Cash and Australian Postal Corporation (Compensation)

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Cash and Australian Postal Corporation (Compensation) [2021] AATA 3323 (15 September 2021)

Administrative Appeals Tribunal

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )
) No: 2016/4590, 2016/6819
GENERAL DIVISION )

Re: Leesa Cash
Applicant

And: Australian Postal Corporation
Respondent

DIRECTION

TRIBUNAL:  Dr I Alexander, Senior Member

DATE OF CORRIGENDUM:            1 October 2021

PLACE:           Sydney

IT IS DIRECTED, in accordance with subsection 43AA(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), that the text of the decision in this application is to be altered such that:

1.    both references to “Comcare” in the decision are replaced with “the Respondent”;

2.    the reference to “Comcare” at paragraph 210 of the reasons for decision is replaced with “the Respondent”;

3.    both references to “Comcare” at paragraph 227 of the reasons for decision are replaced with “the Respondent”.

.................................................................[sgd]…………..

Dr I Alexander, Senior Member

Division:GENERAL DIVISION

File Number(s):      2016/4590, 2016/6819

Re:Leesa Cash

APPLICANT

AndAustralian Postal Corporation

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal:Dr I Alexander, Senior Member

Date:15 September 2021

Place:Sydney

The Tribunal finds that:

· as at 18 July 2016, Comcare was not liable to pay compensation under sections 16 and 19 of the SRC Act for bilateral plantar fasciitis and regional pain syndrome.

· as at 8 September 2016, Comcare was not liable to pay compensation under sections 16 and 19 of the SRC Act for secondary mild adjustment disorder with depressed mood.

The decisions under review are affirmed.

.........................................................[sgd]...............

Dr I Alexander, Senior Member

CATCHWORDS

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION – bilateral plantar fasciitis – regional pain syndrome – whether the effects of the injuries had ceased – secondary mild adjustment disorder with depressed mood – whether the Applicant suffered a psychiatric condition that was contributed to, to a significant degree, by her employment – decisions under review affirmed

LEGISLATION

Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) ss 4, 5A, 5B, 7, 14, 16 ,19

CASES

Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission v May [2016] 257 CLR 468

Telstra Corporation Limited v Hannaford [2006] FCAFC 87

Woodhouse v Comcare [2021] FCAFC 95

REASONS FOR DECISION

Dr I Alexander, Senior Member

15 September 2021

BACKGROUND

  1. Ms Cash commenced employment with Australia Post in October 2014 as a casual employee. After 12 months she was employed on a fixed term contract and was then appointed to a permanent position.

  2. On 1 July 2015, about eight months after starting her employment with Australia Post, Ms Cash lodged a claim for compensation.

  3. In a determination, dated 27 August 2015, Australia Post accepted liability under section 14 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) (the SRC Act) for ‘bilateral plantar fasciitis and regional pain syndrome’ with a date of injury deemed to be 10 June 2015.

  4. Following an assessment by Mr T. O’Neill, clinical psychologist, the description of liability for Ms Cash’s claim was extended on 8 January 2016 to ‘bilateral plantar fasciitis and regional pain syndrome and secondary mild adjustment disorder with depressed mood’.   

  5. In a reviewable decision, dated 16 August 2016, a Reconsideration Officer affirmed an…

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Details
Case
[2021] AATA 3323
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application by Ms Cash against the Australian Postal Corporation regarding compensation for injuries sustained during her employment. The dispute centred on whether Ms Cash continued to suffer from a compensable psychiatric condition and whether her ongoing physical ailments were still causally linked to her employment. The decision was made by Dr I Alexander, Senior Member, of the Tribunal.

The legal issues before the Tribunal were whether Ms Cash suffered a psychiatric condition that was contributed to, to a significant degree, by her employment, and whether the effects of her physical injuries, specifically bilateral plantar fasciitis and chronic regional pain syndrome (CRPS), had ceased. The Tribunal was required to determine if Ms Cash was entitled to ongoing compensation under sections 16 and 19 of the *Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988* (Cth) (SRC Act) as at 8 September 2016 and continuing to the present.

