Cameron v Repatriation Commission

Case [2003] FCA 1323

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Cameron v Repatriation Commission [2003] FCA 1323

VETERAN’S ENTITLEMENT – whether impermissible fact finding under s 120(3) of the Veteran’s Entitlement Act 1986 (Cth) in assessing whether a reasonable hypothesis existed – difference between fact finding or rejecting evidence and assessing and weighing all evidence – conclusion as to lack of reasonable hypothesis a question of fact.

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)s 44

Veteran’s Entitlement Act 1986 (Cth)   ss 120, 175

Bull v Repatriation Commission (2001) 188 ALR 756 applied

Bushell v Repatriation Commission (1992) 175 CLR 408 referred to

Byrnes v Repatriation Commission (1993) 177 CLR 564 referred to

East v Repatriation Commission (1987) 16 FCR 517 referred to

Elliott v Repatriation Commission (2002) 73 ALD 377 discussed

Repatriation Commission v Bey (1997) 79 FCR 364 applied

Repatriation Commission v Deledio (1998) 83 FCR 82 applied

CLARICE CAMERON v REPATRIATION COMMISSION
N 79 of 2003

ALLSOP J
21 NOVEMBER 2003
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 79 of 2003

BETWEEN:

CLARICE CAMERON
APPLICANT

AND:

REPATRIATION COMMISSION
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

ALLSOP J

DATE OF ORDER:

21 NOVEMBER 2003

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the costs of the respondent.

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 79 of 2003

BETWEEN:

CLARICE CAMERON
APPLICANT

AND:

REPATRIATION COMMISSION
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

ALLSOP J

DATE:

21 NOVEMBER 2003

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Background

  1. This is an appeal on a question of law under s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (the AAT Act) from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) dated 8 January 2003 which affirmed the decision of the Repatriation Commission to refuse the applicant’s claim for a widow’s pension under the Veteran’s Entitlement Act 1986 (Cth) (the Act).

  2. The error of law identified in the notice of appeal was expressed as follows:

    Whether the Tribunal erred in law in its application of section 120 of the [Act].

  3. The submissions of the applicant provided some more illumination as to the nature of the error of law:

    …the tribunal erred in its interpretation of section 120 of the Act in that it prematurely and at the incorrect standard of proof made findings of fact.

  4. The nature of the asserted error and the submissions made require careful attention to the fact finding and reasoning process of the Tribunal, not, it should be emphasised, to ascertain the correctness or otherwise of the facts as found, but, rather, to see whether an approach was adopted contrary to that laid down by s 120 of the Act and the cases illuminating its operation.

  5. The applicant’s late husband (Mr Cameron) was a veteran as defined in the Act.  He rendered operational service from 6 May 1942 to 14 December 1945.

  6. Mr Cameron died on 18 April 1980, when he was…

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Details
AGLC
Cameron v Repatriation Commission [2003] FCA 1323
Case
[2003] FCA 1323
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Cameron v Repatriation Commission involved the applicant, Mrs Cameron, seeking to challenge a decision made by the Tribunal regarding the circumstances of her husband's death. Mrs Cameron argued that her late husband's war-caused chronic bronchitis led to bouts of pneumonia, which ultimately debilitated him to the point of being unable to react to an oncoming car, resulting in his death. The Tribunal, however, found no reasonable hypothesis connecting the veteran's death with his circumstances of service. The central issue before the court was whether the Tribunal erred in its assessment of the evidence presented and whether it engaged in inadmissible fact-finding contrary to established legal principles.

The court needed to determine if the Tribunal's findings were legally sound, particularly whether it adhered to the proper legal course in evaluating the evidence. The applicant contended that the Tribunal erred by engaging in inadmissible fact-finding, contrary to the principles set out in Deledio and the reasoning in Bull. The applicant claimed that the Tribunal should not have discounted the reasonable hypothesis presented without sufficient justification. The court's task was to review the Tribunal's decision and ensure it complied with legal standards regarding evidence and hypothesis formulation.

In its decision, the court found that the Tribunal did not engage in inadmissible fact-finding. The court upheld the Tribunal's reasoning, affirming that there was no reasonable hypothesis connecting the veteran's death to his war service. The court examined the evidence and concluded that the Tribunal's assessment was legally sound. The court held that the Tribunal appropriately considered the evidence, including statements from Mrs Cameron and medical experts, and rightly concluded that the presented hypothesis was not reasonable. Consequently, the court dismissed the application and ordered the applicant to pay the costs of the respondent.

