BNQ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BNQ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCA 1831

Appeal from: BNQ16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2020] FCCA 1660
File number: VID 466 of 2020
Judgment of: MURPHY J
Date of judgment: 21 December 2020
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court dismissing application for review of Administrative Appeals Tribunal decision to refuse to grant appellant a protection visa – whether a claim or integer of a claim that was not clearly articulated clearly emerged from the materials before the Tribunal – appeal dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Cases cited:

AWT15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 512

AYY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 89; (2018) 261 FCR 503

Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 26; (2003) 197 ALR 389

Hossain v Minster for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 34; (2018) 264 CLR 123

Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1802; (2001) 233 FCR 136

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3; (2019) 264 CLR 421

NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263; (2004) 144 FCR 1

SZULW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1335

Division: General Division
Registry: Victoria
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 47
Date of hearing: 10 December 2020
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr M Kenneally
Solicitor for the Appellant: Holding Redlich
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr V Murano
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice

ORDERS

VID 466 of 2020
BETWEEN:

BNQ16

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

MURPHY J

DATE OF ORDER:

21 DECEMBER 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The Appellant pay the First Respondent’s costs of an incidental to the appeal.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MURPHY J:

  1. The appellant appeals from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court handed down on 23 June 2020, which dismissed his application for judicial review of a decision of the second respondent, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal made 10 February 2016.  The Tribunal had affirmed the decision of a delegate of the first respondent, the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs to refuse to grant the appellant a Protection (Class XA) visa (visa) under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).

  2. For the reasons I explain, it is appropriate to dismiss the appeal.

    BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

  3. The appellant, a 32 year-old Iranian national of Kurdish ethnicity, arrived in Australia by boat without a visa on 17 July 2012.  On 23 November 2012, the appellant applied for…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 1831
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal was brought by an Iranian national, a member of the Kurdish ethnic group, against the decision of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to refuse his application for a protection visa. The appellant claimed fear of persecution by members of the Mishkas tribe, the Basij, and the Sepah on return to Iran, based on his Kurdish ethnicity, his refusal to join the Basij, and his status as a failed asylum seeker. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the appellant's application for judicial review of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal's decision to affirm the Minister's decision. The appellant argued that the Tribunal failed to consider his claim of potential future psychological harm from interactions with the Basij or other Iranian authorities, which he claimed arose from past assaults by the Basij. The court found that the claim did not clearly emerge from the materials before the Tribunal and that the Tribunal did not make a jurisdictional error in not considering it. The court upheld the Tribunal's decision, finding that the Tribunal's consideration of the claim would not have made a difference to the outcome due to the lack of medical evidence regarding the appellant's mental health. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the Minister's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The Appellant pay the First Respondent’s costs of an incidental to the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons I explain, it is appropriate to dismiss the appeal.BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The appellant, a 32 year-old Iranian national of Kurdish ethnicity, arrived in Australia by boat without a visa on 17 July 2012. On 23 November 2012, the appellant applied for a visa and provided an accompanying statutory declaration dated 22 November 2012 detailing his claims for protection.The appellant’s claims In his statutory declaration the appellant claimed to fear that on return to Iran he would suffer serious or significant harm at the hands of the Basij and the Sepah, and also from members of the Mishkas tribe. His claims may be summarised as follows.Conflict between the Behr tribe and the Mishkas tribe The appellant grew up in a village in Iran in which the population was entirely Kurdish and the people were primarily of the Behr tribe. Other Kurdish tribes were based nearby, including the Mishkas tribe. He claimed that:(a)in about 2002 a dispute arose between the Behr tribe and the Mishkas tribe, which commenced when a Behr bus driver driving through the Mishkas village was attacked by 10 or 20 Mishkas men because of the non-payment of a parking fee by another Behr driver. The driver refused to pay a fee which was owed by another driver and the Mishkas men assaulted him. One man threw a rock which struck the driver on the head and killed him; (b)other Behr men were angered by the attack and about 300 Behr men attacked the Mishkas village and set fire to some houses. There was also an allegation that some of the attackers had raped a Mishkas girl;(c)the local police attempted to mediate between the two tribes, and arrested and imprisoned the man suspected of throwing the rock which had killed the bus driver. The police also arrested some Behr men involved in the attack on the Mishkas village but were unable to hold them due to the lack of evidence. The Mishkas men were unhappy with this outcome and the conflict between the tribes did not abate.(d)in about 2008 the appellant was completing his compulsory military service by working in the local prison. The bus driver’s killer was incarcerated in the prison and he could tell from the appellant’s accent that the appellant was of the Behr tribe. While travelling to his village from the prison one day, the appellant was stopped by some Mishkas men who were carrying sticks and pieces of metal. They surrounded and threatened to beat him. At that time a police car drove past and the Mishkas men told the appellant that he was lucky that time and left. The appellant was subsequently told by a friend that the bus driver’s killer had told his family that the appellant had assaulted him in prison. The appellant believes this is why the Mishkas men had targeted him and threatened to attack him; and(e)since 2002, members of the Mishkas tribe have continued to harass and threaten the Behr tribe as they think that the Behr have escaped justice, and there are constant physical altercations instigated by the Mishkas. As a result, it is not safe for Behr people to travel outside their villages. It is necessary for the appellant’s parents to travel to the city of Ilam about once a week to purchase food and other basic necessities and they have no choice but to pass the Mishkas village. They live in constant fear they will be attacked and killed by the Mishkas.Persecution by Sepah officers

