BP Australia Pty Limited v Nyran Pty Limited

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BP Australia Pty Limited v Nyran Pty Limited [2004] FCAFC 163

CONTRACT – Interpretation – Extrinsic evidence – Ambiguity – Whether ambiguity as to price

DECLARATORY RELIEF – Whether sufficient factual background for making declarations

Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)
Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976 (Cth)
Sale of Goods Act, 1895 (WA)

Petrotimor Companhia de Petroleos SARL & Anor v Commonwealth of Australia & Ors (2003) 128 FCR 507
Environmental Protection (Diesel and Petrol) Regulations 1999 (WA)
Fuel Quality Standards Act 2000 (Cth)
O’Loughlin v Mount (1998) 71 SASR 206
South Sydney Council v Royal Botanic Gardens (1999) 10 BPR 18961
Ginger Development Enterprises Pty Ltd v Crown Developments Australia Pty Ltd [2003] NSWCA 296
Westpac Banking Corporation v Tanzone Pty Ltd  (2000) 9 BPR 17521; [2000] NSWCA 25
Australian Broadcasting Commission v Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd (1973) 129 CLR 99
Team Services PLC v Kier Management & Design Ltd (1993) 36 ConLR 32
BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings (1977) 180 CLR 266
Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul (1986) 162 CLR 221
Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 334
Kockums AB v Commonwealth of Australia [2002] FCAFC 138

BP AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (ACN 004 085 616) v NYRAN PTY LTD (ACN 056 571 530)

W 192 of 2003

CARR, NORTH & SELWAY JJ
24 JUNE 2004
PERTH


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W 192 OF 2003

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

BP AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED (ACN 004 085 616)
(FORMERLY BP AUSTRALIA LIMITED)
APPELLANT

AND:

NYRAN PTY LIMITED (ACN 056 571 530)
RESPONDENT

NYRAN PTY LIMITED (ACN 056 571 530)
CROSS APPELLANT

BP AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED (ACN 004 085 616)
(FORMERLY BP AUSTRALIA LIMITED)
CROSS RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

CARR, NORTH & SELWAY JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

24 JUNE 2004

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The appeal and cross appeal are allowed to the extent that:

The orders made on 22 August 2003 be varied as follows:

(a)       by deleting pars 1(b) and (c);
           (b)       by deleting pars 2(b), (c), (d), and (e);
           (c)       by inserting, instead of the former par 2(b), the following:

(b)      the respondent’s amended cross-claim be dismissed;
           (d)       by re-lettering the sub-pars of par 2 accordingly.

2.The orders made on 14 November 2003 be varied by deleting the last word in par 1(a) and the whole of par 1(b) and adding the following order:

‘2.There be no order for costs in relation to the cross-claim’.

3.Otherwise the appeal be dismissed.

4.Otherwise the cross-appeal be dismissed with no order as to costs.

5.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal save for the costs in relation to Ground 19 of the Notice of Appeal.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W…

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Details
Case
[2004] FCAFC 163
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of BP Australia Pty Limited v Nyran Pty Limited, BP, the appellant, sought to challenge the court's interpretation of certain clauses in a contract with Gull, the respondent. The dispute centred on the admissibility and relevance of extrinsic evidence in interpreting the contract, specifically the Retail Supply Framework Agreement (RFSA). Gull contended that the contract was not ambiguous and that the extrinsic evidence BP sought to introduce was inadmissible because it did not align with the way BP had presented its case.

The primary legal issue the court had to decide was whether the RFSA was ambiguous, and if so, whether the extrinsic evidence BP wished to introduce was admissible under the principles set out in Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of NSW. The court needed to determine if the contract language was plain or ambiguous, and if ambiguous, whether the extrinsic evidence reflected the parties' mutual understanding of the agreed terms. The court also needed to consider whether BP's reliance on extrinsic evidence was consistent with the manner in which it had presented its case, particularly after abandoning a part of its case mid-trial.

The court, after examining the contract and the submissions from both parties, concluded that the RFSA was not ambiguous. The court found that the contract language was plain and clear, particularly with respect to clauses 14 and 24, which governed the pricing. The court further held that even if the contract was ambiguous, the extrinsic evidence BP wished to rely on was inadmissible. This was because BP had not consistently adhered to the manner in which it initially presented its case and had later attempted to introduce evidence that went beyond establishing the parties' mutual understanding of the terms.

