BVW17 v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BVW17 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2017] FCCA 1739

MIGRATION – Decision by Immigration Assessment Authority.

PRACTICE & PROCEDURE – Whether time should be extended to applicant to file an application for judicial review – whether applicant’s explanation for delay in filing application satisfactory – whether application for judicial review has sufficient prospects of success such that it would be in the interests of justice to extend time – application for extension of time refused.

Legislation:
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36, 477
Case cited:
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Limited v Cohen [1984] FCA 176; (1984) 3 FCR 34
Singh v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 813
SNSYE v Minister for immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 500
Sharman License Holdings Ltd v Universal Music Aust Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 802
WAAD v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 399
SZQCZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 91
Vu v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCAFC 59
SZOZG v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 756
Kalanje v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 1618
SZIQP v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 169
SZHFX v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 355
NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10
VWFW v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCAFC 29
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 297 ALR 225
Associated Provincial Picture House Limited v Wednesbury Corporation [1949] 1 KB 223
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407
Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang and Ors (1996) 185 CLR 259
Re Commonwealth of Australia; Ex Parte Marks (2000) 177 ALR 491
Applicant: BVW17
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File Number: SYG 1441 of 2017
Judgment of: Judge Emmett
Hearing date: 26 July 2017
Date of Last Submission: 26 July 2017
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 26 July 2017

REPRESENTATION

Applicant appeared via video link from Christmas Island with an Arabic interpreter.
Solicitor for the Respondents: Louise Buchanan
(Australian Government Solicitor)
FEDERAL CIRCUIT
COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 1441 of 2017

BVW17

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

EX TEMPORE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application for an extension of time pursuant to s.477 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) brought by the applicant in circumstances where his application for judicial review was filed some 13 days after the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (“the IAA”) dated 22 March 2017. The IAA affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (“the Delegate”) to refuse the applicant’s application for a protection visa, having been an application for a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa (SHEV).

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Details
Case
[2017] FCCA 1739
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) to affirm a delegate's refusal to grant a protection visa. The applicant, a citizen of Lebanon, had arrived in Australia in December 2012 and remained in immigration detention since that time. He had lodged an application for a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa in 2016, which was refused by a delegate of the Minister on 14 February 2017. This decision was referred to the IAA for review, and on 22 March 2017, the IAA affirmed the delegate's decision. The applicant was handed a copy of the IAA's decision on 23 March 2017.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether to grant the applicant an extension of time to file his application for judicial review. This required the court to consider whether the applicant's explanation for the delay in filing was satisfactory, and whether the proposed application for judicial review had sufficient prospects of success to warrant an extension of time in the interests of justice. The court was therefore tasked with assessing the merits of the applicant's potential grounds for review in the context of an application for an extension of time.

Emmett J refused the application for an extension of time. His Honour noted that the applicant had not provided a satisfactory explanation for the significant delay in filing his application for judicial review. Furthermore, after reviewing the material before the IAA, Emmett J found that the applicant's claims of fearing harm in Lebanon were not plausible and had not been accepted by the IAA. The IAA had made detailed findings that the applicant had provided little specific detail about his claimed threats, that his claims about being a military intelligence informant were inconsistent and implausible, and that he had not established a fear of specific harm from Hezbollah or a risk of harm from generalised violence in Tripoli. The IAA also found that no details of the applicant's protection claims were released in a data breach and that the applicant had not demonstrated how this breach increased his risk of harm. Consequently, the court concluded that the proposed application for judicial review did not have sufficient prospects of success to justify granting an extension of time.

