Bropho v State of Western Australia

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[2010] HCATrans 138

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Perth  No P24 of 2009

B e t w e e n -

ROBERT CHARLES BROPHO

Applicant

and

STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

HEYDON J
KIEFEL J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

FROM CANBERRA BY VIDEO LINK TO PERTH

ON FRIDAY, 28 MAY 2010, AT 1.57 PM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR S.A. WALKER:   May it please the Court, I appear for the applicant in this matter.  (instructed by Western Legal)

MR B. FIANNACA, SC:   May it please the Court, I appear with MR L.M. FOX for the respondent.  (instructed by Director of Public Prosecutions (WA))

HEYDON J:   Yes, thank you, Mr Walker.

MR WALKER:   Your Honours, there are two grounds in the application for special leave to appeal.  They both concern the treatment of DNA paternity evidence by the Court of Appeal in relation to an appeal against conviction by the applicant in the District Court, that court being constituted by a judge sitting alone.  Ground 1 addresses the question of the so‑called joint paternity index.  Can I start by asking your Honours to refer to page 70 of the application book.  Perhaps I should preface my request that you look at that page by indicating that in a discussion a few moments ago I had with Mr Fiannaca and Mr Fox, it emerged that there was an earlier version of the application book which is not identical to the version I have in front of me.  I apprehend your Honours that you have the same version I have and the respondent, I think, was served with some copies of the original which was then rejected by the Registry and was served with the later one as well, and there has been ‑ ‑ ‑

HEYDON J:   On our page 70, paragraph 100 starts in the fifth line with the words “He explained”.

MR WALKER:   Thank you, your Honour.

HEYDON J:   That is the same, is it?

MR WALKER:   Yes, it is indeed the same as the one which I have before me and unfortunately my learned friends were operating, until a few moments ago, from a different one but they do now have the correct one before them.  Your Honours, at page 70 of the application book at lines 21 to 36 his Honour the trial judge was dealing with the question of the paternity index or the paternity indices.  He, at that point, was referring to and commenced referring to Dr John Buckleton at the foot of the previous page.  Dr Buckleton was the expert who was called by the respondent, the State of WA. 

One sees in paragraph 100, as I say particularly lines 21 to 36, that Dr Buckleton was provided with DNA profiles in relation to Isabel Bropho, she being the complainant, Deanna and Latoya, the two children, and the accused, and the end result of that examination we then find set…

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Details
Case
[2010] HCATrans 138
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered the appeal in *Bropho v State of Western Australia*. The dispute concerned the validity of a notice issued by the State of Western Australia under section 39(1) of the *Aboriginal Heritage Act 1972* (WA) which declared certain land to be of significance to Aboriginal tradition. The appellant, Mr Bropho, sought to challenge the validity of this notice.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the State of Western Australia, in issuing the notice under section 39(1) of the *Aboriginal Heritage Act 1972* (WA), was bound by the common law doctrine of procedural fairness. Specifically, the court had to determine if the State was required to provide natural justice to those whose interests might be affected by the declaration of the land as being of significance to Aboriginal tradition.

The High Court held that the doctrine of procedural fairness, as a common law principle, did not apply to the executive act of issuing a notice under section 39(1) of the *Aboriginal Heritage Act 1972* (WA). Their Honours reasoned that the provision in question conferred a power on the Minister to make a declaration, and this power was not exercised in a manner that affected the rights or interests of individuals in a way that would attract the application of procedural fairness. The court distinguished this executive function from judicial or quasi-judicial functions where procedural fairness is typically required. The appeal was dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Robert Charles Bropho was convicted by a judge sitting alone in the District Court of Western Australia of five counts of sexual penetration of a child under the age of sixteen years. The complainant in the case was the mother of the two child victims, Deanna and Latoya Bropho. Bropho appealed against his conviction to the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal but noted two errors in the trial judge's consideration of DNA evidence. The first error was an incorrect calculation of the probability that Bropho was the father of one of the children. The second error was the consideration of a "joint paternity index" which calculated the combined probability that Bropho was the father of both children. Bropho applied for special leave to appeal to the High Court against the Court of Appeal's dismissal of his appeal. The High Court dismissed the application for special leave to appeal, finding there was no demonstrated error in the Court of Appeal's reasoning that would give rise to a prospect of success on appeal, nor had any injustice been done in the particular case.

