Chel v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Limited (No 5)

Link copied
Case Copied 12 min read

Supreme Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Chel v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Limited (No 5) [2015] NSWSC 1729
Hearing dates:17 November 2015
Decision date: 17 November 2015
Jurisdiction:Common Law
Before: Adamson J
Decision:

(1) Refuse the application that I disqualify myself on the grounds of reasonable apprehension of bias

Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – apprehended bias – hypothetical fair minded observer assumed to be aware of the actual circumstance of case – whether refusal of four adjournment applications capable of forming basis for reasonable apprehension of bias – application refused
Cases Cited: Chel v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Limited [2015] NSWSC 1707
Chel v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Limited (No 3) [2015] NSWSC 1726
Ebner v Official Trustee [2000] HCA 63; 205 CLR 337
Hot Holdings Pty Ltd v Creasy [2002] HCA 51; 210 CLR 438
Re Refugee Tribunal ex parte H [2001] HCA 28; 75 ALJR 982
Category:Procedural and other rulings
Parties: Lili Chel (Plaintiff)
Fairfax Media Publications Pty Limited (Plaintiff)
Vanda Carson (Second Defendant)
Representation:

Counsel:
R Rasmussen (Plaintiff)
T Blackburn SC/L Barnett (Defendants)

    Solicitors:
Beazley Boorman Lawyers (Plaintiff)
Banki Haddock Fiora Lawyers (Defendants)
File Number(s):2011/40923

Judgment (EX TEMPORE – REVISED)

  1. The plaintiff applies for an order that I disqualify myself on the grounds of reasonable apprehension of bias. 

The plaintiff’s submissions

  1. Mr Rasmussen, who appears on her behalf, contended that the reasonable apprehension arises by reason of three separate matters.  The first matter relied upon is said to arise from what occurred when the matter came before me last Thursday, 12 November 2015 for mention, I having adjourned the trial of the proceedings from 9 November 2015, when it was due to start, to 16 November 2015 to accommodate Mr Rasmussen's indisposition.

  2. The matter which is said to give rise to the reasonable apprehension is that I inquired of the parties who had requisitioned the jury and, when I was told by Mr Blackburn SC, who appeared with Ms Barnett on behalf of the defendants, that it was the defendants who had elected for a jury, I did not pursue the matter.

  3. Mr Boorman, the plaintiff's solicitor, has deposed to what occurred in court in an affidavit sworn on 16 November 2015. He said, in [6]:

“On 12 November 2015 I was present I Court when I heard her Honour Justice Adamson say words to the effect of ‘I suppose it would be easier for alternative counsel or Mr Beazley if he has to run this case if there was no Jury’. Her Honour then asked ‘who requisitioned the jury?’ To which Mr Blackburn SC, who appeared for the defendants on the day said ‘we did your Honour’. I recall her Honour Justice Adamson say words to the effect of ‘is it still the defendant’s intention to maintain a jury trial in this matter?’ I heard Mr Blackburn SC respond with words to the effect of ‘At present my instructions are that we want…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Chel v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Limited (No 5) and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2015] NSWSC 1729
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter of Chel v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Limited (No 5) arose before the Federal Court, where the applicant sought to challenge the refusal of four adjournment applications in the underlying defamation proceedings. The applicant contended that this refusal could reasonably lead to an apprehension of bias on the part of the trial judge. The respondent, Fairfax Media Publications Pty Limited, argued that the refusal of the adjournments did not constitute a basis for such apprehension.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the refusal of four adjournment applications in the defamation proceedings could give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the trial judge. The court had to consider whether the hypothetical fair-minded observer, aware of the actual circumstances of the case, could reasonably apprehend that the trial judge might not bring an impartial and unbiased mind to the resolution of the case.

The court held that the refusal of four adjournment applications did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. It was noted that the trial judge had carefully considered each of the adjournment applications and had provided detailed reasons for the refusal. The court held that the hypothetical fair-minded observer, aware of the actual circumstances of the case, would not reasonably apprehend that the trial judge was biased. The court emphasised that the refusal of adjournment applications was a matter of judicial discretion and did not, in itself, indicate any partiality or lack of impartiality on the part of the trial judge.

The court dismissed the application, finding that there was no reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the trial judge. The court also noted that the applicant had not provided any additional evidence or arguments to support the claim of apprehended bias beyond the refusal of the adjournment applications. The court held that the application was without merit and did not warrant any further adjournments or interference with the ongoing proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established