BJM16 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BJM16 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 995

Appeal from: BJM16 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 690
File number(s): VID 603 of 2023
Judgment of: RARES J
Date of judgment: 15 August 2023
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from refusal to grant injunction restraining removal of unlawful non-citizen from Australia pursuant to s 198(6) Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where officer issued notice of intention to remove unlawful non-citizen under s 198(6) – where non-citizen subsequently made request to Minister under s 48B to consider lifting bar to further application for a protection visa – where Minister’s power under s 48B personal and non-compellable - where officers had duty under s 198(6) to remove unlawful non-citizen as soon as reasonably practicable and s 197C makes Australia’s non-refoulement obligations irrelevant to performance of duty – whether s 198(6) contains implication that, if realistic possibility that Minister will consider whether to exercise his power under s 48B, no officer can remove an unlawful non-citizen under s 198(6) until the Minister makes decision – held: appeal dismissed.
Legislation:

Constitution ss 64 and 75(v)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 48A, 48B, 197, 198, 499

Cases cited:

Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v DB Management Pty Ltd (2000) 199 CLR 321

Davis v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2023) 97 ALJR 214

Marya v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 433

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24

Minister for Immigration and Border Protectionv SZSSJ (2016) 259 CLR 180

MZAPC v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 877

Plaintiff M61/2010E v The Commonwealth (2010) 243 CLR 319

Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355

Smethurst v Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police (2020) 272 CLR 177

Division: General Division
Registry: Victoria
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 56
Date of hearing: 15 August 2023
Counsel for the appellant: Mr E Nekvapil SC, Mr A Aleksov, Ms E Brumby and Ms A Best
Solicitor for the appellant: Lander & Rogers Lawyers
Counsel for the respondents: Mr G Johnson
Solicitor for the respondents: Sparke Helmore

ORDERS

VID 603 of 2023
BETWEEN:

BJM16

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

15 AUGUST 2023

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Order 1 made on 8 August 2023 be varied by deleting order 2 therein and substituting “The appeal be listed for hearing on 15 August 2023”.

2.Until the Court otherwise orders, the appellant’s name as disclosed in the affidavit of David Burke affirmed 3 August 2023 and in the affidavit of Matthew Burnham affirmed 14 August 2023 be suppressed and not published on the ground that s 91X of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) so…

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Details
Case
[2023] FCA 995
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of BJM16 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs involved the appellant, an unlawful non-citizen, challenging the Minister's refusal to grant an injunction that would restrain the removal of the appellant from Australia under section 198(6) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The appellant had previously issued a request to the Minister under section 48B to consider lifting the bar to a further application for a protection visa, and sought to argue that there was a realistic possibility that the Minister would consider his request, thereby preventing officers from removing him until the Minister made a decision. The matter was heard in the Federal Court, where the primary issue was whether the duty of officers to remove an unlawful non-citizen under section 198(6) of the Migration Act was subject to any implied qualification if there was a realistic possibility that the Minister would consider the appellant's request under section 48B.

The court considered whether the appellant's request under section 48B had engaged the operation of the Guidelines, which provided instructions on how officers should assess such requests. The appellant argued that the Guidelines mandated a procedural decision by the Minister personally, through the officers' implementation of the statutory instructions. However, the court found that the authorities on which the appellant relied did not address the implication that the duty of officers to remove an unlawful non-citizen under section 198(6) was subject to any qualification. The court also noted that the Minister's power under section 48B was personal and non-compellable, and that the duty of officers to remove an unlawful non-citizen under section 198(6) was not subject to any implied qualification if there was a realistic possibility that the Minister would consider the appellant's request.

The court ultimately dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant had not established a sufficient likelihood of success to justify the preservation of the status quo pending the final hearing. The court also found that the balance of convenience did not favour the appellant, as the removal of an unlawful non-citizen was in the public interest. The court further found that the Minister's power under section 48B was personal and non-compellable, and that the duty of officers to remove an unlawful non-citizen under section 198(6) was not subject to any implied qualification if there was a realistic possibility that the Minister would consider the appellant's request.

