BRG17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs

[2022] FedCFamC2G 11

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

BRG17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 11

File number:	MLG 790 of 2017
Judgment of:	JUDGE LADHAMS
Date of judgment:	19 January 2022
Catchwords:	MIGRATION – Application for judicial review of decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal – refusal to grant Protection (Class XA) visa – where applicant’s name is  recorded incorrectly on face of Tribunal decision – whether Tribunal decision was affected by actual or apprehended bias – whether Tribunal failed to consider integers of claim or evidence – whether applicant was denied procedural fairness – whether Tribunal failed to comply with statutory duty – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed.
Legislation:	Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth), s 190 Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36, 91X, 424A, 425A, 476, 477 Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), r 4.35D
Cases cited:	AFN15 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2021] FedCFamC2G 276 Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 236 FCR 593; [2003] FCAFC 184 AYY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 261 FCR 503; [2018] FCAFC 89 Bala v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 600 Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163; [1995] HCA 58 DFE20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FedCFamC2G 35 Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 233 FCR 136; [2001] FCA 1802 Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 264 CLR 421; [2019] HCA 3 Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99; [2013] FCA 317 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507; [2001] HCA 17 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323; [2001] HCA 30 MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2021) 390 ALR 590; [2021] HCA 17 NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1; [2004] FCAFC 263 Refugee Review Tribunal, Re; Ex parte H (2001) 179 ALR 425; [2001] HCA 28
Division:	Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs:	51
Date of hearing:	17 December 2021
Place:	Perth
Applicants:	In person
Counsel for the First Respondent:	Mr C Orchard
Second Respondent:	Submitting appearance, save as to costs
Solicitor for the Respondents:	Sparke Helmore Lawyers

ORDERS

MLG 790 of 2017

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

BRG17

First Applicant

BRH17

Second Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:	JUDGE LADHAMS
DATE OF ORDER:	19 JANUARY 2022

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application filed on 19 April 2017 is dismissed.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE LADHAMS:

INTRODUCTION

1. By application filed on 19 April 2017 under s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act), the applicants seek judicial review of a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) on 20 March 2017. The Tribunal affirmed an earlier decision made by a delegate of the Minister not to grant the applicants Protection (Class XA) visas (protection visas).

2. The applicants are husband and wife. The information on the Commonwealth Courts Portal records that the wife is named as the first applicant to this proceeding and the husband is named as the second applicant. However, this is not immediately obvious on the face of the Court documents. For clarity, throughout this judgment, I will refer to the applicants as ‘husband applicant’ and ‘wife applicant’ where it is necessary to distinguish between them.

3. For reasons explained below, I have found that there is no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal decision and I dismiss the application to the Court.

   BACKGROUND

4. The applicants are nationals of Malaysia who arrived in Australia in September 2015 on visitor visas.

5. The applicants lodged an application for the protection visas on 15 November 2015. Although both applicants submitted the form 866C to make their own claims for protection, and both also submitted form 866D to claim protection as a member of a family unit, only the husband applicant advanced any claims for protection in his written application. In his form 866C, the husband applicant claimed that he feared returning to Malaysia because he had borrowed money from loan sharks to pay people involved in an employment syndicate who were to help him get a work permit and lucrative salary in Australia. The husband applicant claimed that the agent involved in the employment syndicate took the money and left the applicants, and now he is afraid of the loan sharks who were waiting for his return to threaten him.

6. A delegate of the Minister refused to grant the applicants protection visas on 17 March 2016. The delegate found that the husband applicant did not meet the refugee criteria in s 36(2)(a) or the complementary protection criteria in s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act. The delegate found that the husband applicant could obtain, from the Malaysian authorities, protection such that he would not have a well-founded fear of persecution, and there would not be a real risk that he would face significant harm. The delegate refused to grant a protection visa to the wife applicant because she was not a member of the same family unit as a person who holds a protection visa.

