BZN16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BZN16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 54

Appeal from: BZN16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 1067
File number: NSD 899 of 2017
Judge: GLEESON J
Date of judgment: 9 February 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from a decision of Federal Circuit Court of Australia – no appellable error identified in the decision below – appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5J, 36, 473DC, 473DD

Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CRY16 [2017] FCAFC 210

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZTQS [2015] FCA 1069; (2015) 148 ALD 507

SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 68

SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34

SZTAP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 175; (2015) 238 FCR 404

Date of hearing: 1 November 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 39
Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr J Kay Hoyle
Solicitor for the Respondents: Clayton Utz

ORDERS

NSD 899 of 2017
BETWEEN:

BZN16

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

GLEESON J

DATE OF ORDER:

9 FEBRUARY 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

GLEESON J:

  1. This is an appeal from a decision of a judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (“FCCA”) dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (“IAA”): BZN16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 1067 (“FCCA judgment”). In its decision, the IAA affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (“Minister”) that she was not satisfied that Australia had protection obligations to the appellant pursuant to ss 36(2)(a) and 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“Act”).

  2. The appellant’s notice of appeal contains the following single ground of appeal:

    The Federal circuit court judge committed a legal error in dismissing my case. The judge failed to consider all of the grounds that was raised and filled [sic] to consider arguments put forward by my representative.

  3. The appellant was not legally represented on the appeal and did not file written submissions. He appeared at the hearing of the appeal with the assistance of a Tamil interpreter.

    BACKGROUND TO APPEAL

  4. The appellant is a Sri Lankan male citizen who departed Sri Lanka by boat in September 2012 and arrived in Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival (“UMA”). Although the appellant made an application for a protection visa on 6 February 2013, he was considered to be an unlawful non-citizen and, consequently,…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 54
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of BZN16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved an appeal by a Sri Lankan citizen who had applied for a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa after arriving in Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival. The appellant claimed protection based on his political affiliations, ethnicity, and alleged links to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. The application was refused by the Minister's delegate, and the decision was affirmed by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA). The appellant subsequently appealed to the Federal Court of Australia, which reviewed the decision of the FCCA.

The central legal issue before the Federal Court was whether the FCCA judge had erred in upholding the delegate's decision. The appellant's grounds of appeal primarily focused on the IAA's assessment of the appellant's claims and the reasonableness of relocating within Sri Lanka to avoid harm. The appellant argued that the IAA had failed to adequately address the local nature of the risk and the practicality of relocation.

The Federal Court found that the FCCA judge did not commit any appellable error in his treatment of the grounds of appeal. The Court held that the IAA's approach to the statutory test of harm was correct, as it considered the risk of harm across the entirety of Sri Lanka. The Court noted that the IAA had, in fact, considered the reasonableness of relocation, albeit under the context of complementary protection rather than the statutory definition of a well-founded fear of persecution. The Court accepted that the IAA's assessment of relocation was sufficient and that the appellant's claims challenged the factual basis and correctness of the IAA's findings rather than any error by the FCCA judge.

