Fisheries—Offence—Use of unlicensed boat within designated waters—Conviction—Penalty—Statute authorizing order for forfeiture of any boat used in commission of offence—Whether boat not the property of person committing offence may be forfeit—Fisheries Act 1952-1970 (Cth), s. 13AA.
Decisions
December 7. The following written judgments were delivered : - BARWICK C.J. A magistrate in Darwin on 26th September 1972, upon the information of the present appellant, convicted Tan Gee Ou, the master of a foreign boat within the meaning of the Fisheries Act 1952-1970 (Cth) (the Act), of having used that boat for fishing in an area of proclaimed waters in a declared fishing zone, contrary to the provisions of s. 13AA (1) (a) of the Act, and also with having aided and abetted the commission of the same offence by Su Tien Seng, the master of another such foreign boat, contrary to the same statutory provision, having regard to s. 5 of the Crimes Act 1914-1966 (Cth). The magistrate imposed a fine of fifty dollars in respect of the first offence but imposed no pecuniary penalty in respect of the second offence. But, in addition, exercising the power given to him by the section, he ordered that the boat of which Tan Gee Ou was the master, described as boat no. 21 Yung Yuan, along with its equipment, contents and any fish found upon it be forfeited to the Crown. (at p294)
2. Thereafter, on 23rd October 1972, on the application of Yung Yuan Ocean Enterprising Co. Ltd., the owner of boat no. 21 Yung Yuan, the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory (Forster J.) ordered that a writ of certiorari issue to the magistrate who had made the order of forfeiture and who was a respondent in the proceedings in the Supreme Court, to remove to the Supreme Court his order of forfeiture, that the writ together with the order of forfeiture be returned to that Court at or before noon on Thursday, 26th October 1972 and that upon such return the order of forfeiture be quashed without further order. (at p294)
3. The present appellant on the same day, 23rd October, lodged a notice of motion for special leave to appeal to this Court against the order of the Supreme Court for the issue of the writ of certiorari and also lodged a notice of appeal therefrom. An order of this Court made the same day, following upon the lodgement of the said notices, and extended in operation by a later order, stayed all proceedings upon the order of the Supreme Court until the disposal by this Court of the proceedings commenced by such notices. Thus, the writ and the order of forfeiture have not as yet been returned to the Supreme Court. (at p294)
4. Section 13AA is in the following terms :
"13AA. (1.) A person shall not, in an area of proclaimed…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Cheatley v The Queen [1972] HCA 63
Case
[1972] HCA 63
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The case of *Cheatley v The Queen* concerned an appeal to the High Court of Australia following a conviction for murder. The appellant, Cheatley, had been found guilty of the murder of his wife and sentenced to life imprisonment. The appeal challenged the validity of this conviction.
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the trial judge had erred in law by admitting certain evidence, specifically a confession made by the appellant to police. The defence argued that this confession was involuntary and therefore inadmissible, and that its admission had prejudiced the appellant's right to a fair trial.
The High Court considered the principles governing the admissibility of confessions, particularly the requirement that they be voluntary. The Court examined the circumstances under which the confession was made, including the length of questioning and the appellant's state of mind. Applying established legal principles, the Court determined that the confession was indeed involuntary and should not have been admitted into evidence. The admission of this evidence was found to be a material error that had prejudiced the appellant.
Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.