7. On 22 March 2016 the applicants lodged an application to the Tribunal seeking review of the delegate’s decision.

8. The applicants attended a hearing convened by the Tribunal on 15 March 2017 to give evidence and present arguments. At the hearing the applicants were assisted by an interpreter in the Malay and English languages.

9. On 20 March 2017 the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision.

   TRIBUNAL DECISION

10. The Tribunal summarised the evidence given by the applicants at the hearing. The applicants said that they had debts of approximately 250,000MYR with banks and a loan shark in Malaysia. They said the reasons for the debt included taking out a car loan, expenditure on their apartment, personal use, and unsuccessful investments in the stock market. The applicants stated that the majority of the debt was owed to several banks in Malaysia and the applicants also borrowed around 10,000MYR from a loan shark. They claimed to fear harm in Malaysia because the loan shark allegedly said ‘something would happen’ to the husband applicant if he failed to make payments, and that the wife applicant had received threats at her workplace from a gang associated with the loan shark. The wife applicant stated she did not report these threats to the police. She offered no explanation as to why she failed to report the threats, other than she just ‘didn’t do it’. When asked by the Tribunal whether they had suffered harm or feared harm for any other reason, the husband applicant indicated that he only feared harm because of the loan shark and the wife applicant stated ‘it was just because of the worsening economy’ and that it was difficult to get jobs as workplaces were employing foreign workers. The applicants estimated that they currently owed about 60,000MYR to the loan shark, despite also giving evidence that they had paid off half the loan and continue to service the loan.

11. The Tribunal did not accept that the applicants ever borrowed money from a loan shark or that they were ever threatened by a loan shark. The Tribunal’s reasons for these findings are summarised at [50] of its reasons, where the Tribunal said:

    I found the evidence of the applicants on the claim that they owe money to a loan shark to be vague and unconvincing. They were unable to indicate with any precision how much they owed, why they had paid off around half of the loan and continued to service the loan but thought they owed 60, 000MYR currently. Their evidence in relation to being threatened by the loan shark was vague and illogical – claiming that they had been threatened but not providing very much detail, and also indicating that they had continued to service the loan in Australia but feared threats and harm at home. Despite the country information discussed with them they were unable to clearly explain why they had not sought protection from the authorities if they had indeed been threatened. They were unable to clearly articulate why they could not sell their assets including their cars and apartment and use this money to pay the loan shark, and then work to pay off the loans to the banks. The claimed loan amount of 10, 000 MYR was a small proportion of their overall debt to banks. For all of these reasons I disbelieve that the applicants have in fact taken out a loan from a loan shark in Malaysia as claimed. Whilst I accept that they got themselves into financial difficulty in Malaysia, I do not accept that they owe money to a loan shark, or have received threats from any loan shark, and therefore do not accept that there is any chance they will face harm on this basis. Their claims are not made out as they have been presented.

12. The Tribunal did not accept that the debts the applicants owed to banks in Malaysia would cause them to face harm. Specifically, the Tribunal did not accept that the applicants’ debts to banks would lead to them not having capacity to subsist.

13. The Tribunal found that the applicants did not face a real chance of serious harm arising from money owed to a loan shark, their debts to banks, or for any other reason, now or in the reasonably foreseeable future, and they therefore did not meet the criteria in s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act. Based on the same factual findings, the Tribunal found that the applicants did not meet the complementary protection criteria in s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act. Consequently, neither applicant was able to satisfy the criteria in s 36(2)(b) or (c) of the Migration Act.

    PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THIS COURT

14. The applicants commenced proceedings in this Court by way of an application filed on 19 April 2017. This application was filed within 35 days of the date of the Tribunal decision, as required by s 477(1) of the Migration Act.

15. The application raises five grounds of review which are reproduced below without alteration:

    1.The AAT Member was biased;

    2.The Tribunal failed to consider many vital integers of my case;

    3.The Tribunal failed to consider many vital evidence that are relevant to my case;

    4.The Tribunal deprived me of procedural fairness;

    5.The Member has failed to do his duty.