The court's final orders were that the application be dismissed and that the applicant pay the costs of the respondent. This outcome affirmed the Tribunal's decision, maintaining that the hypothesis linking the veteran's death to his war-caused chronic bronchitis was not substantiated by the evidence presented.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the costs of the respondent.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In essence, the applicant says that the Tribunal, in coming to its opinion that there was no relevant reasonable hypothesis, engaged in inadmissible fact finding, contrary to the course laid out in the passage cited from Deledio and in [21] of the reasons of Emmett J and me in Bull, set out above.The Evidence Before, the Reasoning of, and the Decision of, the Tribunal The issues before, and the hypothesis put to, the Tribunal were set out in [5] to [7] of the Tribunal’s reasons:5.The hypothesis put forward by the Applicant is that the Veteran's war caused chronic bronchitis gave rise to a number of bouts of pneumonia, the latest of which developed a few days before his death. It was put that the Veteran's pneumonia debilitated him and made him unable to properly react to an oncoming car and he was subsequently hit by the car and killed. 6. As noted above, the parties agreed that the Veteran had war caused chronic bronchitis and that the cause of death was a tear to the thoracic aorta and severe trauma caused by the impact of the motor vehicle. The parties also agreed that both death by tear to the thoracic aorta and pneumonia are not the subject of SoPs and so the Tribunal must look to the material before it to decide whether it raises a reasonable hypothesis connecting the Veteran's death with the circumstances of his service. 7. Given the parties' agreement that the Veteran's chronic bronchitis is war caused and that the Veteran's death was caused by the impact of the motor vehicle, the Tribunal must turn its attention to the "connecting" aspects of the hypothesis and decide whether the material before it points to the hypothesis that the Veteran developed pneumonia before the accident (and had pneumonia at the time of the accident) and, if so, rendered the Veteran unable to properly react to an oncoming car. Later in its reasons, the Tribunal expressed the hypothesis put forward in the following terms:27. The hypothesis put forward by the Applicant is that the Veteran's chronic bronchitis gave rise to pneumonia some three days prior to the Veteran's death and that pneumonia produced a fever and consequent delirium and confusion which rendered the Veteran unable to protect himself or remove himself from the path of an oncoming vehicle. The Tribunal received into evidence a statement from Mrs Cameron dated 28 November 2002, oral evidence from Mrs Cameron and statements from medical experts – namely, a report of Dr Funnell dated 29 May 2002, a report of Dr Burns dated 19 July 2002, a second report of Dr Burns dated 27 November 2002 and a report of Professor Breslin dated 11 November 2002, as well as documents relating to the Inquest produced by Mudgee Local Court. The Tribunal dealt with the applicant’s evidence, at [10] to [12] of its reasons, as follows:10.The Veteran, according to the Applicant, was always very sick after his discharge from the army. He had become a heavy smoker during service, increasing his consumption of tobacco by three or four times the amount he had smoked when he joined the army. The Veteran developed pneumonia at one stage in the army and after that his chest was "very bad". He would get sick and be confined to bed for few days every month. The Veteran retired in 1973 because of chest problems and tried to help his son with building work he was doing but was unable to do so because of his chest. 11.The Applicant said that three days before the Veteran died he developed pneumonia and was coughing up blood. She arranged to have the local doctor visit him at home and he was told not to leave his bed. On the day he died the Veteran was concerned about the council rates being due and attracting interest if they were not paid and so at about lunch time he walked up to the council offices and paid the rates. He returned home on foot about an hour later and spent some time lying down reading the paper. According to the Applicant, the Veteran then, at about 4pm, walked a few blocks to the Court House Hotel and had "a couple of beers" with his son and walked back. The Applicant said the Veteran would generally visit the Hotel about three times per week. Later in the day or in the evening he rode with his daughter and son in law in their car to the Court House Hotel to purchase some wine for some visitors. He was struck down crossing the road at that time. 12. The Applicant said that after the inquest she left Mudgee because she did not want to see the woman who knocked the Veteran down. She considered that that woman had told a lot of lies in relation to the Veteran's death.

Decision

Reasons for decision

ALLSOP J

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: ALLSOP J

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