TRADE MARKS ACT 1995
DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS
Re:Opposition by Cantarella Bros Pty Ltd to registration of trade mark application 1014051(35) - HOME CAFE - filed in the name of Angela Muller and Hazel Kennedy.
Delegate: | Terry Williams |
Representation: | Opponent: Ron Webb, Senior Counsel, with instructing solicitor from Gilbert + Tobin solicitors Applicant: no appearance |
Decision: | 2007 ATMO 62 S 52 opposition: s 60 – HOME CAFE deceptively similar to CAFÉ AT HOME as used by opponent. Insufficient likelihood of deception or confusion. Registration to proceed. |
Background
Angela Muller and Hazel Kennedy have applied to register the trade mark HOME CAFE. The application has been examined at the Trade Marks Office and accepted for possible registration in respect of services in class 35 and specified as “wholesale/retail of coffee and chocolate and confectionery products.”
Registration of the trade mark is opposed by Cantarella Bros Pty Ltd (“the opponent”). The parties have served and filed evidence to support their respective positions. The opponent then requested a hearing, which the applicants were given the opportunity to attend and which I conducted under delegation from the Registrar of Trade Marks. In terms of sections 52 and 55 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (“the Act”), I am therefore required to decide if the application should be registered. What follows is my decision.
Substantive matter: section 60.
While the opponent nominated a number of grounds of opposition when it filed its notice of opposition to registration, Mr Webb noted that only one ground, s 60, would be pursued at hearing. He argued that the opponent was required to do no more than establish a ground on the balance of probabilities. He relied here on the decision of Gyles J in Pfizer Products Inc v Karam (2006) 70 IPR 599. As I said in McDonald’s Corporation v Future Enterprises Pte Ltd, (2006) 70 IPR 409, this is also the view of delegates of the Registrar, while still being a matter of debate in the lack of resolution in the Full Court of the Federal Court.
Section 60 reads:
60. The registration of a trade mark in respect of particular goods or services may be opposed on the ground that:
(a) it is substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to, a trade mark that, before the priority date for the registration of the first-mentioned trade mark in respect of those goods or services, had acquired a reputation in Australia; and
(b) because of the reputation of that other trade mark, the use of the first-mentioned trade mark would be likely to deceive or cause confusion.
Note 1: For deceptively similar see section 10.
Note 2: For priority date see section 12.
Mr Webb addressed these in order.
Deceptive similarity
This is a threshold test for s 60. The issue is defined by s 10
For the purposes of this Act, a trade mark is taken to be deceptively similar to another trade mark if it so…
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- Case
- [2007] ATMO 62
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Court was whether Kennedy had established a sufficient reason for the delay in providing notice of her claim, thereby justifying the extension of time sought under section 138(2) of the Act. This required the Court to consider the nature of the "sufficient reason" that would permit an extension, and the principles governing the exercise of discretion in granting such an extension, particularly in circumstances where the delay was significant.
The Court, applying the principles established in cases such as *Nominal Defendant v Motor Accidents Insurance Board* [2004] HCA 30, considered the reasons provided by Kennedy for the delay. These included her initial belief that her injuries were not serious, her subsequent medical treatment, and her eventual understanding of the potential for ongoing symptoms and the need to make a claim. The Court found that Kennedy's reasons, while not entirely free from criticism, did constitute a "sufficient reason" for the delay, particularly given her genuine belief about the severity of her injuries and the subsequent medical advice she received. The Court emphasised that the purpose of section 138 was to prevent stale claims and that the discretion to extend time should be exercised having regard to all the circumstances, including the claimant's conduct and the potential prejudice to the insurer.
The Court ordered that the time for Kennedy to give notice of her claim be extended.
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