| SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA COURT OF APPEAL |
| S EAPCR 2024 0242 |
| TIMOTHY BLOOMFIELD (A PSEUDONYM) | Applicant |
| v | |
| THE KING | Respondent |
---
| JUDGES: | EMERTON P, WALKER and KAYE JJA |
| WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
| DATE OF HEARING: | 21 March 2025 |
| DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 9 May 2025 |
| MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2025] VSCA 98 |
| JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: | DPP v [Bloomfield (a pseudonym)] (Ruling 1) (County Court of Victoria, Judge Wraight, 12 December 2024); DPP v [Bloomfield (a pseudonym)] (Ruling 2) (County Court of Victoria, Judge Wraight, 19 December 2024) |
---
CRIMINAL LAW – Interlocutory appeal – Rape and sexual assault – Whether judge erred in not granting leave to cross‑examine complainant about sexual activities – Where complainant had made prior complaints of sexual abuse – Where prior complaints involve similar circumstances to present complaints – Judge not satisfied evidence of prior complaints substantially relevant to a fact in issue – Whether necessary for applicant to establish falsity of prior complaints – Complaints sufficiently similar to permit inferential reasoning – Interests of justice allow applicant to cross‑examine complainant about prior complaints – Appeal allowed.
Criminal Procedure Act 2009, ss 342, 346(2), 349.
Jackmain v The Queen (2020) 102 NSWLR 847, considered.
---
| Counsel | |||
| Applicant: | Ms M O’Brien with Ms B Proud | ||
| Respondent: | Mr J Dickie | ||
Solicitors | |||
| Applicant: | Malkoun & Co Lawyers | ||
| Respondent: | Ms A Hogan, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions | ||
352
EMERTON P
KAYE JA:
Introduction
The applicant is facing trial in the County Court of Victoria on four charges of rape (charges 1, 3, 5 and 7) and four charges of sexual assault (charges 2, 4, 6 and 8). The alleged offending took place on 21 February 2021 (charges 1 and 2), 5 March 2021 (charges 3 and 4) and on two separate occasions on 6 March 2021 (charges 5 and 6, and charges 7 and 8).[1]
[1]The Crown also alleges that on 21 February 2021 and 6 March 2021, the complainant was affected by prescription drugs. The Crown alleges that on 5 March 2021, the complainant was deprived of sleep, food and water such that she was not capable of consenting.
It is alleged that on those occasions the applicant sexually penetrated the complainant’s vagina without her consent. There is no direct evidence of penetration. The complainant (‘KF’) alleges that on each occasion she was asleep and has inferred from surrounding circumstances that the sexual penetration took place. Her evidence is that she did not consent to any sexual contact and had repeatedly made it clear to the applicant that she did not want any sexual contact.
The applicant denies that he engaged in sexual activity with KF without her consent. He says that he and KF had consensual sexual intercourse on a handful of occasions between the end of February 2021 and early March 2021. The applicant maintains that KF was an active, conscious and willing participant in all the sexual activity and denies that she was ever affected by prescription drugs to an extent that she was incapable of consenting to…
Continue reading Bloomfield (a pseudonym) v The King
Sign in free to access the full text
- AGLC
- Bloomfield (a pseudonym) v The King [2025] VSCA 98
- Case
- [2025] VSCA 98
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the legal framework provided by the Criminal Procedure Act 2009, particularly sections 342, 346(2), and 349, which outline the procedures for granting leave to cross-examine a complainant about their sexual activities. The court considered whether the judge had erred in not granting leave, given that the complainant had made prior complaints under similar circumstances. The court also referenced Jackmain v The Queen and the relevant provisions of section 37A, which prohibit cross-examination about a complainant’s sexual activities unless certain conditions are met. The court needed to determine if the prior complaints were sufficiently similar to allow for such cross-examination and whether the interests of justice supported granting leave.
The court found that the judge had not properly considered the relevance of the prior complaints to the issues in the case. The court held that the interests of justice did permit the applicant to cross-examine the complainant about her prior complaints, as these were sufficiently similar to allow for inferential reasoning. The court held that the judge's decision not to grant leave was in error and that the applicant should have been allowed to challenge the complainant's credibility based on the prior complaints. Consequently, the court allowed the appeal.
The court's decision mandated that the trial judge reconsider the application for leave to cross-examine the complainant about her prior sexual activities, taking into account the findings of the appellate court. The court's ruling underscored the importance of balancing the interests of justice with the rights of the accused to a fair trial.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Full text does not contain this section.