Chel v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Limited

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Supreme Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Chel v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Limited [2015] NSWSC 1707
Hearing dates:16 November 2015
Decision date: 16 November 2015
Jurisdiction:Common Law
Before: Adamson J
Decision:

1. Dismiss the plaintiff's notice of motion filed 16 November 2015.

 

2. Order that these proceedings will be tried by judge alone and not by jury.

 3. Reserve costs.
Catchwords:

DEFAMATION – notice of election for trial by jury – substantive right vests or accrues upon filing of notice of election – whether vested and accrued right can be waived unilaterally by party to whom right accrued – Kencian v Watney [2015] QCA 212 followed – right can be waived – party who wishes to preserve right to trial by jury in defamation action must serve notice of intention and notice of election irrespective of whether other party does so

 

DEFAMATION – whether plaintiff entitled to trial by jury having failed to serve notice of election in accordance with Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 29.2A – no power to permit election for trial by jury where non-compliance with Defamation Act 2005 and relevant rules – Carolan v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] NSWSC 110 followed

  ESTOPPEL – Waltons v Maher estoppel - whether defendants estopped from withdrawing election for trial by jury – whether reliance by plaintiff on defendants’ election for trial by jury was reasonable – whether defendants’ conduct in waiving right to trial by jury unconscionable – elements of estoppel not established
Legislation Cited: Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), s 21
Jury Act 1977 (NSW), s 72
Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), s 85
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 29.2A
Cases Cited: Carolan v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] NSWSC 110
Channel Seven Sydney Pty Ltd v Senator Concetta Fierravanti-Wells [2011] NSWCA 246; 81 NSWLR 315
Esber v Commonwealth [1992] HCA 20 174 CLR 430
O'Connor v SP Bray Limited (1936) 36 SR (NSW) 248
Kencian v Watney [2015] QCA 212
Waltons Stores (Interstate) Limited v Maher (1988) 164 CLR at 387
Category:Procedural and other rulings
Parties: Lili Chel (Plaintiff)
Fairfax Media Publications Pty Limited (First Defendant)
Vanda Carson (Second Defendant)
Representation:

Counsel:
R Rasmussen (Plaintiff)
T Blackburn SC/L Barnett (Defendants)

    Solicitors:
Beazley Boorman Lawyers (Plaintiff)
Banki Haddock Fiora Lawyers (Defendants)
File Number(s):2011/409423

Judgment (ex tempore - Revised)

Introduction

  1. The proceedings for the plaintiff’s claim for damages for defamation were listed to commence last Monday 9 November 2015 for a three-week trial by jury.  It was adjourned by reason of the plaintiff's counsel's indisposition.  Last Friday my Associate was notified that the defendants, who had previously filed a notice of election for a jury, no longer wished to have trial by jury and purported to waive that right.

  2. By notice of motion filed in court today, the plaintiff seeks a declaration that the defendants are estopped from withdrawing or revoking their election for trial by jury; and, in the alternative, an…

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Details
Case
[2015] NSWSC 1707
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter of Chel v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Limited involved a defamation claim brought by the plaintiff against the defendants. The dispute centred on the plaintiff's entitlement to a trial by jury and the defendants' waiver of that right. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The plaintiff argued that despite the defendants' waiver, they were still entitled to a trial by jury. The defendants, on the other hand, contended that the plaintiff's failure to serve the requisite notice of election precluded them from claiming such a trial.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the right to a trial by jury in a defamation case could be waived unilaterally by the party to whom the right accrued. This question was addressed by reference to Kencian v Watney, which held that a vested and accrued right could indeed be waived. Additionally, the court considered whether the plaintiff could still claim a trial by jury despite not serving the notice of election, a matter governed by the Defamation Act 2005 and the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW). The case of Carolan v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (No 2) was pertinent here, establishing that non-compliance with the statutory and rule requirements precluded the court from permitting a trial by jury.

