BTK16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BTK16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1514

Appeal from: BTK16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 505
File number: NSD 1394 of 2017
Judge: PERRY J
Date of judgment: 9 October 2018
Catchwords:

MIGRATION –where Immigration Assessment Authority affirmed delegate’s decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa – where application for judicial review of Federal Circuit Court (FCC) decision refusing an extension of time under subs 477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) for judicial review of the Authority’s decision –observations as to the distinction between judicial review of a decision of an inferior court and judicial review of an administrative decision – where alleged non-jurisdictional errors on the face of the record rely upon FCC reasons – where FCC reasons not part of the record – where unnecessary to decide if FCC’s wrongful reliance upon Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118 concerning summary dismissal was a jurisdictional error – where no merit in the FCC grounds of review of the Authority’s decision in any event – where no error in failing to consider alleged claims of the applicant’s wife and daughters who were not applicants and were in Pakistan – where applicant’s grounds wrongly treat the application for judicial review of the FCC’s decision as if it were an appeal – application dismissed

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – where applicant sought to amend the further amended originating application to raise a new ground not argued before the primary judge - where proposed ground fails to identify any jurisdictional error by the primary judge – application refused

Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163

DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 2; (2018) 353 ALD 641

DMI16 v Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2018] FCAFC 95

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499

Isbester v Knox City Council [2015] HCA 20; (2015) 255 CLR 135

Mentink v Minister for Home Affairs [2013] FCAFC 113

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 [2017] FCAFC 176

MZAFZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1081

NBCY v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 922

Re Refugee Review Tribunal; ex parte Aala [2000] HCA 57; (2000) 204 CLR 82

Seiler v Minister of Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 48 FCR 83

Spencer v Commonwealth [2010] HCA 28; (2010) 241 CLR 118

SZTSU v Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2015] FCAFC 129

SZVDC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 16

Tang v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 139; (2013) 217 FCR 55

Date of hearing: 12 December 2017 and 19 March 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional…
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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 1514
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this case, the applicant, a national of Afghanistan, applied for judicial review of a decision by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCC) which refused to extend the time within which to seek judicial review of the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority affirming the delegate's decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa. The applicant argued that the FCC erred in its consideration of his application for an extension of time and in its review of the Authority's decision. The court was required to decide whether the FCC's decision was reviewable and, if so, whether it was made in error.

The court found that the FCC's decision was reviewable under section 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and that the grounds of review alleged by the applicant did not identify any arguable jurisdictional error. The court held that the Authority did in fact consider the applicant's claims and that its findings that the applicant could relocate lacked any evident and intelligible justification. The court also rejected any breach of procedural fairness on the ground that section 473DA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) is an exhaustive statement of natural justice which excludes the common law rules of procedural fairness. The court held that the grounds identified in the FCC application lacked sufficient merit to warrant an extension of time and that it was not therefore in the interests of justice to do so.

The court further found that the applicant's proposed new ground of review failed to identify any jurisdictional error by the primary judge and refused leave to amend the further amended originating application to raise the new ground. The court dismissed the application for judicial review of the FCC's decision with costs. The court held that the application for leave to file and serve the second further amended application was allowed save that leave to amend to raise proposed FCA ground 8 was refused, and the application for judicial review of the FCC's decision was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to amend the further amended originating application so as to add ground 8 of the draft second further amended originating application filed on 20 April 2018 is refused.

2. Subject to paragraph 1 above, the application for leave to amend the further amended originating application in terms of the draft second further amended originating application filed on 20 April 2018 is allowed.

3. The application for judicial review of the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia given on 17 March 2017 is dismissed.