In conclusion, the court dismissed the appeal and found that the respondents, by themselves, their servants and agents, were not restrained from removing the appellant from Australia. The court's decision highlights the importance of understanding the distinction between the administrative process for officers of the Department to assess a request to lift a bar or obtain a more favourable decision under the Migration Act, and the duty of officers to remove an unlawful non-citizen under section 198(6) of the Act.

Orders

Orders of the court

6. The respondents by themselves, their servants and agents be restrained from removing the appellant from Australia up to and including 22 August 2023.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Section 5.4 dealt with how officers should assess a s 48B request, and instructed them that: ·the Guidelines had been framed to enable identification of cases likely to engage Australia’s protection obligations and referral to the Minister for consideration while allowing other cases to be finalised rapidly;·the Minister did not wish to consider a case unless there were exceptional circumstances that justified him considering new information or where changes in circumstances occurred subsequent to the refusal of a protection visa;·there were three steps for making such assessments, namely identifying, first, requests that were inappropriate to consider, secondly, whether the claim was new and could not have been made as part of the initial application or provided in a review of it, and, thirdly, whether the new claim was likely to engage Australia’s protection obligations;·the assessment involved the possibility of one of three outcomes: first, the request was inappropriate to consider, and accordingly the Minister did not wish to be shown it, secondly, the request did not meet the Guidelines because there were no new claims presented, or the ones that were presented were not plausible or likely to engage Australia’s protection obligations (both of which cases amounted to the Minister instructing officers to refuse the request), and, thirdly, the request met the Guidelines for referral to the Minister, in which case it would be necessary for a brief to be prepared for him, together with material with which he could give appropriate notification to the Parliament under s 48B(3);·officers could finalise a request by a person who had departed Australia as inappropriate to consider because s 48A would no longer apply to such a person;·assessment of the plausibility of the claim or information was objective and that in deciding whether a claim made under a s 48B request was plausible, officers had to, first, give due regard to previous credibility assessments made on the protection visa application and be guided by those findings in deciding whether the claim was plausible, secondly, consider how consistent that new claim was with the prior circumstances, and, thirdly, consider whether it was reasonably possible the situation could have arisen or whether the claim was far-fetched. It provided that officers should be aware of the distinction between new information and new claims. New information related to a claim that had already been considered should not be considered further if the Department, Tribunal or Authority had found that the claim was not plausible or substantiated by objective country information;·officers had to consult country information to assist in determining whether a claim was plausible in accordance with instructions that the Department had already issued as to the use of country information;·although the onus was on the person making the request to provide all relevant information to the Department, the assessing officer might need to undertake other investigations to establish the veracity of the information provided, including seeking further country information;·once the officer had assessed the information, he or she had to form one of two conclusions, namely that the request did not meet the Guidelines or was inappropriate to consider, in which case the applicant would be notified of that decision by a standard form letter, or alternatively, if the request met the Guidelines, in which case the matter would be put before the Minister.BACKGROUND