The Tribunal reasoned that while Ms Cash had suffered CRPS in her left lower limb triggered by plantar fasciitis, the precise nature of her current ailment was uncertain. Applying the principles from *Woodhouse v Comcare* [2021] FCAFC 95, the Tribunal held that the critical inquiry was whether the ailment continued to be contributed to, in a material degree, by the employee's employment. It was irrelevant whether the current ailment was characterised as the same or a different ailment from the original injury. The Tribunal found that Comcare's liability ceases if the ailment no longer has the necessary causal connection to the employee's employment, even if the ailment itself continues unabated.

The Tribunal affirmed the decisions under review, indicating that Ms Cash was not found to be entitled to ongoing compensation for the psychiatric condition or to have established the necessary continuing causal link between her current physical ailments and her employment.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

If the Tribunal finds that section 14 liability should have been accepted, and that section 7(7) of the SRC Act does not operate to disallow compensation for the psychiatric condition, then the Tribunal must determine whether, as at 8 September 2016 and until present, the Applicant is entitled to compensation under sections 16 and 19 of the SRC Act.DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCEMs Cash’s Statements In a written statement dated 11 March 2016, Ms Cash stated, inter alia, as follows:18. As a condition of my employment with Australia Post[2] I was required to were steel cap boots. …[2] Employment commenced on Monday 27 October 2014.19. in early November 2014[3] I first saw the GP as I had developed blisters on my feet which had become infected. My general practitioner treated me with antibiotics and I had approximately 7 days off work…[3] Wednesday 5 November 2014.24. From when I commenced my employment…my feet were always painful and sore, however symptoms of plantar fasciitis really flared up in March 2015[4]…[4] There is no reference to foot pain in GP records until June 2015. 25. In May 2015 I underwent a bone scan which indicated that there were several fractures in my feet.[5] …[5] Bone scan was performed on 26 June 2015 – the “fractures” were misdiagnosed. 27. In June 2015[6] I made a worker’s compensation claim…[6] 1 July 2015. 28. I made the claim after my feet “seized up” essentially causing my feet to stop working, causing me to fall over.29. On 16 July 2015 I saw Dr O’Carrigan30. Dr O’Carrigan referred me to Dr Ho, whom I saw on 24 July 2015…31. On 27 July 2015 I underwent an MRI which confirmed the diagnosis of plantar fasciitis. 32. On 31 July 2015 I had a cortisone injection into my lumbar spine…approximately 2 weeks after the injection I noticed a big change in my left leg’s sensitivity, for the better, and some pain relief in my left foot. The injection was very beneficial to me. 33. I had an injection of cortisone into the fascia (left foot) about 6 weeks later. That was helpful also.…35. Throughout this entire period my left foot has been worse than my right foot, however I have experienced symptoms in both feet .37. Dr Ho confirmed the diagnosis of chronic regional pain syndrome and I was seeing him every month to 6 weeks.38. I worked on 1 September, 3 September and 8 September 2015 however between 9 September and 19 October 2015 I did not work at all…39. I then returned to work 2 days per week…until about the start of February 2016. 40. I then had 6 weeks off and was paid compensation in that period. I then started working again on 9 March, I day per week. ……43. My ongoing symptoms…are as follows: (a) Burning on the soles of both feet, which spreads up the knees.(b) Swelling in both feet, increasing throughout the day.(c) Loss of hair and changes to the nature of the hair on both of my feet and legs.(d) Mottled colour in both feet and legs.(e) Changes to toenails.(f) Numbness in both feet.(g) Constant and chronic pain.44. My ongoing disabilities… are as follows:(a) Unable to stand for more than 10 to 15 minutes.(b) Limited walking to short distance, the distance varying from day to day depending on pain.(c) poor balance.

