FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BWX15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 64
Appeal from: BWX15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 117 File number: VID 102 of 2017 Judge: MURPHY J Date of judgment: 9 February 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court affirming Tribunal’s rejection of application for protection visa – leave to raise new grounds on appeal –whether the Tribunal failed to consider the complementary protection obligations owed to the appellant – whether the Tribunal erred by not putting to the appellant relevant material – whether the Tribunal made findings that were unreasonable by relying on country information from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade to the exclusion of country information provided by the appellant – whether the Tribunal failed to consider the entirety of the appellant’s claim to be at risk of harm – appeal dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Cases cited: Hird v Chief Executive Officer of the Australian Sports Anti-Doping Authority (2015) 227 FCR 95; [2015] FCAFC 7
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437; [2014] FCAFC 1
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332; [2013] HCA 18
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611; [2010] HCA 16
NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407; [2000] HCA 1
VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 238 FCR 588; [2004] FCAFC 158
Water Board v Moustakas (1988) 180 CLR 491; [1988] HCA 12 at 497
Date of hearing: 1 May 2017 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 50 Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr B Petrie Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz Counsel for the First Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice ORDERS
VID 102 of 2017 BETWEEN: BWX15
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
MURPHY J
DATE OF ORDER:
9 FEBRUARY 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The Appellant pay the First Respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MURPHY J:
INTRODUCTION
The appellant is a 54-year-old man of Tamil ethnicity and Hindu faith from the Northern Province of Sri Lanka. He arrived in Australia by boat on 9 August 2012, without a visa. On 15 January 2013 he applied for a protection visa on the basis that he is a person in respect of whom Australia owes obligations of protection pursuant to ss 36(2)(a) and 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).
The appellant appeals from orders of the Federal Circuit Court…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 64
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the appellant's grounds of appeal were without merit. Regarding the alleged failure to consider complementary protection obligations, the court found that the Tribunal had appropriately assessed the appellant's risk of harm based on country information provided by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and that the risk was low. The court also found that the Tribunal had not erred in not putting specific parts of its adverse decision to the appellant for comment, as the appellant had not particularised any such matter. Furthermore, the court found that the Tribunal's reliance on country information from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade did not render its findings unreasonable, and that the Tribunal had considered the entirety of the appellant's claim to be at risk of harm.
In conclusion, the court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the costs of the first respondent. The court found that the appellant's grounds of appeal were without merit and that the Tribunal had appropriately assessed the appellant's risk of harm if returned to Sri Lanka. The court also found that the Tribunal had not erred in its consideration of the appellant's claims and relevant country information.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The Appellant pay the First Respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In my view it is expedient and in the interests of justice to grant the appellant leave to raise the new grounds on appeal. Essentially this is because:(a)the appellant has a great deal at stake in this appeal. If leave is not granted he will lose the opportunity to put arguments in support of his case. That may mean that he is returned to Sri Lanka where he fears persecution, torture, cruel and inhuman treatment or punishment or degrading treatment or punishment;(b)the question of prejudice is an important consideration: VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 238 FCR 588; [2004] FCAFC 158 at [48] (Kiefel, Weinberg and Stone JJ). The Minister did not contend that he would suffer any prejudice if leave was given to raise the new grounds of appeal; conversely, the appellant’s prejudice may be serious;(c)the issues in the appeal involve an analysis of the Tribunal decision and questions of law. The factual findings made by the Tribunal are not central to the new grounds, and they could not have been met by calling evidence before the Federal Circuit Court;(d)having regard to the existing grounds of appeal, the new grounds require little additional use of the resources of the respondent or the Court; and(e)the Minister did not oppose a grant of leave.CONSIDERATIONGround one This ground of appeal has no merit. The notice of appeal alleges that the Tribunal made a finding that if the appellant were returned to Sri Lanka he would be held in degrading conditions in prison because he had left the country illegally. There is, however, no such finding in the Tribunal’s reasons and the appellant made no submissions addressed to this ground. Further, insofar as the appellant’s claim relied on the complementary protection regime under s 36(2)(aa) of the Act, I can see nothing to indicate that the Tribunal failed to adequately deal with it. Under the heading “Tamil failed asylum seeker” (at paragraphs 45 to 51 of its reasons) the Tribunal considered the risk that the appellant would be tortured or mistreated if he were returned to Sri Lanka. Based on country information provided by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) the Tribunal found that risk to be low. The Tribunal noted that the risk of harm in this regard is higher where the returnee has an actual or suspected affiliation with the LTTE, but found that did not apply to the appellant. It found that returnees generally are not regarded as having links with the LTTE, or as being opposed to the government simply because they have been in Australia. It accepted that there is a real chance that the appellant will be contacted by the military or police if he is returned to Sri Lanka, but considered that such treatment does not amount to either serious or significant harm. I dismiss ground one of the appeal. Ground two Under this ground the appellant alleges that the Tribunal failed to put to him parts of its adverse decision for him to comment upon, as required by s 424AA. However, the appellant did not particularise any matter which the Tribunal was obliged to, but did not, put to him. There is nothing in the material to indicate that the Tribunal erred in this regard.