Background

Background to the litigation

The first respondent, in written submissions, accurately summarised the background of the applicants’ claims and the Tribunal’s decision, as follows:“PART II BACKGROUND3. The applicant is a citizen of Lebanon who first arrived in Australia in December 2005 the holder of a short stay sponsored family visitor visa: Applicant at Court Book (CB) 1 and movement record at CB 262. He departed in March 2006. In 2007 he applied offshore for a temporary business visa which was refused in 2008: CB 10-20. In 2012, he applied for another sponsored family visitor visa, but this was refused in October 2012: CB 21. The applicant again arrived in Australia at Christmas Island on 14 December 2012: Entry interview at CB 22-44, Question 47 on application at CB 143. The applicant has remained in immigration detention since 2012.4. On 30 September 2015, the applicant lodged an application for a Safe Haven Enterprise Subclass 790 visa (“SHEV”). The applicant later withdrew this application and lodged a further application for a SHEV on 21 June 2016: CB 123-194. It is a decision in respect of the 21 June 2016 application that is the subject of the present application.5. The applicant claimed in his entry interview that he left Lebanon because he was being chased by Syrian intelligence and that he also feared Hezbollah. He claimed he had previously lived in Sweden from 2002-2005: CB 37-40.6. In his SHEV, the applicant claimed that from 2007 he was a military intelligence informant to the Lebanese Armed Forces and that he provided the army information relating to terrorist groups operating in Tripoli. He claimed to fear being killed by various groups and individuals in Tripoli because of his role as an informer to the LAF and because he had refused to join those groups and he might be forced to join them. He also claimed that because of the release of his personal details on the website of the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (Department) in February 2014 Hezbollah and other extremist groups ‘will know’: CB 178-181, 208-222. He attended an interview with a delegate of the Department on 27 June 2016 in relation to his application: CB 195, 271.7. On 14 February 2017, a delegate of the Minister refused to grant the applicant a protection visa: CB 266-299.8. On 23 February 2017, the delegate’s decision, being a fast track reviewable decision as defined in s 473BB of the Act, was referred to the IAA for review under Part 7AA of the Act: CB 300. The applicant was notified of the referral on the same day: CB 307-319.9. The IAA made a number of post referral requests for documents to the Department, to which the Department responded: CB 305-6, 320-343, 344-350.PART III TRIBUNAL DECISION10. On 22 March 2017, the IAA affirmed the delegate’s decision: CB 351-373. A copy of the decision was handed to the applicant on 23 March 2017: CB 374-5.11. The IAA accepted that the applicant was a national of Lebanon who arrived in Australia undocumented by boat on 14 December 2012: CB 356.12. In relation to the applicant’s claims to fear harm in Lebanon, the IAA found, in summary, that:12.1. The applicant had provided very little detail about the personal circumstances in which the threats and harm he claimed to face arose, even when pressed for details. Rather, the details provided by the applicant concerned the broader situation in Tripoli, the political and historical background to the conflict, and did not relate specifically to the applicant’s situation. The IAA found that many of the applicant’s key claims are not plausible: CB 357-8.12.2. The IAA did not accept that the applicant acted as an informant for the LAF, including due to the inconsistent claims made at his entry interview compared with his later claims in relation to his reasons for leaving Lebanon, and for four specific reasons. The IAA found it was not plausible the applicant could infiltrate various different groups, including due to his claims about his family’s history; the information said to have been provided to the LAF was general and would not have endangered his life; the applicant did not explain how the groups became aware he had passed information to the LAF and, given country information, had the groups become aware that the applicant had passed information to the LAF, he would have been harmed: CB 361-2.12.3. The IAA did not accept the applicant’s claimed fear of specific harm from Hezbollah. The IAA did not accept the applicant’s evidence about specific issues with Hezbollah or people said to be linked to it, including any issues arising from a relative in Australia: CB 361-2.12.4. The IAA did not accept that the circumstances of the applicant’s brothers’ deaths reflect a risk of harm to the applicant: CB 362-3.12.5. The IAA considered the general security situation in Tripoli. In light of country information indicating an improved security situation and the applicant’s own evidence that he would not engage in fighting upon return and where he lived, the IAA did not accept he would face a real chance of harm from generalised violence. The IAA considered country information and found that the security situation in Tripoli had changed significantly since the applicant left, with a negotiated ceasefire having been entered into in 2014. The IAA found that while the applicant had lived in an area beset by sectarian and political violence, it was not satisfied that the applicant himself had ever been targeted or harmed as claimed or that he faces such harm in future: CB 362-364.12.6. The IAA did not accept that the applicant had provided any credible information to support his assertion that he faced a risk of recruitment from Sunni militia groups and rejected that claim: CB 364.12.7. The IAA found that no details of the applicant’s protection claims were released as part of the data breach. The IAA also noted that the applicant had not made clear how he thinks accessing the information disclosed might increase the risk of the harm he claimed to fear. As the IAA had found that the applicant was not at risk of harm from any group before leaving Lebanon and in light of country information considered by the delegate indicating that Lebanon has a long history of migration and return and seeking asylum is not a crime, the IAA found that there is no evidence to suggest that access to the information released or anyone suspecting the applicant to have sought asylum overseas would lead to a real chance of harm: CB 364.12.8. The IAA also noted that there is information in the delegate’s decision and the referred material relating to character and security concerns about the applicant. While the IAA accepted the applicant had been in prison in Lebanon for the reasons given at his SHEV interview, the IAA found the applicant had not raised any concerns to fear harm arising from this. The IAA disregarded the other material provided to it regarding the applicant, including for the purposes of assessing credibility: CB 365.13. The IAA then made findings rejecting any fear of persecution or risk of significant harm arising from these claims.”

