FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BBO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 212
Appeal from: BBO16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 2541 File number: NSD 1856 of 2016 Judge: ROBERTSON J Date of judgment: 9 March 2017 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing an application for judicial review of decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) – subclass 790 Safe Haven Enterprise visa – whether primary judge erred in finding that the appellant had not been denied procedural fairness – whether primary judge erred in concluding that the relocation test in relation to the complementary protection provisions in s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) had been correctly applied – Held: appeal dismissed
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application to amend to add new ground of jurisdictional error – tendency to undermine the appellate process in circumstances where no adequate explanation why ground not raised before the primary judge or earlier in the conduct of the appeal, the appellant having legal representation throughout – Held: application refused
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2)(aa), 36(2A), 36(2B)(a), 57(2)(b), 473DA(1), 473DC(3), 476(4)(c) Cases cited: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH [2015] HCA 40; 256 CLR 326
Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1990) 52 FCR 437
SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 40; 233 CLR 18
SZMCD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCAFC 46; 174 FCR 415
Sun v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 52; 243 FCR 220
Date of hearing: 23 February 2017 Date of last submissions: 28 February 2017 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 86 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr J Hyde with Mr AM Cheema Solicitor for the Appellant: Norton Rose Fulbright Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Reilly Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mills Oakley Lawyers Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent submitted save as to costs ORDERS
NSD 1856 of 2016 BETWEEN: BBO16
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
ROBERTSON J
DATE OF ORDER:
9 MARCH 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appellant have leave to amend ground 1 in the form of the proposed amended notice of appeal filed on 24 February 2017.
2.Leave be refused to the appellant to add ground 5 in the form of the proposed amended notice of appeal filed on 24 February 2017.
3.The appeal be dismissed.
4.The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent, as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ROBERTSON J:
Introduction
This is an appeal from orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 30 September 2016 dismissing an amended application for judicial review of…
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- Case
- [2017] FCA 212
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues were whether the primary judge erred in finding that the appellant had not been denied procedural fairness and whether the primary judge correctly applied the relocation test in relation to the complementary protection provisions in s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act. The appellant argued that the decision-maker failed to give him a reasonable opportunity to address the issue of relocation within Pakistan and did not adequately consider his personal circumstances.
The Full Court found that the appellant had not demonstrated any error by the primary judge. The Court held that the decision-maker did provide the appellant with an opportunity to address the issue of relocation and that the appellant's arguments about his personal circumstances had been considered. The Court also found that the decision-maker correctly applied the relocation test under s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act. The appeal was therefore dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the respondent.
Additionally, the Court refused the appellant's application to amend the grounds of appeal to include a new ground of jurisdictional error. The Court found that the application tended to undermine the appellate process as the appellant had not provided an adequate explanation for why the new ground was not raised before the primary judge or earlier in the appeal process, despite having legal representation throughout.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appellant have leave to amend ground 1 in the form of the proposed amended notice of appeal filed on 24 February 2017.
2. Leave be refused to the appellant to add ground 5 in the form of the proposed amended notice of appeal filed on 24 February 2017.
3. The appeal be dismissed.
4. The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent, as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The delegate found, at [126], that it would be reasonable for the appellant to relocate to another city such as Lahore where he would be supported by the Shia community. She found that it would be reasonable for the appellant to relocate as outlined in s 36(2B)(a) of the Migration Act.The Immigration Assessment Authority The appellant’s case was automatically referred to the Immigration Assessment Authority, an independent office within the Migration and Refugee Division of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The then solicitors for the appellant made a written submission to the Immigration Assessment Authority dated 24 March 2016. The solicitors submitted that sectarian attacks and violence, albeit less serious, still constituted a real chance of persecution for Shias, including the appellant, in Lahore and throughout Pakistan. It was submitted that targeted violence, albeit unreported or underreported, still constituted a real chance of persecution for “low-profile” Shias, including the appellant, in Lahore and throughout Pakistan. The solicitors submitted that the appellant, as a Shia who attended mosques and processions, was at heightened risk of being targeted and killed in Lahore and throughout Pakistan. The solicitors referred to a 2015 decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal in relation to a Hazara Shia from Quetta, the decision being that it would not be reasonable for that applicant to relocate because he would be recognised as a Hazara Shia on the basis of his appearance, his language, his accent, his identity documents and that he was likely to reside in a Hazara community. The solicitors submitted that it would not be reasonable for the appellant to relocate because there was no evidence that he would be supported by the Shia community in Lahore or anywhere else in Pakistan. The solicitors submitted that the appellant, with a high school education, was unlikely to get a job in Lahore or anywhere else in Pakistan. The solicitors submitted that the delegate failed to consider the availability of family connections. In response to a DFAT statement that “in practical terms, internal relocation of Shias occurs with relative frequency due to family connections and employment opportunities in [Lahore and Islamabad]”, the solicitors said that the appellant had stated that his parents were dead and he was not in contact with his siblings; his wife’s mother was dead and her father was sick; and he had no real extended family in Pakistan. He had no family connections in Lahore or anywhere else in Pakistan. The solicitors submitted that it would not be reasonable for the appellant to relocate because he had limited funds, education, and work experience, and no family connections in Lahore or anywhere else in Pakistan. Attached to the solicitors’ submission was a statutory declaration of the appellant. He stated that the Department rejected his protection claim, saying that he would not be persecuted on account of his Shia religion throughout Pakistan, and that he could safely, legally, and reasonably relocate to another area of Pakistan, such as Lahore. He stated, amongst other things, that he had never been to Lahore; that Shias were a religious minority in Lahore and throughout Pakistan; Sunni Muslim extremist groups had organised attacks against Shias and other religious minorities in Lahore and throughout Pakistan; if he moved to Lahore or elsewhere in Pakistan, he believed that Sunni Muslim extremist groups would identify him; even if he were able to survive in Lahore or elsewhere in Pakistan it will be very difficult for him to support himself and his family as he did not have enough qualifications to get a good job and he did not have enough money to start another business; he believed that Shias in Lahore and elsewhere in Pakistan were just struggling to survive and support themselves; and if he had believed that he and his family could live in Lahore or elsewhere in Pakistan he would not have come to Australia.