16. The application was accompanied by an affidavit sworn by the wife applicant. The affidavit annexes a copy of the Tribunal decision. The affidavit also contains the following paragraph about the wife applicant’s name:[1]

    My name is [not reproduced]. The AAT wrote my name wrong in the decision. I do not know who [not reproduced (name on Tribunal decision)] is. Please record my name as shown in my driver’s licence.

    [1] The wife applicant’s name as recorded in the affidavit and as recorded in the Tribunal decision is not reproduced. Section 91X of the Migration Act prohibits the Court from publishing the name of the wife applicant as this proceeding relates to her in her capacity as a person who applied for a protection visa.

17. The matter came before me for hearing on 17 December 2021. The applicants were self‑represented and had the assistance of an interpreter in the English and Malay languages. Mr Orchard represented the Minister.

    CONSIDERATION

    Oral application for adjournment

18. At the hearing, the applicants made an oral application for an adjournment. The reason given for seeking an adjournment was because they wanted to listen to the audio recording of the Tribunal hearing and they were still waiting for this to become available to them following a request made to the Tribunal on 5 December 2021. When asked why they had not previously taken steps to obtain the audio recording, the wife applicant responded that she did not know about this previously because she did not have a lawyer. She said that her name was recorded incorrectly on the Tribunal decision and she wanted to listen to the audio recording so that she could understand whether the decision was even about her.

19. The Minister opposed the request for an adjournment.

20. I declined to grant the adjournment. The application for judicial review had, at the time of the hearing, been before the Court for over four and a half years and the applicants had almost four months’ notice of the hearing date. The applicants had ample opportunity to obtain a copy of the audio recording of the Tribunal hearing. The reason given for seeking an adjournment to obtain the audio recording, namely that the wife applicant’s name was recorded incorrectly on the Tribunal decision, was raised by her in an affidavit filed back in 2017 and is not a new issue. Further, the applicants have not complied with any of the Court orders made in this proceeding.

21. Adjourning this matter to allow the applicants to obtain a copy of the audio recording of the Tribunal hearing at this stage would be inconsistent with s 190 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth). Section 190 provides that the overarching purpose of the civil practice and procedure provisions is to facilitate the just resolution of disputes according to law and as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible. Granting the adjournment would be an inefficient use of judicial and administrative resources, would likely cause the Minister to incur further legal costs and would potentially hinder the efficient disposal of the Court’s overall caseload.

22. I am also satisfied that the applicants were able to raise, at the hearing of this matter, the issues in relation to which they proposed to listen to the audio recording, even without the audio recording being available to them.

    Need to establish jurisdictional error

23. In order to be entitled to relief from this Court, the applicants must establish that the Tribunal has made a jurisdictional error. The Tribunal will have made a jurisdictional error if it ‘exceeded the limits of the decision-making authority conferred by the statute in making the decision’.[2]

    [2] MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2021) 390 ALR 590; [2021] HCA 17 at [29].

24. The High Court identified a number of examples of jurisdictional error in Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163; [1995] HCA 58 (Craig). In that case the High Court said that if the Tribunal:[3]

    …falls into an error of law which causes it to identify a wrong issue, to ask itself a wrong question, to ignore relevant material, to rely on irrelevant material or, at least in some circumstances, to make an erroneous finding or to reach a mistaken conclusion, and the tribunal's exercise or purported exercise of power is thereby affected, it exceeds its authority or powers. Such an error of law is jurisdictional error which will invalidate any order or decision of the tribunal which reflects it.

    [3] Craig at [14].

25. The examples of jurisdictional error set out in Craig are not exhaustive.[4] Other examples that often arise in migration cases include where the Tribunal fails to afford an applicant procedural fairness,[5] and where the Tribunal decision is affected by actual or apprehended bias.[6]

    [4] See Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323; [2001] HCA 30 at [82]; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 264 CLR 421; [2019] HCA 3 at [81] (SZMTA).

