SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Carswell v KBRV Resort Operations Pty Ltd (No 2) [2018] QSC 110
PARTIES:
PAUL SIMON CARSWELL
(plaintiff)
v
KBRV RESORT OPERATIONS PTY LTD(defendant)
FILE NO/S:
BS No 4069 of 2016
DIVISION:
Trial Division
PROCEEDING:
Trial
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:
29 May 2018
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
7 February 2018
JUDGE:
Martin J
ORDERS:
The Application is dismissed.
CATCHWORDS:
PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – PLEADINGS – ANSWERING PLEADINGS – DENIALS AND NON-ADMISSIONS – where the plaintiff suffered an injury at work and is suing the defendant – where the defence filed on 18 May 2016 did not admit the injuries – where the defendant’s lawyers disclosed surveillance and medical evidence with respect to the plaintiff’s injuries on the first day of trial – where the further amended defence filed on 23 August 2017 then denied the plaintiff’s injuries without reference to the disclosed material – where two paragraphs of the further amended defence were struck out – where the defendant seeks leave to amend the further amended defence by inserting new paragraphs to replace those which were struck out – whether the proposed amendments comply with the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 – whether the defendant had always placed in issue the substance of the plaintiff’s claims – whether the amendments would enable the defendant to lead a positive case which it could not have done under the earlier versions of the pleadings – whether the defendant has indicated what evidence it might seek to lead if the amendments are granted – whether the plaintiff will suffer prejudice
Hassall & Ors v Johnden Engineering Pty Ltd & Anor [2001] QSC 211
Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, rr 5, 149, 150, 165, 166, 380
COUNSEL:
R J Douglas QC and JM Sorbello for the plaintiff
G W Diehm QC and B F Charrington for the defendant
SOLICITORS:
Morton & Morton for the plaintiff
Cooper Grace Ward for the defendant
The trial of this matter commenced on 23 August 2017 but was adjourned on 24 August following the unexpected and limited disclosure by the defendant to the plaintiff’s lawyers of:
(a)over nine hours of covert video surveillance taken during the period from 8 January to 24 April 2016 and surveillance logs relating to that period; and
(b)medical reports from Dr McPhee (an orthopaedic surgeon) and Dr Rice (a psychiatrist) in which each commented upon the surveillance logs and, it appears, upon a “collection of highlights of the log surveillance”.
At about the same time, the plaintiff became aware of orders made by Mullins J on 21 October 2016 (“the October order”). So far as is relevant, her Honour ordered:
1. Pursuant to UCPR r 393(2) and (3), the applicant is relieved of the obligation to disclose, deliver, give and/or provide to any other party to the action an opportunity to inspect the documents referred…
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- Case
- [2018] QSC 110
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered Dr Richardson's report, which stated that the plaintiff's psychiatric condition was secondary to his primary back injury and that further treatment was unlikely to assist. The court noted that Rule 380 UCPR provides for a wide discretion in granting leave to amend pleadings and that a just resolution of proceedings remains the paramount purpose of the rule. The court also referred to Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University, which emphasised the importance of speed, efficiency, and minimising costs while allowing parties to plead their case properly. The court concluded that the defendant's proposed amendments did not comply with the rules and that granting leave to amend would result in significant delay and prejudice to the plaintiff.
The court dismissed the application to amend the defence, finding that the defendant had not demonstrated that the amendments were necessary to enable it to lead a positive case or that the plaintiff would not suffer prejudice. The court noted that the defendant had not indicated what evidence it might seek to lead if the amendments were granted and that the proposed amendments would result in significant delay and prejudice to the plaintiff. The court held that the defendant had had sufficient opportunity to plead its case and that it was too late for a further amendment.
The court made no orders for costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
The Application is dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Dr Richardson (a psychiatrist whose reports were tendered without being subject to cross-examination) was of the view that:(a) The plaintiff presented “with a diagnosis of Adjustment Disorder with depressed and anxious mood and there appears to be no pre-existing psychosocial or depressive symptomatology relevant to this case.”(b) The “primary injury is that to his lower back which has resulted in a chronic pain syndrome …”.(c) The “development of his depressive symptomatology is secondary to his primary back injury …”(d) “…I do not believe that further treatment is likely to assist Mr Carswell from a psychiatric perspective with his problems primarily relating to his back injury and the development of pain.”Consideration Rule 380 was considered by Mackenzie J in Hassall v Johnden Engineering Pty Ltd[3] where he said:“[10] Rule 380 UCPR provides that an amendment after filing of a request for trial date may only be made with leave of the court. Its terms provide for a wide discretion, the exercise of which no doubt will be influenced by the individual circumstances of the particular case without the need for closed categories of relevant factors to be identified.” (emphasis added)[3] [2001] QSC 211. In addition to that guidance it is appropriate to refer to the broader consideration given to the analogue of r 5 in the ACT Supreme Court Rules (r 21) in Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University.[4] Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ said:“[98]Of course, a just resolution of proceedings remains the paramount purpose of r 21; but what is a “just resolution” is to be understood in light of the purposes and objectives stated. Speed and efficiency, in the sense of minimum delay and expense, are seen as essential to a just resolution of proceedings. This should not detract from a proper opportunity being given to the parties to plead their case, but it suggests that limits may be placed upon re-pleading, when delay and cost are taken into account. The Rule’s reference to the need to minimise costs implies that an order for costs may not always provide sufficient compensation and therefore achieve a just resolution. It cannot therefore be said that a just resolution requires that a party be permitted to raise any arguable case at any point in the proceedings, on payment of costs.…[102]The objectives stated in r 21 do not require that every application for amendment should be refused because it involves the waste of some costs and some degree of delay, as it inevitably will. Factors such as the nature and importance of the amendment to the party applying cannot be overlooked. While r 21 assumes some ill-effects will flow from the fact of a delay, that will not prevent the parties dealing with its particular effects in their case in more detail. It is the extent of the delay and the costs associated with it, together with the prejudice which might reasonably be assumed to follow and that which is shown, which are to be weighed against the grant of permission to a party to alter its case. Much may depend upon the point the litigation has reached relative to a trial when the application to amend is made. There may be cases where it may properly be concluded that a party has had sufficient opportunity to plead their case and that it is too late for a further amendment, having regard to the other party and other litigants awaiting trial dates. Rule 21 makes it plain that the extent and the effect of delay and costs are to be regarded as important considerations in the exercise of the court’s discretion. Invariably the exercise of that discretion will require an explanation to be given where there is delay in applying for amendment.” (emphasis added)[4] (2009) 239 CLR 175.