BWX15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

Link copied
Case Copied 26 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BWX15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 64

Appeal from: BWX15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 117
File number: VID 102 of 2017
Judge: MURPHY J
Date of judgment: 9 February 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court affirming Tribunal’s rejection of application for protection visa – leave to raise new grounds on appeal –whether the Tribunal failed to consider the complementary protection obligations owed to the appellant – whether the Tribunal erred by not putting to the appellant relevant material – whether the Tribunal made findings that were unreasonable by relying on country information from the Department of  Foreign Affairs and Trade to the exclusion of country information provided by the appellant – whether the Tribunal failed to consider the entirety of the  appellant’s claim to be at risk of harm – appeal dismissed  
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Cases cited:

Hird v Chief Executive Officer of the Australian Sports Anti-Doping Authority (2015) 227 FCR 95; [2015] FCAFC 7

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437; [2014] FCAFC 1

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332; [2013] HCA 18

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611; [2010] HCA 16

NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407; [2000] HCA 1

VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 238 FCR 588; [2004] FCAFC 158

Water Board v Moustakas (1988) 180 CLR 491; [1988] HCA 12 at 497

Date of hearing: 1 May 2017
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 50
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr B Petrie
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz
Counsel for the First Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice

ORDERS

VID 102 of 2017
BETWEEN:

BWX15

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MURPHY J

DATE OF ORDER:

9 FEBRUARY 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The Appellant pay the First Respondent’s costs.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MURPHY J:

INTRODUCTION

  1. The appellant is a 54-year-old man of Tamil ethnicity and Hindu faith from the Northern Province of Sri Lanka. He arrived in Australia by boat on 9 August 2012, without a visa. On 15 January 2013 he applied for a protection visa on the basis that he is a person in respect of whom Australia owes obligations of protection pursuant to ss 36(2)(a) and 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).

  2. The appellant appeals from orders of the Federal Circuit Court…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read BWX15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2018] FCA 64
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of BWX15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant, a citizen of Sri Lanka, appealed against the decision of the Federal Circuit Court affirming the rejection of his application for a protection visa by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). The appellant contended that the Tribunal failed to consider his complementary protection obligations, did not put relevant material to him, made unreasonable findings by relying solely on country information from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and failed to consider the entirety of his claim to be at risk of harm. The court was required to decide whether the Tribunal erred in its assessment of the appellant's risk of harm if returned to Sri Lanka, and whether the Tribunal adequately considered the appellant's claims and relevant country information.

The court found that the appellant's grounds of appeal were without merit. Regarding the alleged failure to consider complementary protection obligations, the court found that the Tribunal had appropriately assessed the appellant's risk of harm based on country information provided by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and that the risk was low. The court also found that the Tribunal had not erred in not putting specific parts of its adverse decision to the appellant for comment, as the appellant had not particularised any such matter. Furthermore, the court found that the Tribunal's reliance on country information from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade did not render its findings unreasonable, and that the Tribunal had considered the entirety of the appellant's claim to be at risk of harm.

