IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S35 of 1989 B e t w e e n -
TANNING RESEARCH LABORATORIES
INC.
Appellant
and
J. O'BRIEN
Respondent
Tanning(2) BRENNAN J
DEANE J
DAWSON JTOOHEY J
GAUDRON J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON THURSDAY, 14 SEPTEMBER 1989, AT 9.36 AM
(Continued from 13/9/89)
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
ClT 2 / 1 /FK 72 14/9/89
BRENNAN J: Yes, Mr Campbell. MR CAMPBELL: Your Honours, yesterday I was looking at the ambit of the expressions that were used by His Honour
Mr Justice Dixon in BLAIR V CURRAN concerning what
had been necessarily decided by a previous decision
or what was cardinal to it, and was proposing to take
Your Honours to some cases which showed how far back beyond the ultimate decision it was possible to take that proposition. And, if I could take Your Honours to REG V HARTINGTON MIDDLE QUARTER, 119 ER, 288;
the judgment begins at 292.
It was a case concerning the settlement of
people for the purpose of formal relief or some
similar relief. Beginning from the foot of 292 in
the judgment of Mr Justice Coleridge:
In October 1849, two justices removed two
children of tender age, John and William
Gould, from the now respondent township of
Levenshulme to the now appellant township
of Hartington Middle Quarter. In the order
they were described as the lawful children
of William and Esther Gould. They were at
the time unemancipated, and were adjudged
to be settled in the appellant township inright of their father's settlement therein.
They were received; and the order was never
appealed against -
although, in fact, there was a mistake of some sort.
Then, skipping down to over the next paragraph:
The order of 1849 was a judgment in rem,
conclusive against all the world, as to
the then settlement of the two children .....
This will not be disputed; and it is unnecessary
to cite any authority for what stands on a
principle so sound and so often recognised.
And the same rule will hold in respect of the settlement of any one deriving from either
of them, so long as that one of them retains the adjudged settlement. If John or William should
marry, and have issue, and die without having
acquired a settlement elsewhere, it could not be
disputed, irmnediately after the death, that thesettlement of his widow and unemancipated
children, after proof of her marriage and their
legitimacy, was in the appellant township;
for that on which their settlement would, underthese circumstances, depend was the very point
decided by the competent tribunal in 1849.
ClT2/2/FK 73 14/9/89 Tanning(2) MR CAMPBELL (continuing):
Indeed, under the circumstances, the decision
on their settlement was legally involved in
the judgment of 1849: it is therefore
res judicata.
He talks about the mistake and then skipping to the
next paragraph:
The present case, however, is not precisely in
its facts the one…
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- Case
- [1989] HCATrans 207
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was the ambit of a previous decision and what matters were necessarily decided or formed the basis of that decision. This involved an examination of how far back in the reasoning of a prior judgment one could look to determine what was conclusively determined for the purposes of issue estoppel. The court considered whether facts that were foundational to a prior judgment, even if not the ultimate issue decided, could be subject to estoppel in subsequent proceedings.
The court was referred to the case of *Reg v Hartington Middle Quarter*, which illustrated how a judgment *in rem* concerning the settlement of children was conclusive not only as to their immediate settlement but also as to any derivative settlements that depended on the same foundational facts. These foundational facts, such as the settlement of a parent and their marriage, were considered to be legally involved in the prior judgment. The principle applied was that if a fact was essential to the prior decision, it could not be re-litigated, even if the subsequent case concerned a different, albeit related, settlement.
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