Chairperson of the Royal Commission Into the Management of Police Informants v Director of Public Prosecutions Victoria and Ors (according to the attached Schedule)

Case •

[2020] VSCA 184

•

8 July 2020

SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

COURT OF APPEAL

S EAPCI 2020 0047

CHAIRPERSON OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION INTO THE MANAGEMENT OF POLICE INFORMANTS Applicant
v
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS VICTORIA
and ORS (according to the attached Schedule) 		Respondent

---

JUDGES: BEACH, McLEISH and WEINBERG JJA
WHERE HELD: MELBOURNE
DATE OF HEARING: 23 June 2020
DATE OF ORDERS: 23 June 2020
DATE OF REASONS: 8 July 2020
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: [2020] VSCA 184

---

COURTS – Inherent jurisdiction of Supreme Court – Suppression orders – Application by Chairperson of Royal Commission into Management of Police Informants to vary suppression orders – Variation necessary for preparation of final submissions by counsel assisting, and of Commissioner’s final report – Whether Supreme Court has inherent jurisdiction to vary suppression orders made by Magistrates’ Court and County Court prior to commencement of Open Courts Act 2013 – Whether application abuse of process – Inherent supervisory jurisdiction properly invoked – Need to facilitate proper administration of justice – No abuse of process – Proceeding not oppressive – Variations granted – Open Courts Act 2013 ss 1, 3, 15, 17, 18, 47(3), 52, Magistrates’ Court Act 1989 s 126(2), County Court Act 1958 s 80(1), Constitution Act 1975, s 85.

---

APPEARANCES: Counsel Solicitors
For the Applicant

Ms P A Neskovcin QC

with Mr S Mukerjea

 Holding Redlich
For the First Respondent Ms K A O’Gorman Ms A Hogan, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions
For the Second Respondent Mr D P Holding and
Ms R Avis 		Ms A Pavleka, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (Cth)
For the Third Respondent Dr I R L Freckelton QC
with Ms M Pekevska 		Corrs Chambers Westgarth
For the Fourteenth Respondent Mr N Papas QC with
Mr B D Nibbs 		Victorian Bar Pro Bono Scheme
For the Twenty First, Thirty-Seventh to Fortieth Respondents Ms L Ristivojevic and
Ms S Seoud 		Sarah Tricarico Lawyers Pty Ltd
For the Twenty Third Respondent Mr C M Terry Chris McLennan & Co
For the Forty-Fourth Respondent Mr M H Thomas and
Ms E Clark 		Fayman Lawyers
For the Sixty-Third Respondent Ms C M Pierce Clayton Utz
For the Sixty-Fifth Respondent Ms N Mikhaiel Hunter and Braddon
For the Sixty-Sixth Respondent Ms R Ellyard Norton Rose Fulbright

BEACH JA
McLEISH JA
WEINBERG JA:

  1. The applicant (‘the Commissioner’) is the Chairperson and Commissioner of the Royal Commission into the Management of Police Informants, appointed pursuant to s 5 of the Inquiries Act 2014, and letters patent dated 13 December 2018.[1]  The circumstances in which the Royal Commission was established are set out in this Court’s decision in Chairperson of the Royal Commission into the Management of Police Informants v Chief Commissioner of Victoria Police.[2]

    [1]Which letters patent were amended on 7 February 2019.

    [2][2019] VSCA 154, [1]–[3] (‘Chairperson v Chief Commissioner’).

  1. In this proceeding,[3] the Commissioner sought the variation of 52 non-publication orders (‘the suppression orders’) made in a number of proceedings in the Supreme, County, and Magistrates’ Courts of Victoria. The variation sought was in the same terms for each of the 52 orders,[4] and was also in the same terms as the variation granted by this Court,[5] in Chairperson v Chief Commissioner, in relation to the suppression orders that were the subject of that proceeding.  The variation involved the addition of the following words at the end of each of the suppression orders:

PROVIDED THAT nothing in this order prevents the disclosure of information by a person to the Royal Commission into the management of police informants or prevents any disclosure of information by that Royal Commission, in accordance with the provisions of the Inquiries Act 2014 and the Witness Protection Act 1991.

[3]Reserved, pursuant to s 17B of the Supreme Court Act 1986, for the consideration of the Court of Appeal, by an order made by Beach JA, sitting in the Trial Division, on 9 June 2020.

[4]Initially, the Commissioner sought to vary 57 orders.  Later, however, she abandoned her application with respect to five of these orders.  The orders are identified in exhibit HRR-2 of the confidential affidavit of Howard Rapke sworn 1 May 2020.  In these reasons, we will refer (as necessary) to the orders by the numbers given to them in this exhibit.

[5]Constituted by Whelan, Beach and Weinberg JJA.

  1. There were 63 respondents to the Commissioner’s application.  They comprised eight institutional defendants (the Victorian Director of Public Prosecutions, the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (‘the CDPP’), the Chief Commissioner of Victoria Police, the Chief Examiner, the State of Victoria, the County Court of Victoria, the Magistrates’ Court of Victoria and the Australian Federal Police (‘the AFP’)) and 55 individuals who were either parties in the proceedings in which the suppression orders were made, or were the subject of one or more of those suppression orders.[6]

    [6]There were three additional individuals who were added as respondents on the application of the Chief Commissioner of Victoria Police.  They were added for the purpose of the Chief Commissioner obtaining orders in relation to them about the non-publication of their images.  They were not, however, the subject of any of the suppression orders that were the subject of the application to vary the 52 suppression orders the subject of this proceeding.

  1. The Commissioner’s application was heard by this Court on 23 June 2020.  At the conclusion of argument, we made orders granting the variation sought by the Commissioner in relation to each of the 52 suppression orders, and said that we would publish our reasons in due course.  These are those reasons.

Basis of the Commissioner’s application

  1. The Commissioner’s application in Chairperson v Chief Commissioner, for the variation of the suppression orders that were the subject of that proceeding, was made during the gathering and hearing of evidence phase of the inquiry.  The basis for the application was that the suppression orders the subject of that proceeding, prohibiting the disclosure by non-publication or otherwise of the identities of specified individuals, ‘would frustrate the efficient and effective conduct of the inquiry and the ability to hold parts of the inquiry in public’.[7]

    [7]Chairperson v Chief Commissioner [2019] VSCA 154, [21], [116].