4. The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons set out below, the application for leave to file and serve the second further amended application is allowed save that leave to amend to raise proposed FCA ground 8 is refused, and the application for judicial review of the FCC’s decision is dismissed with costs. 2. BACKGROUND2.1 The application for a protection visa and decision by the delegate The applicant is a national of Afghanistan. He entered Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival in late 2012 and was taken into immigration detention pursuant to subs 189(3) of the Act. He was released from immigration detention on 23 April 2013 upon being granted a temporary humanitarian visa and subsequently various bridging visas. On 12 May 2015, the Minister lifted the bar imposed by s 46A of the Act on the lodgement of a valid visa application by the applicant who then lodged an application for a Temporary Protection class XD subclass 785 visa. As such, it was not in issue (as the delegate found) that the applicant satisfied the definition of a fast track applicant under subs 5(1)(a) of the Act, and the delegate’s decision was therefore a fast track reviewable decision subject only to limited merits review by the Authority. In support of his application, the applicant made a statement dated 17 June 2015 setting out his claims for protection. The applicant claimed to fear harm from the Taliban in Afghanistan by reason of: (1)his Shia Muslim religion;(2)his political opinion as a result of supporting his daughters (who were minors) being educated and his wife working as a teacher;(3)his imputed political opinion as a result of his opposition to his daughters being “married off as children”; and/or(4)his imputed political opinion as a “traitor” as a result of living in Australia. The applicant’s claim for protection was made only on his own behalf as he identified his wife and minor daughters as residing in Pakistan. The applicant attended an interview with the delegate on 18 November 2015. By a decision given on 2 May 2016, the delegate refused to grant the applicant a protection visa. The delegate accepted that the applicant had received two letters threatening his family due to his wife’s teaching position and his daughters’ enrolment in school, and a demand that his eldest daughter be engaged to a Taliban member (delegate’s reasons at [162] and [172]). With respect to the claims to fear persecution as a refugee so as to satisfy the criterion in subs 36(2)(a) of the Act, the delegate found that there was a real chance that the applicant would be killed by anti-government elements (AGEs) in Kandahar, Afghanistan, by reason of his religion and therefore that his fear in this respect was well-founded (delegate’s reasons at [207]). However, the delegate did not accept that the applicant’s fears as to the consequences of his support for his wife’s teaching position, his daughters’ education or his refusal to allow his eldest daughter to be married were well founded (delegate’s decision at [220]). Further, the delegate found that the applicant was able to relocate to Kabul and therefore was not satisfied that the real chance of persecution on the grounds of his religion related to all areas of the receiving country, as required by subs 5J(1)(c) of the Act (delegate’s reasons at [222]-[234]). The delegate also found, with respect to the complementary protection criterion in subs 36(2)(aa) of the Act that it would be reasonable for the applicant to relocate to Kabul (delegate’s reasons at [247]-[257]). 2.2 The decision of the Authority on the fast track review affirming the delegate’s decision

