Background
Background to the litigation
On 2 October 2020, Mortimer J in CPJ16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 1408 concisely summarised the applicant’s lengthy detention and litigation history up to the point of the application then being decided as follows (emphasis in original):[1] This is an application for review of a decision made personally by the Minister to set aside a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and refuse the applicant’s application for a protection visa. For the reasons that follow, the applicant’s arguments should be rejected.BACKGROUND[2] There is a lengthy background to the current application. The applicant is a citizen of New Zealand who entered Australia in 2009 on a false passport. In 2010, once it was discovered that she had used a false passport to enter the country, a delegate of the Minister cancelled her visa and she was taken into immigration detention. A few days later she absconded and lived in the community until 2015, when she was located and taken back into immigration detention.[3] On 21 September 2015, she applied for a protection visa. The basis of her application was that an ex-partner, who had gang connections, had put out a contract to have her killed because he believed she had betrayed him to police. The applicant claimed she had moved to another part of New Zealand but was constantly afraid of being recognised, because of the country’s small population. She claimed she had not reported the alleged contract to the police because that would make it seem like she was in fact a police informant. She claimed that, in any event, the police would not be able to protect her.[4] On 16 December 2015, a delegate of the Minister refused the applicant’s protection visa application. The delegate found that the applicant did not satisfy s 36(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), which relevantly requires that an applicant for a protection visa be a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations.[5] The applicant applied for review of the delegate’s decision in the Tribunal. On 4 August 2016, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision, but on 14 June 2017 the Federal Circuit Court ordered by consent that the decision be set aside and remitted the applicant’s application to the Tribunal.[6] On 18 December 2017, a differently constituted Tribunal set aside the delegate’s decision and remitted the application for reconsideration with the direction that the applicant satisfied s 36(2)(aa) of the Act on the basis that the applicant’s ex-partner had put out a contract to have her killed and that authorities in New Zealand would not be able to protect her.[7] On 7 September 2018, a different delegate again refused the applicant’s visa application, this time under s 501(1) of the Act, which provides that the Minister “may refuse to grant a visa to a person if the person does not satisfy the Minister that the person passes the character test”. The delegate found that the applicant did not pass the character test because there was a risk that she would engage in criminal conduct in Australia if she were allowed to remain in the country (see s 501(6)(d)(i)). That finding was based primarily on the applicant’s “extensive criminal history” and “other serious conduct”, which is discussed further below.[8] The applicant again applied for review of the delegate’s decision in the Tribunal. This was her third review application before the Tribunal. On 3 December 2018, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision, but on 25 February 2019 the Federal Court ordered by consent that the decision be set aside and remitted the applicant’s application to the Tribunal.[9] On 18 September 2019, a differently constituted (fourth) Tribunal set aside the delegate’s decision and remitted the application for reconsideration with a direction that the applicant was not to be refused the visa under s 501(1) of the Act. The Tribunal considered that, as the applicant had been found to be a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations, “good government” required that the discretion conferred by s 501 of the Act be exercised in favour of the applicant because (at [20]):(a)sending the applicant back to New Zealand would put Australia in breach of its international obligations;(b)the alternative to sending the applicant back to New Zealand – indefinite or prolonged detention – “would be open only to the criminal courts, not a member of the executive branch of government”; and(c)there were strong humanitarian reasons for exercising the discretion in the applicant’s favour.[10] The Tribunal was not satisfied there was a risk that the applicant would engage in criminal conduct if she were allowed to remain in Australia, primarily because she had compelling reasons not to engage in such conduct and she had not committed any offences since 2010 (at [52]). The Tribunal declined an invitation by the Minister’s representative during the review to consider in the alternative whether the applicant failed the character test because she was not of good character within the meaning of s 501(6)(c) of the Act.[11] The Minister and the applicant both sought review of the Tribunal’s decision in this Court, that being the third time the applicant was participating in a judicial review proceeding about her protection visa application. The Minister sought to have the Tribunal’s decision quashed, and the applicant sought declaratory relief and an order compelling the Minister to determine her visa application in accordance with the Tribunal’s second decision: see Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v CPJ16 [2019] FCA 2033. The impetus for the application for declaratory relief was that the Minister had by this point given notice to the applicant that he was considering using his personal powers under s 501A(2) of the Act to set aside the Tribunal’s decision and refuse the applicant’s visa application. The question was whether this notice of intention operated to prevent the Minister or his delegate granting the applicant a visa under s 65(1) of the Act. On 25 November 2019, the Court dismissed the Minister’s application and granted the relief sought by the applicant, ordering the Minister to determine the applicant’s application on or before 6 December 2019.