  1. The Royal Commission is now nearing the end of its inquiry, and is preparing for the exchange and receipt of final submissions between counsel assisting and relevant parties, and the publication of its final report.  In the affidavit initially filed in support of the Commissioner’s application, one of the solicitors assisting the Royal Commission described the reasons for the application in the following terms:

The suppression orders pose two potential difficulties for the Commission in relation to the process for the exchange of submissions and disclosure of the Commission’s final report.

The first difficulty is that it is likely that the submissions (both those of counsel assisting and any responsive submissions) will contain information which is presently the subject of the suppression orders.  This raises the prospect that the disclosure of such information by the Commission in counsel assisting’s final submissions, and to the Commission in responsive submissions, will place the Commission and the responding parties in breach of the suppression orders unless the orders are varied. 

…

The second way in which the suppression orders pose a difficulty for the Commission is in relation to the possible publication of final submissions and the Commission’s final report on the Commission’s website.  Because both the submissions and the final report will contain information which is the subject of the suppression orders … publication of these documents on the Commission’s website would contravene one or more of the suppression orders unless those orders are varied.

Throughout the Commission’s inquiry, it has been the Commissioner’s desire to conduct the inquiry as openly and transparently as the circumstances allow.  The Commission considers that this is central to building public confidence in its work.  There has been substantial publicity of the Commission’s proceedings over the past 12 months and to date the Commission has made extensive material about its inquiry available to the public via its website, including copies of witness statements, transcripts of evidence, and exhibits.  Most of the Commission’s hearings have occurred in public and have been live-streamed via the Commission’s website.  In some cases where the Commission has held hearings in private, the Commissioner has still permitted accredited media to be present in order to observe the proceedings and, to the extent permissible, report on them. 

It is therefore the Commissioner’s desire, to the fullest extent possible, to receive final submissions and release the Commission’s final report in a manner which remains transparent and accessible to the general public, having regard to the public interest in the matters which are the subject of the Commission’s inquiry and their importance to Victoria’s criminal justice system.  The Commissioner views publication of the final submissions, and particularly publication of the Commission’s final report, on the Commission’s website as an effective means by which to achieve this outcome.

For these reasons, the Commissioner seeks a variation of the suppression orders so that the Commissioner may consider for herself what parts of the information contained in submissions and in the Commission’s final report should and should not be disclosed or published and to whom.

  1. The evidence was that in the event that the Commissioner obtained the variation she sought, it was her intention to invite submissions from the respondents in this proceeding regarding the extent to which publication and/or disclosure by the Commission, of information which is the subject of the suppression orders, should be permitted and, in the course of doing so, to consider (based on the then prevailing facts and circumstances) whether it is necessary or appropriate for the Commissioner to make her own non-publication orders pursuant to s 26 of the Inquiries Act or s 10A of the Witness Protection Act 1991.  In the affidavit referred to above, the solicitor deposed:

When considering whether it is necessary or appropriate to make her own non-publication orders, the Commissioner will be particularly cognisant of issues such as personal safety and prejudice to the administration of justice.  However, the Commissioner is also mindful that many of the orders were made years ago and circumstances may have changed.  The Commissioner will be required to consider afresh, in the context of her inquiry, whether the information the subject of these orders still needs to be suppressed.  For example, a suppression order made to avoid prejudicing the administration of justice in another proceeding then pending at the time the order was made, but no longer pending, may no longer be required. 

Further, all the suppression orders were made before the circumstances which led to the establishment of the Commission and the importance of fully exploring and exposing them were publicly known.

  1. The Commissioner’s case was that it is necessary for the variation to be made so that the Commission can, in a timely manner, discharge its obligations to afford relevant parties procedural fairness; have information presently the subject of the suppression orders disclosed to it in responsive submissions made by those parties; and publish information presently the subject of the suppression orders, ‘in so far as it is necessary or appropriate’ — but subject to her first considering the necessity or appropriateness of making her own orders under s 26 of the Inquiries Act or pursuant to s 10A of the Witness Protection Act. 

Respondents’ contentions and submissions

  1. Many of the respondents did not file or make submissions in opposition to the Commissioner’s application.  Some of these parties went further and said that they did not oppose that application.  Five of the 63 respondents, however, were opposed to the application.  Those parties, and the extent and bases of their opposition, were as follows.

The 2nd respondent (CDPP)

  1. The CDPP opposed the proposed variation of a number (but not all) of the suppression orders.  She submitted that the effect of the variation sought by the Commissioner was to remove the decision about publication from the supervision of the Court to the Commissioner.  While the Commissioner’s submissions outlined a justification for the global variation sought, those submissions failed adequately to address considerations relevant to the individual orders.  Each order, it was submitted, needed to be considered on its own facts and circumstances. 

  1. In her initial written submission, the CDPP also submitted that the Commissioner’s submissions ‘[did] not address Commonwealth legislation’.  Her submission, however, did not identify the relevant Commonwealth legislation, or indicate how that legislation might impact upon the resolution of the present proceeding.  In any event, this point was later abandoned by the CDPP after the Commissioner had abandoned her application to vary five of the original 57 orders referred to in the Commissioner’s originating motion.

  1. In her written argument, the CDPP made short submissions in relation to specific suppression orders that she opposed being varied in the way sought by the Commissioner.[8]  In those submissions, the CDPP contended, in respect of a number of the suppression orders, that the Commissioner had failed to demonstrate a sufficient need to vary the order.  Alternatively, the CDPP submitted that there was no evidence that the necessity for the order had altered or diminished following the making of it.  The CDPP also opposed the variation of two particular orders in respect of which, it was submitted, there was no evidence that the relevant respondent had received notice of the Commissioner’s application (despite service having been effected).[9]

The 14th respondent

[8]Orders 1, 4, 8, 15, 19, 21, 47 and 51.

[9]Orders 47 and 51.

  1. The 14th respondent was represented on the hearing of the application by pro bono counsel.  Counsel informed the Court that their client opposed the orders sought by the Commissioner, but that they were not in a position to advance any submissions on the substantive issues.  In opposing the orders sought by the Commissioner, the 14th respondent relied upon the submissions made in opposition by the CDPP and the 63rd respondent (the AFP).

The 27th respondent

  1. Only one of the suppression orders sought to be varied affects the 27th respondent.  The particular order was made in the County Court more than 15 years ago.  In a letter from his solicitors to the solicitors assisting the Royal Commission, the 27th respondent expressed his opposition to the variation of this suppression order.  While it was acknowledged that the suppression order was made primarily to avoid prejudicing trials that were then pending, it was submitted that it was also made in order to protect the personal safety of the 27th respondent.  The 27th respondent contended that while the trials that were sought to be protected by the order may long ago have concluded, the concern for his personal safety if relevant material is published remains.