The court found that the right to a trial by jury could indeed be waived by the party to whom it accrued, following the reasoning in Kencian v Watney. However, the court also held that the plaintiff's failure to serve the notice of election precluded them from claiming a trial by jury, in line with Carolan v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (No 2). Furthermore, the court rejected the plaintiff's estoppel argument, finding that the elements necessary for establishing a Waltons v Maher estoppel were not satisfied. The court concluded that the defendants were not estopped from withdrawing their election for a trial by jury, as the plaintiff's reliance on the defendants' initial election was not reasonable, and the defendants' conduct in waiving the right was not unconscionable.

Background

Background to the litigation

The plaintiff, Chel, initiated a defamation action against the defendant, Fairfax Media Publications Pty Limited, over certain articles published by the defendant. Chel elected for a trial by jury, which is a substantive right that vests or accrues upon filing of the notice of election for trial by jury. However, Chel failed to serve the required notice of election for trial by jury in accordance with the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 29.2A. Fairfax Media, on the other hand, had duly served a notice of election for trial by jury. Subsequently, Fairfax Media attempted to withdraw their election for trial by jury. Chel sought to enforce Fairfax Media's election for trial by jury and to estop Fairfax Media from withdrawing it. Chel argued that Fairfax Media should be estopped from withdrawing their election for trial by jury due to their reliance on that election, and that Fairfax Media's conduct in waiving the right to trial by jury was unconscionable.

The case was heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. It was a proceeding related to a defamation action, where the primary issue was the entitlement to a trial by jury. Chel initially elected for a trial by jury but failed to serve a notice of election in accordance with the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 29.2A. Fairfax Media had properly served a notice of election for trial by jury and later sought to withdraw it. Chel applied to the court to enforce Fairfax Media's election for trial by jury and to estop Fairfax Media from withdrawing it. The court considered the relevant statutory and rule requirements and the doctrine of estoppel in the context of the parties' conduct.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether a vested and accrued right to trial by jury can be waived unilaterally by the party to whom the right accrued.
2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a trial by jury having failed to serve notice of election in accordance with the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 29.2A.
3. Whether the defendants are estopped from withdrawing the election for trial by jury under the principles of Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher.
4. Whether the plaintiff's reliance on the defendants’ election for trial by jury was reasonable.
5. Whether the defendants’ conduct in waiving the right to trial by jury was unconscionable.

Held
1. The court held that a vested and accrued right to trial by jury can be waived unilaterally by the party to whom the right accrued, following the decision in Kencian v Watney [2015] QCA 212.
2. The court held that the plaintiff is not entitled to a trial by jury having failed to serve notice of election in accordance with the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 29.2A.
3. The court held that the defendants are not estopped from withdrawing the election for trial by jury under the principles of Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher.
4. The court held that the plaintiff's reliance on the defendants' election for trial by jury was not reasonable.
5. The court held that the defendants' conduct in waiving the right to trial by jury was not unconscionable.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court considered the issue of whether a vested and accrued right to trial by jury can be waived unilaterally by the party to whom the right accrued. In addressing this, the court looked at the case of Kencian v Watney [2015] QCA 212, where the Queensland Court of Appeal held that such a right could indeed be waived. The court found that to preserve the right to trial by jury in a defamation action, a party must serve notice of intention and notice of election irrespective of whether the other party does so. This principle was followed in the current case, leading to the conclusion that the right could be waived.

Turning to the second issue, the court addressed whether the plaintiff was entitled to a trial by jury having failed to serve notice of election in accordance with the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 29.2A. The court referred to the case of Carolan v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] NSWSC 110, where it was held that the court has no power to permit an election for trial by jury where there is non-compliance with the Defamation Act 2005 and the relevant rules. The court in the current case adopted this reasoning, concluding that the plaintiff was not entitled to a trial by jury due to non-compliance with the required procedural steps.

The court then examined whether the defendants were estopped from withdrawing their election for trial by jury under the principles of Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher. It was necessary for the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendants' conduct in withdrawing the election was unconscionable and that the plaintiff's reliance on the election was reasonable. The court found that the elements of estoppel were not established as the plaintiff's reliance was not considered reasonable, and the defendants' conduct in waiving the right to trial by jury was not deemed unconscionable. Consequently, the defendants were not estopped from withdrawing their election for trial by jury.