Capital Finance Australia Ltd v Tolcher

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Capital Finance Australia Limited v Tolcher [2007] FCAFC 185

CORPORATIONS – winding up – attempt by liquidator and company in liquidation to recover payments under the “unfair preferences” and “uncommercial transactions” provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – finance companies had, acting as undisclosed principals through a corporate agent, leased out photocopying equipment to substantial hirers – discovery that agent guilty of duplicative leasing of some of the same equipment as agent for another finance company as undisclosed principal, and, in some instances of effecting leases of non-existent equipment – finance companies insisting that agent cause all of the Equipment Rental Agreements to be paid out – agent executed deed promising finance companies that it would pay them all out – agent arranges for bank to “refinance” – bank purchases particular equipment from the finance companies for prices equal to the payout figures on the Equipment Rental Agreements, then leases that equipment to the agent – the leases from the agent to the end hirers remain in place throughout and, so far as end hirers concerned, agent has been the owner of the equipment throughout because existence of the finance companies as undisclosed principals and of the bank as refinancier never disclosed to them – question whether the payout amounts paid by bank to finance companies recoverable by liquidator and company in liquidation as unfair preferences (s 588FA of Act) or under uncommercial transactions provision (s 588FB of Act) – meaning of “transaction” – transaction constituted by composite of circumstances.
Held: (1) there was a composite of circumstances constituting a transaction of the agency company, and the primary judge’s order that the finance companies should disgorge the amounts paid to them by the bank should stand; (2) the transactions were not unfair preferences because at the time when the transactions were entered into the finance companies were not creditors of the company.

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 9, 553, 588FA, 588FB, 588FE, 588FF, 588FG, Pt 5.7B Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 51A

Airservices Australia v Ferrier (1996) 185 CLR 483 cited
Alati v Kruger (1955) 94 CLR 216 distinguished
Australian Kitchen Industries Pty Ltd v Albarran (2004) 51 ACSR 604 cited
Australian Securities Commission v Marlborough Gold Mines Ltd (1993) 177 CLR 485 cited
Demondrille NomineesPty Ltd v Shirlaw (1997) 25 ACSR 535 cited
Dimos v Willetts (2000) 2 VR 170 referred to
Environmental & Earth Sciences Pty Ltd v Vouris (2006) 152 FCR 510 referred to
Ferrier and Knight (as liquidators of Compass Airlines Pty Ltd) v Civil Aviation Authority (1994) 55 FCR 28 applied
Haines v Bendall (1991) 172 CLR 60 cited
Kalls Enterprises Pty Ltd (in liq) v Baloglow (2007) 63 ACSR 557 discussed
Lewis (as liquidator of Doran Constructions Pty Ltd (in liq) v Doran (2005) 54 ACSR 410 cited
Lewis v Cook (2000) 18 ACLC 490 cited
Mann v Sangria Pty Ltd (2001) 38 ACSR 307 cited
Mulherin v Bank of Western Australia Ltd;…

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Details
Case
[2007] FCAFC 185
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Capital Finance Australia Ltd v Tolcher, the central issue was whether certain payments made by National Australia Bank (NAB) to Capital Finance Australia Pty Limited (Capital Finance) constituted an uncommercial transaction or an unfair preference under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). These payments were made during the period leading up to Lloyd Scott Enterprises Pty Limited (LSE) entering voluntary administration. The first respondent, Mr. Tolcher, was appointed liquidator of LSE. The trial judge had ruled that the payments were both an unfair preference and an uncommercial transaction, ordering Capital Finance to compensate LSE. Capital Finance appealed against this decision. The court had to determine whether the payments made by NAB to Capital Finance were made as purchase money for equipment or if they were related to the obligations under a deed executed between the parties. The court found that the payments were indeed made as purchase money and did not constitute an unfair preference. However, the court did find that the overall transaction constituted an uncommercial transaction under the Corporations Act. Consequently, the appeal was partially allowed, and the orders made by the trial judge were set aside in part, declaring that the transaction was an uncommercial transaction. The liquidator's cross-appeal was dismissed, and costs orders were made in favour of the respondents.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed in part.

2. Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the Orders made on 31 January 2007 be set aside and in their place declare that the transaction constituted by the agreements between Capital Finance Australia Pty Limited (“Capital Finance”) and Capital Corporate Finance Limited (together “the Capital Companies”), Lloyd Scott Enterprises Pty Limited (“LSE”) and Lloyd John Scott recorded in the Deed dated 12 January 2001 (“the Second Deed”), the steps taken by LSE with the concurrence of the Capital Companies to procure funds through lease finance with National Australia Bank Limited to satisfy the obligations LSE had undertaken to the Capital Companies under the Second Deed and the application by Capital Finance of those funds in satisfaction of part of LSE’s obligations under the Second Deed was for the purposes of Pt 5.7B of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) an uncommercial transaction.

