BRR18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs
[2023] FedCFamC2G 170
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia
(DIVISION 2)
BRR18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 170
File number(s): SYG 918 of 2018 Judgment of: JUDGE GIVEN Date of judgment: 8 March 2023 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Whether Immigration Assessment Authority assessed the child applicants against the wrong country of reference – whether Authority unreasonably rejected claim that applicants would be persecuted as undocumented, non-nationals Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5, 5H, 5J, 36 Cases cited: C7A/2017 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2020) 276 FCR 147
Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611
Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Guo Wei Rong (1997) 191 CLR 559
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden (2016) 240 FCR 158
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 264 CLR 541
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZAPN (2015) 254 CLR 10
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 297 ALR 225
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam (1999) 93 FCR 220
Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Abebe (1999) 197 CLR 510
Sykes v Cleary (No.2) (1992) 176 CLR 77
WZARV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCCA 1556
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 52 Date of hearing: 5 October 2022 Place: Sydney Counsel for the Applicant: Mr D Taylor Solicitor for the Applicant: Sydney West Legal and Migration Counsel for the Respondents: Mr T Reilly Solicitor for the Respondents: Minter Ellison Lawyers ORDERS
SYG 918 of 2018 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: BRR18
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
order made by:
JUDGE GIVEN
DATE OF ORDER:
8 march 2023
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The time for compliance with order 1 made on 5 October 2022 is extended to 4.00pm on 9 March 2023.
2.The application filed on 2 April 2018, as amended, is dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE GIVEN:
The applicants seek judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (Authority) dated 8 March 2018, which affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (delegate) to refuse to grant them Safe Haven Enterprise Visas (visas) (CB 493 to 512).
background
The following statement of background facts and summary of the Tribunal’s decision are derived from the submissions of the first respondent, but are not in dispute.
The applicants are a family comprising a mother and her five children. The first applicant (applicant) is a citizen of Indonesia. The applicant, her late husband and three of the applicant children arrived in Australia by boat as unauthorised maritime arrivals on 1 November 2012. Two of the applicant children were born in Australia.
On 22 December 2015 the family lodged a combined application for the visa in which only the applicant's husband made claims for protection based on his status as a stateless Rohingya (CB 51 to 287). The applicant's husband died on 17 August 2016 as a result of a car accident.
On 2 May 2017, following the death of the applicant's husband, the applicant lodged Part C of a visa application, stating that she and the five children were now making their own claims for protection (CB 354 to 389).
The applicant claimed to have a well-founded fear of persecution in Indonesia in the form of a threat to her life, or significant hardship threatening her capacity to subsist, because of her membership of particular social groups comprised of widows without family support, and family members of Rohingyans. The applicant claimed that her children will face significant economic hardship, denial of access to basic services and significant physical harassment and ill-treatment because they are stateless, of Rohingya ethnicity and members of a particular social group, being children of widows and single mothers. She also claimed that they would face inhuman and/or degrading treatment or punishment if they were to return to Indonesia.
It was further claimed that the three oldest children are stateless and their country of former habitual residence is Malaysia, while the younger two children are stateless and their country of former habitual residence is Australia. This claim was predicated on the difficulties they claim to face in obtaining identity documents, because they do not have birth documentation. The applicant made further claims that the two eldest daughters would be at risk of being abducted and trafficked, and she feared that her parents might be violent towards her if she returns to Indonesia.
The delegate interviewed the applicant on 20 September 2017. On 18 January 2018 the delegate refused to grant the applicants the visas (CB 436 to 468). The matter was then referred to the Authority for review. On 12 February 2018 the applicants made written submissions to the Authority (CB 482 to 486).
On 8 March 2018, the Authority affirmed the delegate's decisions (CB 493 to 512).
The Authority’s decision
To the extent that the written submission addressed matters which were before the delegate, the Authority found that this was not new information and considered it (at CB 495 at [6]).
The Authority first considered the issues related to the claimed statelessness and identity/nationality concerns. It did not accept that any of the applicants were stateless. The Authority found that Indonesia is the receiving country for the purposes of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) in relation to the applicant (CB 497 at [11] and 498 at [17]) and, on the basis of Article 4(5) of Chapter 2 of the Indonesian Law on Citizenship, found Indonesia to be the receiving country for all the child applicants (CB 497 to 498 at [12] to [17]).
In relation to the applicant's claim that she would be without family support on return to Indonesia, the Authority found the evidence about her relationship with her family to be “unsatisfactory” and “inconsistent”. On that basis, the Authority found that the applicant would be able to access family support in Indonesia, and did not accept that she is at risk of harm from members of her family (CB 499 to 500 at [20] to [26]). The Authority also did not accept that her family would harm her because she had married a Rohingya man (CB 499 at [22]).