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the applicant’s explanation for the delay in filing the application for judicial review is satisfactory.
2. Whether the application for judicial review has sufficient prospects of success such that it would be in the interests of justice to extend time.
3. Whether time should be extended to the applicant to file an application for judicial review.
4. Whether the IAA’s findings concerning the applicant’s claims of being a military intelligence informant and the associated risks are correct.
5. Whether the IAA’s findings concerning the applicant’s claims of specific harm from Hezbollah and other groups are correct.
6. Whether the IAA’s assessment of the general security situation in Tripoli and its impact on the applicant’s claims is correct.
7. Whether the IAA’s consideration of the data breach and its impact on the applicant’s claims is correct.
8. Whether the IAA’s evaluation of character and security concerns about the applicant is appropriate.

Held
1. Whether the applicant’s explanation for the delay in filing the application for judicial review is satisfactory.
The court concluded that the applicant's explanation for the delay in filing the application for judicial review was unsatisfactory. Result: Application for extension of time refused.

2. Whether the application for judicial review has sufficient prospects of success such that it would be in the interests of justice to extend time.
The court concluded that the application for judicial review did not have sufficient prospects of success such that it would be in the interests of justice to extend time. Result: Application for extension of time refused.

3. Whether time should be extended to the applicant to file an application for judicial review.
The court concluded that time should not be extended to the applicant to file an application for judicial review. Result: Application for extension of time refused.

4. Whether the IAA’s findings concerning the applicant’s claims of being a military intelligence informant and the associated risks are correct.
The court concluded that the IAA’s findings concerning the applicant’s claims of being a military intelligence informant and the associated risks are correct. Result: IAA findings upheld.

5. Whether the IAA’s findings concerning the applicant’s claims of specific harm from Hezbollah and other groups are correct.
The court concluded that the IAA’s findings concerning the applicant’s claims of specific harm from Hezbollah and other groups are correct. Result: IAA findings upheld.

6. Whether the IAA’s assessment of the general security situation in Tripoli and its impact on the applicant’s claims is correct.
The court concluded that the IAA’s assessment of the general security situation in Tripoli and its impact on the applicant’s claims is correct. Result: IAA findings upheld.

7. Whether the IAA’s consideration of the data breach and its impact on the applicant’s claims is correct.
The court concluded that the IAA’s consideration of the data breach and its impact on the applicant’s claims is correct. Result: IAA findings upheld.

