FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BZY15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 323
Appeal from: BZY15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 2051 File number: VID 982 of 2017 Judge: STEWARD J Date of judgment: 14 March 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing an application for judicial review – procedural fairness – whether Tribunal’s decision was irrational or illogical – no jurisdictional error – appeal dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 425 Cases cited: Bains v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 205 FCR 217
BZY15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 2051
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611
Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141
SZBELv Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152
Date of hearing: 28 February 2018 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 27 Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter Counsel for the Respondents: Mr C Tran Solicitor for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
VID 982 of 2017 BETWEEN: BZY15
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
STEWARD J
DATE OF ORDER:
14 MARCH 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
STEWARD J:
INTRODUCTION
This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court (the “FCC”) dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) affirming a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (the “Minister”) to refuse the grant of a Protection visa pursuant to s 36(2)(a) or, alternatively, s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the “Act”).
The appellant is a Tamil male from Sri Lanka who arrived in Australia in 2012. He applied for a Protection visa in November 2012 and the Minister refused to grant that visa on 26 August 2013.
PROCEEDING IN THE TRIBUNAL
The appellant was represented before the Tribunal by his registered migration agent. The hearing was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter. The Tribunal considered the appellant’s claims to the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (as it then was), the appellant’s pre-hearing statement, submissions prepared by the appellant’s migration agent and the oral submissions made before it.
Significant to these proceedings is the appellant’s claim that his uncle was a member of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (the “LTTE”). He claimed that his uncle stayed with the appellant and his family for a period of 20-25 days; that his uncle was abducted and killed on 25 December 2014; and that the Sinhalese community was…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read BZY15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2018] FCA 323
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central issue before the court was whether the decision of the Tribunal was irrational or illogical, and whether there had been a jurisdictional error. The appellant argued that the Tribunal's reasons were not logical or rational and that there had been a jurisdictional error. The Minister argued that the appeal should be dismissed, as the appellant had not shown any basis for appellate interference.
The court held that the appellant's submissions amounted to no more than emphatic disagreement with the conclusion of fact reached by the Tribunal. The court found that the Tribunal had provided sufficient notice to the appellant that his uncle's membership of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam was an issue, and that the appellant had been given an opportunity to present evidence and arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review. The court concluded that the Tribunal's decision was rational and logical, and that there had been no jurisdictional error. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed with costs.
In summary, the court dismissed the appeal against the decision of the FCC which had dismissed the appellant's application for judicial review. The court found that the Tribunal's decision was rational and logical, and that there had been no jurisdictional error. The appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the Minister.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
By Notice of Appeal dated 12 September 2017, the decision of the FCC was appealed to this Court. The notice identified three grounds of appeal – (1)that the FCC decision contained jurisdictional error;(2)that the Tribunal’s reasons were neither logical or rational;(3)that further grounds of appeal would be provided once the appellant had secured legal representation.The second ground of appeal was wholly new. Over the objection of the Minister, I gave the appellant leave to rely on it. CONSIDERATION The appellant was self-represented before me and did not provide a written outline of submissions, nor did he identify any additional grounds of appeal. The Minister was represented by Mr Tran of counsel who gave, in my view, very fair and proper assistance to the appellant. The general plea that the decision of the FCC was infected with jurisdictional error is rejected. It is not supported by any particular expressed error of law identifiable in the reasons of the learned primary judge. To the extent that it involves the same three matters in relation to the s 425 issue that was alive before the primary judge, in my view, the FCC was correct to decide that s 425 was complied with and that the appellant was not denied procedural fairness by the Tribunal. It will be recalled that the appellant put his s 425 case in three different ways. The first ground was that the Tribunal failed to disclose to the appellant that it did not believe that his uncle was a member of the LTTE. Superficially, this complaint has some merit because the Minister had previously accepted the uncle’s membership of the LTTE and it is plain from the reasons for decision of the Tribunal that the member below had mistakenly thought otherwise. However, a careful review of the transcript of the hearing in the Tribunal satisfies me that the appellant was put sufficiently on notice that his uncle’s membership of the LTTE was an issue. The governing principle here is well known. In SZBELv Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152, Gleeson CJ, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ said at par [33]:The Act defines the nature of the opportunity to be heard that is to be given to an applicant for review by the Tribunal. The applicant is to be invited “to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review” (s 425(1) (emphasis added)). The reference to “the issues arising in relation to the decision under review” is important. At par [36], the court observed that, subject to being given notice, an appellant before the Tribunal was entitled to assume that the reasons given by the delegate for refusing to grant the application would identify the issues for the purposes of s 425. At par [38], the court then said:When it is said, in the present matter, that the appellant was not put on notice by the Tribunal that his account of certain events would be rejected as “implausible”, and that this conclusion was “not obviously … open on the known material”, the focus of the contention must fall upon what was “obviously … open” in the Tribunal's review. That can be identified only by having regard to “the issues arising in relation to the decision under review”. It is those issues which will determine whether rejection of critical aspects of an applicant's account of events was “obviously … open on the known material”.