Given the findings, the Federal Court dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal. The Court concluded that there was no appellable error in the FCCA judge's decision, and the appeal was without merit.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant was not legally represented on the appeal and did not file written submissions. He appeared at the hearing of the appeal with the assistance of a Tamil interpreter.BACKGROUND TO APPEAL The appellant is a Sri Lankan male citizen who departed Sri Lanka by boat in September 2012 and arrived in Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival (“UMA”). Although the appellant made an application for a protection visa on 6 February 2013, he was considered to be an unlawful non-citizen and, consequently, the application was considered to be invalid. Subsequently, pursuant to the provisions of the Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (Cth) (“Caseload Act”), the appellant was invited to, and did, make an application for a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa dated 7 October 2015. The application was refused by the Minister’s delegate on 20 May 2016.Appellant’s claims for protection and the IAA’s findings The Minister’s written submissions recorded the following matters concerning the appellant’s claims for protection and the IAA’s findings, which the appellant did not appear to dispute:5.The appellant is of Tamil ethnicity from Batticaloa in Sri Lanka. In general terms, the appellant claimed to fear harm from the Sri Lankan authorities because of his political opinion, his ethnicity and his membership of a particular social group. His support for the Tamil National Alliance (“TNP”) put him at risk from the authorities and the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (“TMVP”).6.The appellant’s claims involved two broad sets of facts. First, he claimed that in March 2011 he was arrested and detained by the Sri Lankan Army (“SLA”). He was questioned about his links to the LTTE and then beaten. Later, in November 2011, an intelligence group called the appellant’s mother about the appellant’s LTTE links and made an extortion demand.7.Secondly, the appellant claimed that he helped the TNA during the election period or when the TNA held rallies. In March 2012, members of the TMVP threatened the appellant, asking him to do work for them. The appellant joined the TNA in July 2012 and distributed leaflets for the TNA candidate. Thereafter, he was subjected to increasing harassment from the TMVP, including a death threat in August 2012 and a visit to his house where someone broke the windscreen of his vehicle. The TMVP members threatened to kill the appellant’s father. The appellant was advised not to lodge a complaint about TMVP members because they had connections with the police and government. On 31 August 2012, he sought refuge in the home of a priest.8.The IAA’s reasons are set out at [6]-[80] of the Decision. The IAA essentially agreed with the delegate that the appellant’s claims were credible. However, the IAA was not satisfied, including based on country information, that there was a real chance the appellant would suffer serious or significant harm on the bases he claimed. The IAA’s reasons were, in outline:(a)it was not satisfied that the appellant would face serious harm from the TMVP outside of Batticaloa. Although the appellant would not necessarily be able to secure state protection from the authorities in his home area, the Sri Lankan authorities, intelligence and security forces would not have any interest in the appellant directly. There were no official laws or policies that discriminated on the basis of political opinion and no evidence of systematic political discrimination. The IAA was satisfied that outside Batticaloa the appellant could support the TNA, which had a national presence, without interference. The IAA concluded that there was nothing in the appellant’s profile or past that would cause him to be targeted by the authorities. (at [31]-[38] and specifically at [36]);(b)it did not accept, based on country information, that the appellant faced a real chance of being harmed for reasons of his Tamil ethnicity. The appellant did not have any additional profile as a Tamil that would put him at risk from the authorities or the Sinhalese population (at [39]-[45]);(c)based on country information the Sri Lankan authorities would have no interest in the appellant on the basis of any LTTE connection (at [46]-[48]);(d)it was not satisfied that, based on country information, failed asylum seekers are targeted for harm or are imputed to hold political or other opinion or are generally at risk (at [49]-[53]);(e)it was not satisfied that any processes or penalties to which the appellant may be subjected as a result of leaving Sri Lanka illegally would constitute a real chance of serious harm (at [51]-[61]).9.In relation to complementary protection, the IAA concluded that if the appellant returned home to Batticaloa there was a real chance the appellant would be arbitrarily deprived of his life. However, it found that it would be reasonable for the appellant to relocate to an area outside of Batticaloa. The risk of harm from the TMVP was confined to the appellant’s home area and the authorities would have no interest in him if he returned to Sri Lanka. The appellant was asked at the delegate’s interview about whether he would be able to relocate outside of Batticaloa (at [74]) and the IAA considered his responses. The IAA noted that although the appellant had experienced a degree of trauma and may feel depressed at his current situation, the appellant continued to have family support in Sri Lanka, was educated with considerable work experience and trade skills, was well-regarded and there “was no obvious reason” why the appellant could not relocate to another area where the risk of harm from the TMVP was not present (at [72]-[78]).(footnotes omitted)FCCA judgment

