Byrd and Byrd (Conditional Admission of Expert’s Evidence)

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FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BYRD & BYRD (CONDITIONAL ADMISSION OF EXPERT’S EVIDENCE) [2011] FamCA 810
FAMILY LAW – EVIDENCE - expert opinion evidence – whether the expert opinion evidence tendered by one party should be struck out before any supporting evidence can be produced – where expert opinion partly based on evidence struck out – the basis rule – the court’s power to reserve judgment on the admission of documentary evidence in a trial until all the evidence is tendered
Family Law Rules (2004) (Cth)
Evidence Act (1995) (Cth)
Adler v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2003) NSWCA 131
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich and Others [2005] NSWCA 152
Bodney v Bennell (2008) FCAFC 63
Carpenter & Lunn (2008) FamCAFC 125
Clarke v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486
Daniel and Others (for the Ngarluma, Yindjibarndi, Yaburara, Mardudhunera and Wong-goo-tt-oo Peoples) v Western Australia and Others  (2000) 178 ALR 542
Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 277 ALR 611
Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705
Noetel and Quealy [2005] FamCA 677
Pownall v Conlan Management Pty Ltd (1995) 12 WAR 370
Quick v Stoland Pty Ltd (1998) 157 ALR 615
Rhodin v Wingate [2002] NSWCA 165
Sydneywide Distributors Pty Ltd v Red Bull Australia Pty Ltd [2002] FCAFC 157
APPLICANT: Mr Byrd
RESPONDENT: Ms Byrd
FILE NUMBER: SYC 767 of 2009
DATE DELIVERED: 29 September 2011
PLACE DELIVERED: Sydney
PLACE HEARD: Sydney
JUDGMENT OF: Le Poer Trench J
HEARING DATE: 29 September 2011

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT:

Mr Richardson SC

Mr Campton

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: Gibsons Lawyers
COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: Ms Rees
SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: Watts McCray

Orders

  1. The report of Ms D attached to her affidavit filed in court on 27 December 2011 is conditionally admitted to evidence with the admissibility of the report and the weight to be given to it to be determined at the conclusion of the taking of evidence in the case as a whole.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Byrd & Byrd (conditional admission of expert’s evidence) is approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY

FILE NUMBER:  SYC 767 of 2009

Mr Byrd

Applicant

And

Ms Byrd

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The wife seeks to read the Affidavit of Ms D sworn 26 September 2011.  This contains the valuation evidence which the wife seeks to rely upon in relation to the husband’s business, S Company.  The single expert, Mr P, has valued the business at $2.398 million, whereas the valuation of Ms D, if accepted, would contend for a value of $6.516 million. 

  2. The parties caused a joint balance sheet to be tendered, which has been marked as exhibit X4.  That document illustrates the impact of the different values attributed to this particular asset. With agreement as to the values of all other assets, liabilities and superannuation, the wife contends for a total asset value of…

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Details
Case
[2011] FamCA 810
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of *Byrd and Byrd*, Le Poer Trench J considered the admissibility of expert evidence in circumstances where the factual basis for the expert's opinion had not been fully established. The dispute concerned the admission of a report prepared by an expert, Ms D, attached to her affidavit.

The central legal issue before the court was whether section 79 of the *Evidence Act* requires that the admissibility of expert opinion evidence be dependent on the proper disclosure and proof of its factual basis. This involved considering whether a "basis rule," as understood at common law, applied under the *Evidence Act*, or if the Act intended for such issues to be managed through the court's general discretion.

Le Poer Trench J, referencing *Daniel v Western Australia* and *Quick v Stoland*, concluded that section 79 of the *Evidence Act* does not mandate a strict basis rule. The court reasoned that the legislative intent, as reflected in the Australian Law Reform Commission's Report No 26, was to allow expert opinion evidence to be admitted even if its factual basis is not fully proven by admitted evidence. The weight to be given to such evidence, and its ultimate admissibility, is to be determined by the tribunal of fact, with the court retaining a general discretion to exclude evidence if its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value or if excessive time would be expended in its reception.

Consequently, the court ordered that the report of Ms D attached to her affidavit filed on 27 December 2011 be conditionally admitted to evidence. The final determination of the report's admissibility and the weight to be accorded to it was reserved for the conclusion of the taking of evidence in the case as a whole.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

The report of Ms D attached to her affidavit filed in court on 27 December 2011 is conditionally admitted to evidence with the admissibility of the report and the weight to be given to it to be determined at the conclusion of the taking of evidence in the case as a whole.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In Daniel v Western Australia, Nicholson J stated that section 79 of the Evidence Act does not provide for the basis rule principle, and it need not be applied. In that judgment his Honour referred to Quick v Stoland:[16] in Quick v Stoland Pty Ltd (1998) 157 ALR 615 at 617-18 Branson J, with whom Emmett J relevantly agreed, said that unlike the common law as set out in Pownall v Conlan Management Pty Ltd (1995) 12 WAR 370 at 375, the Evidence Act and s 79 do not require that the admissibility of expert opinion depend upon proper disclosure and proof of the factual basis of the opinion. This is because it was intended that the general discretion of the court to refuse to admit evidence was sufficient to deal with problems that might arise in respect of expert opinion the basis of which was not disclosed: ALRC Report No 26, vol 1, para 750. Section 79 was therefore to be seen as concerned with the view, estimation or judgment inherent in the inference drawn by the expert from that factual basis. Her honour said, “it is the expert’s inference, in this sense, which s 79 requires to be wholly or substantially based on his or her specialised knowledge.” (emphasis added) As illustrated earlier in these reasons, lack of requirement under the legislation is due to the fact that it was intended that the general discretion of the court to refuse to admit evidence would be sufficient to deal with any issues which might arise in respect of expert opinion where the basis for that opinion is not disclosed. In the ALRC Report number 26 at paragraph 750, it says: 750. The Basis Rule. It has been implied in some cases and asserted in some academic writing that there is a rule of evidence that for expert opinion testimony to be admissible it must have as its basis admitted evidence.[83] The better view is that there is no such rule. Were it to exist, it would not be possible to have opinion evidence which had as a significant component the opinions or the statements of others. This would preclude the tendering of evidence whose value is dependent upon material not before the court and, therefore, difficult for it to assess. While this would have its advantages, it would fail in its inflexibility to take account of the normal means by which experts generally form their opinions—by means of reports of technicians and assistants, consultation with colleagues and reliance upon a host of extrinsic material and information that it would be an endless and unfruitful task with which to burden the courts. It is proposed to refrain from including a basis rule in the legislation, thus allowing opinion evidence whose basis is not proved by admitted evidence prima facie to be brought before the court. Under these circumstances the weight to be accorded to it will be left to be determined by the tribunal of fact. Areas of doubt however must be addressed. These include:• whether evidence by the expert of the hearsay foundation of his opinion may be excluded and, if so, on what grounds; and• whether an opinion based upon hearsay material should be open to exclusion and, if it is excluded, the grounds for its exclusion.Such material will be able to be excluded by the operation of a relevance discretion. Thus, if it appears to the court that excessive time will be expended upon the reception of the evidence, or that its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value, the court not being able to assess the weight to be accorded to it, the testimony can be excluded. The same approach is proposed to control the admissibility of the expert’s testimony of the facts on which his opinion is based where a party does not propose to, or does not, call direct evidence of the truth of the statements of fact relied upon by the expert. Tactical considerations will demand that under most circumstances the bases of expert opinion testimony are established by other admissible evidence.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established