3. Otherwise appeal is dismissed.

4. Appellants pay the respondents’ costs of the appeal.

5. Cross appeal dismissed.

6. Cross-appellants pay the Cross-respondents’ costs of the cross appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

My reasons are elaborated upon below.FACTUAL BACKGROUND1. The Master Lease Agreement between NAB and LSE At the relevant time (from the discovery and the obtaining of the Mareva order in mid December 2000 to the making of the last of the eight payments on 25 May 2001) the standard form of Master Lease Agreement between NAB and LSE dated 9 April 1999 was in place. It was to come into play only if and when NAB and LSE agreed on the terms on which NAB was to purchase particular equipment identified by LSE and lease that equipment to LSE. The Master Lease Agreement obliged NAB to acquire equipment pursuant to an “Equipment Schedule” agreed to by LSE and NAB (cl 2 of the Master Lease Agreement). The Equipment Schedule was an offer by LSE to lease the equipment from NAB. If NAB accepted the offer, NAB would become the owner of the equipment, and LSE a bailee of it without any proprietary rights in it (cl 11.1); NAB had a right to terminate the lease early and to repossess upon repudiation or “default” (cll 4(c), 13), and to recover from LSE as liquidated damages an amount calculated in accordance with cl 13.3. Generally speaking, that amount was the present day value of the rentals that would have been payable if the lease had run its full course, less the amount of the proceeds of sale of the equipment. If the lease ran its full course, LSE was to return the equipment to NAB. If the proceeds of sale that NAB received proved to be less than the amount that NAB and LSE had specified as the “Residual Value” of it in the Equipment Schedule, LSE was to pay the shortfall to NAB. The Master Lease Agreement was unsuited to a sub-bailment by LSE to sub-bailees. For example, cl 11.3(a) provided that LSE was not to allow the equipment to be located elsewhere than on land or premises owned or occupied by LSE. The Master Lease Agreement contemplated a lease of goods by NAB’s “customer” for use in its own business. No doubt, however, it was open to NAB and LSE to agree, expressly or by implication, to vary or acquiesce in departures from the Master Lease Agreement. They apparently did so, at least by implication, in early 2001, when, at LSE’s request NAB bought items of equipment from Capital and leased it to LSE, well knowing that the equipment was subject to Equipment Rental Agreements that were already on foot between LSE and lessees and that the equipment was located at the premises of the lessees. At the time of the events of December 2000, Mr Scott, LSE and other companies associated with Mr Scott already had various financial facilities in place with NAB. Indeed, NAB had a fixed and floating charge over the undertaking of LSE that had been created on 6 November 1998. There was a limit of $4 million on the Master Lease facility, which had been utilised to the extent of some $1 million.2. The First and Second Principal and Agency Agreements between CCFL and LSE, and CFAL and LSE respectively The First P&A Agreement was dated 7 July 1995 and the Second P&A Agreement, 1 July 2000. There were similarities, but some differences, as between the two. Under both agreements, CCFL and CFAL respectively were to remain owners of the goods throughout, and LSE was to act in all respects as agent for them as undisclosed principals (cl 2.1 of the First P&A Agreement, cll 4.5 and 2 of the Second P&A Agreement).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