In respect of the applicant's claim that she would face harm without family support or as a female head of household, the Authority was prepared to accept that the applicant may be looked down upon and experience teasing or taunting and other hurtful remarks, however, found that this would not constitute “serious harm” (CB 501 at [28]). The Authority also found that neither the applicant's evidence, nor country information, supported a finding that as a widow with five children the applicant would face a real chance of economic disadvantage of such severity that it would constitute serious harm amounting to persecution or threaten her capacity to subsist (CB 501 at [30]). Rather, the Authority was satisfied that the applicant would be able to obtain employment, and rely on some support from her family, and that she and the applicant children would be able to, “at the very least” subsist (CB 501 at [30]).
In relation to the claim that the applicant’s children would face harm as Rohingyans, the Authority was willing to accept that the applicant children may face some prejudice and a low level of discrimination because of their mixed ethnicity and Rohingyan background. However, by reference to country information, was not satisfied that there was a real chance that they would face serious harm of any kind (CB 501 to 502 at [32] to [33]). The Authority was also not satisfied that the applicant children would face harm on account of being children of a widow or single mother, or that they would be at risk of being trafficked and kidnapped (CB 505 at [40] to [41]).
The Authority noted that the applicants were affected by the Department’s data breach, however, was not satisfied that they were at requisite risk as a result of it (at [42]).
The Authority rejected the applicants' claims and found that they did not meet the requirements of the definition of “refugee” in subsection 5H(1) of the Act (CB 506 at [46]). Based on its anterior factual findings, the Authority found that the applicant did not satisfy the complementary protection criterion (CB 508 at [52]).
application to this court
By an application to show cause filed with this Court on 2 April 2018 the applicants sought judicial review of the Authority’s decision and raised 12 grounds of review, with particulars. The applicants have been represented by their current solicitor since the commencement of the proceedings.
On 26 April 2018, a Registrar of the Court made procedural orders which, inter alia, appointed the first applicant as the litigation guardian of the child applicants, pursuant to Division 11.2 of the (then) Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth). By reference to that order, which helpfully included the birth dates of the children, it appears that the fourth and fifth applicants have now reached their majority. Accordingly, I will vacate the order in respect of them (unless the parties indicate there is a reason not to). The inclusion of birth dates in an order of this nature is practical and helpful and the first respondent’s solicitors are to be commended for this practice, which should become a common feature in litigation guardian orders proposed by those who represent the Minister. The orders also provided for the applicants to file and serve an amended application and evidence by 19 July 2018. The applicants did not avail themselves of that opportunity.
On 20 July 2018, an Affidavit of the applicants’ solicitor affirmed on 18 July 2018 was filed, for the applicants annexing a Freedom of Information request by which the applicant sought the audio recording of an interview conducted between her late husband and the Department on 12 April 2016, which she said the Authority relied upon in making its decision (FOI request).
On 31 August 2018, an Affidavit made by the applicant on 29 August 2018 was filed for the applicants by which, the applicant alleged that she had been denied procedural fairness by reason of the FOI request not having been acceded to.
On 9 September 2019 a proposed Amended Application was filed on behalf of the applicants, abandoning the previous grounds of review and replacing them with a single ground with particulars. No grant of leave was made in respect of this proposed Amended Application at any time.
On 30 June 2022, the matter was brought into my docket. On 13 July 2022 I made orders, inter alia, listing the matter for hearing before me on 7 September 2022, together with an additional grant of leave to the applicant to file any amended application and evidence by 27 July 2022. The applicants did not avail themselves of that opportunity. On 15 August 2022, my Chambers received an email from the applicant’s (then) Counsel, which, inter alia, foreshadowed a “possible application for adjournment” of the aforementioned hearing date due to the failure of the Minister to provide to the first applicant, the recording of her husband’s interview with the Department which took place on 12 April 2016 (located at CB 310 to 311). At my direction, my Associate informed the parties that, quite aside from the effect of r 13 of the Legal Profession Uniform Conduct (Barristers) Rules 2015 (NSW), correspondence to Chambers is not an appropriate mechanism for the ventilation of matters of substance in connection with proceedings. Accordingly, the matter was listed for a directions hearing on 17 August 2022. By the time of the directions hearing, the solicitors for the first respondent had provided the audio recording in question. At the directions hearing, I granted leave to the applicants to file and serve any proposed Amended Application[1] and Affidavit evidence on or by 7 September 2022. On 6 September 2022 an Affidavit of Fouad Haroon (a paralegal in the employ of the applicants’ solicitor) was filed annexing a transcript of the applicant’s visa interview on 20 September 2017 (Transcript Affidavit). On 11 September 2022 an Affidavit of the applicant’s solicitor affirmed on that same date was filed with the Court (Taylor Affidavit).