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Nor did the Authority find that the applicant had any association with high profile government institutions or a particular profile that would make him a target of attacks (Authority’s reasons at [55]). 2.3 The FCC’s decision refusing to extend time within which to seek judicial review of the Authority’s decision The applicant sought judicial review of the decision by the Authority in the FCC. It is not in issue that that application (the FCC application) was filed three days after the 35 day period specified by s 477(1) of the Act and accordingly required an extension of time under s 477(2). Prior to the hearing, the FCC granted the applicant leave to amend the application (FCC reasons at [22]). The grounds of the amended application were extensive and set out at length so-called particulars which appeared to be a mix of quotations from the Authority’s decision and narrative, making it difficult to discern with clarity precisely what the grounds were. Such prolix, repetitive and confusing pleading, which was repeated in the application for judicial review in this Court, is not to be encouraged. The primary judge held that the various grounds of review did not identify any arguable jurisdictional error. In short, first those grounds alleging in various ways a failure to consider “the claims of the wife and daughters” to fear harm raised no arguable case of jurisdictional error because the application for the protection visa was that of the applicant, and not his wife and daughters (FCC reasons at [24]-[26]). Secondly, his Honour held that, to the extent those grounds alleged in various ways a failure to consider the applicant’s claims, they did not identify any arguable jurisdictional error because the Authority did in fact consider those claims (FCC reasons at [24] and [26]). Nor was it arguable that the Authority’s findings that the applicant could relocate lacked any evident and intelligible justification (FCC reasons at [27]). Finally the primary judge rejected as unarguable any breach of procedural fairness either on the ground that it was unclear what use the Authority had made of information subject to a non-disclosure certificate under s 473GB of the Act and whether the Authority had considered whether to disclose the documents covered by the non-disclosure certificate, or on the ground that the non-disclosure certificate itself was invalid. Specifically, his Honour held that s 473DA of the Act is an exhaustive statement of natural justice which excludes the common law rules of procedural fairness (distinguishing MZAFZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1081) (FCC reasons at [28]-[29]). As such, the primary judge concluded that the grounds identified in the FCC application lacked sufficient merit to warrant an extension of time and that it was not therefore in the interests of justice to do so (FCC reasons at [30]).3. CONSIDERATION3.1 Relevant principles It was not in issue that, despite there being no pathway to appeal from the refusal by the FCC to extend time under subs 477(2) of the Act, the Federal Court had original jurisdiction under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) to entertain the application for judicial review of the FCC decision: see e.g Tang v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 139; (2013) 217 FCR 55 at [10]-[11] (the Court); DMI16 v Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2018] FCAFC 95 (DMI16) at [37] (the Court).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The primary judge held that the various grounds of review did not identify any arguable jurisdictional error. In short, first those grounds alleging in various ways a failure to consider “the claims of the wife and daughters” to fear harm raised no arguable case of jurisdictional error because the application for the protection visa was that of the applicant, and not his wife and daughters (FCC reasons at [24]-[26]). Secondly, his Honour held that, to the extent those grounds alleged in various ways a failure to consider the applicant’s claims, they did not identify any arguable jurisdictional error because the Authority did in fact consider those claims (FCC reasons at [24] and [26]). Nor was it arguable that the Authority’s findings that the applicant could relocate lacked any evident and intelligible justification (FCC reasons at [27]). Finally the primary judge rejected as unarguable any breach of procedural fairness either on the ground that it was unclear what use the Authority had made of information subject to a non-disclosure certificate under s 473GB of the Act and whether the Authority had considered whether to disclose the documents covered by the non-disclosure certificate, or on the ground that the non-disclosure certificate itself was invalid. Specifically, his Honour held that s 473DA of the Act is an exhaustive statement of natural justice which excludes the common law rules of procedural fairness (distinguishing MZAFZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1081) (FCC reasons at [28]-[29]). As such, the primary judge concluded that the grounds identified in the FCC application lacked sufficient merit to warrant an extension of time and that it was not therefore in the interests of justice to do so (FCC reasons at [30]).3. CONSIDERATION3.1 Relevant principles It was not in issue that, despite there being no pathway to appeal from the refusal by the FCC to extend time under subs 477(2) of the Act, the Federal Court had original jurisdiction under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) to entertain the application for judicial review of the FCC decision: see e.g Tang v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 139; (2013) 217 FCR 55 at [10]-[11] (the Court); DMI16 v Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2018] FCAFC 95 (DMI16) at [37] (the Court). That being so, it is well established that the jurisdiction of an inferior court to decide matters is broader than that of an administrative decision-maker. Thus, after discussing the scope of errors of a jurisdictional kind in the context of an administrative tribunal, the High Court explained in Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 (Craig) at 179-180 that: In contrast [to an administrative tribunal], the ordinary jurisdiction of a court of law encompasses authority to decide questions of law, as well as questions of fact, involved in matters which it has jurisdiction to determine. The identification of relevant issues, the formulation of relevant questions and the determination of what is and what is not relevant evidence are all routine steps in the discharge of that ordinary jurisdiction. Demonstrable mistake in the identification of such issues or the formulation of such questions will commonly involve error of law which may, if an appeal is available and is pursued, be corrected by an appellate court and, depending on the circumstances, found an order setting aside the order or decision of the inferior court. Such a mistake on the part of an inferior court entrusted with authority to identify, formulate and determine such issues and questions will not, however, ordinarily constitute jurisdictional error. Similarly, a failure by an inferior court to take into account some matter which it was, as a matter of law, required to take into account in determining a question within jurisdiction or reliance by such a court upon some irrelevant matter upon which it was, as a matter of law, not entitled to rely in determining such a question will not ordinarily involve jurisdictional error.