BI and Anor v Minister for Immigration and Anor (No.2)
[2018] FCCA 833
•16 April 2018
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| BI & ANOR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR (No.2) | [2018] FCCA 833 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application for review of former Migration Review Tribunal decision – general assertions of error by the Tribunal – whether the first applicant was given a meaningful opportunity to provide evidence to the Tribunal at the hearing – whether the Tribunal decision was made on insufficient or incomplete evidence – whether the Tribunal decision was irrational or illogical – no jurisdictional error revealed – application dismissed. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s.476 Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), sch.2, cl.457.224, sch.4, PIC 4020 |
| Cases cited: Bi & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 335 Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611 Trivedi v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 42; (2014) 220 FCR 169 |
| First Applicant: | SHUJUAN BI |
| Second Applicant: | TENG MU |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 3446 of 2014 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Nicholls |
| Hearing date: | 31 January 2018 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 31 January 2018 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 16 April 2018 |
REPRESENTATION
| Applicants: | In person |
| Counsel for the Respondents: | Mr T Reilly |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | DLA Piper Australia |
ORDERS
The application made on 12 December 2014 is dismissed.
The applicants pay the first respondent’s costs set in the amount of $6,825.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 3446 of 2014
| SHUJUAN BI |
First Applicant
TENG MU
Second Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an application made pursuant to s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) on 12 December 2014 seeking review of the decision of the former Migration Review Tribunal, now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) which, on 19 November 2014, affirmed the decision of the Minister’s delegate (“the delegate”) refusing Temporary Business Entry (Class UC) visas to the applicants.
This judgment must also be read in light of Bi & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 335 (“Bi & Anor”).
The evidence before the Court is a bundle of relevant documents filed and tendered by the Minister (“the Court Book” – “CB”, “RE1”).
Background
Mrs Bi and Mr Mu applied for the visas on 5 June 2013 (CB 1 to CB 87). They were represented by a registered migration agent (CB 4). Mrs Bi applied on the basis that she had been nominated for employment by her sponsor, Aumay Group Pty Ltd. The position for which she had been nominated was that of “General Manager” (CB 15).
Mr Mu is Mrs Bi’s adult son. He applied as a dependant of his mother (CB 3).
The delegate refused the grant of the visas on 12 September 2013 (CB 103 to CB 108). The delegate found that one of the criterion for the grant of the visa was the requirement that the primary applicant satisfy cl.457.224(1) of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (“the Regulations”). At the relevant time, cl.457.224(1) of the Regulations was in the following terms:
“Clause 457.224
(1) The applicant satisfies public interest criteria 4001, 4002, 4003, 4004, 4006A, 4010, 4013, 4014, 4020 and 4021.”
The Public Interest Criterion (“PIC”) are contained in Schedule 4 to the Regulations. At the relevant time, PIC 4020 was in the following terms:
“Part 1 – Public interest criteria
4020
(1) There is no evidence before the Minister that the applicant has given, or caused to be given, to the Minister, an officer, the Migration Review Tribunal, a relevant assessing authority or a Medical Officer of the Commonwealth, a bogus document or information that is false or misleading in a material particular in relation to:
(a) the application for the visa; or
(b) a visa that the applicant held in the period of 12 months before the application was made.
(2) The Minister is satisfied that during the period:
(a) starting 3 years before the application was made; and
(b) ending when the Minister makes a decision to grant or refuse the application;
the applicant and each member of the family unit of the applicant has not been refused a visa because of a failure to satisfy the criteria in subclause (1).
(3) To avoid doubt, subclauses (1) and (2) apply whether or not the Minister became aware of the bogus document or information that is false or misleading in a material particular because of information given by the applicant.
(4) The Minister may waive the requirements of any or all of paragraphs (1)(a) or (b) and subclause (2) if satisfied that:
(a) compelling circumstances that affect the interests of Australia; or
(b) compassionate or compelling circumstances that affect the interests of an Australian citizen, an Australian permanent resident or an eligible New Zealand citizen;
justify the granting of the visa.
(5) In this clause:
information that is false or misleading in a material particular means information that is:
(a) false or misleading at the time it is given; and
(b) relevant to any of the criteria the Minister may consider when making a decision on an application, whether or not the decision is made because of that information.
Note: Regulation 1.03 defines bogus document as having the same meaning as in section 97 of the Act.”
The delegate found that in Mrs Bi’s visa application form, there was a statement that she had never previously been refused an Australian visa (CB 105.6 and see also CB 9). The delegate found that she had twice been refused visas in 2012 (CB 105.7). Therefore, the delegate concluded that Mrs Bi did not satisfy cl.457.224 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations as she did not meet PIC 4020 of Schedule 4 to the Regulations. Consequently, Mr Mu did not satisfy the relevant criterion as her dependant.