[1] Noting that the previously filed document was not granted leave this was not a Further Amended Application
On 12 September 2022, the applicants’ written submissions were filed which appended fresh proposed grounds of review (omitting formal parts) intended to constitute a proposed Amended Application. The written submissions addressed only the grounds in the newly proposed grounds. On 20 September 2022 the first respondent filed written submissions which also addressed the newly proposed grounds of review.
At the commencement of the hearing on 5 October 2022, and on the basis that there was no opposition from the first respondent, I granted leave to the applicants to rely upon the grounds in the form appended to their written submissions on the basis that an Amended Application raising the grounds in that form be filed by 6 October 2022 (Amended Application). The Amended Application was then not filed in accordance with the orders of the Court and, at the time of writing these reasons for judgment, remains unfiled. I will make an additional order extending time for this to occur, in order that the Court file should be complete. It is unsatisfactory that the applicant’s solicitor has not complied with the Court’s orders to date, particularly in light of the numerous opportunities granted to the applicants to amend in respect of which they did not avail themselves.
The Transcript Affidavit was read for the applicants without objection. The Taylor Affidavit was also read for the applicants without objection. The Court Book filed for the first respondent on 24 May 2018 was also received and marked Exhibit “1R”. Despite having been earlier represented by Counsel, at hearing the applicants were represented only by their solicitor. The first respondent was represented by Counsel.
By the Amended Application the applicants raise the following grounds of review (omitting particulars):
1. The Authority assessed the three older children against the wrong country of reference under s. 5H of the Migration Act 1958.
2. The Authority misunderstood and made unreasonable findings rejecting the claim, namely that there was a real chance the third, fourth and fifth applicants would be persecuted and suffer serious harm because they would be imputed to be non-nationals and hence remain undocumented, and not recognised by the Indonesian State as citizens, including for reason of their membership of a particular social group.
The grounds overlap to a significant degree and turn upon the Authority’s consideration of the potential lack of documentation which the children might face, and the consequences which were said to flow therefrom.
Ground 1
By this ground the applicants allege that the Authority assessed the three older children (the second, third and fourth applicants) against the “wrong country of reference” pursuant to to
s 5H of the Act. That section relevantly provides:
Meaning of refugee
(1) For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person in Australia, the person is a refugee if the person:
(a) in a case where the person has a nationality--is outside the country of his or her nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or
(b) in a case where the person does not have a nationality--is outside the country of his or her former habitual residence and owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to return to it.
Note: For the meaning of well-founded fear of persecution, see section 5J.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply if the Minister has serious reasons for considering that:
(a) the person has committed a crime against peace, a war crime or a crime against humanity, as defined by international instruments prescribed by the regulations; or
(b) the person committed a serious non-political crime before entering Australia; or
(c) the person has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations
Essentially, the ground contends that it was not open to the Authority to find that the child applicants in question were Indonesian nationals, or that Indonesia was the “receiving country” given that the Authority recognised there was a chance they may be refused documentation which recognised or proved their legal status as citizens in Indonesia.
The applicants assert that because the Authority did not make a positive finding in respect of whether the applicant children would in fact be able to obtain proof of their citizenship (in the form of documentation provided by Indonesia), this amounted to “de jure statelessness”. As such, the Authority’s finding that the applicant children were Indonesian citizens, irrespective of Governmental recognition, was said by the applicants to constitute an “impermissible assumption” for the purpose of s 5H of the Act.
The first respondent’s position in respect of the applicants’ view, is that the legal status of citizenship and the practical proof of it are two separate matters. The first respondent says that, pursuant to s 5(1) of the Act, the “receiving country” of an applicant is to be determined “solely by reference to the law of the relevant country”: see Sykes v Cleary (No.2) (1992) 176 CLR 77 per Mason CJ, Toohey and McHugh JJ at 105 to 107.
The Authority’s finding in respect of the three older applicant children, was based upon the application of Article 4(5) of Chapter 2 of the Indonesian Law on Citizenship. The Authority observed that the law provides for the conferral of citizenship upon “children born through legal wedlock from an Indonesian mother and a stateless father or whose country does not provide automatic citizenship to their offspring”.
