C v The Independent Commissioner Against Corruption

The Supreme Court of South Australia, constituted by Kourakis CJ, Stanley and Bleby JJ, considered an application for judicial review brought by a public officer against the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption (ICAC). The applicant sought to quash decisions made by the Commissioner to vary directions regarding the non-communication of evidence given during an investigation into alleged corruption. The applicant also sought declarations and injunctions to prevent the use of compulsorily obtained evidence in subsequent investigations.

The central legal issues before the Court were whether the Commissioner had afforded the applicant procedural fairness when varying the non-communication directions, and whether the Commissioner had failed to take into account relevant considerations. Specifically, the applicant argued that the Commissioner should have provided notice and an opportunity to comment before varying the directions, particularly concerning potential prejudice to the applicant's safety or reputation. Further issues concerned the Commissioner's discretion to make multiple or modified assessments during an investigation and the permissible use of evidence obtained in one investigation for the purposes of another under section 56A of the ICAC Act.

A majority of the Court, comprising Bleby and Stanley JJ, summarily dismissed the application for judicial review. They reasoned that the ordinary meaning of "reputation" within the statutory context did not extend to prejudice in the eyes of those to whom disclosures were legally required for the purposes of the investigation itself. Furthermore, the Court held that "safety" in this context referred to physical safety, not psychological harm. Regarding the Commissioner's discretion, the Court found it was open to the Commissioner to make multiple assessments, and that section 56A of the ICAC Act permitted the use of evidence obtained in one investigation for any other investigation. Kourakis CJ dissented in part, finding that Ground 1 was reasonably arguable and that there was a statutory indication to afford witnesses an opportunity to disclose risks to their safety or reputation.

The majority ordered the summary dismissal of the plaintiff's application for judicial review, with costs to be heard.