In conclusion, the court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the costs of the first respondent. The court found that the appellant's grounds of appeal were without merit and that the Tribunal had appropriately assessed the appellant's risk of harm if returned to Sri Lanka. The court also found that the Tribunal had not erred in its consideration of the appellant's claims and relevant country information.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The Appellant pay the First Respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons set out below I have made orders to dismiss the appeal.THE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY In a statutory declaration attached to his visa application the appellant made a number of claims, including that:(a)he was born on 9 October 1963 in the Killinochichi region in the Northern Province of Sri Lanka. That region was controlled by the Sri Lankan army until about 2000, when it was captured by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and remained under LTTE control until the end of the civil war in 2009;(b)he attended school until Year 8, and from the age of 18 he worked on the family farm in Killinochichi. During that time the LTTE tried to force him to join them as a cook, but he did not do so. His parents were against allowing him to join the LTTE because they were worried that he would be killed. Because of harassment from the LTTE, he wished to move away from Killinochichi;(c)in 1996 he moved to Batticaloa and purchased a van which he rented out to a local business. He says that on two or three occasions armed members of the LTTE tried to forcefully take the van from him and they came to his house and threatened him. He was afraid the LTTE would kill him, so he sold the van and went to live and work in Saudi Arabia. He remained there between 2000 and 2006, except to return home every two years to visit for two months;(d)in 2006 the appellant returned home permanently. One night four armed men with covered faces came to his rented house in Batticaloa and threatened him. They said that he had become rich from working in Saudi Arabia, so he had to pay them money and come with them. He said that he refused their demands and the men fled after the neighbours were alerted;(e)the same night, the appellant and his family moved to his wife’s brother’s house because they feared the men would return. The following day his wife went to the police station and made a complaint. The appellant was scared to return home to Killinochichi because of the people who threatened him in Batticaloa and those who earlier demanded his van. He believed that there was not a safe place for him to live in Sri Lanka;(f)he decided to flee the country. The day after the incident he went with his brother-in-law to Colombo where he stayed in a lodge for about two weeks while he made arrangements to flee to Thailand. While he was in Colombo some men returned to his house looking for him. His wife told the men that he had left and that she did not know where he was;(g)on 6 February 2006 he fled to Thailand where he stayed for two months. He then went to Malaysia where he worked as a kitchen hand until 2009; (h)in 2009 the UNHCR interviewed him and, following the interview, issued him with a refugee card and said that they had accepted him as a refugee; (i)in 2009 he was arrested for working in Thailand without a visa. He was taken to an immigration camp where he was kept for two months. After he was released he went to the city of Kajang and worked in a general store while awaiting resettlement through the UNHCR;(j)also in 2009, while the appellant was in Thailand, his home village in Killinochichi was bombed in an aircraft attack and all the houses were destroyed. His mother, father and siblings travelled to a refugee camp in Vavuniya, and while travelling his mother was killed in a bombing. The rest of the family remained in the refugee camp for three or four months;(k)the appellant worked in the general store in Kajang for the next three years. He was not paid enough money to both survive and to support his family in Sri Lanka. He waited a long time to receive a resettlement offer from the UNHCR and when an offer was not forthcoming he felt that his position was hopeless and decided to come to Australia; and(l)he contacted an agent in Malaysia who told him to first travel to Indonesia. He went to Indonesia on 11 May 2012 and waited there until 7 August 2012 when his agent obtained passage for him on a boat to Australia.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

I dismiss ground four of the appeal. CONCLUSION I have made orders to dismiss the appeal with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In my view it is expedient and in the interests of justice to grant the appellant leave to raise the new grounds on appeal. Essentially this is because:(a)the appellant has a great deal at stake in this appeal. If leave is not granted he will lose the opportunity to put arguments in support of his case. That may mean that he is returned to Sri Lanka where he fears persecution, torture, cruel and inhuman treatment or punishment or degrading treatment or punishment;(b)the question of prejudice is an important consideration: VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 238 FCR 588; [2004] FCAFC 158 at [48] (Kiefel, Weinberg and Stone JJ). The Minister did not contend that he would suffer any prejudice if leave was given to raise the new grounds of appeal; conversely, the appellant’s prejudice may be serious;(c)the issues in the appeal involve an analysis of the Tribunal decision and questions of law. The factual findings made by the Tribunal are not central to the new grounds, and they could not have been met by calling evidence before the Federal Circuit Court;(d)having regard to the existing grounds of appeal, the new grounds require little additional use of the resources of the respondent or the Court; and(e)the Minister did not oppose a grant of leave.CONSIDERATIONGround one This ground of appeal has no merit. The notice of appeal alleges that the Tribunal made a finding that if the appellant were returned to Sri Lanka he would be held in degrading conditions in prison because he had left the country illegally. There is, however, no such finding in the Tribunal’s reasons and the appellant made no submissions addressed to this ground. Further, insofar as the appellant’s claim relied on the complementary protection regime under s 36(2)(aa) of the Act, I can see nothing to indicate that the Tribunal failed to adequately deal with it. Under the heading “Tamil failed asylum seeker” (at paragraphs 45 to 51 of its reasons) the Tribunal considered the risk that the appellant would be tortured or mistreated if he were returned to Sri Lanka. Based on country information provided by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) the Tribunal found that risk to be low. The Tribunal noted that the risk of harm in this regard is higher where the returnee has an actual or suspected affiliation with the LTTE, but found that did not apply to the appellant. It found that returnees generally are not regarded as having links with the LTTE, or as being opposed to the government simply because they have been in Australia. It accepted that there is a real chance that the appellant will be contacted by the military or police if he is returned to Sri Lanka, but considered that such treatment does not amount to either serious or significant harm. I dismiss ground one of the appeal. Ground two Under this ground the appellant alleges that the Tribunal failed to put to him parts of its adverse decision for him to comment upon, as required by s 424AA. However, the appellant did not particularise any matter which the Tribunal was obliged to, but did not, put to him. There is nothing in the material to indicate that the Tribunal erred in this regard.