The applicant claimed to be an Indonesian citizen and legally married to her husband. Accordingly, the relevant law appears to deem her children to be Indonesian citizens. On this basis, the first respondent submitted that the Authority’s finding referred to at [29] above was at the very least open to it, citing C7A/2017 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2020) 276 FCR 147 per Katzmann, Wigney and Abraham JJ at [124] to [126] (C7A/17).
The present case is relevantly indistinguishable from C7A/17. There is nothing in the instant matter to cause me to depart from the findings therein that the receiving country is a matter determinable by the decision-maker according to the usual principles of administrative law. I accept the first respondent’s submission that the factual finding that the three older child applicants were citizens of Indonesia, was a matter for determination upon evidence before the Authority, and one on which reasonable minds may very well differ. On the material before the Authority it was open to it to find as it did that, because the applicant was an Indonesian citizen, and legally married to her husband, the older children would be deemed to be Indonesian citizens.
It is true that the Authority referred to potential challenges that the children may have in obtaining documentation to prove their Indonesian citizenship. However that does not undermine the base fact that the citizenship would be deemed as a matter of Indonesian law, and I accept the first respondent’s submission that there is a difference between the legal status of citizenship and its documentation.
In any event the Authority, while acknowledging that there may be some difficulty in obtaining the documents, was not satisfied that the applicants in question would ultimately be unable to do so (CB 504 at [38]). The Authority went on, in essence, to ask itself “what if I am wrong?” when (at the conclusion of [38]) it also considered whether the absence of such documentation would cause the children to be denied access to services in such a way as to threaten their capacity to subsist and found that it would not. Whether such harm amounted to serious harm, was a matter uniquely of fact and degree for the Authority to determine, and is not for assessment by the Court: see Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZAPN (2015) 254 CLR 10 per French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ at [51]; WZARV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCCA 1556.
The applicants also submitted that the findings of the Authority were not open because the Authority misunderstood, or failed to address, claims and evidence provided by the applicant. However, those aspects (namely the difficulties which the applicant had experienced in 2009 in registering the children previously) and difficulties in establishing the existence of the marriage by reason of it having not been registered (or not being recognised outside of Indonesia) were considered.[2] To the extent that it was alleged that the children may be considered to have been born out of wedlock, the evidence before the Authority did not categorically support this, such that it remained open to the Authority to conclude as it did. Secondly, the applicant did not in fact claim that her marriage with her husband was not registered by the Malaysian Government. By reference to the Transcript (lines 265 to 285), the applicant provided documentation to the delegate and when asked specifically if the marriage was not registered, her response (line 285) was “maybe not”. In any event, the material before the Authority indicated that Article 4(7) of Chapter 2 of the Indonesian Law of Citizenship “provides that children born out of wedlock from an Indonesian mother are citizens of Indonesia” (CB 498 at [17]).
[2] see for example CB 504 at [38]
The Authority’s conclusion that the children met the requirements of Article 4(5) of the Indonesian law regarding citizenship was open to it on the material and evidence before it. As such, its conclusion that Indonesia was the receiving country for the purposes of s 5H of the Act had a reasonable foundation and was not in error as alleged. Accordingly, the applicants have not established the error alleged by ground 1.
Ground 2
The contention in ground 2 that the Authority erred in making unreasonable findings that certain of the applicants would not suffer serious harm as a result of being unable to obtain identity or citizenship documentation is, in essence one of “outcome focussed unreasonableness” of the kind identified in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1 (see in particular per Allsop CJ at [6] to [11]; see also Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden (2016) 240 FCR 158 at [54] to [65] ). The applicants assert that the conclusion reached by the Authority about their claim that they would suffer persecution by being imputed as non-nationals because of a lack of documentation was legally unreasonable.
In Stretton (supra), Wigney J summarised the task for the Court at [92] as being:
The critical point is that, in reviewing a decision on the ground of legal unreasonableness, the Court’s role is strictly supervisory. It is concerned with determining whether there has been a lawful exercise of power having regard, in particular, to the terms, scope and purpose of the statute conferring the power. In circumstances where reasonable minds might differ about the outcome of, or justification for, the exercise of power, or where the outcome falls within the range of legally and factually justifiable outcomes, the exercise of power is not legally unreasonable simply because the Court disagrees, even emphatically, with the outcome or justification. If there is an evident, transparent and intelligible justification for the decision (Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 at [76] at [105]; Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437 at [44] –[45] ), or if the decision is within the “area of decisional freedom” of the decision‐maker (Li at [28] at [66] at [105]; Singh at [44]), it would be an error for the Court to overturn the decision simply on the basis that it would have decided the matter differently…
As noted at [34] above, it is not for this Court to substitute its own view of whether the applicants would face persecution or serious harm by reason of any potential lack of documentation of membership of a particular social group. The Court can only assess whether the conclusion of the Authority in relation to this claim was open to it, within the bounds of the statutory power it was exercising by reference to whether there was an evident, transparent and intelligible justification for its findings.