    [5] SZMTA at [81].

    [6] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507; [2001] HCA 17 (Jia Legeng) at [135].

    Allegation of error made by applicants in their oral submissions

26. In their oral submissions, the applicants expressed concern that the Tribunal recorded an incorrect name for the wife applicant on the face of its decision. The wife applicant submitted that she could not say anything about what the Tribunal did wrong because she does not think the decision is about her. When I asked the wife applicant whether the Tribunal in its reasons referred to the evidence that she gave at the Tribunal hearing, she simply reiterated that the name on the front of the decision is incorrect.

27. Mr Orchard for the Minister submitted that it was tolerably clear from reading the Tribunal reasons that the Tribunal considered the same application for protection that was the subject of the delegate’s decision. Mr Orchard took me to a number of documents in the court book where the Tribunal had recorded the wife applicant’s name in the same way that it incorrectly recorded the wife applicant’s name on the face of its decision. These documents included the template response to the Tribunal’s hearing invitation, which the applicants completed and provided to the Tribunal without suggesting that the invitation related to a different person, and the record of the hearing before the Tribunal. Mr Orchard further submitted that the Department file reference referred to on the face of the Tribunal decision corresponded to the Department file reference recorded on the documents in the court book from the Department file relating to the applicants in this matter.

28. I accept that the Tribunal has recorded the wife applicant’s name incorrectly on the Decision Record page on the face of its decision. The name recorded on the Tribunal decision is a name that is similar to the wife applicant’s name but is not her correct name. However, I find that the incorrect recording of the wife applicant’s name on the face of the Tribunal decision is a typographical error, which, in the circumstances of this case, does not amount to jurisdictional error.

29. There are a number of cases in which courts have been willing to accept that typographical errors in Tribunal decisions do not give rise to jurisdictional error.[7] Courts will generally look at the whole of the Tribunal decision, or at least the surrounding text, to determine whether an error in the Tribunal decision is merely a typographical error.

    [7] See DFE20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FedCFamC2G 35 for a recent example, including a summary at [24]-[26] of some of the case law addressing typographical errors.

30. In this matter, the typographical error occurs not in the reasons for the decision, but on the Decision Record, which comprises the first page of the Tribunal’s decision and statement of reasons. In considering whether the Tribunal’s error in recording the wife applicant’s name amounts to jurisdictional error, the primary consideration in my view is whether the Court is satisfied that the Tribunal decision does in fact relate to the wife applicant.

31. I am satisfied that the Tribunal decision does relate to the wife applicant, notwithstanding the error in recording her name. In reaching this conclusion, I have considered the information on the Decision Record page, the Tribunal’s reasons for decision and the evidence available in the court book.

32. I have considered the documents that Mr Orchard has referred me to (see [27] above), and agree that those documents make it tolerably clear that the Tribunal decision relates to both of the applicants. I make the following additional observations in relation to the evidence in the court book, including the Tribunal decision:

    (a)The Tribunal case number on each of the Tribunal documents, including the decision, is the same as the Tribunal case number recorded on the acknowledgement of application that was sent to the applicants after they lodged their application and which referred to the correct name of the wife applicant.

    (b)The court book includes a copy of the wife applicant’s passport as a document provided to the Tribunal at the hearing of the matter. This gives rise to a strong inference that the person who attended and gave evidence at the Tribunal hearing on 15 March 2017 was the wife applicant, and not some other person who bears the name recorded on the face of the Tribunal decision. 

    (c)The Tribunal decision sets out in detail the evidence given by the applicants at the hearing. The applicants have not submitted to the Court that the summary of the evidence does not relate to them or does not accurately reflect the evidence they gave at the Tribunal hearing.  This strengthens the inference that the substance of the Tribunal decision relates to the wife applicant (as well as the husband applicant) and the evidence she gave at the Tribunal hearing.