Ultimately, the court dismissed BP's appeal and cross-appeal, affirming the primary judge's decision on the admissibility of extrinsic evidence. The court set aside certain declarations and orders related to the contract interpretation, and directed that BP pay the respondent's costs of the appeal, except for those related to the specific ground of appeal concerning the contract interpretation.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal and cross appeal are allowed to the extent that:

The orders made on 22 August 2003 be varied as follows:

(a) by deleting pars 1(b) and (c);

(b) by deleting pars 2(b), (c), (d), and (e);

(c) by inserting, instead of the former par 2(b), the following:

(b) the respondent’s amended cross-claim be dismissed;

(d) by re-lettering the sub-pars of par 2 accordingly.

2. The orders made on 14 November 2003 be varied by deleting the last word in par 1(a) and the whole of par 1(b) and adding the following order:

‘2. There be no order for costs in relation to the cross-claim’.

3. Otherwise the appeal be dismissed.

4. Otherwise the cross-appeal be dismissed with no order as to costs.

5. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal save for the costs in relation to Ground 19 of the Notice of Appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Gull put the following answering submissions:(a)The RFSA was not ambiguous. Clauses 14 and 24 of the RFSA, in particular, had the effect that the existing price specified in cl 14 was to continue to apply until a new price was identified. Consequently, extrinsic evidence was not admissible for the purpose of construing the contract.(b)If the RFSA was ambiguous the relevant evidence sought to be relied upon by BP should not be received as it was contrary to the way in which BP conducted its case. This issue was discussed by the primary Judge in his reasons:‘When the matter came on for hearing it involved the applicant’s claim for rectification based on a claim for misleading and deceptive conduct. That was a case of alleged actual subjective intention entitling evidence to be called in that behalf. Following the cross-examination of Mr Lawson and part way through the cross-examination of Ms Lucas, that aspect of the applicant’s case was abandoned.The question then arose of to what extent the evidence which had that far been received would be admissible in relation to the construction questions. The result was that senior counsel for the applicant reduced to writing what was relied upon. That statement (`the October 24 statement’) read:“1. EVIDENCE RELIED UPON BY THE APPLICANT ON THE QUESTION OF CONSTRUCTION OF THE PRICE NEGOTIATION CLAUSE: All evidence which tends to establish the fact when entering into the RSFA the parties intended by the RSFA to delete the underlined words in clause 21.2 of the FSA – “if new prices have not been agreed, then the prices specified in clause 11 will continue to apply”. (Precise evidence to be provided) 2. EVIDENCE RELIED UPON BY THE APPLICANT ON THE QUESTION OF CONSTRUCTION OF CLAUSE 81: All evidence which tends to establish the fact known to each party prior to execution of the RSFA that the CFQP would be charged when an amount separately identified and described as a CFQP was imposed or asked for as part of the price of fuel. (Precise evidence to be provided)”The trial proceeded on that basis. In closing submissions, however, senior counsel for the applicant made written and oral submissions concerning the material surrounding circumstances. In the written submission reference was made to the objective framework of facts within which the Deed and RFSA are said to have come into existence. . It was submitted that the presumed intention of the applicant and the respondent was as set out in the following six propositions:‘1. The transaction in question was the amendment of the FSA based upon oral discussions, written communications and the execution of the Deed and RFSA. 2. The parties to the transaction were two substantial oil companies, the distinction between BP and Gull being that BP is engaged in the refining, wholesaling and retailing of fuel whereas Gull is primarily concerned with the retailing of fuel from service stations located in Perth. 3. The primary purposes of the transaction were as follows: (a) to accommodate the consequences of the introduction of regulations altering the specification of fuels from 1 January 2000 and the extension of the term of the FSA from 3 years to 7 years;(b) to amend the Price Negotiations clauses in the FSA by deleting those provisions to the effect that if new prices were not agreed then old prices would continue to apply; (c) to agree to changes to the basis for termination of the fuel supply arrangements; (d) to agree to the terms referable to payment of a clean fuels quality premium to be charged by BP in consequence of the introduction of the regulations. 4. The mutual concern of BP and Gull was that Gull should compete on a level playing field with Shell, Caltex, Mobil and BP Marketing in a commercial environment altered by reason of BP’s exit from its refinery exchange arrangements with Shell, Caltex and Mobil, which involved the swapping of fuel in different locations to commercial buy/sell agreements. 