FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BTK16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1514
Appeal from: BTK16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 505 File number: NSD 1394 of 2017 Judge: PERRY J Date of judgment: 9 October 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION –where Immigration Assessment Authority affirmed delegate’s decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa – where application for judicial review of Federal Circuit Court (FCC) decision refusing an extension of time under subs 477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) for judicial review of the Authority’s decision –observations as to the distinction between judicial review of a decision of an inferior court and judicial review of an administrative decision – where alleged non-jurisdictional errors on the face of the record rely upon FCC reasons – where FCC reasons not part of the record – where unnecessary to decide if FCC’s wrongful reliance upon Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118 concerning summary dismissal was a jurisdictional error – where no merit in the FCC grounds of review of the Authority’s decision in any event – where no error in failing to consider alleged claims of the applicant’s wife and daughters who were not applicants and were in Pakistan – where applicant’s grounds wrongly treat the application for judicial review of the FCC’s decision as if it were an appeal – application dismissed
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – where applicant sought to amend the further amended originating application to raise a new ground not argued before the primary judge - where proposed ground fails to identify any jurisdictional error by the primary judge – application refused
Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Cases cited: Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163
DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 2; (2018) 353 ALD 641
DMI16 v Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2018] FCAFC 95
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
Isbester v Knox City Council [2015] HCA 20; (2015) 255 CLR 135
Mentink v Minister for Home Affairs [2013] FCAFC 113
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 [2017] FCAFC 176
MZAFZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1081
NBCY v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 922
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; ex parte Aala [2000] HCA 57; (2000) 204 CLR 82
Seiler v Minister of Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 48 FCR 83
Spencer v Commonwealth [2010] HCA 28; (2010) 241 CLR 118
SZTSU v Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2015] FCAFC 129
SZVDC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 16
Tang v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 139; (2013) 217 FCR 55
Date of hearing: 12 December 2017 and 19 March 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 1514
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the FCC's decision was reviewable under section 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and that the grounds of review alleged by the applicant did not identify any arguable jurisdictional error. The court held that the Authority did in fact consider the applicant's claims and that its findings that the applicant could relocate lacked any evident and intelligible justification. The court also rejected any breach of procedural fairness on the ground that section 473DA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) is an exhaustive statement of natural justice which excludes the common law rules of procedural fairness. The court held that the grounds identified in the FCC application lacked sufficient merit to warrant an extension of time and that it was not therefore in the interests of justice to do so.
The court further found that the applicant's proposed new ground of review failed to identify any jurisdictional error by the primary judge and refused leave to amend the further amended originating application to raise the new ground. The court dismissed the application for judicial review of the FCC's decision with costs. The court held that the application for leave to file and serve the second further amended application was allowed save that leave to amend to raise proposed FCA ground 8 was refused, and the application for judicial review of the FCC's decision was dismissed with costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for leave to amend the further amended originating application so as to add ground 8 of the draft second further amended originating application filed on 20 April 2018 is refused.
2. Subject to paragraph 1 above, the application for leave to amend the further amended originating application in terms of the draft second further amended originating application filed on 20 April 2018 is allowed.
3. The application for judicial review of the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia given on 17 March 2017 is dismissed.
4. The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The primary judge held that the various grounds of review did not identify any arguable jurisdictional error. In short, first those grounds alleging in various ways a failure to consider “the claims of the wife and daughters” to fear harm raised no arguable case of jurisdictional error because the application for the protection visa was that of the applicant, and not his wife and daughters (FCC reasons at [24]-[26]). Secondly, his Honour held that, to the extent those grounds alleged in various ways a failure to consider the applicant’s claims, they did not identify any arguable jurisdictional error because the Authority did in fact consider those claims (FCC reasons at [24] and [26]). Nor was it arguable that the Authority’s findings that the applicant could relocate lacked any evident and intelligible justification (FCC reasons at [27]). Finally the primary judge rejected as unarguable any breach of procedural fairness either on the ground that it was unclear what use the Authority had made of information subject to a non-disclosure certificate under s 473GB of the Act and whether the Authority had considered whether to disclose the documents covered by the non-disclosure certificate, or on the ground that the non-disclosure certificate itself was invalid. Specifically, his Honour held that s 473DA of the Act is an exhaustive statement of natural justice which excludes the common law rules of procedural fairness (distinguishing MZAFZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1081) (FCC reasons at [28]-[29]). As such, the primary judge concluded that the grounds identified in the FCC application lacked sufficient merit to warrant an extension of time and that it was not therefore in the interests of justice to do so (FCC reasons at [30]).3. CONSIDERATION3.1 Relevant principles It was not in issue that, despite there being no pathway to appeal from the refusal by the FCC to extend time under subs 477(2) of the Act, the Federal Court had original jurisdiction under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) to entertain the application for judicial review of the FCC decision: see e.g Tang v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 139; (2013) 217 FCR 55 at [10]-[11] (the Court); DMI16 v Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2018] FCAFC 95 (DMI16) at [37] (the Court). That being so, it is well established that the jurisdiction of an inferior court to decide matters is broader than that of an administrative decision-maker. Thus, after discussing the scope of errors of a jurisdictional kind in the context of an administrative tribunal, the High Court explained in Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 (Craig) at 179-180 that: In contrast [to an administrative tribunal], the ordinary jurisdiction of a court of law encompasses authority to decide questions of law, as well as questions of fact, involved in matters which it has jurisdiction to determine. The identification of relevant issues, the formulation of relevant questions and the determination of what is and what is not relevant evidence are all routine steps in the discharge of that ordinary jurisdiction. Demonstrable mistake in the identification of such issues or the formulation of such questions will commonly involve error of law which may, if an appeal is available and is pursued, be corrected by an appellate court and, depending on the circumstances, found an order setting aside the order or decision of the inferior court. Such a mistake on the part of an inferior court entrusted with authority to identify, formulate and determine such issues and questions will not, however, ordinarily constitute jurisdictional error. Similarly, a failure by an inferior court to take into account some matter which it was, as a matter of law, required to take into account in determining a question within jurisdiction or reliance by such a court upon some irrelevant matter upon which it was, as a matter of law, not entitled to rely in determining such a question will not ordinarily involve jurisdictional error.