FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Caason Investments Pty Ltd v Cao (No 2) [2015] FCAFC 192
Citation: Caason Investments Pty Ltd v Cao (No 2) [2015] FCAFC 192 Appeal from: Caason Investments Pty Ltd v Cao [2014] FCA 1410 Parties: CAASON INVESTMENTS PTY LIMITED (ACN 089 590 858) and WISE PLAN PTY LTD (ACN 007 008 577) v SIMON XIAO FAN CAO, CHARLES MAO, LARRY MARSHALL, GEORGE SYCIP, JI RAN LAURIE KAN, IAN RICHARD NEAL, ANTHONY JOHN SURTEES, SIMON JEREMY NEWTON GRAY, JAMES ABERDEIN HARVEY, PHILIP SYDNEY PATERSON, DEAN LLOYD MARSH, JOHN STEVEN WESTAWAY, TIMOTHY WILLIAM MURTON, DARREN CRAIG KLENK, MALCOLM STEVEN WIGHT, DEAN BRIAN CROOK, DALE JOHN RYAN, STEPHEN HAROLD KUCHAR, GEOFFREY ALLAN LLOYD and JUSTIN LUKE HUMPHREY File number: NSD 269 of 2015 Judge: GILMOUR, FOSTER AND EDELMAN JJ Date of judgment: 22 December 2015 Catchwords: COSTS – whether, in circumstances where the Full Court has allowed an appeal from a decision of a single judge of the Court not to permit the plaintiffs to amend their Statement of Claim and then has re-exercised the Court’s discretion in respect of that application to amend by permitting amendments some of which were not brought forward before the primary judge, it was appropriate for the Full Court to set aside the order for costs made by the primary judge in respect of the hearing before her and make such order for costs as, in all the circumstances, the Full Court considered to be just – whether, in the events which have happened, the costs of the appellants incurred before the primary judge should be paid or substantially paid by the respondents
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether a dissenting judge should express reasons concerning a consequential issue
Legislation: Australian Securities and Investments Act 2001 (Cth), s 12DA
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 728, 729, 1041H
Corporations Law (Cth), s 232
Fair Trading Act 1999 (Vic), s 9
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 43Cases cited: Akron Securities v Iliffe (No 2) [1997] NSWCA 11
Aktas v Westpac Banking Corporation Ltd (No 2) (2010) 241 CLR 570
Basic Inc v Levinson 485 U.S. 224 (1998)
Caason Investments Pty Limited v Cao [2014] FCA 1410
Caason Investments Pty Ltd v Cao [2015] FCAFC 94
CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172
CSR Ltd v Eddy (2005) 226 CLR 1
Deutsche Morgan Grenfell Group Plc v Inland Revenue [2006] UKHL 49; [2007] 1 AC 558
Halliburton Co. v Erica P. John Fund Inc 573 U.S. 1 (2014)
Hepples v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1992) 173 CLR 492
Kazar (Liquidator) v Kargarian (2011) 197 FCR 113
South-West Forest Defence Foundation Inc v Executive Director of the Department of Conservation & Land Management (1998) 154 ALR 411
Vines v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2007) 73 NSWLR 451Gageler S and Lim B, “Collective irrationality and the doctrine of precedent” (2015) 38 Melbourne University Law Review 525
Date of hearing: 29 June 2015 and then decided on the papers Date of last submissions:
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- Case
- [2015] FCAFC 192
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether, given the Full Court had allowed the appeal and permitted amendments that were not presented to the primary judge, it was appropriate to set aside the primary judge's order for costs and make a new order. Additionally, the court needed to determine whether the costs incurred by the appellants before the primary judge should be paid or substantially paid by the respondents. The court also considered whether a dissenting judge should express reasons on a consequential issue.
The Full Court set aside the primary judge's order for costs and made a new order for costs. The court found that it was appropriate to set aside the primary judge's order because the Full Court had allowed the appeal and permitted amendments that were not presented to the primary judge. The Full Court ordered that the respondents pay 75% of the appellants' costs of and incidental to the hearing before the primary judge. The court reasoned that the respondents' opposition to the amendments was not unreasonable and that the appellants should bear some responsibility for not making the necessary concessions earlier. The Full Court did not consider it necessary for the dissenting judge to express reasons on the consequential issue of costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Order 7 made by Farrell J on 6 March 2015 be set aside.
2. In lieu thereof, the second to twentieth respondents pay 75% of the appellants’ costs of and incidental to the hearing before Farrell J of their Interlocutory Application filed on 21 March 2014 as taxed or agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
By these Reasons for Judgment, we determine the question of the costs of the hearing of the application before the primary judge in light of our decision in the appeal. CONSIDERATION Before the primary judge, the appellants succeeded in securing:(1)An order providing for the consolidation of the two Arasor proceedings in her Honour’s docket;(2)The Court’s approval in respect of certain minor amendments to their pleading; and(3)The Court’s acceptance in principle that it was open to the appellants to plead market-based causation in respect of their claims based upon the respondents’ alleged misleading and deceptive conduct in respect of two prospectuses and several Financial Statements although the primary judge also observed in respect of these claims that they had not been adequately pleaded. Before her Honour, the appellants failed in their argument that direct or individual reliance was not a necessary integer of the claims which they sought to make pursuant to s 728 and s 729 of the Act. Her Honour took the view that such reliance was a necessary element of such a claim and therefore held that, unless such reliance was pleaded and the claims thereby confined to claims where direct reliance was able to be pleaded and established, leave to amend should be refused. This is the matter in respect of which we disagreed with the primary judge. The primary judge did not deal with the question of costs in her Reasons for Judgment published on 23 December 2014. At [126] of those Reasons, her Honour said that she would afford to the parties an opportunity to be heard on the question of costs. Then, on 24 December 2014, her Honour made an order requiring the parties to confer on the issue of costs. She also fixed a date for any necessary argument in respect of costs in the event that agreement could not be reached. On 4 March 2015, the primary judge heard argument in respect of the orders to be made in light of her Reasons for Judgment and in respect of costs. On that occasion, Counsel who appeared for the appellants sought an order reserving the costs of the Interlocutory Application filed by the appellants on 21 March 2014. He accepted that the costs thrown away by the orders for consolidation and the minor amendments allowed by the Court should be paid by the appellants. Otherwise, he submitted that costs should be reserved. The respondents argued that they should have their costs of the appellants’ Interlocutory Application because her Honour had disallowed the amendments by which they had sought to raise market-based causation. At the conclusion of argument, her Honour said (p 17, ll 4–17):HER HONOUR: Okay. Beguiling as Mr Hyde’s submissions usually are, I don’t think he’s won on these ones. I do consider that it is appropriate to order that the applicants pay the costs in respect of each of the heads that you’ve identified. For the reasons that even though I made orders that would permit consolidation, in light of the concessions that were ultimately made by the applicant, I don’t think that the opposition was unreasonable to the pleading as originally propounded. I always have a difficulty when parties finally make a concession – in essence punishing it – but it isn’t a punishment, it’s, I think, an indication that it would have been appropriate for there to have been an earlier coming to the realisation that some of those issues needed to be dealt with in terms of time.MR HYDE: May it please the court.HER HONOUR: I realise sometimes it only comes out in argument, but at the end of the day I think that opposition wasn’t an unnecessary or futile opposition.