  1. The 27th respondent did not appear on the hearing of the application.  In his solicitors’ letter, however, he asserted that the Supreme Court did not have power or jurisdiction to vary a suppression order made by the County Court.  The 27th respondent contended, in the alternative, that if the Supreme Court did have such power and jurisdiction, the variation should nonetheless not be made given that the Commissioner had not sought to have the County Court vary the order that it had made.

The 44th respondent

  1. A number of the suppression orders that were sought to be varied affect the 44th respondent.  Some of those orders were made in the Magistrates’ Court and others were made in the County Court.[10]

    [10]Of the orders affecting the 44th respondent, orders 27, 29, 39 and 53 were made in the County Court, and orders 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 42 and 43 were made in the Magistrates’ Court.

  1. In support of the 44th respondent’s argument that those orders should not be varied, reliance was placed upon three confidential affidavits sworn by his solicitor.  In the first of these affidavits, the solicitor deposed to the 44th respondent’s concerns for himself and his family should the relevant orders be varied, and should details about him be published on the Commission’s website, or in the Commissioner’s final report.

  1. In his written submission filed in opposition to the Commissioner’s application, the 44th respondent contended that the Supreme Court did not have either the jurisdiction or power to vary the orders made in the Magistrates’ Court or County Court. He submitted, in the alternative, that if the Supreme Court did have jurisdiction or power to vary those orders, then the very existence of the statutory power of review, under s 15 of the Open Courts Act 2013 (of which the Commissioner has not availed herself) provided a discretionary basis for refusing to hear the Commissioner’s application.

  1. In the second and third confidential affidavits relied upon by the 44th respondent, his solicitor deposed to the circumstances of an application for a variation of one of the suppression orders,[11] made by the Commissioner in the County Court in 2019, after this Court’s decision in Chairperson v Chief Commissioner had been delivered.  The circumstances of that application, and its resolution, were said to render the current application by the Commissioner an abuse of process.  Ultimately, however, in oral argument that submission appeared to reduce to the proposition that this Court should reject the Commissioner’s application in circumstances where the variation of the particular order affecting the 44th respondent (order 29) had already been sought and obtained in the County Court on a basis that had been agreed between the parties.  It was submitted that either the County Court judge who varied the order, or the County Court, should now have the opportunity to review the order made in 2019 in light of the circumstances that then pertained, and those that now pertain.

    [11]Order number 29 (made in the County Court on 8 February 2007).

The 63rd respondent (The AFP)

  1. In opposing the Commissioner’s application, the 63rd respondent relied upon a confidential affidavit of an Acting Commander in the AFP.  That affidavit contained detailed evidence about the circumstances of the 14th respondent and gave specific reasons for opposing the Commissioner’s application with regard to the suppression orders that affected that respondent.

  1. In its submissions, the AFP referred to and supported the CDPP’s submissions that:

·each suppression order should be considered on its own merits, with the ‘necessity of the duration of the order’ being dependent upon the circumstances of each case;

·‘an order made for the protection of an identity may have been made in circumstances where the risk remains such that, even after a significant number of years, the order remains as necessary today as at the time it was granted’;  and

·‘the Courts should maintain all future control over any issues of publication involving the protection of an identity pursuant to their earlier suppression orders, rather than granting the Commissioner discretion to do so effectively unrestricted and unsupervised by the Courts’.

  1. In addition, the AFP relied upon an affidavit, sworn by one of its solicitors, which exhibited correspondence passing between the solicitors for the AFP and those assisting the Royal Commission.  In that correspondence, the solicitors for the AFP proposed a different variation of the suppression orders in which the AFP had an interest.  The variation proposed involved limiting the potential disclosure of information to a number of specified parties.  In relation to one group of individuals to whom disclosure might be made, the AFP were prepared to agree to the possibility of disclosure, but only with the prior consent of both the AFP and the CDPP.  It was submitted that the variation proposed by the AFP met each of the reasons advanced by the Commissioner in support of her application for a variation of wider effect and that the Commissioner’s application for a variation in the terms she sought was therefore not necessary.

  1. The AFP also observed that, notwithstanding that orders providing for the service of material on all of the individual respondents had been complied with, there remained a possibility that one or more of the individual respondents may not have received notice of the Commissioner’s application.  In argument, we were told that relevant materials sent to the last known address of four of the respondents had been returned to sender.  The issue then became whether this Court was prepared to proceed on the basis that the interests of those particular respondents were adequately protected having regard to the submissions made by the other respondents who opposed the Commissioner’s application.

The jurisdiction issue

  1. The jurisdiction issue is confined to that part of the Commissioner’s application which seeks the variation of suppression orders that were made in the Magistrates’ Court and the County Court.  For reasons that follow, there is no issue as to the jurisdiction of this Court to vary suppression orders which were made in the Trial Division of the Supreme Court.  That is so, whether those orders were made before, or after, the Open Courts Act came into effect on 1 December 2013.

Commissioner’s submissions

  1. The Commissioner accepted that there is no right of appeal, or review, by the Supreme Court under the Open Courts Act in relation to suppression orders made by the Magistrates’ Court or County Court.  That concession was plainly correct.

  1. The Open Courts Act created an entirely new regime for the making of suppression orders in all Victorian courts. It is noteworthy that ss 1 and 3 specifically recognise the existence of suppression orders made pursuant to the ‘exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the Supreme Court’.

  1. The term ‘suppression order’ is given a technical definition in s 3 as including, among other things, what is termed ‘a proceeding suppression order’. That expression, which is both new, and unique to the Act, is defined as ‘an order made under section 17.’

  1. Section 17 provides that a court or tribunal may make a ‘proceeding suppression order’ on one or more of the grounds specified in s 18. Section 18(1)(a) provides that such an order can be made if it is necessary to prevent a real and substantial risk of prejudice to the administration of justice that cannot otherwise be prevented by reasonably available means. Section 18(1)(c) provides that orders of this kind can be made if it is necessary to protect the safety of any person. Of course, these provisions operate only prospectively. They do not convert suppression orders that happened to have been made by the Magistrates’ Court or County Court, prior to December 2013 into ‘proceeding suppression orders’, under s 17.

