Administrative
Appeals
Tribunal
DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2003] AATA 221
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )
) No N2002/509
GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION ) Re DENNIS BORG Applicant
And
AUSTRALIAN POSTAL CORPORATION
Respondent
DECISION
Tribunal Mr M J Sassella, Senior Member
Dr M E C Thorpe, MemberDate7 March 2003
PlaceSydney
Decision The tribunal affirms the decision under review. The applicant is entitled to no costs associated with this application. ...................[Sgd]..................
Senior Member
RELEVANT LAW
3. The Act provides in s 14(1) that an applicant such as Mr Borg is to be paid compensation if he or she has suffered an injury that has resulted in incapacity for work or impairment. The Act defines an injury in an extensive fashion in s 4(1):
injury means:
(a) a disease suffered by an employee; or
(b) an injury (other than a disease) suffered by an employee,
being a physical or mental injury arising out of, or in the course of, the employee's employment; or
(c) an aggravation of a physical or mental injury (other than a disease) suffered by an employee (whether or not that injury arose out of, or in the course of, the employee's employment), being an aggravation that arose out of, or in the course of, that employment;
but does not include any such disease, injury or aggravation suffered by an employee as a result of reasonable disciplinary action taken against the employee or failure by the employee to obtain a promotion, transfer or benefit in connection with his or her employment;
4. In the present case the applicant was arguing that his work for Australia Post had caused him a direct injury, notably to his right elbow and shoulder.
5. On the question of whether a party before the tribunal bears an onus of proof, Hill J in the Federal Court summarised the position in Casarotto v Australian Postal Commission (1989) 86 ALR 399, 412-413:
“In McDonald v. Director General of Social Security (1984) 1 FCR 354 Woodward J.. in the context of social security legislation counselled against using the expression ‘onus of proof’ where an application comes to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for review. Of course, where a statutory provision such as s.190(b) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 deals with the matter specifically there is no difficulty. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal is bound by s.43 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 to carry out the review by placing itself in the shoes of the administrator, although it considers the matter having regard to the material before it rather than the material that was originally before the administrator. Since the tribunal is obliged to inform itself on any matter in such manner as it thinks appropriate (s.33(1)(c)) and is not bound as such by the rules of evidence, it is obvious that there may be difficulties if principles such as onus of proof applicable in proceedings before courts are strictly adopted.
“It may be that what was said by Woodward J. in McDonald
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- Case
- [2003] AATA 221
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine whether the respondent's liability for compensation continued beyond the cessation date and if there was sufficient evidence to support the continuation of the applicant's injuries. In this regard, the court noted that the applicant had provided expert evidence, but this evidence did not identify the facts or assumptions of fact on which it was based. The court held that for expert evidence to be admissible, the expert must identify the facts or assumptions of fact on which their evidence is based. This requirement was not satisfied in this case, and thus, the expert evidence was not admissible.
The tribunal found that there was no evidence to support the continuation of the applicant's injuries beyond the cessation date. The tribunal held that since the applicant did not provide sufficient evidence to support the continuation of his injuries, the respondent's liability for compensation ceased on the specified date. Consequently, the tribunal affirmed the decision under review, and the applicant was entitled to no costs associated with this application.
Orders
Orders of the court
The tribunal affirms the decision under review. The applicant is entitled to no costs associated with this application.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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