Catto v Hampton Australia Ltd (In Liq) (No 3)

Link copied
Case Copied 74 min read

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil)

CATTO & ORS v HAMPTON AUSTRALIA LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION) & ORS (No 3)

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Vanstone

19 August 2004

CORPORATIONS - CONSTITUTION AND LEGAL CAPACITY - INTERNAL DISPUTES - REMEDIES WHERE OPPRESSION - WHAT CONSTITUTES OPPRESSIVE CONDUCT

CORPORATIONS - WINDING UP - LIQUIDATORS

Resolution of company in general meeting that it wind up voluntarily attacked as being oppressive to the minority shareholders and as constituting an "equitable fraud" by the company and by its majority shareholder - various relief sought - appeal pursuant to s 1321 Corporations Act 2001 raising conduct of liquidator and mode of distribution - claim and appeal dismissed.

TORTS - MALICIOUS PROCEDURE AND FALSE IMPRISONMENT - ABUSE OF PROCESS

Counterclaim by majority shareholder for tort of abuse of process on basis that proceedings were commenced and prosecuted to obtain advantage not reasonably related to verdict - counterclaim dismissed.

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 140, 232-233, s243N, ss411-414, s479, s491, s501, s506, s661, s1321, s1383, s1400; Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) Part 2D.1, Part 5.5, Part 2J.1; Corporations Law s701, s195, ss206C-206E, ss411-414, s260, s232, s180; Corporations (Ancillary Provisions) Act 2001 (SA) s7(3); Administration and Probate Act 1919 (SA) s5, s17, s46, referred to.
Re: Broadcasting Station 2GB Pty Ltd [1964-65] NSWR 1648; John J Starr (Real Estate) Pty Ltd v Robert R Andrew (Australasia) Pty Ltd (1991) 6 ACSR 63; Shirim Pty Ltd v Fesena Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 10; Bosnjak (No 1) (1998) 28 ACSR 688; Fexuto v Bosnjak (2001) 37 ACSR 672; Heydon v NRMA Ltd (2001) 51 NSWLR 1; Byrne v Australian Airways Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410; Nicron Resources Ltd v Catto (1992) 8 ACSR 219; Commissioner of Succession Duty v Hargrave (1972) 3 SASR 118; Williams v Spautz (1991-1992) 174 CLR 509; Hanrahan v Ainsworth (1990) 2 NSWLR 73, applied.
Ngurli Ltd & Anor v McCann & Anor (1953) 90 CLR 425; Peters' American Delicacy Co Ltd v Heath & Ors (1938-1939) 61 CLR 457; Melcann Ltd v Super John Pty Ltd (1995) 13 ACLC 92; Gambotto & Anor v WCP Ltd & Anor (1994-95) 182 CLR 432, distinguished.
Wayde v New South Wales Rugby League Ltd (1985) 180 CLR 459; Elkington & Ors v Moore Business Systems Australia Ltd (1994) 13 ACSR 342; Spautz v Williams [1983] 2 NSWLR 506; Varawa v Howard Smith Co Ltd (1911) 13 CLR 35; The Law of Torts (John G Fleming, 9th Ed, 1998, LBC Info Services); Shorter Oxford English Dictionary CT Onions, 3rd Ed, 1973, Clarendon Press, Oxford, discussed.
Coombes v Dynasty Pty Ltd (1994) 14 ACLR 60; (1995) 59 FCR 122; Jenkins v Enterprise Goldmines NL (1992) 6 ACSR 539; New South Wales Rugby League Ltd v Wayde (1985) 1 NSWLR 86; McWilliam v LJR McWilliam Estates Pty Ltd (1990) 20 NSWLR 703; Re G Jefferey (Mens Store) Pty Ltd (1984) 9…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Catto v Hampton Australia Ltd (In Liq) (No 3) and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2004] SASC 242
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Catto v Hampton Australia Ltd (In Liq) (No 3), the plaintiffs, who were minority shareholders of Hampton Australia Limited, challenged the voluntary winding up of the company, alleging that it was oppressive to them. They further contended that the conduct of the liquidator and the manner of distribution of the company's assets were improper. The second defendant, KLV, counterclaimed for damages, alleging that the plaintiffs had abused the legal process by initiating the proceedings with the primary intent to extort a higher settlement amount than the actual value of their shares.

The primary legal issues before the court involved determining whether the winding-up resolution was oppressive, whether it constituted an equitable fraud, and if the liquidator had acted appropriately. Additionally, the court needed to decide whether the plaintiffs' initiation of the proceedings constituted an abuse of process.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims and the appeal, concluding that there was no evidence to support the assertion that the winding up was oppressive or amounted to an equitable fraud. The court found that the resolution to wind up the company was a proper exercise of the corporation's power, and the plaintiffs' allegations lacked merit. Regarding the appeal concerning the conduct of the liquidator and the mode of distribution, the court upheld the liquidator's actions as being within their statutory powers and not open to challenge. The counterclaim by KLV for abuse of process was also dismissed, as the court found no evidence that the plaintiffs' actions were intended to extort money from KLV.