Decision

Reasons for decision

‘When asked about Ms Cash’s presentation of with widespread left sided pain, Dr Johnstone said that it was “highly unusual presentation” which she could not explain. Conclusion On consideration of the available evidence, I am satisfied that in 2015 Ms Cash did suffer CRPS in the left lower limb that was triggered by her plantar fasciitis. Ms Cash, with the support of Dr Ho, submits that that she currently continues to suffer from CPRS and is entitled to payments pursuant to sections 16 and 19 of the SRC Act. Dr Johnstone suggested a current diagnosis of “chronic primary limb pain”. This diagnosis covers the unusual presentation of Ms Cash’s claimed symptoms but does not provide much assistance in determining the cause of her symptoms. I accept that Ms Cash continues to suffer an “ailment”, the precise nature of which, on my reading of the evidence, is uncertain. The question that now arises is whether her current “ailment” and CRPS can be considered to be the same “ailment”. The relevance of this question is addressed in the decision of the Full Federal Court in Woodhouse v Comcare [2021] FCAFC 95 where the court heard an appeal form a decision of the Tribunal that the applicant was not presently entitled to compensation pursuant to sections 16 and 19 of the SRC Act. The Full Court dismissed the appeal and his honour, Derrington J, relevantly stated:[51] Comcare’s submissions should be accepted. On the construction by the parties and adopted by the Tribunal below, the factual inquiry focused upon whether the ailment continued to be contributed to, in a material degree, by the employee’s employment. In that analysis, it was irrelevant that it was characterised as being the same or a different ailment as that from which she suffered following the incident. Conversely, if her employment, had ceased to contribute in a material degree to an ailment, it did not matter that it was the same ailment as that from which she suffered earlier. By contrast, on the construction for which the applicant now contends, it is only necessary to consider whether the ailment from which she now suffers is the same as her earlier ailment, the contraction of which was contributed in a material degree by her employment. Whether her employment continues to contribute to the applicant’s ailments is irrelevant. … [Counsel for applicant] accepted that, on that construction, had the Tribunal found that the applicant’s current ailments were not the same as the Compensable Injuries, they would not be compensable under the SRC Act. …[84] Some understandable uncertainty and ambiguity crept into the submissions in this case which can be traced to the use of the word “continuing” in describing the causal relationship between the employment and the injury in respect of which compensation is sought. It must be kept in mind that s14 operates to impose liability on Comcare where and for a long as certain conditions exist. However, s 14 only provides the core or central touchstone of liability and other sections regulate the extent and manner in which such compensation is provided. An important element of s 14 is the condition that compensation is payable only where it results in death, incapacity or impairment. Whilst death is permanent, the other two sequelae may be temporary with the result that s 14 will only render Comcare liable to where the causative requirement continues to have effect. Similarly, s 14 only renders Comcare liable where that which causes or has caused death, incapacity or impairment is an “injury” as defined by s 4(1); ie in this case, an ailment that has been contributed to by the employee’s employment and is therefore a “disease”. If the cause of the incapacity ceases to be an “injury” as defined, the constituent elements for Comcare’s liability also ceases. It follows that it is the continuing existence of the necessary statement of affairs which defines the duration of Comcare’s liability. …[85] Logically, the causes of a disease or ailment tend to cease once the condition is suffered and the employee ceases employment or the causative factors are remedied. However, having been caused by the contribution of the employee’s employment, the condition itself often continues and compensation is payable to the extent to which it results in death, incapacity or impairment. It does not follow that, in order for Comcare to remain liable, the employee’s employment needs to remain a constant and continuing contributor to the ongoing injury. …what is required is that the contribution requirement remain in place in the sense that the disease or ailment continues to have the characteristic of having been contributed to in a material degree by the relevant employment. … it is preferable to say that the causal nexus between the employee’s employment and suffering of the disease continues unbroken. ……[90] … Comcare has no liability under s 14 in relation to an ailment, the continued existence of which can longer be said to have the necessary causal connection to the employee’s employment. The mere fact that the ailment suffered may once have had the necessary causal connection to the employee’s employment is irrelevant. Even where the ailment continues unabated, if it ceases to have the characteristic of being one which was relevantly contributed to by the employee’s employment, Comcare’s liability ceases. [emphasis added]

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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