Catto v Hampton Aust Ltd (in Liq)

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CATTO & ORS v HAMPTON AUSTRALIA LTD (IN LIQ) & ANOR
[2000] SASC 104

Magistrates Appeal: Civil

  1. WILLIAMS J  Hampton Australia Ltd (In Liquidation) (“Hampton”) and Kalgoorlie Lakeview Pty Ltd (“KLV”), the first and second defendants in the action, have each appealed against decisions of a Master made on 31 January 2000 in which he dismissed an application by each of them.

  2. The Master’s decision and the appellants’ grounds of complaint

  3. The application by Hampton was made on 14 September 1999 and sought orders:

    “1..... That paragraphs 10 to 16 (inclusive), 49, 50, 58.2 and 58.3 of the More Explicit Statement of Claim dated 7 September 1999 and paragraphs 1, 2, 4 and 5 of the prayers for relief as against the First Defendant set out therein be struck out.

    2...... Further or in the alternative, that a fuller and more explicit pleading be filed in response to the First Defendant’s Rule 46.20 Notice dated 23 August 1999.”

  4. The application by KLV was made on 16 September 1999 and sought orders as follows:

    “1..... That paragraphs 9-28, 33-34, 46-47 and 49-50 of the More Explicit Further Amended Statement of Claim (“the Amended Claim”) together with Prayers 1 (last appearing), 2 (first and second appearing) and 5 of the Amended Claim be struck out.

    2...... Further, or in the alternative, that further and better particulars be provided of the paragraphs 9, 13, 14, 45, 47-50 and 58 of the Amended Claim referred to in the accompanying affidavit.”

  5. The Master gave one set of reasons for his decisions in which he discussed the two applications and dealt in some detail with the arguments put in support of each application.  He also explained why he dismissed each application.

  6. The first appellant has eight grounds contained in the Notice of Appeal.  I will not repeat them except to say that Hampton complains about the Master’s approach to the question of whether the statement of claim disclosed a reasonable cause of action and whether the prayers for relief were tenable.

  7. The second appellant has seven grounds in the Notice of Appeal.  KLV makes similar complaints to Hampton but particularly complains that the Master erred in finding that the plaintiffs (the respondents in the present action) had not failed to plead material facts capable of satisfying the test for ascertaining whether a term should be included in a contract.

  8. The plaintiffs’ case as pleaded

  9. On the case put forward by the plaintiffs, in terms of the statement of claim, the plaintiffs collectively held approximately 0.3% of the issued shares in Hampton.  The remaining 99.7% of the issued shares were held by KLV.  On 5 December 1997, at an extraordinary General Meeting of Hampton, KLV voted in favour of resolutions that Hampton be wound up voluntarily.  KLV also voted that, in accordance with Article 124 of Hampton’s Articles of Association, the assets be divided in specie amongst company members but on the basis that members, other than KLV, receive only cash assets and that KLV receive a…

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Details
Case
[2000] SASC 104
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Catto v Hampton Aust Ltd (in Liq) involves the first appellant, Hampton Aust Ltd, and the second appellant, KLV, who appealed against the Master's decision to dismiss their respective applications to strike out portions of the plaintiffs' statement of claim. The dispute arose out of a winding-up of Hampton Aust Ltd and the division of assets amongst its members, as per the Articles of Association and the Corporations Law. The plaintiffs, who held a small percentage of the shares in Hampton, sought to challenge the manner in which the assets were distributed.

The legal issues the court was required to decide centred on whether the plaintiffs had disclosed a reasonable cause of action and if the prayers for relief were tenable. Additionally, the court had to determine whether the plaintiffs had failed to plead material facts capable of satisfying the test for ascertaining whether a term should be included in a contract. This included examining whether the plaintiffs' statement of claim was sufficient to establish the basis of their claims against the defendants.

The court, in its reasoning, found that the Master had properly considered the applications and dismissed them for the reasons given. The court found that the plaintiffs' statement of claim was sufficient to disclose a reasonable cause of action and that the prayers for relief were tenable. The court also held that the plaintiffs had not failed to plead material facts necessary to ascertain whether a term should be included in a contract. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the orders made by the Master were upheld.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed

Background

Background to the litigation

The plaintiffs, collectively holding approximately 0.3% of the issued shares in Hampton, sought to challenge a resolution passed at an extraordinary General Meeting of Hampton on 5 December 1997. The remaining 99.7% of the issued shares were held by KLV. At the meeting, KLV voted in favour of resolutions to wind up Hampton voluntarily and to divide the assets in specie amongst the company members. However, the resolution specified that members, other than KLV, would receive only cash assets, while KLV would receive a mixture of assets, including shares in other companies, all receivables, and some cash. The plaintiffs argued that the resolution was unfair and sought relief on this basis.