  1. Section 15(1) makes provision for the review of suppression orders, including ‘proceeding suppression orders’, as defined under the Act. However, as regards suppression orders, the subsection provides only that the ‘court or tribunal that made a suppression order may review the order.’ It follows that, in relation to orders made by inferior courts, the Supreme Court is not given the power under s 15 to review those orders.

  1. The orders sought to be varied by the Commissioner in this proceeding were all made prior to 2013. Those made by the Magistrates’ Court were made pursuant to s 126(2) of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1989. The orders made by the County Court were made pursuant to s 80(1) of the County Court Act 1958.  Those provisions were repealed by the Open Courts Act when it came into force.  However, savings provisions were enacted, as would be expected.[12]

    [12]See cl 52 of sch 8 of the Magistrates’ Court Act and s 98 of the County Court Act for the savings provisions.

  1. Surprisingly, neither the Magistrates’ Court Act, nor the County Court Act, specifically enabled suppression orders made under those Acts to be varied or revoked.  To the extent that such orders were, prior to 2013, so varied or revoked, the source of the power to do so appears to have been nothing more than an implication from the statutory conferral of the power to make the suppression order in the first place.

  1. It appears that any suppression order made by either the Magistrates’ Court or the County Court, prior to December 2013, cannot now be the subject of review under s 15(1) of the Open Courts Act by either of those courts.  That is simply because such pre-2013 suppression orders are not ‘proceeding suppression orders’, as defined.  To the extent that such orders can still be varied by the courts that made them, the identification of the source of the power to do so is likely to be complex.  However, it seems to rely upon a statutory implication that once existed and is not itself the subject of any savings provision.

  1. The Commissioner accepted that she does not, by this application, seek to have this Court make any finding of error on the part of the magistrate or judge who made the suppression order in question.  She does not seek relief in the form of certiorari, mandamus, or injunction.  What she desires is merely a limited variation of those pre-2013 suppression orders, and one that will only operate prospectively.

  1. The Commissioner submitted that the power of the Supreme Court to vary or revoke a suppression order made by an inferior court, otherwise than by appeal or judicial review, is ‘derived from the Supreme Court’s inherent supervisory jurisdiction for the administration of justice in Victoria, including the jurisdiction recognised by s 85 of the Constitution Act 1975’.  As the Commissioner submitted:

The Supreme Court is the superior court in Victoria with unlimited jurisdiction in all cases whatsoever.  That jurisdiction includes such powers and authorities that the Supreme Court had prior to the commencement of the Supreme Court Act 1986.  Those powers and authorities include those that were enjoyed by superior courts in England (namely, the Courts of Kings Bench, Common Pleas, Exchequer and Chancery) before the commencement of the Judicature Statute 1874 (UK).

The jurisdiction of the superior courts of England included the jurisdiction for the control and superintendence of all inferior courts as the ‘guardian and protector of public justice throughout the kingdom’.  The Supreme Court’s equivalent jurisdiction is, likewise, as ‘guardian of the general administration of justice in Victoria’.  The jurisdiction is inherent and arises from the Supreme Court’s general responsibility as a superior court for the administration of justice in this jurisdiction.  It has been said that nothing shall be intended to be out of the jurisdiction of a superior court but that which specifically appears to be so.[13]

[13]In support of these submissions as to jurisdiction and power, the Commissioner relied upon a number of authorities, including BHP Ltd v Dagi [1996] 2 VR 117, 153–5 (‘Dagi’) and authorities cited therein;  Grassby v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 1, 16 (‘Grassby’);  DMW v CGW (1982) 151 CLR 491, 509; Reid v Howard (1995) 184 CLR 1, 16–17 (‘Reid’);  Slaveski v State of Victoria [2009] VSCA 6, [50] (‘Slaveski’);  Jackson v Sterling Industries Ltd (1987) 162 CLR 612, 639; Hamilton v Oades (1989) 166 CLR 486, 502; and Jago v District Court (NSW) (1989) 168 CLR 23, 25–6 (Mason CJ), 74 (Gaudron J).

  1. The Commissioner submitted that the unlimited jurisdiction of the Supreme Court forms the basis of that Court’s primary authority to adjudicate on criminal trials.  She further submitted that this unlimited jurisdiction also permits the Supreme Court to both ‘prevent’ and ‘punish summarily’, as a contempt, any interference with the due course of justice in proceedings not only before the Supreme Court, but also before any inferior court in this State.[14]  She submitted that such statutory powers as the Magistrates’ Court and the County Court now have to punish for contempt (which, it is important to note, do not include statutory powers to punish for sub judice contempt) do not limit, either expressly or impliedly,[15] the Supreme Court’s inherent supervisory jurisdiction to prevent and punish as contempts any interference with the administration of justice in the lower courts.

    [14]In support of these submissions, the Commissioner relied upon Truong v The Queen (2004) 223 CLR 122, 180 [168]; John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd v McRae (1955) 93 CLR 351, 359–365; Grassby (1989) 168 CLR 1, 16–17; Dagi [1996] 2 VR 117, 125 (Winneke P), 137 (Brooking JA), 154–7 (Tadgell JA).

    [15]See s 85(5) of the Constitution Act  and Dagi [1996] 2 VR 117, 149 (Brooking JA).

  1. The Commissioner further submitted that the Supreme Court has always had an inherent supervisory jurisdiction to vary or revoke suppression orders made by inferior courts.  Further, at least one mechanism available to the Supreme Court to prevent an interference with the administration of justice anywhere in this State would be to make a non-publication order, in the inherent jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.  This would be in the nature of a quia timet injunction to restrain a threatened contempt.  The Supreme Court having such a power, it should be inferred that it must also have the power, in its inherent, supervisory jurisdiction, to call up non-publication orders made by inferior courts, and to vary or revoke those orders, provided they are no longer necessary to secure the administration of justice.

  1. While the Commissioner acknowledged that there was no appellate authority directly in point, she referred to an order made by Whelan J (as his Honour then was) in April 2011 where he revoked a suite of non-publication orders made not just in the Supreme Court, but also in the Magistrates’ Court and the County Court.  His Honour did so following the finalisation of all criminal proceedings involving a particular offender.

  1. Additionally, the Commissioner contended that there was support for her primary submission as to jurisdiction in Fairfax Digital Australia & New Zealand Pty Ltd v Ibrahim.[16]  There, Bathurst CJ

appeared to allude to (without elaboration) the existence of a power in the inherent, supervisory jurisdiction of a superior court to hear an ‘appeal’ from a non-publication order made by another court otherwise than via a statutory right of appeal or judicial review.