5. BP’s concern was that the extension of the FSA from 3 to 7 years should not be upon terms whereby it could not alter the base price of fuel; Gull’s concern was that it should not be financially prejudiced by BP imposing an increase in the base price.6. Gull’s awareness post 3 August 2000 of BP’s contention that it could impose an increase in the base price, which awareness continued up to and including the date upon which Gull executed the Deed and RFSA (19 February 2002) and the conduct of BP and Gull post 3 August 2000”.’Gull argued that the attempt to use the surrounding circumstances to establish that the parties intended not merely to delete the relevant words in cl 21.2 of the FSA (as had been identified in the October 24 statement), but also that each party had the objective and/or subjective intention to achieve other commercial advantages or purposes (such as those identified in cll 5 and 6 of the six propositions) was contrary to the manner in which BP had chosen to present its case.(c)In any event, if the RFSA was ambiguous the relevant evidence should not be received because the evidence did not establish that the parties had a mutual understanding of the terms agreed.Overall the primary Judge accepted and adopted the Gull submissions. The primary Judge referred to a number of cases on the use of extrinsic materials in the interpretation of contracts, most particularly the reasons of Mason J in Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of NSW (1982) 149 CLR 337 (Codelfa) at 352. His Honour summarised the legal position as follows:‘At the risk of repeating what is said in Codelfa, it follows that the issues arising in this matter should be approached in the following manner. It is necessary firstly to determine whether the contract has a plain meaning or contains an ambiguity. If the contract has a plain meaning, evidence of `surrounding circumstances’ will not be admissible to contradict the language of the contract. If the language of the contract is `ambiguous or susceptible of more than one meaning’ evidence of `surrounding circumstances’ is admissible to assist in the interpretation of the contract. The concept of `surrounding circumstances’ is to be understood to be a reference to `the objective framework of facts’. It will include evidence of prior negotiations so far as they tend to establish objective background facts known to both parties and the subject matter of the contract. It will also include facts so notorious that knowledge of them is to be presumed. Additionally it will include evidence of a matter in common contemplation and constituting a common assumption. From the evidence of that setting the parties’ presumed intention may be taken into account in determining which of two or more possible meanings is to be given to a contractual provision. What cannot be taken into account is evidence of statements and actions of the parties which are reflective of their actual intentions and expectations. Objective background facts can include statements and actions of the parties which reflect their mutual actual intentions. That is, evidence of the mutual subjective intention of the parties to a contract may be part of the objective framework of facts within which the contract came into existence. It is the mutuality which makes the evidence admissible. I accept the submission for the applicant that the presence of cl 68 [the “entire agreement” clause] does not preclude the application of the above principles and takes effect only in relation to the contractual obligations when the extent of them is known as a consequence of the interpretation of the contract in issue.’

Decision

Reasons for decision

Of course, nothing in these reasons should be understood as expressing any view on the correctness or otherwise of the primary Judge’s analysis of the meaning of cl 81 of the RFSA. We do note, however, that the submissions made in this Court would seem to suggest that the parties are significantly closer in their respective understandings of cl 81 than they seem to have been when arguing their respective positions before the primary Judge. To this extent at least the analysis by the primary Judge has been of some benefit to the parties. However, as we have said above, convenience and utility to the parties are not the only pre-conditions for the making of declarations in these circumstances.CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons the appeal in relation to the first declaration made by the primary Judge should be dismissed. The declarations in relation to cl 81 of the RFSA should be set aside. Consequentially the orders made in favour of the respondent on the amended cross-claim should be set aside. There does not appear to be any reason to interfere with the directions made in his Honour’s first set of orders. The cross-appeal has been decided on a point not argued by either party. In those circumstances, so it seems to us, there should be no order in relation to the costs of the cross-appeal. In view of the fact that the appeal is to be dismissed, par 1 of his Honour’s costs orders of 14 November 2003 should remain in force and the appellant should pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal save for the costs in relation to the interpretation of cl 81.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established