HEEREY, LINDGREN AND GORDON JJ (dissent)
It follows from what I have said above that I would allow the appeal. In these circumstances, the cross-appeal would become moot, but I note that I agree with all that Gordon J has said on the cross-appeal at [143]–[153] of her Honour’s Reasons. In the present respect there is no relevant distinction between the unfair preference and the uncommercial transaction claim, and the discussion by the Full Court in Ferrier and Knight (as liquidators of Compass Airlines Pty Ltd) v Civil Aviation Authority (1994) 55 FCR 28 at 91–93 applies to the latter as well as the former. There were no special circumstances in the present case, such as concealment from the liquidator, that would take the case out of the ordinary approach of awarding interest as from the time of the liquidator’s demand (that is, at 19 September 2001).CONCLUSION I would allow the appeal, set aside the orders made on 31 January 2007, order that the Further Amended Originating Process be dismissed, and order that the respondents pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal and of the proceeding at first instance. I would dismiss the cross-appeal and order the cross-appellants to pay the cross-respondents’ costs of the cross-appeal. This appeal concerns the voidable transaction provisions of Part 5.7B of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (“the Corporations Act”) and, in particular, whether:(1)a Deed between Capital Finance Australia Pty Limited (“Capital Finance”) and Capital Corporate Finance Limited (“Capital Corporate”) (together “the Capital Companies”), Lloyd Scott Enterprises Pty Limited (“LSE”) and Lloyd John Scott (“Mr Scott”) executed on 12 January 2001 (“the Second Deed”); and (2)steps consequent upon the making of the Second Deed including, in particular, certain payments made to Capital Finance between 14 February 2001 and 31 May 2001, were properly characterised either as an uncommercial transaction within the meaning of s 588FB of the Corporations Act or as an unfair preference within the meaning of s 588FA of the Corporations Act or both. LSE was placed into voluntary administration on 25 June 2001. Mr Tolcher, the first respondent, was appointed liquidator of LSE on 20 July 2001. The relation back period was 25 December 2000 to 25 June 2001: s 588FE(2). The execution of the Second Deed and each of the payments the subject of the appeal, identified below and totalling $3,751,861.40, fell within the relation back period: The trial judge held each payment was both an unfair preference and an uncommercial transaction and was therefore voidable under s 588FE of the Corporations Act. His Honour ordered Capital Finance to pay LSE the sum of $5,584,009.50. That sum comprised the payments the subject of the appeal totalling $3,751,861.40 together with interest from the date on which the demand was made for the return of those monies. The Capital Companies appealed. For the reasons that follow, I would dismiss the appeal. I consider that there was an uncommercial transaction within the meaning of s 588FB of the Corporations Act. In those circumstances, it is unnecessary to resolve whether there was also an unfair preference within the meaning of s 588FA of the Corporations Act. I do not consider, however, that there was an unfair preference.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by:

The circumstances leading to the execution of the Second Deed show that Capital’s concern was not to recover a debt: in relation to the ongoing operation of the Equipment Rental Agreements, LSE was Capital’s “conduit”, not its debtor. Capital’s concern was to be rid of LSE and the lessees because it had lost confidence in Mr Scott. Officers of Capital used the term “Exposure” to refer, not to a potential liability or loss of capital, but simply to the extent which Capital had an investment in the Equipment Rental Agreements. Capital officers used the notion of a payout amount as the measure of Capital’s exposure in that sense. In order for Capital’s exposure in that sense to be reduced to nil, the Equipment Rental Agreements had to be paid out.CONSIDERATION1. The eight payments were made by NAB to CFAL as purchase money By their Further Amended Originating Process, Mr Tolcher and LSE sought an order that Capital pay LSE an amount equal to each of the eight payments. Capital submits that the eight payments were paid by NAB to CFAL as purchase money to acquire legal and beneficial ownership of particular items of equipment. I agree. CFAL issued invoices to NAB showing amounts for “PAYOUT QUOTE”, “GST” and “TOTAL PAYOUT”, and stating “For Leasing to: Lloyd Scott Enterprises Pty Ltd”. The equipment was already the subject of Equipment Rental Agreements expressed to be made between LSE and the lessees, and NAB was buying the reversion. NAB paid the amounts of the invoices to Capital. LSE did not do so: it did not become indebted to NAB as a borrower in respect of the amounts of the eight payments, although it become liable to NAB as a lessee from NAB. Accordingly, with respect I do not agree with the primary Judge that there were no sales by Capital to NAB. I do not think it to the point that there was no more formal agreement between them: the issue of the tax invoices followed by payment by NAB to CFAL of the amounts of the invoices was sufficient evidence of the sales.2. Were the eight payments also made pursuant to the Second Deed? Capital submits that the purchases by NAB from CFAL supplanted the Second Deed. I accept that the Second Deed remained on foot although Capital and LSE recognised that LSE’s capacity to perform its obligations under it depended on LSE’s being able to refinance. By cl 4.1 of the Second Deed LSE promised Capital that LSE would progressively pay to Capital, at the rates specified in the clause, the amounts that the lessees would have been required to pay to it if they had all requested a termination of their obligations under their Equipment Rental Agreements. The evidence shows that Capital regarded cl 4.1 as pro tanto complied with if, as happened, a financier paid out Equipment Rental Agreements in consideration of thereby acquiring the equipment. The following circumstances show the ongoing recognition of the Second Deed. (1) There was a general correspondence between the aggregate of the three amounts paid by NAB to CFAL on 14 February 2001 and the first payment that was to be made under cl 4.1 of the Second Deed on 11 February 2001, namely, $3 million. On 14 February 2001, the three amounts (identified at [87] of Gordon J’s Reasons for Judgment) totalling $2,736,767.18, were paid by NAB to CFAL. (The amounts that fell due on 11 March, 11 April and 11 May 2001 were not paid, but NAB paid five further amounts totalling $1,015,094.22 to CFAL later in May 2001 – see [87] in Gordon J’s Reasons for Judgment).