[16](2012) 83 NSWLR 52 (‘Ibrahim’).

44th respondent’s submissions

  1. In reliance upon various passages in several authorities,[17] the 44th respondent submitted that the Supreme Court’s so-called ‘unlimited jurisdiction’ was not unlimited at all, but must relate to the proper exercise of judicial power (and not, for example, the exercise of some administrative function).  It was submitted that in order for an exercise of power to be within the Court’s inherent, or inherent supervisory jurisdiction, that exercise must be ‘necessary’ for the administration of justice.  It was submitted that the exercise of power sought by the Commissioner was ‘simply not necessary for the administration of justice’.

    [17]For example, Kirby J’s judgment in Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales (2006) 226 CLR 256, 296 [125] (‘Batistatos’);  Slaveski [2009] VSCA 6, [52]; and Reid (1995) 184 CLR 1, 16–17.

  1. As it was put in the 44th respondent’s written submission:

There is available to the [Commissioner], in s 15 of the Open Courts Act, a right to review of the various suppression orders made by the inferior courts which made those orders.  There is a further well established right to seek judicial review in the Supreme Court of the decision of the inferior court.  The [Commissioner] has simply chosen, for reasons known to [herself], not to avail [herself] of the opportunity to make such an application though aware of the availability of that procedure and foreshadowing that [she] may indeed make such an application.

  1. Plainly, the proposition stated in the first sentence of the passage above is misconceived. As previously indicated, there appears to be no power whatsoever under s 15 of the Open Courts Act for either the Magistrates’ Court, or the County Court, to review their own pre-2013 suppression orders.

  1. Next, the 44th respondent submitted that not only was there no jurisdiction on the part of this Court to make the orders but, even assuming that such jurisdiction did exist, it would be wrong of this Court to do so.  That is because this would be ‘inimical to justice’.  It would, amongst other things, ‘prevent the exercise of statutory authority by the County and Magistrates’ Courts given to those courts by the Open Courts Act’.  Once again, that particular submission is misconceived.  No such statutory authority is vested in either the Magistrates’ Court, or the County Court, in relation to pre-2013 suppression orders.

  1. Additionally, the 44th respondent noted the existence of a number of cases in the Supreme Court that have involved the judicial review of non-publication orders made by inferior courts.  The 44th respondent observed that ‘in each and every case, the court considered itself constrained by the principles of judicial review’.  Further, in none of those cases was it in any way suggested that the Supreme Court had power to consider the question of whether or not a suppression order should be made or varied ‘on the merits’, by virtue of the Court’s inherent jurisdiction.[18]

    [18]See, for example, DPP (Cth) v Magistrates’ Court of Victoria [2011] VSC 593, [10] and The Age Co Ltdv Magistrates’ Court of Victoria [2004] VSC 10, [9].

  1. In relation to the Commissioner’s reliance upon Ibrahim, the 44th respondent submitted that, contrary to the Commissioner’s submissions, Bathurst CJ was referring in that case to an appeal created by statute, and that there was no basis for concluding that his Honour was referring to some right of appeal existing in the inherent jurisdiction of the New South Wales Supreme Court.

  1. As to the Commissioner’s submission based upon the Supreme Court’s power to punish sub judice contempts in relation to matters before inferior courts, the 44th respondent submitted:

Presently, courts of inferior jurisdiction are empowered by statute to make suppression orders and there exists a statutory scheme for the review of those orders by the inferior courts.  Further still, it is well established that the making of such orders, and orders on review, are subject to the supervision of the Supreme Court by way of prerogative writ.  There is simply no necessity for the extension of power proposed by the [Commissioner]. 

Further, the [Commissioner] fails to point to any basis for what would be, if proceeding by extension of the power to punish for contempt, a power to be exercised with great caution.  Indeed, it would appear that the only matter the [Commissioner] relies upon is [her] own convenience.

  1. The 44th respondent submitted, in the alternative, that the existence of the statutory power under s 15 of the Open Courts Act to review extant suppression orders by the inferior courts by which those orders were made meant that the present application was premature.  This was said to constitute a discretionary basis upon which the Supreme Court should refuse to entertain this application.

  1. Finally (so far as the 44th respondent is concerned), in relation to order 29, reference was made to the doctrine of abuse of process as a separate basis for contending that this Court should not entertain the Commissioner’s application.  As we have already observed, however, that submission ultimately reduced to the proposition that the County Court judge who, in 2019, varied the suppression order on the application of the Commissioner was the appropriate judicial officer to consider the present application, and not this Court.

Inherent jurisdiction generally

  1. To the extent that there is an objection to the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the Commissioner’s application, because its inherent supervisory jurisdiction does not extend to the making of orders varying or revoking earlier suppression orders made by inferior courts, it need first be said that, as a general proposition, the existence of a broad, inherent, supervisory jurisdiction cannot be in doubt.

  1. The High Court has said that ‘inherent jurisdiction’ is the power which a court has simply because it is a court of a particular description.[19]  Inherent jurisdiction, self-evidently, is not derived by implication from any statutory provisions.  It extends to courts of ‘unlimited jurisdiction’, of which, the Supreme Court of this State is clearly one such body.

    [19]R v Forbes (1972) 127 CLR 1, 7 (Menzies J).

  1. There is a considerable body of scholarly writing on the subject of the ‘inherent jurisdiction’ as that concept applies, in particular, to the Supreme Courts of the States.[20]  Notwithstanding the somewhat amorphous and ubiquitous nature of an inherent jurisdiction, its existence is well recognised, and it is often invoked as the justification for a number of essential functions performed by superior courts.[21]

    [20]See, for example, Keith Mason, ‘The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court’ (1983) 57 The Australian Law Journal 449;  and Wendy Lacey, ‘Inherent Jurisdiction, Judicial Power and the Implied Guarantees Under Chapter III of the Constitution’ (2003) 31(1) Federal Law Review 57, 63–7.  For the position in England and an historical evaluation of this doctrine, see I H Jacob, ‘The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court’ (1970) 23(1) Current Legal Problems 23.

    [21]In that regard, we note that the Federal Court and the Family Court, although both superior courts, are not regarded as having any inherent jurisdiction.  Rather, they are viewed as having implied statutory powers which, in broad terms, equate in most instances, to the inherent jurisdiction of State Supreme Courts.