Hampton and KLV filed separate applications seeking to have certain paragraphs of the plaintiffs' statements of claim struck out or to have the plaintiffs provide further and better particulars. The Master heard both applications together and gave one set of reasons for his decisions, dismissing both applications. Hampton and KLV then appealed the Master's decisions to the court.

Decision

Reasons for decision

WILLIAMS J
The Master’s decision and the appellants’ grounds of complaint The application by Hampton was made on 14 September 1999 and sought orders:“1..... That paragraphs 10 to 16 (inclusive), 49, 50, 58.2 and 58.3 of the More Explicit Statement of Claim dated 7 September 1999 and paragraphs 1, 2, 4 and 5 of the prayers for relief as against the First Defendant set out therein be struck out.2...... Further or in the alternative, that a fuller and more explicit pleading be filed in response to the First Defendant’s Rule 46.20 Notice dated 23 August 1999.” The application by KLV was made on 16 September 1999 and sought orders as follows:“1..... That paragraphs 9-28, 33-34, 46-47 and 49-50 of the More Explicit Further Amended Statement of Claim (“the Amended Claim”) together with Prayers 1 (last appearing), 2 (first and second appearing) and 5 of the Amended Claim be struck out.2...... Further, or in the alternative, that further and better particulars be provided of the paragraphs 9, 13, 14, 45, 47-50 and 58 of the Amended Claim referred to in the accompanying affidavit.” The Master gave one set of reasons for his decisions in which he discussed the two applications and dealt in some detail with the arguments put in support of each application. He also explained why he dismissed each application. The first appellant has eight grounds contained in the Notice of Appeal. I will not repeat them except to say that Hampton complains about the Master’s approach to the question of whether the statement of claim disclosed a reasonable cause of action and whether the prayers for relief were tenable. The second appellant has seven grounds in the Notice of Appeal. KLV makes similar complaints to Hampton but particularly complains that the Master erred in finding that the plaintiffs (the respondents in the present action) had not failed to plead material facts capable of satisfying the test for ascertaining whether a term should be included in a contract. The plaintiffs’ case as pleaded On the case put forward by the plaintiffs, in terms of the statement of claim, the plaintiffs collectively held approximately 0.3% of the issued shares in Hampton. The remaining 99.7% of the issued shares were held by KLV. On 5 December 1997, at an extraordinary General Meeting of Hampton, KLV voted in favour of resolutions that Hampton be wound up voluntarily. KLV also voted that, in accordance with Article 124 of Hampton’s Articles of Association, the assets be divided in specie amongst company members but on the basis that members, other than KLV, receive only cash assets and that KLV receive a mixture of assets comprising shares in other companies, all receivables and some cash. Authority to wind up on the resolution of company members is provided by s 491 of the Corporations Law. Article 124 of Hampton’s Articles of Association deals with a distribution in kind on the authority of a special resolution of members and enables the liquidation to attribute values to property which is to be the subject of division.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: WILLIAMS J

The appeal in Catto v Hampton Aust Ltd (in Liq) centred on the Master’s decision to dismiss applications by the first and second appellants, Hampton and KLV, to strike out certain paragraphs of the plaintiffs’ statements of claim and prayers for relief. The Master found that the statements of claim disclosed a reasonable cause of action and that the prayers for relief were tenable, and he also determined that the plaintiffs had not failed to plead material facts necessary for including a term in the contract. The court upheld these findings.

Regarding the first issue, the court examined the plaintiffs’ statements of claim and found that they disclosed a reasonable cause of action. The plaintiffs held a small percentage of the issued shares in Hampton, while the remaining shares were held by KLV. The court noted that the plaintiffs had sufficiently outlined their claims against Hampton and KLV concerning the winding up resolution and the distribution of assets. The court found no error in the Master’s decision that the statement of claim was adequate.

On the second issue, the court reviewed the prayers for relief and determined that they were tenable. The plaintiffs sought various orders related to the winding up and distribution of assets, and the court found that these were appropriate given the facts of the case. The court held that the Master did not err in finding the prayers for relief tenable.

Regarding the third issue, the court considered whether the plaintiffs had failed to plead material facts that could establish a term in the contract. The plaintiffs argued that the Master had erred in this regard, but the court found no such error. The plaintiffs had provided sufficient details in their statements of claim to support their case, and the court held that the Master correctly found that no material facts were omitted.

The ratio decidendi of this decision is that where a statement of claim sufficiently discloses a reasonable cause of action and the prayers for relief are tenable, and where the plaintiffs have adequately pleaded the material facts necessary to support their claims, the Master’s findings will be upheld on appeal. The court followed established principles of pleading and contract law in reaching its decision, ensuring that the plaintiffs' statements of claim met the necessary legal standards.