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Bruce v Tyley

Bruce v Tyley

Case [1916] HCA 34 26 May 1916

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21 CLR 277

TYLEY AND ANOTHER

RESPONDENTS. PLAINTIFFS, ContractValidity-Personal contract with the Crown--Services to be performed

at military campSub-contract-Delegation of duties - Public policy - Impeding right to contract with Crown-Assignment of contract- Valuable consideration - Right of assignee to sue - Property Act 1860 (S.A.) (23 &24 Vict. No. 6), sec. 19.*

After the beginning of the war A, who was about to tender to the military authorities for the collection and removal of kitchen refuse from a military camp, agreed with B that in the event of the tender being accepted B should, for a certain monetary consideration, have the right to collect a certain portion of the refuse. A then tendered for the work, and his tender was accepted. Subsequently B, by deed, in consideration of natural love and affection, assigned to his wife his interest in the contract between him and A.

Held, that B's wife was not entitled to sue A for breach of the contract By Barton and Isaacs JJ., on the ground that the contract between A and the military authorities was a personal one, the duties under which A had no right to delegate to B, and, therefore, that B had no legally enforceable contract with A; Sec. 19 of the Property Act of

thereof in his own name as the assignor 1860 provides that " Every person

or the first of the assignors could have shall have power to assign any chose

brought if no such assignment had been in action, and the assignee thereof

made, without prejudice nevertheless for the time being may bring every

to any equity of the defendant as against such action thereupon or in respect

the plaintiff or any such assignor."

21 CLR 278

By Isques J., also on the ground that the contract between A and B, if it was an absolute contract to make no agreement with the Crown except one which would permit B to share in the collection of the refuse, was contrary to public policy and void, inasmuch as it affixed a penalty to a free exercise by A of his right to contract with the Crown

By Gavan Duffy J., on the ground that, apart from Statute, as there was no valuable consideration for the assignment of the contract between A and B by B to his wife, that assignment did not operate as an equitable assignment of the legal chose in action consisting of the right to sue A for a breach of the contract, and that sec. 19 of the Property Act of 1860 (S.A.), the only relevant effect of which is to dispense with the necessity of joining the assignor as a party where the assignee of a legal chose in action is seeking to enforce his rights in a Court of law, gave no right to B's wife to sue for a breach of the

Decision of the Supreme Court of South Australia (Murray J.) reversed.

APPEAL from the Supreme Court of South Australia.

An action…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Bruce v Tyley

Details

AGLC: Bruce v Tyley [1916] HCA 34
Case: [1916] HCA 34
Decision Date: 26 May 1916

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of *Bruce v Tyley* involved a dispute arising from a contract for the collection of waste material from a military camp. William Herbert Bruce (the appellant) entered into an agreement with Albert Arthur Tyley, whereby Tyley was to collect a portion of the refuse if Bruce's tender for the entire work was accepted by the military authorities. Subsequently, Tyley assigned his interest in this agreement to his wife, Emily Mabel Tyley, by deed of gift. When Bruce repudiated the agreement, Mrs. Tyley, as the assignee, sued Bruce for breach of contract. The Supreme Court of South Australia found in favour of Mrs. Tyley, awarding her damages. Bruce appealed this decision to the High Court of Australia.

The High Court was required to determine several legal issues. Primarily, the court had to consider whether the contract between Bruce and Tyley was legally enforceable, particularly in light of the fact that it was contingent on Bruce obtaining a contract with the military authorities. A key question was whether Bruce's obligations under the military contract could be delegated to Tyley. Furthermore, the court had to assess the validity of the assignment of Tyley's rights to his wife, considering the nature of the underlying contract and the consideration for the assignment. The court also considered whether the agreement between Bruce and Tyley was contrary to public policy.

The High Court, by a majority, reversed the decision of the Supreme Court. Barton and Isaacs JJ. held that the contract between Bruce and the military authorities was personal in nature, meaning Bruce could not delegate his duties under it. Consequently, they found that Tyley had no legally enforceable contract with Bruce. Isaacs J. also reasoned that if the contract between Bruce and Tyley was an absolute agreement that Tyley should share in the refuse collection regardless of the terms of the military contract, it was void as being contrary to public policy, as it could impede Bruce's freedom to contract with the Crown. Gavan Duffy J. based his decision on the lack of valuable consideration for the assignment from Tyley to his wife, concluding that it did not operate as an equitable assignment of the legal chose in action, and that the relevant statute merely dispensed with the need to join the assignor.

The High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of the Supreme Court of South Australia. The court ordered that the judgment in favour of Mrs. Tyley be reversed, meaning she was not entitled to recover damages from Bruce.

Orders