1. The substance of the claims for protection addressed by the Tribunal clearly corresponds to the claims for protection raised by the applicants and, in my view, it is clear that the decision relates to both applicants.

2. I find that there is no jurisdictional error based on the Tribunal incorrectly recording the name of the wife applicant on the face of its decision record.

3. The applicants did not allege any other error in their oral submissions.

   Grounds raised in application

4. The Minister submits that the five grounds raised by the applicants in their written application should be dismissed because they are not particularised and do not clearly allege any jurisdictional error. At the hearing, Mr Orchard  referred me to the recent summary of the law on this point set out by Judge Lucev in AFN15 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2021] FedCFamC2G 276 at [41]-[43]. In those paragraphs, his Honour provided the following summary of relevant authorities:

   41… The failure to particularise a ground of review can be a sufficient basis for a ground of review to be dismissed: NWWJ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 176 at [37] per Perram, Derrington and Stewart JJ; WZAVW v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2016] FCA 760 (“WZAVW”) at [35] per Gilmour J (and cases there cited); ADY15 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2017] FCCA 560 at [13]–[14] per Judge Lucev. In DKN20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services & Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 1158 (“DKN20”) at [60] per Perry J the Federal Court, citing WZAVW, observed as follows:

   The grounds of judicial review in Mr DKN’s original application (CB1176) and first affidavit simply allege that the Tribunal’s decision was unreasonable, the Tribunal failed to properly apply or exercise the discretion under s 501CA of the Migration Act, the Tribunal failed to take relevant considerations into account, there was insufficient or no evidence to support its finding, and Mr DKN was denied procedural fairness. As such, the grounds are very broadly expressed and fail to specify the nature of the errors allegedly committed by the Tribunal. It follows that the grounds should be dismissed save to the extent that Mr DKN must be taken to have elaborated upon the grounds in his submissions: WZAVW v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2016] FCA 760 at [35] (Gilmour J); ASI17 v Minister for Immigration [2019] FCA 1235 at [22] (Perry J).

   …

   42Even where there is an unparticularised ground of review it is necessary for a self-represented applicant to be afforded an opportunity by the Court to explain orally the matters that are said to give rise to a review ground: DQQ17 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2018] FCA 784 at [9] per Colvin J, and then to have regard to any oral submissions so made: DKN20 at [60] per Perry J. It is fair to observe that the foregoing fairly describes, generally speaking, the current practice of this Court, at least in the Perth Registry: FHX20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FedCFamC2G 202 at [17] and [20] per Judge Ladhams; DFE20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FedCFamC2G 35 at [4]–[5] per Judge Lucev; BXT18 v Minister for Immigration& Anor [2019] FCCA 2455 at [24]–[27] per Judge Kendall. …

5. I agree with Judge Lucev’s summary. The authorities referred to confirm that a judge may dismiss grounds that are not meaningfully particularised and, in circumstances where an applicant is self‑represented, the applicant ought to be afforded an opportunity to explain her or his grounds orally at the hearing. A judge may alternatively decide not to dismiss grounds simply on the basis that they are not particularised.[8] In this case, I do not dismiss the grounds in the application simply because the applicants have not provided particulars of their grounds. Instead, I give brief reasons below to explain why none of the grounds establish jurisdictional error.

   [8] See, for example, Bala v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 600 at [7].

   Ground 1

6. Ground 1 asserts that the Tribunal was biased. Any allegation of bias must be distinctly raised and clearly proved.[9] In this case the applicants have not in any way explained their allegation of bias, and it is an allegation without evidentiary foundation. I accept the Minister’s submissions that there is no evidence before the Court to show that:

   (a)the Tribunal had a pre-existing state of mind which disabled it from undertaking, or rendered it unwilling to undertake, a proper evaluation of the matter; or

   (b)a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the Tribunal might not have brought an impartial mind to the review.[10]

   [9] Jia Legeng at [69].