8. Whether the IAA’s evaluation of character and security concerns about the applicant is appropriate.
The court concluded that the IAA’s evaluation of character and security concerns about the applicant is appropriate. Result: IAA findings upheld.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court considered whether the applicant's explanation for the delay in filing the application for judicial review was satisfactory. The applicant's submissions were assessed to determine if they provided a reasonable explanation for the delay. The court noted that the applicant's explanation centred on his alleged difficulties in accessing legal advice and obtaining relevant documents while in immigration detention. The court found the applicant's explanation to be somewhat credible given the circumstances of his detention, but also highlighted the need for prompt action in such cases.

In evaluating whether the application for judicial review had sufficient prospects of success, the court considered the merits of the applicant's claims as assessed by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA). The court closely examined the IAA's findings concerning the applicant's claims of being a military intelligence informant and the associated risks, finding that the IAA's conclusions were well-reasoned and supported by the evidence. The applicant's claims were scrutinized for plausibility, consistency, and detail, with the court agreeing that the applicant had not provided sufficient evidence to substantiate his claims of being an informant or facing specific harm from Hezbollah or other groups.

The court further assessed whether time should be extended to the applicant to file the application for judicial review. It considered the balance between the applicant's explanation for the delay and the need for judicial review processes to be timely. The court acknowledged the applicant's challenges but emphasized the importance of adhering to procedural timelines. The court concluded that the applicant's reasons for the delay, while somewhat understandable, did not justify an extension of time in this case.

Regarding the IAA's findings on the applicant's claims of being a military intelligence informant and associated risks, the court found that the IAA's analysis was thorough and the conclusions were reasonable. The court noted the IAA's consideration of the inconsistencies in the applicant's statements and the lack of specific evidence to support the claims. The IAA's findings that the applicant's claims were not plausible were upheld by the court, which found that the applicant had not provided sufficient detail or credible evidence to support his assertions.

The court also examined the IAA's findings concerning the applicant's claims of specific harm from Hezbollah and other groups. The IAA had rejected these claims based on the lack of specific evidence and the broader context of the security situation in Tripoli. The court agreed with the IAA's findings, noting that the applicant had not provided any credible evidence to substantiate his fears of specific harm from these groups. The court found that the IAA's conclusion that the applicant was not at risk of significant harm from these claims was well-supported by the evidence.

The court evaluated the IAA's assessment of the general security situation in Tripoli and its impact on the applicant's claims. The IAA had considered country information indicating an improved security situation and the applicant's own evidence that he would not engage in fighting upon return. The court found that the IAA's conclusion that the applicant would not face a real chance of harm from generalised violence was reasonable, given the evidence of a negotiated ceasefire and the applicant's own evidence that he would not engage in fighting.

The court also reviewed the IAA's consideration of the data breach and its impact on the applicant's claims. The IAA had found that no details of the applicant's protection claims were released as part of the data breach and that there was no evidence to suggest that accessing the information disclosed would lead to a real chance of harm. The court agreed with the IAA's findings, noting that the applicant had not provided any credible information to support his assertion that the data breach would increase the risk of harm to him.

Finally, the court examined the IAA's evaluation of character and security concerns about the applicant. The IAA had accepted that the applicant had been in prison in Lebanon but found that he had not raised any concerns about this history leading to fear of harm. The IAA disregarded other material provided to it regarding the applicant, including for the purposes of assessing credibility. The court found that the IAA's approach to assessing character and security concerns was appropriate, given the lack of credible evidence linking the applicant's past to a real chance of harm upon return to Lebanon.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the court will consider extensions of time for filing applications for judicial review on a case-by-case basis, weighing the applicant's reasons for delay against the need for timely judicial review processes. The court will uphold findings of fact and credibility assessments made by the IAA, provided they are supported by the evidence and are reasonable in the circumstances. In this case, the court found that the applicant's explanation for the delay was credible but did not justify an extension of time, and that the IAA's findings on the merits of the applicant's claims were well-reasoned and supported by the evidence.