The applicants applied for review to the Tribunal on 13 September 2013 (CB 109 to CB 120). They were represented by a registered migration agent (CB 109).
Both Mrs Bi and Mr Mu, accompanied by their representative, attended a hearing before the Tribunal on 31 October 2014 (CB 153).
According to the Tribunal’s account of what occurred at the hearing, the Tribunal made clear that the issue in the review was that of PIC 4020 of Schedule 4 to the Regulations (see [13] at CB 283). What immediately follows in the Tribunal’s decision record, is a lengthy and detailed report of the Tribunal’s questions, and Mrs Bi’s answers (and those of her representative), given in evidence at the hearing ([14] at CB 283 to [50] at CB 286).
It was Mrs Bi’s evidence to the Tribunal that the statement in her visa application (that she had not previously been refused an Australian visa), was the fault of her migration agent. Her evidence was that she had told him that she had been refused twice (see [21] at CB 284 to [31] at CB 285).
I should note that at the hearing, the Tribunal told Mrs Bi that there was no evidence before it to show that there was an approved sponsorship or an approved business nomination in relation to her sponsor ([12] at CB 283).
The possible relevance of this is that evidence of such approval was a necessary criterion for the grant of the visa. In any event, the Tribunal proceeded with the review on what it said was the “substantive” issue of PIC 4020 of Schedule 4 to the Regulations ([13] at CB 283).
The Tribunal was satisfied that Mrs Bi ([86] – [88] at CB 293):
“[86] … was asked the visa application question, and gave the migration agent or their employee the wrong answer to this question, which the migration agent would have duly recorded in the visa application, with her authority.
[87] The Tribunal is also satisfied that this information was false in a material particular, because it was false when it was given and in its view was relevant to a criteria the Minister may consider when making a decision on an application, whether or not the decision was made because of that information.
[88] The Tribunal considers that when considering the grant of a subclass 457 visa it is of relevance for the Department to know if a person has been earlier refused visas. This goes to the applicant’s identity generally, and hence to the applicable PIC considerations. It may also go to issues which require a determination of the applicant’s intention, such as cl.457.223(4)(d)(i).”
The Tribunal considered whether the requirements of PIC 4020(1) or (2) of Schedule 4 to the Regulations should be waived. It decided not to do so, and gave reasons for this ([90] at CB 294 to [114] at CB 298). Similar to the delegate, the Tribunal found that Mrs Bi did not satisfy cl.457.224(1) of Schedule 2 to the Regulations. It affirmed the decision on this basis. It found that as Mrs Bi’s dependant, Mr Mu also did not satisfy the relevant criterion for the grant of the visa.
The Application to the Court
The grounds of the application to the Court are in the following terms:
“1. The Tribunal has fallen into error concerning the exercise of the discretion.
2. The interpreters didn’t translate correctly and effectively between the applicant and the member.
3. The decision of the member was made on insufficiency and incomplete evidence.”
[Errors in original.]
The applicants were unrepresented at the time of the filing of the application to the Court. A Notice of Appearance was filed in this matter on 4 February 2015 by Parish Patience Immigration Lawyers which was signed by Mr Michael Jones. It indicated that the applicants had engaged legal representation. Orders were made on that date which, amongst other things, set the matter down for hearing on 4 October 2016, and gave the applicants the opportunity to file any amended application and any further evidence by way of affidavit. The applicants filed no further documents in this regard. Those orders also gave the applicants, and the Minister, the opportunity to file written submissions. The Minister filed written submissions on 27 September 2016. The applicants filed no written submissions.
On 18 February 2015 a Notice of Withdrawal as Lawyer was filed.
On 29 September 2016, an email was sent to my Associate from the Minister’s solicitor advising that the applicants had contacted the Minister’s department seeking his consent to an adjournment of the final hearing (of which he did consent). The basis of the adjournment was that Mrs Bi’s father had been diagnosed with fourth stage (terminal) cancer, and that the family had received a “Notice of Critical Illness”. That notice was attached to the email as translated by a National Accreditation Authority for Translators and Interpreters (NAATI) accredited translator, as well as Mrs Bi’s travel itinerary to China which was booked two days after the date of the “Notice of Critical Illness”. I granted the adjournment.
The application was subsequently listed for hearing on 31 January 2018. Before the Court, the applicants appeared in person. Mrs Bi was assisted by an interpreter in the Mandarin language. She confirmed that she understood the interpreter. Mr Mu demonstrably did not require the services of an interpreter. He also often intervened to interpret for his mother.
Mr Mu took the lead in making oral “submissions”, although Mrs Bi was given the opportunity, and subsequently did make “submissions” to the Court. The submissions were in the nature of a series of complaints.
