FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| BQN18 v MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS & ANOR | [2019] FCCA 2149 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application for reinstatement – applicable principles – where applicant does not meet threshold of demonstrating arguable grounds of review – where no other discretionary consideration favours grant of relief – application dismissed. |
| Legislation: Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), rr.13.03C, 16.05 Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36, 65 |
| Applicant: | BQN18 |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 910 of 2018 |
| Judgment of: | Judge A Kelly |
| Hearing date: | 23 July 2019 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 23 July 2019 |
| Delivered at: | Melbourne |
| Delivered on: | 23 July 2019 |
REPRESENTATION
| The Applicant: | In person |
| Counsel for the Respondents: | Mr Young |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Mills Oakley |
ORDERS
The Application in a Case filed on 9 April 2019 be dismissed.
The applicant pay the costs of the first respondent fixed at $1000.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 910 of 2018
| BQN18 |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS |
First Respondent
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Ex Tempore Revised from Transcript)
Introduction
By application dated 3 April 2018, the applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) made on 9 March 2018 affirming a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) refusing to grant her a Protection (subclass 866) visa pursuant to s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Act).
The application was dismissed by order made on 20 March 2019. The applicant now seeks to reinstate her application. The application for reinstatement should be refused on the substantive basis that the applicant’s stated grounds of review are not reasonably arguable.
Background
The applicant, a Malaysian citizen of Muslim faith, aged 42 years, first came to Australia on 14 August 2016 then holding a visitor visa. Before coming to Australia, she had worked in Malaysia as an operations specialist until October 2015, but thereafter had been unemployed.
It further appears that the applicant was married, but separated in 2010. The applicant listed no family members in her visa application.
Claims to protection
In her visa application, the applicant outlined her claims to protection quite briefly. But, in essence, she claimed that due to her participation in a political rally, she had been beaten on two occasions by a gangster, whom, she claimed,…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read BQN18 v Minister for Home Affairs and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2019] FCCA 2149
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was the threshold required for an arguable ground of review on an application for reinstatement. The court was also required to consider the broad discretion vested in the court to allow reinstatement and the principles governing the exercise of such discretion, specifically referencing the test established in *House v The King*.
The court reasoned that the exercise of discretion in favour of an order for reinstatement does not necessitate satisfaction of the grounds of review to the same level as a final hearing. Instead, the applicable threshold is whether the grounds for judicial review are shown to be "arguable," meaning they are not fanciful, illogical, impermissible, or devoid of merit, but possess a level of rationality and a basis in the material sufficient for the court to hear full argument. The court noted that this assessment should not expect fully developed grounds, particularly from an unrepresented applicant whose first language may not be English. The court further observed that the decision to reinstate is essentially discretionary and subject to the principles outlined in *House v The King*. The applicant's stated grounds for reinstatement detailed their inability to attend the hearing due to travel difficulties, issues with obtaining leave from work, and a lack of timely responses from the respondent's solicitors and the court registry despite providing advance notice of their predicament.
The court's decision on the final orders or outcome is not provided in the case text.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The exercise of discretion in favour of an order for reinstatement does not require the court to be satisfied of the grounds of review to the same level as apply at a final hearing of an application for judicial review: CAL15 at [5]. Rather, on an application for reinstatement, the threshold which is applicable to a consideration of the merits of the application is whether the grounds for judicial review are shown to be “arguable”: CAL15, [5] citing MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection.[9] There, Mortimer J stated at [6]:The threshold is whether a ground of review is “arguable.” That means it is not fanciful, illogical, impermissible or devoid of merit but has a level of rationality and a basis in the material before the court sufficient for the court to be satisfied it is appropriate to hear full argument, with the parties having a fair opportunity to prepare for such argument. At the level of assessing whether a ground is “arguable”, the court should not expect a ground of judicial review to be fully developed, especially by an unrepresented asylum seeker whose first language is not English. (emphasis added)[9] [2015] FCA 1391, [62]. It is clear that the discretion conferred under the rules to allow reinstatement is a broad one: see Savrimootoo v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection.[10] [10]Savrimootoo v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1167, [47] (Mortimer J). It follows that, upon an application for reinstatement, which requires the court to consider whether a grant of review is arguable, the test is evaluative. As Ryan J observed in MZYEZ, it follows from the principles considered above that the “decision whether or not to reinstate a proceeding is essentially discretionary, and so attracts the application of the principles” stated by Dixon J, Evatt and McTiernan JJ in House v The King;[11]BAL17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection.[12] [11] House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499, 504-505.[12]BAL17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 792, [10] (Bromwich J). The applicant’s grounds for reinstatement of her application and for setting aside the order made on 20 March 2019 dismissing it are stated as follows: 1. I am the applicant in this matter.2. I did not attend a first mentions date in my federal circuit court matter on 20 March 2019.3. This is because I live many hours away from the court and could not find the arrangements necessary to take me to Melbourne. I had also problems seeking leave from work because of a recent change in employment.4. I have previously corresponded with Sharon Sanga µ-om the Respondent on this matter. She told me she was handling this matter.5. On 13 March 2019, I contacted the Respondent's solicitor, Sharon Sanga of Mills Oakley Lawyers by email to inform her r would not be able to attend the scheduled court date on 20 March 2019. I requested her to assist me change the court date or to have a timetable for the rest of the court matter. On the same date I received an automatic reply from her office saying Sharon Sanga was on leave and that all inquiries should be directed to Ada Wong. Annexure 1 is the email exchange with Sharon Sanga on 13 March 2019.6. On 13 March 2019, I contacted Ada Wong of Mills Oakley Lawyers as per the instructions I received from Ms Sanga's automatic email reply. Annexure 2 is the email I sent to Ada Wong on 13 March 20I9.7. I did not receive a reply from Ms Ada Wong for several days.8. On the morning of 19 March 2019, my employer confirmed I could not leave my place of work unless I wanted to get fired.9. At 12.40pm on 19 March 2019, I sent an email to the Victorian Federal Court registry explaining my workplace situation and therefore my inability to attend the hearing on 20 March 2019. I also forwarded the proof of my attempts to contact the government lawyers and asked for another date to come into court. I received a reply from the registry at 5 .1 0prn on the same day. The registry gave me the name of another lawyer I needed to contact. Annexure 3 is the email exchange with registry and myself.10.On 19 March 2019, I emailed the third government lawyer Rohan advising him of my attempts to contact his firm regarding this matter. I wanted to get agreed consent orders we can forward to the court.11.Till this date r still have not received any reply from Rowan, Ada or Sharon. I have had no support from the registry to have this matter reinstated.12.I believed the government lawyers would have been courteous enough to assist me in this matter given that I have given them over a week in notice of my problems. 1 expected them to assist me without having to waste this court's precious time.13.I do not know whether the Respondent will agree to me re-listing the matter because they have not responded to my emails.