  1. The powers falling within the scope of a court’s inherent jurisdiction are ancillary or incidental to the court’s general jurisdiction, and are, of course, procedural in nature.  According to one commentator, they have traditionally included the development of rules of court and practice directions; the power to correct, vary, or extend orders to prevent injustice; the power to order that proceedings be heard in camera; and, of particular importance so far as this application is concerned, the power to prohibit the publication of part of proceedings.[22]

    [22]Lacey, ‘Inherent Jurisdiction, Judicial Power and the Implied Guarantees Under Chapter III of the Constitution’, 66.  They have traditionally also included the power to dismiss for want of prosecution; the power to punish for contempt; the power to stay execution of a judgment; the grant of what used to be called Anton Piller Orders and Mareva Injunctions; and the power to stay proceedings as an abuse of process, or under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

Analysis

  1. Notwithstanding the careful and detailed submissions made on behalf of the 44th respondent, we consider that there is no doubt as to the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to vary or revoke non-publication (suppression) orders made in the Magistrates’ Court or the County Court, and whether made before 2013, or subsequently.

  1. The foundation for this Court’s jurisdiction is to be found in s 85 of the Constitution Act. In terms, that section defines the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction as being ‘in all cases’, ‘in or in relation to Victoria’ and as being ‘unlimited’.  As has been observed before, this is a very wide definition of jurisdiction.[23]  Moreover, it is well settled that laws conferring jurisdiction are to be construed broadly, while laws excluding jurisdiction are to be construed narrowly.[24]

    [23]Mark Leeming, Authority to Decide: The Law of Jurisdiction in Australia, (Federation Press, 2nd ed, 2020) 137.

    [24]Ibid 134.

  1. In our view, there is nothing in the authorities relied upon by the 27th and 44th respondents which tells against this Court having jurisdiction to vary or revoke suppression orders made in the Magistrates’ Court or the County Court, and whether made before, or since, 2013.

  1. In particular, Slaveski, upon which some reliance was placed, was a very different case from the present.  In Slaveski, the applicant sought to persuade the Court that it had jurisdiction to engage in an administrative function in either issuing a licence, or compelling the Chief Commissioner to do so, at least in the circumstances of that case. In the present case, there can be no doubt that what is sought by the Commissioner is an exercise of judicial power, and within s 85 of the Constitution Act.

  1. Further, in our view there is force in the Commissioner’s submissions relating to the Supreme Court’s power to punish and prevent contempts of inferior courts that are within its purview.  The Supreme Court, having jurisdiction to make a non-publication or suppression order in relation to proceedings in an inferior court in this State (so as to prevent a contempt of that inferior court), plainly has the power to amend such an order so as to impose a greater restriction on the publication of material that needs protection.  Having the power to amend an order to make it more restrictive, it must follow that the Court also has power to make such an order less restrictive.  The Supreme Court’s jurisdiction could not sensibly be held to depend upon whether any order that it made should be regarded as less, rather than more restrictive.

  1. In relation to the 44th respondent’s reliance upon decisions in the Trial Division of this Court[25] wherein the Court has, in reviewing the decision of an inferior court, confined its consideration of the matter by reference to well-settled principles of judicial review, the short point is that those cases involved proceedings brought by way of judicial review of orders made by inferior courts, and nothing more.  For a court to confine itself to the principles of judicial review in a proceeding which is brought by way of judicial review (and nothing more) says little, if anything, about whether that court might have other, or additional, jurisdiction in relation to the order if an appropriate proceeding were to be instituted.

    [25]Such as TheAge Co Limited v Magistrates’ Court of Victoria [2004] VSC 10 and DPP (Cth) v Magistrates’ Court of Victoria [2011] VSC 593.

  1. Finally, the jurisdiction sought to be invoked by the Commissioner in this case is one which this Court has exercised for many years — one example being the orders made by Whelan J, upon which the Commissioner properly relied.  That jurisdiction (to revoke suppression orders made by inferior courts within this State) is not dependent upon the Supreme Court having itself been seized of some underlying criminal or other proceeding.

  1. It follows that the 44th respondent’s submissions that the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to make the orders sought by the Commissioner in relation to the suppression orders made in the Magistrates’ Court and County Court had to be rejected.

  1. For completeness, we would, however, reject the Commissioner’s submission that the judgment of Bathurst CJ in Ibrahim provides assistance in the resolution of the jurisdictional issue.  We doubt that his Honour should be understood as endorsing the notion of some ‘appeal’ that does not have a statutory basis.  Perhaps more importantly, as the Commissioner pointed out in her written submission, the current application is in no sense an ‘appeal’ from the orders made in the Magistrates’ Court or the County Court.  Thus, in our view, Ibrahim does not assist in the resolution of the current issues between the parties.

Resolution of the application

  1. In Chairperson v Chief Commissioner, this Court held that, in an application to revoke or vary a suppression order, the party seeking to preserve the existing order needs to persuade the court that the order remains necessary for one of the reasons now provided for in s 18 of the Open Courts Act.[26]  The Court also said that it recognised (again) that there is a high public interest in permitting the Royal Commission to conduct a detailed and thorough analysis of all of the matters underlying the conduct in which Ms Gobbo and Victoria Police are alleged to have engaged.[27]

    [26]Chairperson v Chief Commissioner [2019] VSCA 154, [106]–[107].

    [27]Ibid [115].

  1. Similarly, at the conclusion of argument, we were of the view that submissions between counsel assisting and relevant parties appearing before the Commission should be as responsive and open as reasonably practicable, but consistently with the operation of the provisions of the Witness Protection Act, the protection of the safety of relevant persons, and the maintenance and support of the proper administration of justice.[28]  The same considerations apply with respect to the Commissioner’s final report.

    [28]Cf s 18(1)(a) and (c) of the Open Courts Act.

  1. Accordingly, we concluded that it was appropriate to make the variations to the orders that were sought by the Commissioner to facilitate these objectives.  The Commissioner, after hearing submissions from appropriately interested parties, will then be able to determine for herself, in accordance with the provisions of the Inquiries Act, whether any and, if so, what non-publication (suppression) orders are necessary.  As this Court observed in Chairperson v Chief Commissioner,[29] under the provisions of the Inquiries Act and the Witness Protection Act, the Commissioner has both the power, and the responsibility, to protect the position of persons to whom the provisions of the Witness Protection Act apply.