At the hearing, the applicants’ solicitor equated a denial of documentation with a denial of fundamental human rights, and raised a number of risks that would potentially be enlivened by such a denial. Namely, difficulty accessing basic services, increased vulnerability to trafficking and discrimination. While the zeal with which these submissions was made may be admirable, and it was clear that their solicitor wished to make their case forcefully, the Court cannot consider submissions based only on the humanitarian and compassionate merits of the applicants’ situation, in its assessment of whether the Authority erred.
The applicants firstly say that the Authority failed to consider the claim of the children to be members of a particular social group, namely “children of apparent Rohingyan ethnicity born outside of Indonesia to a Rohingyan father, who did not possess birth certificates”. However, I reject this assertion, given that such a particular social group was not advanced before the Authority.
To the extent that constituent parts of what is now said to be a particular social group were advanced in various ways, the Authority considered those in the context and terms by which they were squarely raised (CB 504 at [38] and 506 at [45]) and concluded that the applicants would not face harm for any s 5J(1)(a) reason.
The balance of the particulars to this ground direct themselves again to the Authority’s conclusions regarding the nationality of the children as being Indonesian, that they were not stateless and about difficulties in obtaining documentation.
The threshold for establishing legal unreasonableness is necessarily high: see Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 per Crennan and Bell JJ at [135]. The High Court has also described the test for unreasonableness as being stringent and extremely confined: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 264 CLR 541.
In reaching the conclusions it did about whether the applicants would face serious harm, the Authority had regard to country information about the situation and consequences of, inter alia, being undocumented in Indonesia (CB 502 to 504 at [35] to [38]). Particular reference to the footnoted material reveals that the Authority extensively considered material as to the impacts that any potential lack of documentation may have on the children. The Authority then considered this substantively in respect of each of the s 36(2)(a) (CB 506 at [51]) and s 36(2)(aa) criteria (CB 507 at [51]). In so finding, the Authority specifically made reference to the impact that any lack of documentation may have on the ability of the child applicants to subsist (which reflects s 5J(5)(e) of the Act) and concluded that this would not lead to such a denial (CB 504 at [38]).
The applicants also contend as part of ground 2 that because of what is described as being a “number of equivocations” within the Authority’s decision, that when the Authority considered that requisite harm would not result from the applicant children being unable to obtain documentation, it failed to ask itself “what if I am wrong”: see Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam (1999) 93 FCR 220 per Sackville J at [60] to [67]. The dicta of Sackville J in Rajalingam (following Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Guo Wei Rong (1997) 191 CLR 559 and Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Abebe (1999) 197 CLR 510), was that where a decision-maker is uncertain as to whether an alleged event occurred, it may be necessary to take into account the possibility that its findings were wrong. While the first respondent submitted that the Rajalingam exercise was unnecessary in the present case, submitting that there was no real doubt expressed as to the Authority’s correctness of its conclusion, for the reasons already given at [34] above, I am satisfied that the Authority did in fact undertake this additional process.
What is required for the applicants to make good their allegation that the Authority’s conclusions regarding serious harm to the child applicants were unreasonable, is that they demonstrate the conclusions of the Authority were not open to it, in the sense that reasonable minds could not differ. The material before the Authority was such that the findings it made were open to it, including for the reasons already set out in relation to ground 1 above. The applicants are, understandably, disappointed by the conclusions of the Authority, but this does not suffice to establish error and notwithstanding the impassioned submissions of their solicitor, nothing raised went beyond an invitation to the Court to revisit the merits of the Authority’s decision for itself, which is an impermissible exercise beyond the Court’s jurisdiction. I am not satisfied that the Authority’s conclusions regarding serious harm in respect of (any of) the applicants transgresses the limits of decisional freedom in the sense contemplated by French CJ in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 297 ALR 225.
In all the circumstances of the present case, I conclude that the Authority’s findings in relation to whether the applicants face serious harm for the purposes of s 5J of the Act were a matter entirely for it, were open and not legally unreasonable. Accordingly, ground 2 is not made out.
Conclusion
The decision being free from jurisdictional error, it is a privative clause decision and must be dismissed. I will so order.
I will hear the parties as to costs and in respect of the partial vacation of the litigation guardian order.
I certify that the preceding fifty-two (52) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Given. Associate:
Dated: 8 March 2023
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