The final orders of the court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims, the appeal, and the counterclaim by KLV. The plaintiffs were ordered to pay KLV's costs on an indemnity basis, which included the costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

By counterclaim the second defendant, KLV, seeks damages and other relief, contending that the conduct of the plaintiffs in relation to the institution and prosecution of these proceedings amounts to the tort of abuse of process. In essence KLV claims that the plaintiffs’ real purpose has been to use the threat of proceedings – which were always going to be lengthy and costly in terms not only of representation but through many hours of lost employee time – to extract a sum far greater than the true value of their shares and far greater than a court would ever order. It was put that what was sought by the plaintiffs was in truth “ransom money”.Background The plaintiffs’ case encompassed events and transactions occurring over the period 1991 to the filing of proceedings in 1998. The evidence of those events was presented entirely by way of documents, almost all of them discovered by the defendants. The plaintiffs attempted to prove that throughout, the purpose of KLV – and the Normandy Poseidon Group (“NP Group”) which owned KLV via its ownership of Gold Mines of Kalgoorlie Pty Ltd (“GMK”) and GMK Investments Pty Ltd (both companies forming part of the “GMK Group”) – was to eliminate the minority shareholders; and further that the resolutions of 5 December 1997 were the culmination of that plan. The Statement of Claim, which was rather an unwieldy document, dealt with the matter in this way. First it asserted breach of contract as against Hampton. It relied upon a term which it claimed should be implied into the contract between Hampton and its shareholders to the effect that any exercise of the Corporations Law power to wind up Hampton would be for a proper purpose and would not operate to oppress the minority shareholders. The asserted oppression was said to arise from the development and implementation of what was defined as “the Plan”, being the same events asserted to give rise to the causes of action against KLV. The Plan was said to have had its genesis in March 1991. It was said to have developed over the ensuing period to 1997. Its existence was sought to be proved by some hundreds of documents, many originating in the NP Group rather than within Hampton or KLV specifically. The status of many remains in doubt. Many appear to be discussion papers prepared by officers of various rankings within the Group. The overall purpose attributed to the Plan was to rid Hampton of its minority shareholders so that “special benefits” in the form of utilisation of tax losses within the NP Group, savings of administration expenses and other efficiencies would accrue. The Plan was said to have resulted in two attempts to eliminate the minority shareholders. The first attempt was in the form of a s 414 Corporations Law bid in 1991. Although a number of shareholders accepted the offer made at that time by KLV, some shareholders (including the plaintiffs) took the matter to the Federal Court where the dispute settled and their shares were retained. Punctuating the first and second attempts was a recommendation put to the GMK Board to the effect that the minority shareholders should be bought out. The Board did not accept the recommendation. The second attempt was the voluntary winding up, the core subject of this action.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

From the time of the sale of Areas to the time of the winding up of Hampton the corporate structure of the Hampton Group was as illustrated in Appendix B.The Evidence of a PlanThe First Attempt By letter of 17 May 1991 sent to all shareholders of Hampton, KLV offered to buy each share in Hampton for $1.52. Accompanying the letter was a report by Messrs James Askew Appleyard, Resource Assessment and Management Consultants, expressing the view that the offer was fair and reasonable. KLV’s letter indicated that it was anticipated that in due course KLV would be in a position to compulsorily acquire any outstanding shares. By way of explanation for that event the plaintiffs pointed to a “Discussion Paper” under the name of PMJ Dennis, then the General Manager, Finance, KLV, which was dated 4 March 1991. Mr Dennis recommended that such an offer be made. Under the heading “The Problem” the author observed that there was no point in Hampton continuing as a public company when less than 1% of it was owned by shareholders outside the GMK Group. Disadvantages including the inability to relieve tax losses within the Group, and the need to act in the interests of all shareholders were highlighted. Many of the minority shareholders accepted the offer. KLV then moved to compulsorily acquire the outstanding shares. Some shareholders, including the plaintiffs, took proceedings in the Federal Court objecting to the acquisition, but the matter was resolved, the objectors retaining their shares.The Failed Plan 1994-1995 The plaintiffs pointed to a number of documents leading up to the recommendation to the GMK Board in June 1995 to make an offer to the minority shareholders of Hampton, as demonstrating a continuing movement towards addressing some of the ongoing deleterious effects of the presence of a small number of independent shareholders on the share register. In addition they argued that the estimates within these documents of the benefits which would accrue to the Group, absent the minorities, provided a measure of the true value of the minority shares. A document which incorporates a file management reference containing the date 29 June 1994 and the name “Laurencis” (presumably the document of a man by that name who was employed within the NP Group) compared the tax implications of recognising and not recognising Hampton Group interest for tax purposes. All that can be drawn from it is, I think, a concern within the NP Group, at some level, about that issue. A letter of advice dated 29 July 1994 from Messrs Arthur Andersen to Mr Issakov, a director of both Hampton and Areas, discussed the tax and stamp duty implications of the “potential” liquidation of Hampton. The plaintiffs then relied on an undated document of uncertain authorship, but which plainly was raised after the Arthur Andersen advice of 29 July 1994 headed “Hampton Australia Limited”, but with no addressee. It discussed the desirability of declaring a dividend from Areas to Hampton to reduce capital gains tax and the undeclared interest of $165,000 owing to Hampton from related companies which was, it said, always intended to be forgiven once the minority interests were eliminated and before Hampton’s liquidation.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.