    [29][2019] VSCA 154, [117].

  1. There was, in our view, no substance in the submissions of the 2nd and 63rd respondents that the variations sought by the Commissioner involved the removal of the decision about publication from the supervision of the Court to the Commissioner.  Any decision made by the Commissioner remains under the supervision of the Court, in the sense that an affected person may take judicial review proceedings in relation to any decision with which that person might be dissatisfied.  In oral argument, senior counsel for the Commissioner made it clear that any party who wished to review a decision by the Commissioner about issues of non-publication would be given a full 14 days to apply to the Court before the Commissioner acted upon such decision.

  1. We accept that, in any disputed case, before there is any actual publication of material currently suppressed, the individual order and the circumstances surrounding it would need to be examined.  It is not, however, necessary for this Court to examine individually each of the many orders the subject of this proceeding and the particular circumstances relating to each order before making the variation sought by the Commissioner.  In our view, that is a task best suited to the Commissioner, to be performed by her having regard to all the circumstances under which the Royal Commission is being conducted, and in compliance with the relevant statutory provisions to which we have referred.[30]

    [30]Open Courts Act, Witness Protection Act and Inquiries Act.

  1. To the extent that the 2nd and 63rd respondents submitted that, in respect of particular orders, the Commissioner’s application should be rejected because she had failed to demonstrate a sufficient need to vary the order or, alternatively, that there was no evidence that the need for the order had diminished following its making, that submission must be rejected. Each of the orders the subject of this proceeding should only remain in force for as long as it is necessary to serve one of the objectives referred to in s 18(1) of the Open Courts Act.

  1. As this Court said in Chairperson v Chief Commissioner,[31] once an application is made for the review of suppression orders then, unless the Court is satisfied that the orders are necessary for one of those purposes, the order should be revoked or, at least, varied so as to reflect such necessity as is established at the time of the review.

    [31][2019] VSCA 154, [106]–[107].

  1. In relation to such evidence as was filed and relied upon to support the contention that a particular party’s safety was still at risk and that it therefore remained necessary that that party’s identity continue to be suppressed (see, for example, the evidence in the confidential affidavit sworn by the Acting Commander), that evidence can (and no doubt would) be considered by the Commissioner, along with all of the relevant evidence of current circumstances, when she comes to consider what, if any, orders should be made in accordance with s 26 of the Inquiries Act.

  1. As to the AFP’s submission that the more limited form of variation proposed by their solicitors to the solicitors assisting the Royal Commission would serve the Commissioner’s purposes, and that the wider variation sought by the Commissioner was thus not necessary, the following points may be made:

(1)The variation proposed by the AFP contained elements requiring the consent of the AFP and the CDPP.  Such a variation would have had the capacity to result in further disputation between the parties, necessitating further hearings in this Court.

(2)While suppression orders should be as narrow as necessary to achieve their purposes, when considering a variation which eases or relaxes a suppression order, it is not to the point to say that a narrower variation is all that is necessary.  It is the non-publication order itself which should be no wider in its operation than necessary.

(3)As this Court said in Chairperson v Chief Commissioner,[32] the fact that the Commissioner has ample power to protect information that needs to be protected leads to the conclusion that it is not necessary for orders of this Court to impose any additional restrictions or prohibitions.

[32][2019] VSCA 154, [123].

  1. We turn now to that part of the 44th respondent’s submissions that invoked the doctrine of abuse of process.  In our view, there was nothing in that argument.  Non-publication orders are, by their very nature, interlocutory.  They should only ever remain in force for so long as they are needed to serve a relevant purpose (in this case either the protection from harm of an individual, or to prevent a risk of prejudice to the proper administration of justice).

  1. In his written submissions, the 44th respondent asserted that the Commissioner had engaged in an abuse of process in seeking a variation of order 29, in the County Court, on a particular basis and then seeking the present variation in this Court.  The 44th respondent made complaint that the Commissioner sought to vary the same order in this Court, without providing any explanation as to why she did not seek the present variation in the County Court.[33]  The 44th respondent asserted that by the institution of the present application, the Commissioner denied the original decision-maker the opportunity to consider the proposed variation and created a duplication of proceedings.  More specifically, it was submitted that by the institution of the present application, the Commissioner created unfairness to the 44th respondent ‘in seeking orders which would undermine protections in place at the time [the County Court] varied the order and upon which [the 44th respondent] relied’.

    [33]The fact that there may be real uncertainty as to whether the County Court actually has jurisdiction to vary pre-2013 suppression orders, except pursuant to an ill-defined implied statutory power to do so, based upon an equally ill-defined implied savings provision, constitutes a powerful rejoinder to this abuse of process argument.  The Commissioner is under the most severe of time constraints in fulfilling her duties and was entirely justified, in our view, in coming to this Court in order to bring about the variation to the orders that she sought.

  1. To the extent that the 44th respondent maintained these submissions in oral argument, we should say for the sake of completeness that we do not see the institution of the present proceeding in this Court as having the effect contended for in the 44th respondent’s written submissions. The orders sought by the Commissioner in the present proceeding merely facilitate the appropriate performance of the Commissioner’s duties, including the making of any necessary non-publication orders under s 26 of the Inquiries Act.  Nothing in the Commissioner’s application suggests that this Court’s procedures have been invoked for an illegitimate or collateral purpose or that the application is unjustifiably oppressive to the 44th respondent.  Nor can it be suggested that the use of this Court’s procedures would, somehow, bring the administration of justice into disrepute.[34]

    [34]See generally, Rogers v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 251, 286; Batistatos (2006) 226 CLR 256, 264 [6], 267 [15].

  1. We accept that, with respect to the order varied in the County Court in 2019,[35] it is possible that the Commissioner might have gone to the County Court to seek the variation she now seeks in this proceeding.  In our view, however, there was no semblance of abuse of process in coming to this Court, having regard to the present circumstances.  Properly analysed, the issue raised by the 44th respondent was one of discretion — that is, whether this Court should refuse the Commissioner’s application because it could, theoretically, have been made to the court in which the original order was made.

    [35]Order 29.

  1. It remains to deal with the submission made by the 44th respondent that, as a matter of discretion, the Commissioner’s application should have been refused in relation to each of the orders made in the Magistrates’ Court and County Court because the Commissioner had not made applications that possibly could have been made to those courts.

