Carruthers v Griffis

Case [2000] NTSC 11


Carruthers v Griffis [2000] NTSC 11

PARTIES:FIONA JOY CARRUTHERS

and

SHANE JOHN GRIFFIS

TITLE OF COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY

JURISDICTION:  SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY EXERCISING TERRITORY JURISDICTION

FILE NO:JA84 OF 1999 (9919654)

DELIVERED:  15 March 2000

HEARING DATES:  18 February 2000

JUDGMENT OF:  MILDREN J

CATCHWORDS:

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:

Appellant:J Lawrence

Respondent:  In person

Solicitors:

Appellant:Domestic Violence Legal Help

Respondent:  

Judgment category classification:    B

Judgment ID Number:  

Number of pages:  24        

THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
OF AUSTRALIA
AT DARWIN

Carruthers and Griffis  [2000] NTSC 11

No. JA84 of 1999 (9919654)

BETWEEN:

FIONA JOY CARRUTHERS

Appellant

AND:

SHANE JOHN GRIFFIS

Respondent

CORAM:  MILDREN J

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Delivered 15 March 2000)

MILDREN J

  1. This is an appeal from an order made by the Court of Summary Jurisdiction constituted by a Magistrate dismissing an application by the appellant for a restraining order under s4 of the Domestic Violence Act.

    Does an appeal lie?

  2. It was submitted by the respondent that no appeal lies to this Court from such an order.  The Domestic Violence Act does not specifically provide, as one might expect, for applications to be made in accordance with a particular form, or in accordance with the regulations or rules of Court, by lodging the same with the Clerk of the Court of Summary Jurisdiction. Rather, that seems to be assumed by the wording of s4 of the Act as, once the application is brought on for hearing, the Court (which is defined by s3(1) to be the Court of Summary Jurisdiction) clearly has jurisdiction under s4 to make the order sought. The Act is also silent on the question of whether or not an appeal lies. Mr Lawrence for the appellant, submitted that an appeal lay to this Court by virtue of s163(1) of the Justices Act which provides:

    163    Right of appeal to Supreme Court

    (1)     A party to proceedings before the Court may appeal to the Supreme Court from a conviction, order or adjudication of the Court (including a conviction of a minor indictable offence but not including an order dismissing a complaint of an offence), on a ground which involves -

    (a)     sentence; or

    (b)     an error or mistake, on the part of the Justices whose            decision is appealed against, on a matter or question of        fact alone, or a matter or question of law alone, or a          matter or question of both fact and law,

    as hereinafter provided, in every case, unless some Special Act expressly declares that such a conviction, order, or adjudication shall be final or otherwise expressly prohibits an appeal against it.

    Mr Griffis, who appeared in person, submitted that no appeal lay, as there is no appeal from an order dismissing a complaint of an offence, but it is plain that an order dismissing an application under the Domestic Violence Act is not "a complaint of an offence", but is an "order" within s163(1).  Clearly Mr Lawrence is correct and an appeal does lie.

    Are…

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Carruthers v Griffis [2000] NTSC 11
Case
[2000] NTSC 11
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CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Carruthers v Griffis, the appellant, Carruthers, sought a restraining order against the respondent, Griffis, under the Domestic Violence Act. The appeal was heard by a higher court, which reviewed the decision of the original court. The appeal focused on the magistrate's findings regarding an incident at the Family Law Court where Griffis was alleged to have used offensive and provocative language in the presence of Carruthers. The key legal issues were whether the words spoken were directed at Carruthers, whether they were likely to lead to a breach of the peace, and whether Griffis would likely behave in a similar manner again.

The higher court found that the magistrate's decision that the words were not directed at Carruthers, while noting that the words were said in Carruthers' presence, was not in error. The court concluded that even if the words had been directed at Carruthers, the magistrate was justified in finding that the behaviour was not likely to lead to a breach of the peace. The evidence showed that Griffis left the building immediately after the incident, and Carruthers remained inside, suggesting no immediate likelihood of a breach of the peace. The court held that the appeal should not be upheld on this ground and that there was no need for a retrial regarding the incident at the Family Law Court.

The higher court allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the magistrate's order dismissing the application concerning the alleged assault on 24 August 1999. It ordered that this issue be retried in the Court of Summary Jurisdiction by a different magistrate. The court also indicated it would hear the parties regarding costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Particulars of this ground have been provided by Mr Lawrence. Most of the matters complained of have already been dealt with. One matter of complaint is in relation to the incident at the "Family Law Court" in that the learned Magistrate did not find that the words complained of were directed at the appellant, although his Worship did find that the words were said in the appellant's presence. His Worship found that the behaviour of the respondent by using those words constituted behaviour of an offensive and provocative manner. It is difficult to see what the appellant complains of, given this finding, but I assume that the real complaint is his Worship's decision that the words were not likely to lead to a breach of the peace. In order for the appellant to have obtained a restraining order on this ground, the appellant needed to show not only that the respondent had behaved in a provocative and offensive manner towards the appellant, but also, that the behaviour "is such as is likely to lead to a breach of the peace" (see s4(1)(c)(ii) of the Domestic Violence Act) and also, that the respondent, unless restrained, was likely again to behave in the same or a similar manner (see s4(1)(c)(iii)). Even if the words spoken had been directed at the appellant, I do not consider that the learned Magistrate was wrong to conclude that the behaviour was not likely to lead to a breach of the peace. The learned Magistrate found that the words uttered were a parting shot as the respondent walked out of the Court building. Mr Lawrence complained about this finding, but the evidence is that the respondent left the building immediately afterwards. The appellant was inside the building at all times. There was nothing to suggest that a breach of the peace was likely at the time. I do not consider that I should uphold the appeal on this ground, or that there should be a retrial of the issues relating to the incident at the "Family Law Court".Conclusion In conclusion, the appeal is allowed in part. The order of the learned Magistrate dismissing the application is set aside, in so far as it relates to the alleged assault on 24 August 1999 and I order that that issue be retried in the Court of Summary Jurisdiction constituted by a different Magistrate. I will hear the parties as to costs.--------------------------------------------

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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