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellant claimed to fear harm on return to Iran from the Mishkas tribe, the Basij and the Sepah because:(a)he is a Kurd a member of the Behr tribe;(b)he will be imputed with a political opinion because of his refusal to become a member of the Basij, and(c)he will return to Iran as a failed asylum seeker.The delegate’s decision On 1 July 2013, the appellant was interviewed by a delegate of the Minister in respect of his visa application. On 9 December 2013, the delegate refused to grant the appellant the visa. It is unnecessary to go to the detail of this decision as it has been superseded by the decision of the Tribunal.The application to the Tribunal On 27 December 2013, the appellant applied to the Refugee Review Tribunal (as the Tribunal was then named) for review of the delegate’s decision. On 2 April 2014, the appellant’s legal representative provided written submissions to the Tribunal which, relevantly to the appeal, argued that Kurdish people are discriminated against in Iran by the state and by other citizens, and that the Basij targets Kurds and other minority groups. On 21 April 2015, the appellant participated in the hearing before the Tribunal, assisted by his legal representative and an interpreter (the First Hearing). On 1 May 2015, the appellant’s legal representative provided post-hearing submissions to the Tribunal, which addressed his claim to fear harm by reason of being a young Kurdish male, as well as claiming that the Iranian government had dispossessed his family of land they had farmed. For reasons which are not clear on the papers the application was reallocated to another Tribunal member. On 19 November 2015, the appellant participated in a second hearing before a reconstituted Tribunal, again assisted by his legal representative and an interpreter (the Second Hearing). On 3 December 2016, the appellant’s legal representative provided another post-hearing submission to the Tribunal, essentially directed to claims of systemic discrimination against Kurdish people in Iran. On 10 February 2016, the Tribunal decided to affirm the delegate’s decision, and published its reasons. The Tribunal noted the appellant’s evidence, given for the first time in the Second Hearing, that he had suffered psychological harm when he was assaulted by the Basij in the 2012 incident. The Tribunal decision records the appellant’s evidence as follows (at [54]):…the applicant told the Tribunal that what had happened to him in the past had affected his memory. On one occasion he was assaulted by the Basij and he was still suffering the psychological consequences, but he did not want to talk about it too much in case people think that he is crazy. He said that he had not mentioned it to the Department of Immigration or the Tribunal in the past, because he did not want people to think that he is mentally unwell. The Tribunal asked him whether he wanted to talk about this incident, he described the motorcycle episode. The Tribunal observed that he had mentioned this previously both in his written and oral evidence.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellant disputes the Minister’s contention that the Tribunal’s consideration of the asserted claim could not possibly have made a difference to the outcome because, in the absence of medical evidence about the appellant’s mental health, the Tribunal could not assess whether he did suffer psychological harm in the past nor whether any future encounter with the Basij or other Iranian authorities could cause him to suffer serious or significant psychological harm. While the appellant accepts that his claim would have been strengthened by medical evidence, he says that he claimed to suffer mental health problems including memory problems as a result of being assaulted by the Basij in the past, and that the claim that he might suffer further psychological harm in any future interactions with the Basij was capable of acceptance by the Tribunal without any requirement for medical evidence. He contends that the Tribunal’s error in failing to consider the asserted claim was material, and shows jurisdictional error. CONSIDERATION I am not persuaded that the asserted claim or integer of a claim – that on return to Iran the appellant might suffer serious or significant psychological harm from future non-violent interactions with the Basij or other Iranian authorities - clearly emerged from the materials before the Tribunal. I do not consider that the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error by not considering such a claim, nor that the primary judge erred by failing to so find. In AYY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 89; (2018) 261 FCR 503 at [18] (Collier, McKerracher and Banks-Smith JJ) the Full Court adopted the following principles, collected by Barker J in AWT15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 512 at [67]-[68], as to when a claim can be said to ‘clearly emerge’ from or be ‘squarely raised’ by the materials. Their Honours said: (a)such a finding is not to be made lightly (NABE at [68]); (b)the fact that a claim might be said to arise from materials is not enough (NABE at [68]); (c)to clearly emerge from the materials, the claim must be based on “established facts” (SZUTM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 45; (2016) 241 FCR 214 per Markovic J (at [37]-[38])). In SZUTM, Markovic J said: 37. While the tribunal is not required to deal with claims which are not clearly set out and which do not clearly arise from the material before it, the tribunal is not limited to dealing with claims expressly articulated by an applicant. A claim not expressly advanced by an applicant will attract the review obligation of the tribunal when it is plain on the face of the material before it. 38. Both the appellant and the Minister have made submissions on whether there is a requirement that there be a claim based on “established facts”. At [35], the primary judge found, relying on NABE and Dranichnikov that, as the threshold point the claim must “emerge clearly from the materials before the Tribunal and should arise from established facts”. I agree with the primary judge’s approach: the decision in NABE must be read in light of the principle set out in Dranichnikov.(d)while there is no precise standard to determining whether an unarticulated claim has been “squarely raised” or “clearly emerges” from the materials “a court will be more willing to draw the line in favour of an unrepresented party”: Kasupene v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1609; (2008) 49 AAR 77 per Flick J (at [21]); and (e)understanding whether a claim has clearly emerged from materials cannot be assessed in a vacuum. Consideration must be given to the way an applicant’s claims are presented over time.