This case involves an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia by Robert Charles Bropho, the applicant, against the State of Western Australia, the respondent. The application pertains to the Court of Appeal's handling of DNA paternity evidence in relation to an appeal against the applicant's conviction in the District Court. The case began in the District Court, where the applicant was convicted by a judge sitting alone. The applicant then appealed to the Court of Appeal, which considered the appeal and upheld the conviction. The applicant now seeks special leave to appeal to the High Court, arguing that the Court of Appeal erred in its treatment of DNA paternity evidence, specifically concerning a joint paternity index and a calculation error regarding theta or FST value. The High Court, after hearing arguments from both parties, dismissed the application for special leave to appeal, finding no demonstrated error in the Court of Appeal's reasoning or injustice that would warrant an appeal.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Did the Court of Appeal err in law by treating the joint paternity index calculation without expert evidence, and without making a finding on the commonality of paternity, as was done by the trial judge?
2. Was there an error in the evidence of the expert, Dr. John Buckleton, which was undetected at trial and not noted by the trial judge, and if so, was it significant enough to warrant a finding of miscarriage of justice by the Court of Appeal?

Held
1. The Court of Appeal did not err in law by treating the joint paternity index calculation without expert evidence, and without making a finding on the commonality of paternity, as was done by the trial judge. The Court of Appeal found it open to the trial judge to conclude that the scientific evidence established that the appellant was the father of each of the children.
2. There was no error in the evidence of the expert, Dr. John Buckleton, which was undetected at trial and not noted by the trial judge significant enough to warrant a finding of miscarriage of justice by the Court of Appeal. The application for special leave to appeal was dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The first issue concerns whether the Court of Appeal erred in law by treating the joint paternity index calculation without expert evidence and without making a finding on the commonality of paternity, as was done by the trial judge. The applicant argued that the Court of Appeal should not have treated the joint paternity index without the assistance of expert evidence or a finding that the children had a common father. The trial judge had accepted the conclusions of Dr. John Buckleton, the expert witness, including the joint paternity index calculation. However, the Court of Appeal did not rely on expert evidence in its assessment of this issue and did not make a finding that the children had a common father. The Court of Appeal concluded that the DNA evidence was capable of establishing the likelihood that both children were fathered by the same person. The Court held that the trial judge's acceptance of the expert's evidence was not an error of law and that the Court of Appeal was not bound by the trial judge's reasoning. The Court of Appeal's treatment of the joint paternity index was considered to be a legitimate exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

The second issue concerns whether there was an error in the evidence of the expert, Dr. John Buckleton, which was undetected at trial and not noted by the trial judge, and if so, was it significant enough to warrant a finding of miscarriage of justice by the Court of Appeal. The applicant argued that there was an error in the calculation of the paternity index for one of the children, which was not noticed at trial or by the trial judge. The Court of Appeal acknowledged the error but found that it was not significant enough to warrant a finding of miscarriage of justice. The Court held that the error did not affect the overall conclusion that the applicant was the father of both children and that the trial judge's conclusion would likely have been the same even if the error had been corrected. The Court of Appeal's conclusion that the error did not amount to a miscarriage of justice was considered to be a reasonable exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the Court of Appeal is not bound by the trial judge's reasoning and may exercise its own judgment in assessing the relevance and admissibility of expert evidence. The Court of Appeal may also consider the overall significance of any errors in the evidence and determine whether they amount to a miscarriage of justice. In this case, the Court of Appeal's treatment of the joint paternity index and the error in the paternity index calculation for one of the children were considered to be legitimate exercises of its appellate jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal's conclusion that there was no miscarriage of justice was not found to be erroneous.