[12] On 6 December 2019, the last day for compliance with the Court’s orders, as foreshadowed in the Minister’s notification the subject of the Court’s declaratory relief in CPJ16 [2019] FCA 2033, the Minister purported to exercise his personal power under s 501A(2) of the Act to set aside the Tribunal’s decision, and refuse the applicant’s protection visa application.[13] Two weeks later, the Minister then appealed from this Court’s orders in CPJ16 [2019] FCA 2033. Given that the Minister had already purported to exercise his powers under s 501A(2) of the Act, the appeal was dismissed as moot: Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v CPJ16 [2020] FCAFC 87.[14] In exercising his personal power under s 501A(2) of the Act, the Minister found that the applicant did not pass the character test because she was not of good character within the meaning of s 501(6)(c) of the Act. In reaching this conclusion, the Minister referred to the applicant’s criminal history, her disregard for Australia’s immigration laws, her behaviour in detention, and information which suggested to the Minister the appellant had in the past “exposed her children to a risk to their health and wellbeing” (at [69]). The Minister found it was in the national interest to cancel the applicant’s visa on account of her criminal and other serious conduct, the risk that she would engage in such conduct in the future, and “the importance of preserving a positive and enduring bi-lateral relationship with New Zealand”, which in the Minister’s opinion would be compromised if Australia were to facilitate the applicant’s evasion of the New Zealand justice system by granting her a protection visa (at [119]). The Minister stated that, having found that the applicant did not pass the character test and that it was in the national interest to refuse her application for a protection visa, he considered whether to exercise his discretion to refuse her application and decided to do so taking into account the interests of her son, the expectations of the Australian community, Australia’s international non-refoulement obligations, and the strength, nature and duration of the applicant’s ties to Australia.[15] On 9 December 2019, the applicant sought review of the Minister’s decision: see CPJ16 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 980. Excluding the Minister’s appeal to the Full Court, this was the fourth judicial review proceeding in relation to her protection visa application. The applicant did not challenge the Minister’s findings that she did not pass the character test. Instead, the applicant submitted that the Minister’s decision was affected by error: first, because in deciding whether to exercise his discretion to refuse the applicant’s application he had failed to engage properly with the consequences of his refusing her application; second, because in his consideration of the national interest criterion he had taken into account either or both of two irrelevant considerations; namely, the importance of preserving a positive relationship with New Zealand and the potential exploitation of Australia’s visa system by individuals seeking to evade the New Zealand justice system.[16] The Court accepted the applicant’s submissions on both grounds. The Court found that the Minister had failed to “squarely address that the actual consequence of his decision would be that there was a real risk that the applicant would be killed or seriously harmed after being refouled” (at [47]). The Court also found that the Minister’s consideration of the national interest criterion was flawed because it was premised on a false characterisation of the applicant: as merely a person trying to avoid New Zealand’s criminal justice system, rather than a person at real risk of being killed or seriously harmed. Consequently, on 9 July 2020, the Court set aside the Minister’s decision and ordered the Minister to determine the applicant’s application for a protection visa according to law on or before 23 July 2020.[17] This remitter meant that there would be an eighth decision on the merits of the applicant’s protection visa application, by either a delegate, the Tribunal or the Minister himself.THE DECISION UNDER REVIEW[18] On 23 July 2020, again the last day for compliance with the Court’s orders, the Minister once more exercised his personal power adversely to the applicant, setting aside the Tribunal’s decision of 18 September 2019, and refusing to grant the applicant a protection visa. On this occasion, however, the Minister sought to exercise the power conferred on him by s 501A(3), which, unlike s 501A(2), is stated not to be subject to the rules of natural justice. In these reasons I will refer to the decision under s 501A(2) as the Minister’s first decision and the decision under s 501A(3) as the Minister’s second decision. In both cases, the nature of the power is one which authorises the Minister to “override” the conclusion reached by the Tribunal under a full merits review process. It is an extraordinary power in a system so heavily premised on merits review as that contained within the Migration Act.