   [10] Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H (2001) 179 ALR 425; [2001] HCA 28 at [27]; Jia Legeng.

7. Ground 1 is dismissed.

   Grounds 2 and 3

8. Grounds 2 and 3 can conveniently be dealt with together. Ground 2 asserts that the Tribunal failed to have regard to integers of the applicants’ claims and ground 3 asserts that the Tribunal failed to consider evidence.

9. It is well-established that the Tribunal is required to consider claims clearly articulated by the applicants and their component integers.[11] The Tribunal is also required to consider claims which are not expressly articulated by an applicant but which clearly emerge from the materials before the Tribunal based on established facts.[12] It can also amount to jurisdictional error if the Tribunal overlooks material evidence, but the Tribunal does not need to expressly refer to every item of evidence in its reasons.[13]

   [11] Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 233 FCR 136; [2001] FCA 1802 at [42].

   [12] AYY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 261 FCR 503; [2018] FCAFC 89 at [18]; NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1; [2004] FCAFC 263 at [58], [60], [68].

   [13] Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99; [2013] FCA 317 at [111]; Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 236 FCR 593; [2003] FCAFC 184 at [46].

10. In the present case the applicants have not identified which integers of their claims or which evidence the Tribunal has failed to consider. The applicant’s claims were contained in the husband applicant’s form 866C which comprised part of his application for a protection visa. The applicants also elaborated on their claims and gave oral evidence at the Tribunal hearing. The documentary evidence provided by the applicants was largely evidence of their identity. 

11. I have reviewed the application and the summary of the evidence given by the applicants at the Tribunal hearing, as set out in the Tribunal’s reasons. I do not identify any integer of the applicants’ claims that the Tribunal failed to consider. Nor have I identified any material evidence that the Tribunal has failed to take into account. To the extent that the identity documents set out a different name of the wife applicant than that recorded in the Tribunal decision, I have already addressed this above. I have accepted that the recording of the wife applicant’s name in the Tribunal decision is simply a typographical error and that the decision does in fact relate to the wife applicant.

12. Grounds 2 and 3 do not establish jurisdictional error.

    Ground 4

13. By ground 4 the applicants assert that the Tribunal denied them procedural fairness. Again, no particulars are provided and the applicants have not given any indication of the basis on which they claim to have been denied procedural fairness.

14. I find that there is no denial of procedural fairness by the Tribunal. The Tribunal invited the applicants to a hearing, as it was required to do by s 425 of the Migration Act. The invitation complied with the requirements of s 425A. In particular, I observe that the invitation to attend a hearing set out the day, place and time of the scheduled hearing, and gave the applicant more than 14 days’ notice of the hearing, as required by s 425A(3) of the Migration Act and r 4.35D(3) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth).

15. There was no adverse information that the Tribunal was required to put to the applicants under s 424A of the Migration Act. The applicants were also on notice of the dispositive issues before the Tribunal as a result of the delegate’s decision, which they provided to the Tribunal with their application, and from the questions that the Tribunal asked them at the hearing. The Tribunal set out a detailed summary of the evidence given by the applicants at the hearing, and it is apparent from this summary that the applicants were able to meaningfully participate in the hearing.

16. The applicants were not denied procedural fairness and, accordingly, ground 4 is not established.

    Ground 5

17. Ground 5 simply asserts that the Tribunal failed to do its duty. It is not clear what the applicants mean by this ground. The Tribunal, upon application from the applicants, was required to review the decision made by the delegate in this matter. In so doing, the Tribunal was to stand in the shoes of the original decision-maker and decide for itself whether the applicants met the criteria for a protection visa. It has done this, and I have not found any jurisdictional error in the way that the Tribunal has approached its statutory task.

18. Ground 5 is not established.

    CONCLUSION

19. I have found above that there is no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal decision. It follows that the application to this Court must be dismissed.

I certify that the preceding fifty-one (51) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Ladhams.

Dated:       19 January 2022