FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
BJM16 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 690
ORDERS
MLG 1381 of 2023 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: BJM16
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
AUSTRALIAN BORDER FORCE
Second Respondent
order made by:
JUDGE J YOUNG
DATE OF ORDER:
3 August 2023
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Application filed on 2 August 2023 be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s cost in a sum to be fixed if not agreed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary…
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- Case
- [2023] FedCFamC2G 690
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the principles for granting an interlocutory injunction, which required the applicant to demonstrate that there was a sufficient likelihood of success at the final hearing and that the inconvenience or injury to the applicant if the injunction was refused outweighed that to the Minister if it was granted. The court noted that the two limbs of the test were interrelated, with a stronger case for error potentially reducing the need for a marked balance of convenience. The court considered the applicant’s claim that new information had arisen which would strengthen any future application for a protection visa. The court had to balance the applicant’s right to remain in Australia with the Minister’s obligation to enforce the Migration Act. The court also considered the High Court's recent decision in Davis v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs, which clarified the nature of the Minister's personal and non-compellable powers under section 48B of the Migration Act.
The court found that the applicant had raised a serious question to be tried, as there was a sufficient likelihood that he would succeed in establishing that the Minister had failed to consider his new information. However, the court also found that the balance of convenience did not favour granting an interlocutory injunction, as the potential harm to the Minister and the public interest in enforcing the Migration Act outweighed the inconvenience to the applicant. The court emphasised the importance of the Minister’s personal discretion in exercising the powers under section 48B of the Migration Act, and that the court’s role was limited to ensuring that the Minister had considered all relevant information. The court concluded that the applicant’s application for an interlocutory injunction should be dismissed.
The court ordered that the applicant’s application for an interlocutory injunction be dismissed. The applicant was given leave to file an amended application within 28 days, if desired, and to serve and file any such amended application at least seven days before the scheduled date of removal. The Minister was ordered to be notified of any such amended application. The court’s decision highlighted the importance of the Minister’s personal discretion in exercising the powers under section 48B of the Migration Act, and the limited role of the court in reviewing such decisions. The court also emphasised the need to balance the applicant’s right to remain in Australia with the public interest in enforcing the Migration Act.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: JUDGE J
The High Court has considered the Minister’s personal and non-compellable powers in a number of cases, most recently in Davis v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2023) 408 ALR 381; [2023] HCA 10 (Davis). The High Court confirmed that the Minister exercises the personal and non-compellable powers ‘by personally making the first or both of two distinct sequential statutory decisions neither of which the Minister is obliged to make’. The first decision is a procedural decision to either consider or to not consider whether it is in the public interest to exercise the relevant power. The second decision is a substantive decision to either think that it is in the public interest to exercise the power and to do so, or to not think that it is in the public interest to exercise the relevant power and not to do so: see Davis at [14] per Kiefel CJ, Gageler and Gleeson JJ.CONSIDERATION OF APPLICATION FOR INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTIONRelevant Principles The relevant principles in relation to the granting of an interlocutory injunction were recently set out in (MZAPC 1). I respectfully repeat and adopt those principles as follows:In considering whether to exercise the discretion to grant an interlocutory injunction, it is appropriate for the Court to consider:whether there is a serious question to be tried, which requires the applicant to show that there is a sufficient likelihood that he will succeed at the final hearing to justify the preservation of the status quo pending the final hearing; andwhether the inconvenience or injury that the applicant would suffer if the injunction is refused outweighs or is outweighed by the inconvenience or injury the Minister would suffer if the injunction is granted: see Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57; [2006] HCA 46 (O’Neill) at [65].The two limbs of the test for the grant of an interlocutory injunction are interrelated. This was explained in Morrison v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 723, where French J (as his Honour then was) said at [22]:… In order to grant interlocutory relief to restrain his removal, pending a substantive application, I would have to have regard both to the possibility that he has some case to argue in relation to the decision to cancel his visa and secondly that the balance of convenience lies in favour of an interim order. These two requirements are inter-dependent. Of course, the stronger the case that there is an arguable error on the part of the Minister, the less the balance of convenience need lie in favour of the applicant in order to justify the grant of relief… and in CPK20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 870, where Thawley J said at [13]:Consideration of the two main inquiries cannot be conducted completely independently of each other, because “an apparently strong claim may lead a court more readily to grant an injunction when the balance of convenience is fairly even” and “[a] more doubtful claim (which nevertheless raises ‘a serious question to be tried’) may still attract interlocutory relief if there is a marked balance of convenience in favour of it”: Bullock v The Federated Furnishing Trades Society of Australasia (No 1) [1985] FCA 19; (1985) 5 FCR 464 at 472 per Woodward J (Smithers and Sweeney JJ agreeing at 467 and 469 respectively); see also ABAR15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 363at [28] (Charlesworth J).Is there a serious question to be tried?