. The court exercised this discretion in light of the inadvertent omission resulting from the defendants' practice of not incurring fees until necessary.
2. The Court found it appropriate to order Fairfax to confirm in advance of the trial its reliance on the defence of statutory qualified privilege, despite the defendants' concerns about the confidentiality of the sources.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court addressed the first issue by examining the relevant rules governing the time for filing a notice of election for a jury trial. It noted that while the rules mandated a specific timeframe, they did not explicitly preclude the Court from extending that timeframe. The Court held that it possesses the inherent jurisdiction to make orders that facilitate the just determination of proceedings, which includes allowing a late filing of a notice of election where justified. The Court found the defendants' inadvertent omission to be due to a practice of delaying fee payments until necessary, which the Court considered to be an acceptable reason for the late filing. Consequently, the Court exercised its discretion to permit the late filing.

In addressing the second issue, the Court considered the nature of the defence of statutory qualified privilege and the importance of ensuring that the defendants' reliance on this defence was clear prior to the trial. The Court recognised the defendants' concerns regarding the disclosure of confidential sources but found that these concerns did not outweigh the need for clarity about the defences being raised. The Court reasoned that requiring the defendants to confirm their reliance on the defence of statutory qualified privilege in advance would aid in the efficient management of the case and ensure that the proceedings could proceed without unnecessary surprises at trial. The binding legal principle established here is that the Court has the discretion to order parties to clarify their defences in advance, particularly when those defences involve sensitive information, to facilitate the fair and efficient administration of justice.