  1. In an ordinary case involving a single suppression order (or perhaps involving multiple suppression orders in the one proceeding), one would not expect an application for a variation of that order to be made in a court different from the original court.[36]  In such circumstances, an appropriate exercise of discretion may involve the refusal of the application on the basis that there is no good reason why the application should not be made to the court in which the order was made.  That, however, was not this case.

    [36]There is, as has been seen, a particular problem with pre-2013 suppression orders and how such orders can be varied or revoked.

  1. The prospect of multiple applications in different courts in relation to the subject matter of this proceeding is not one that should be treated lightly. The undesirability of multiple different outcomes in respect of the suppression orders is obvious. Moreover, s 29 of the Supreme Court Act 1986 requires this Court to

exercise its jurisdiction in every proceeding before it as to secure that, as far as possible, all matters in dispute between the parties are completely and finally determined, and all multiplicity of proceedings concerning any of those matters is avoided.

  1. In the circumstances, we were not persuaded that there was any discretionary basis upon which this Court should refuse to hear and determine the Commissioner’s application with respect to all of the suppression orders she sought to have varied.

  1. Finally, in considering the Commissioner’s application, we did not regard the fact that material served on four of the respondents at their last known addresses had been returned to sender as preventing us from hearing and determining the Commissioner’s application.  In our view, the interests of those respondents (and any others who may not have actually received notice of the application despite orders for service being complied with) were well represented by those parties who appeared on the application, and opposed the orders sought by the Commissioner.

Conclusion

  1. For the reasons given above, we made orders at the conclusion of argument varying each of the 52 suppression orders in the form sought by the Commissioner.

SCHEDULE OF PARTIES

CHAIRPERSON OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION INTO THE MANAGEMENT OF POLICE INFORMANTS

 Applicant
- and -

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS VICTORIA

 First Respondent

COMMONWEALTH DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

 Second Respondent

CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF VICTORIA POLICE

 Third Respondent

CHIEF EXAMINER

 Fourth Respondent

STATE OF VICTORIA

 Fifth Respondent

D6 (A PSEUDONYM)

 Sixth Respondent

(NAME SUPPRESSED)

 Seventh Respondent

D8 (A PSEUDONYM)

 Eighth Respondent

D9 (A PSEUDONYM)

 Ninth Respondent
(NAME SUPPRESSED) Tenth Respondent
(NAME SUPPRESSED) Eleventh Respondent

D12 (A PSEUDONYM)

 Twelfth Respondent
(NAME SUPPRESSED) Thirteenth Respondent

D14 (A PSEUDONYM)

 Fourteenth Respondent
(NAME SUPPRESSED) Fifteenth Respondent

(NAME SUPPRESSED)

 Sixteenth Respondent

D17 (A PSEUDONYM)

 Seventeenth Respondent

D18 (A PSEUDONYM)

 Eighteenth Respondent

D19 (A PSEUDONYM)

 Nineteenth Respondent
(NAME SUPPRESSED) Twentieth Respondent

D21 (A PSEUDONYM)

 Twenty-First Respondent
(NAME SUPPRESSED) Twenty-Second Respondent

D23 (A PSEUDONYM)

 Twenty-Third Respondent
(NAME SUPPRESSED) Twenty-Fourth Respondent
(NAME SUPPRESSED) Twenty-Fifth Respondent
(NAME SUPPRESSED) Twenty-Sixth Respondent
(NAME SUPPRESSED) Twenty-Seventh Respondent
(NAME SUPPRESSED) Twenty-Eighth Respondent

D29 (A PSEUDONYM)

 Twenty-Ninth Respondent
(NAME SUPPRESSED) Thirtieth Respondent

D31 (A PSEUDONYM)

 Thirty-First Respondent

D32 (A PSEUDONYM)

 Thirty-Second Respondent
(NAME SUPPRESSED) Thirty-Third Respondent

D34 (A PSEUDONYM)

 Thirty-Fourth Respondent

D35 (A PSEUDONYM)

 Thirty-Fifth Respondent

D36 (A PSEUDONYM)

 Thirty-Sixth Respondent

D37 (A PSEUDONYM)

 Thirty-Seventh Respondent

D38 (A PSEUDONYM)

 Thirty-Eighth Respondent

D39 (A PSEUDONYM)

 Thirty-Ninth Respondent
(NAME SUPPRESSED) Fortieth Respondent
(NAME SUPPRESSED) Forty-First Respondent

D42 (A PSEUDONYM)

 Forty-Second Respondent

D43 (A PSEUDONYM)

 Forty-Third Respondent

D44 (A PSEUDONYM)

 Forty-Four Respondent

D45 (A PSEUDONYM)

 Forty-Fifth Respondent
(NAME SUPPRESSED) Forty-Sixth Respondent
(NAME SUPPRESSED) Forty-Seventh Respondent

D48 (A PSEUDONYM)

 Forty-Eighth Respondent

D49 (A PSEUDONYM)

 Forty-Ninth Respondent

D50 (A PSEUDONYM)

 Fiftieth Respondent

D51 (A PSEUDONYM)

 Fifty-First Respondent
(NAME SUPPRESSED) Fifty-Second Respondent
(NAME SUPPRESSED) Fifty-Third Respondent

(NAME SUPPRESSED)

 Fifty-Fourth Respondent

D55 (A PSEUDONYM)

 Fifty-Fifth Respondent
(NAME SUPPRESSED) Fifty-Sixth Respondent

D57 (A PSEUDONYM)

 Fifty-Seventh Respondent

D58 (A PSEUDONYM)

 Fifty-Eighth Respondent

D59 (A PSEUDONYM)

 Fifty-Ninth Respondent

D60 (A PSEUDONYM)

 Sixtieth Respondent

COUNTY COURT OF VICTORIA

Sixty-First Respondent

MAGISTRATES’ COURT OF VICTORIA

 Sixty-Second Respondent

COMMISSIONER OF AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE

 Sixty-Third Respondent

D64 (A PSEUDONYM)

 Sixty-Fourth Respondent

D65 (A PSEUDONYM)

 Sixty-Fifth Respondent

D66 (A PSEUDONYM)

 Sixty-Sixth Respondent

D67 (A PSEUDONYM)

 Sixty-Seventh Respondent
Actions
Download as PDF Download as Word Document
Cases Citing This Decision

13

Monday (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2022] ACTCA 25
Director of Public Prosecutions v State of Victoria [2025] VSCA 41
Hoser v Pelley [No 4] [2023] VSCA 319