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Needless to say, the parties did not reach an accommodation and the matter came before her Honour in the Division 2 Court. THE TRIAL JUDGE’S DECISION The trial judge recited the history of the application and the material before her. She dealt with the proceeding as an application for an interlocutory injunction and referred to the need for an applicant to establish that there was a sufficient likelihood of success to justify, in the circumstances, the preservation of the status quo pending the final hearing and that the balance of convenience favoured that to occur, relying on Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57. Her Honour relied on decisions of this Court in MZAPC v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 877 (Colvin J) and Marya v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 433 (Rofe J), each of which dealt with applications for interlocutory relief restraining removal of the then-applicants. Her Honour applied, as she was bound to, the construction placed by Colvin J on the interaction between the request under s 48B and the duty to remove under s 198(6) (as I explain at [37] to [42] below) There was, however, a point of distinction between those other proceedings and this, in that unlike in MZAPC [2023] FCA 377 and Marya [2023] FCA 433, her Honour had the Guidelines in evidence.THE APPELLANT’S SUBMISSIONS After I raised the need for the appellant to formulate the precise form of an injunction which he sought, his senior counsel proposed the form of orders below: 1. An order restraining the Commonwealth of Australia, by any “officer of the Department” within the meaning of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) from removing the Appellant from Australia.2. Paragraph 1 ceases to have effect, if any of the following occurs:(a)the Minister decides not to consider whether to exercise the power in s 48B in respect of the Appellant, or any officer of the Department implements such a decision by the Minister; or(b)the Minister decides not to exercise the power in s 48B in respect of the Appellant, or any officer of the Department implements such a decision by the Minister; or(c)the Appellant makes a valid visa application. The appellant argued that the information contained in his s 48B request was acknowledged by the Department on 27 July 2023 as having been received, and, therefore, had engaged the operation of the Guidelines principally, as I understood the argument, because, first, the Guidelines were an exercise by the Minister of his statutory powers to consider whether he would make a procedural decision, through officers of his Department in accordance with the Guidelines, in the sense discussed by Kiefel CJ, Gageler and Gleeson JJ in Davis v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2023) 97 ALJR 214 at 224 [16], and, secondly, there was a realistic possibility that application of the Guidelines would result in a positive procedural decision by the Minister to consider the request.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The reasons of each justice referred to what Brennan J had said in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 65-66. Kiefel CJ, Gageler and Gleeson JJ held at 226 [28]-[29] that the terms of s 351, which for present purposes are analogous to those of s 48B, conferred a personal, non-compellable, power on the Minister alone, as distinct from the Department, that he administered in accordance with s 64 of the Constitution, to make any decision whether or not to exercise the power to grant a more favourable decision. They held that because s 351(3) (and analogously, s 48B(2)) conferred on the Minister personally the power to evaluate the public interest as to whether a more favourable decision could be substituted, the section necessarily implied that no other officer of the Commonwealth could exercise that power. Their Honours held that the Minister could not circumvent that statutory limitation by any purported use of the executive power to allow officers of his Department to exercise his power. However, they held that he could exercise his personal power in advance through a procedural decision, by requiring officers to communicate his advance decision in cases falling within a class covered by that procedural decision. Edelman J and Jagot J came to the same result, giving separate and extensive reasons. CONSIDERATION It is important to appreciate that none of the authorities on which the appellant relied dealt with the implication that he seeks be found to qualify the duty of an officer to remove an unlawful non-citizen under s 198(6). Rather, those authorities dealt with the administrative process for officers of the Department to assess or consider a request to lift a bar or obtain a more favourable decision under the Migration Act that can only be exercised by the Minister personally, otherwise than in the ordinary course of administration by officers of his Department. In SZSSJ 259 CLR at 200 [53]-[55], French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ said that, in that case, the Minister had made a procedural decision in exercise of his non-compellable personal power to consider whether to lift the bar for the appellants there to apply for a visa. Accordingly, the Court held that, when considering the substantive question of whether it was in the public interest to lift the bar, there was an implication in the Migration Act that the Minister had to afford the appellants there procedural fairness. In other words, the implication of the obligation to provide procedural fairness arose because of the Court’s finding that the Minister already had made a procedural decision to consider whether he would lift the bar. That is different to a situation, such as the present, where the appellant has made a request for the Minister to exercise his non-compellable power under s 48B(6) to consider whether the Minister would embark on the path of making a procedural and or substantive decision under s 48B(1). The appellant’s argument is that the Guidelines already have given instructions as to the Minister’s procedural decision in respect of the determination of whether his s 48B request falls into one class of case prescribed in the Guidelines. He contended that once an officer evaluates the request and the plausibility of the information in it in accordance with the Guidelines, that will result in a procedural decision by the Minister personally through the officer’s application of his statutory instructions about the performance of the officer’s functions to assist him, in the sense that Kiefel CJ, Gageler and Gleeson JJ discussed in Davis 97 ALJR at 224 [16]. The appellant submitted that during the time in which unspecified officers had to follow and implement the Minister’s written instructions in the Guidelines in respect of his s 48B request, another officer could not be obliged to remove him under s 198(6) because the Minister was considering the exercise of his personal power through the process that the Guidelines mandated.