C v L & ORS

Case [2005] SASC 315

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court)

C v L & ORS

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Justice Besanko, The Honourable Justice Anderson and The Honourable Justice Layton)

18 August 2005

DEFAMATION - STATEMENTS AMOUNTING TO DEFAMATION - IN GENERAL

DEFAMATION - FAIR COMMENT

DEFAMATION - DAMAGES - GENERAL DAMAGES - ASSESSMENT - SPECIAL MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED BY JURY - AGGRAVATION

Appeal and cross-appeal against orders made by Judge of District Court awarding plaintiff damages for defamation – interview with first defendant for television programme relating to breakdown of her de facto relationship with the plaintiff and action under the De Facto Relationships Act 1996 – reference to the plaintiff treating women “like a doormat” – meaning conveyed to the ordinary reasonable viewer – relevance of most damaging meaning of words – defence of fair comment on matter of public interest – foundation of fact – assessment of damages – loss of reputation – grief or annoyance – matters of aggravation – partial justification – damages awarded manifestly inadequate – appeal allowed for the purpose of increasing damages – cross-appeal dismissed.

De Facto Relationships Act 1996 ss 10, 11; Supreme Court Rules 1987 rr 78.03, 95.01, referred to.
L v C [2002] SADC 36, discussed.
Pamplin v Express Newspapers [1988] 1 WLR 116; Gumina v Williams (No 2) (1990) 3 WAR 351; Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1966) 117 CLR 118; Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1963] 1 QB 340; Mirror Newspapers Ltd v Harrison (1982) 149 CLR 293; Farquhar v Bottom & Anor [1980] 2 NSWLR 380; Chakravarti v Advertiser Newspapers Ltd (1966) 65 SASR 527; Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd v Marsden (1998) 43 NSWLR 158; Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234; Chakravarti v Advertiser Newspapers Ltd (1998) 193 CLR 519; Corse v Robinson (unreported, Supreme Court of Western Australia, Malcolm CJ, Owen and Steytler JJ, 8 December 1997); Nationwide News Pty Ltd & Ors v Abboud & Anor (unreported, Supreme Court of Western Australia, Malcolm CJ, Pidgeon and Franklyn JJ, 12 September 1996); John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v ACP Publishing Pty Ltd [2005] ACTCA 12; Ronci v Nationwide News Pty Ltd & Anor (unreported, Supreme Court of Western Australia, Steytler J, 21 June 1996); Keays v Murdoch Magazines (UK) Ltd & Anor [1991] 1 WLR 1184; Mapp v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1998] QB 520; McCann v Scottish Media Newspapers Ltd (2000) SLR 256 OH; Pryke v Advertiser Newspapers Ltd (1984) 37 SASR 175; London Artists Ltd v Littler [1969] 2 QB 375; Farquhar v Bottom & Anor [1980] 2 NSWLR 380; Bellino v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1996) 185 CLR 183; Rocca v Manhire (1992) 57 SASR 224; Conservation Council of SA Inc v Chapman (2003) 87 SASR 62; Peterson v Advertiser Newspapers Ltd (1995) 64 SASR 152; Coyne v Citizen Finance Ltd (1991) 172 CLR 211

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Details
AGLC
C v L & ORS [2005] SASC 460
Case
[2005] SASC 315
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal and cross-appeal were brought by the plaintiff against the first defendant and others, following a decision by the District Court awarding the plaintiff damages for defamation. The defamation arose from an interview with the first defendant for a television program concerning the breakdown of her de facto relationship with the plaintiff. During the interview, the first defendant referred to the plaintiff treating women "like a doormat." The key issue was whether this statement amounted to defamation and, if so, whether it was a fair comment on a matter of public interest. Other issues included the assessment of damages, particularly the consideration of special matters by the jury, such as aggravation, and whether the damages awarded were manifestly inadequate.

The court examined the meaning conveyed to the ordinary reasonable viewer and found that the most damaging meaning of the words referred to the plaintiff treating women in a degrading manner. The court also considered the defence of fair comment on a matter of public interest, examining whether the comment was based on facts and whether those facts were matters of public interest. The court found that the first defendant's statement was not based on facts and did not relate to a matter of public interest. The court further assessed the damages awarded, considering the loss of reputation, grief or annoyance, and matters of aggravation. It concluded that the damages awarded were manifestly inadequate.

The appeal was allowed for the purpose of increasing the damages awarded to the plaintiff, and the cross-appeal was dismissed. The court found that the award of damages was insufficient to adequately compensate the plaintiff for the defamation suffered. The precise amount of additional damages was to be determined in a further hearing.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

The plaintiff requires an extension of time within which to institute the appeal. It seems that he filed his notice of appeal within time, but he did not serve the notice of appeal on the defendants within time. To be properly instituted an appeal must be both filed and served within time (r 95.01 Supreme Court Rules 1987). The defendants also submit that the plaintiff did not serve an application to extend time within the period fixed by me sitting as a single Judge of the Court. Whilst I do not think this particular point is a reason not to extend the time for the institution of the appeal, the plaintiff’s submission that it was irrelevant because the order did not in terms require service lacked merit. In terms of the application to extend time within which to institute the appeal, the delay in this case is not significant, being in the order of five days, and the defendants frankly acknowledge that they are not able to identify any prejudice as a result of the delay. I am satisfied that the time for the institution of the appeal should be extended. It follows that the defendants’ application to have the appeal struck out as incompetent must be dismissed.Background facts The Judge made a number of findings about the respective backgrounds of the plaintiff and the first defendant and about their relationship. For the purposes of the appeal it is sufficient to set out those findings in summary form. The plaintiff was born in November 1935 in rural New South Wales. He graduated in pharmacy from The University of Sydney and shortly afterwards he travelled to the United Kingdom, where he met the woman who was to become his first wife. They married in Australia in 1962 and moved to Adelaide to live. The plaintiff obtained employment in a pharmacy at Elizabeth Park. Over time the plaintiff purchased various delicatessens and supermarkets. He became wealthy and by about mid-1988 his assets totalled in excess of $3 million. In 1986 the plaintiff purchased a house and land at Yatala Vale and also vacant land at Walkerville upon which he and his wife intended to build a small residence. On 13 May 1987, the plaintiff’s wife died. The first defendant was born in January 1944. After leaving school at age 18 years she worked as a dental nurse and then in a photographic studio. She married in September 1964 and in April 1970 a daughter of the marriage was born. In 1975 the first defendant undertook a beautician’s course and subsequently she obtained work in the beauty industry. In 1976 the first defendant separated from her husband and they were divorced in the following year. The first defendant’s employment in the beauty industry led to various promotions and by 1979 she was the South Australian Sales Manager for Bentley Fragrances. The Judge found that the first defendant held a responsible position which involved a considerable amount of travel. At the time the first defendant met the plaintiff in Adelaide on 17 January 1988 she had assets valued at about $175,000.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

ANDERSON J LAYTON J

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: ANDERSON J, LAYTON J

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