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Much of the above history is also set out in the first of three affidavits that the applicant relies upon, albeit that she does not accept the correctness of the 23 July 2020 decision of the Minister for Home Affairs to override, for a second time, the Tribunal’s 18 September 2019 decision. She therefore continues to characterise herself as an applicant for a protection visa. However, her unsuccessful challenges to that decision are now exhausted and she is no longer a protection visa applicant because that application has been refused.Evidence on the Separate Questions By the time of the hearing of the Separate Questions on 6 October 2021, the applicant was no longer legally represented, but she filed affidavit evidence and written submissions, and made oral submissions at the hearing, as did the Commonwealth. Because the Commonwealth accepted that it bore the onus of proving that the applicant’s detention was lawful once that was questioned by the bringing of this proceeding, the Commonwealth was required (without dissent) to file its evidence and submissions first, to adduce its evidence first, and to address the Court first. The Commonwealth relied upon affidavits from three deponents, each of whom had been a Status Resolution Officer (SRO) assigned to manage the applicant’s case. The Commonwealth also relied upon a bundle of Departmental records, filed the evening before the Separate Questions hearing, being case review records for the applicant. The bundle was tendered and, after the withdrawal of an initial objection primarily due to the last-minute provision of these documents, it was admitted into evidence. That evidence establishes:(a)that SROs are assigned responsibility for a number of immigration detainees;(b)part of that role involves assessing whether it remains appropriate for each detainee to be detained, and that there is no reason under s 196 of the Migration Act for the detainee to be released from detention;(c)an SRO is required to form a view about whether they know or reasonably suspect that a detainee is an unlawful non-citizen for the purposes of the Migration Act;(d)if the SRO knows or reasonably suspects that the detainee is an unlawful non-citizen, then they will continue to require that person to be detained, but will otherwise take steps to facilitate the release of the detainee;(e)an SRO ordinarily personally engages with each detainee for whom they have responsibility on a monthly basis, either in person or, especially during the pandemic, over the telephone;(f)the three SROs who provided affidavit evidence were, at different times, the SRO assigned responsibility for the applicant covering the period from 12 October 2016 to the date of the making of the most recent SRO’s affidavit, which was filed on 15 September 2021;(g)each of those three SROs depose that, during the time that they had responsibility for the applicant, they knew or reasonably suspected that she was not an Australian citizen, did not hold a valid visa, and therefore was an unlawful non-citizen;(h)each of those SROs depose to recording, in case review records produced by them, their satisfaction that the applicant’s detention was appropriate and the reasons for that conclusion, and that they would not have completed those records in that way if they had not been so satisfied;(i)the same conclusion is able to be reached from the information contained in the bundle of departmental records for the period from May to September 2016, for which it was not possible to obtain an affidavit from the SRO who was responsible for the applicant at that time – the evidence of each of the three SROs enables those records, which are relevantly identical in nature to the records produced by them, to be understood as recording the knowledge or belief that the applicant was not an Australian citizen, did not hold a valid visa and therefore was an unlawful non-citizen;(j)there is no evidentiary or other reason to doubt that this situation had existed from the time that the applicant went into detention in 2015 and did not change after 15 September 2021, noting that the applicant does not dispute that she is not an Australian citizen and does not hold a valid visa: as noted above and below she continues to describe herself as an applicant for a protection visa.
Decision
Reasons for decision
The Commonwealth accepts that it bears the onus of proving that the restraint of the applicant by her detention is legally justified, but submits that, as the majority in AJL20 observed at [61], because “the evident intention of the [Migration Act] is that an unlawful non-citizen may not, in any circumstances, be at liberty in the Australian community, no question of release on habeas can arise”. Other prior authority relied upon by the applicant cannot overcome this binding conclusion. The answer to the second question must therefore also be “No”.Conclusion The Separate Questions are answered as follows:(1)Has the applicant’s detention by the respondent at any given time since 19 June 2016 been unlawful? Answer: No.(2)Is the applicant entitled to release from detention by way of an order in the nature of a writ of habeas corpus? Answer: No. The above answers mean that the applicant does not have any arguable case for false imprisonment because her detention has been found to be lawful. However, there may be other remedies that she wishes to pursue in light of those answers. The appropriate course for the proceeding is for the applicant to be given time to prepare and furnish the Commonwealth with any draft amended originating application and any draft amended statement of claim, seeking consent for the grant of leave to file the same. If such consent is forthcoming, then it is likely that such leave will be granted. If consent is not forthcoming, any resultant application for leave will need to be heard and determined.