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Accordingly, I accept that the FCCA judge did not err in his treatment of ground 3.CONCLUSION The appeal must be dismissed. Costs should follow the event.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Accordingly, the Minister submitted, there was no appellable error in the FCCA judge’s failure to accept either of these grounds of the amended application. CONSIDERATION The matters raised by the appellant orally do not demonstrate error on the part of the FCCA judge. Rather, they challenge the factual basis of the decision of the IAA (and the Minister’s delegate) and the correctness of the findings that the appellant would be able to live in Sri Lanka, outside of Batticaloa, without a real chance of suffering serious or significant harm on the bases he claimed. I will adopt, in the appellant’s favour, the Minister’s assumption that the appellant’s appeal included the grounds in his amended application to the FCCA. As a result of the matters set out at [11] above, there is no appellable error in relation to the FCCA judge’s reasons concerning these two grounds. The other two grounds are considered below.Relocation The first ground of review in the amended application is:1.The [IAA] found that there was real chance that [the appellant] would be seriously harmed for his political support for TNA … The [IAA] finds it is reasonable for the Applicant to relocate to Colombo … The [IAA] committed jurisdictional error made findings by having regard to the entirety of issues and/ or failing to address all relevant matters in relation to the applicant’s circumstances. The [IAA] erred when it failed to address whether the risk was local and whether the Applicant would be able to avoid such risks.Particulars1.1The evidence relied upon by the [IAA’s] finding in support the relocation findings does not address at the relevant matters (such as family network) but relies on the [IAA’s] finding on country information that TMVP and associates only operative only in the north rather than addressing the relevant issues supporting the conclusion.1.2The [IAA] failed to deal with reasonableness and practicality of relocating in accordance with the Act.1.3The [IAA] has failed to address the Applicant’s claims of fear throughout Sri Lanka.1.4 The [IAA] has committed jurisdictional error.Minister’s submissions The Minister made the following relevant written submissions:13.The Caseload Act amended the Act so as to remove references to the UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 1951 (“Refugee Convention” or “Convention”). In its place, it provided for a codified regime based on the Refugee Convention that, among other things, provided for a statutory definition of what constituted a well-founded fear of persecution. In that regard, the changes included the introduction of s.5J(1)(c), which states that a person has a well-founded fear of persecution if, among other things, “the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of a receiving country”.14.Prior to the introduction of s.5J(1)(c), it was well-established that under the Refugee Convention a person did not have a well-founded fear of persecution if it was reasonable for that person to relocate to a safe area outside the area where that person may suffer harm: Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437; SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 233 CLR 18; SZFDV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 233 CLR 51.15.It is submitted that, properly construed, s.5J(1)(c) – unlike the prior position before its introduction – does not require the concept of relocation to be referrable to considerations of reasonableness. That construction is evident both from the natural meaning of the plain words of the section and the terms of the Explanatory Memorandum to the Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Bill 2014 (which stated that “it is the Government’s intention that the principle will no longer encompass the consideration of whether the relocation is “reasonable” in light of the individual circumstances of the person” (at [1183]). This construction has been accepted in the Federal Circuit Court: DFE16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 308 at [26]; EDA16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 768 at [42]. The issue has also been the subject of some consideration by this Court: per Logan J in CDZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 967 at [11]-[28] (“CDZ16”); per Robertson J in BBO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 212 at [70]-[75] (“BBO16”).16.Consistently with this construction of s.5J(1)(c), which the first respondent submits is the correct one, the IAA’s approach was correct, focused as it was on the statutory test of the harm to which the appellant may be exposed in the entirety of the receiving country: [31]-[38] of the Decision. To that extent, his Honour’s conclusion at [35] of the Judgment was correct. It should be noted that there was, in fact, no necessity – for the reasons explained above – to advert to concepts of reasonableness in this context. To that extent, the first respondent does not accept his Honour’s view that it is correct to characterise s.5J as incorporating an element of reasonableness. However, it is not necessary for the Court to resolve this issue. This is because, on a plain and fair reading of the Decision, the IAA did, in any event, consider whether it was reasonable for the appellant to relocate.17.The IAA was required to consider the reasonableness of relocation when it came to consider questions of complementary protection pursuant s.36(2B)(a) of the Act. That provision makes it an express requirement that the decision-maker be satisfied that “it would be reasonable for the non-citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm”. There is thus no need to distil any “relocation principle” or any related notion of reasonableness: per Robertson J in BBO16 at [70]-[77].18.It is evident from paragraphs [31]-[38] and [71]-[78] of the Decision that the IAA was aware of the need to consider whether it was reasonable for the appellant to reside in an area other than Batticaloa. The IAA assessed a number of different factors including the appellant’s family support, education and training and risk from the TMVP. It is respectfully submitted that his Honour was correct to find that notions of practicality do not require specific exposition so long as the tribunal identifies the reasonableness of the relocation, as it clearly did in this case: [36] of the Judgment. The IAA concluded its assessment of the reasonableness of relocation in its Decision by “[h]aving regard to all of the circumstances” (at [78]). Those words should be treated as encompassing all of the matters that the IAA referred to earlier in its reasons, as well as those factors that bore upon the IAA’s assessment of relocation in the Convention context.19.Further, the question of reasonableness is one that requires a factual inquiry to be undertaken and an evaluative judgment to be made: SZBGC v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1168 at [25] per Emmett J. While the practical realities facing an applicant will be relevant (and in any event were considered by the IAA in this case), s.36(2B)(a) does not specify any mandatory relevant considerations.(footnotes omitted)Consideration