The applicants said that they wanted to raise additional grounds to those in the application, and to also provide “evidence” to the Court.
As mentioned above, the application to the Court was made on 12 December 2014. The “progress” of the case since that time is set out above (at [18] - [20]). Mr Mu sought to explain the applicants’ failure to comply with the orders made in this matter giving them the opportunity to file any amended application or evidence by way of affidavit, and to explain why no attempt was made to provide these documents to the Court within the three years available to them before the final hearing. Mr Mu stated that he and Mrs Bi had been denied the opportunity to attend the first Court date where they could have gained “knowledge” about how to conduct their case.
Mr Mu also stated that he had no “knowledge” of any legal representation, nor that the first Court date (4 February 2015), would be “cancelled”. He said that he and Mrs Bi had not provided any authority to Mr Jones to represent them.
I adjourned for a short period to provide the applicants (and the Minister) with details of what relevantly appeared on the Court’s file.
On resumption of the hearing, Mr Mu stated that he never asked Mr Jones to represent them nor did “they” know Mr Jones (in context, “they” would appear to be a reference to himself and Mrs Bi).
Mr Mu’s submission was that he did not “know” until the beginning of the hearing (after the Court pointed out the lack of evidence to support, for example, ground two of the application), that Mr Jones had acted for them.
Mr Mu also initially stated that the applicants had never had any legal representation in February 2015. This is contrary to a Notice of Address for Service (“NAS”) filed by the applicants in these proceedings on 5 February 2015. The NAS gives the reason for the change of address for service as “[n]o longer represent (sic)”, and question 5 on the NAS asks “[i]s this form giving Notice of a change [of] legal representation?”. The “yes” box to that question has been “ticked”. Further, Mr Mu subsequently stated that he contacted Mr Jones, presumably at that time, who told him that “David who is a solicitor [gave] him the case”.
Subsequently, given the opportunity to make her submissions, Mrs Bi stated (through the interpreter) that “in regards to the lawyer, we didn’t ask him to represent us, and after his partner passed away, he stopped representing us”.
At the final hearing, there was no evidence before the Court as to any of these events. I did consider whether to give the applicants the opportunity to give evidence. Ultimately, it was not necessary to do so, even in light of the serious allegation that Mr Jones (a solicitor) acted without instructions [in any event, see Bi & Anor].
First, whether the applicants engaged “David” from Parish Patience Immigration Lawyers, or did not speak with Mr Jones, cannot possibly reveal jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision. This is because this matter related to the subsequent application before the Court, and not the Tribunal. That is, it post-dated the Tribunal’s decision. I should also note that with regard to the applicants’ reference to “David”, I can take judicial note that Mr David Bitel was a principal of that firm in 2015, and passed away in 2016.
Second, the question is, even if the applicants’ submissions were to be accepted, whether they were denied a fair opportunity to present their case to the Court. I find that they did have, and were given, such an opportunity.
One, as mentioned above, on 4 February 2015, orders were made by the Court that gave the applicants the opportunity to file any amended application and any evidence by way of affidavit. They were given approximately 10 weeks to do that. The matter was also set down for final hearing. The applicants did not comply with the Court’s orders.
Two, it became apparent from what the applicants submitted before the Court, that their desire to have attended the first Court date was to obtain advice (“knowledge”) about the case.
While there is an obligation on the Court to ensure unrepresented applicants are provided with a fair opportunity to present their case, the first Court date, or indeed any other Court event, is not the opportunity for unrepresented applicants to receive legal advice from the Court. This includes advice as to what evidence, or grounds, they should put before the Court.
Three, the applicants had knowledge of the orders made by the Court. The applicants did not assert otherwise. In September 2016, the applicants sought an adjournment of the final hearing. The applicants provided evidence in support of that application. It was on the basis of that evidence, that the adjournment of the final hearing was granted. That application is inconsistent with the applicants’ claim now, that their absence from the first court date meant that they did not know how to proceed with their case, at least in a procedural context.
Four, before the Court, the applicants made no attempt to explain why, if they lacked relevant “knowledge”, they took no steps to acquire such knowledge in the usual way. For example, by seeking legal advice from a solicitor.
The applicants made no claim that they could not afford at least some initial legal advice. They also provided no explanation as to why they made no attempt to seek legal advice, for example from any community legal centre.
On the evidence that is before the Court, Mrs Bi has tertiary qualifications in a “Bachelor of Business Administration” (CB 10.3), and for over nine years was the “General Manager” of the “Qingdao Xinyada Trading Co. Ltd” (CB 11.5). It is to be noted that the visa for which she had applied was to enable her to take up employment in Australia as the “General Manager” of Aumay Group Pty Ltd (CB 15) (see also the letter from the company director at CB 78 to CB 81 as to her proposed duties).
Five, before the Court, Mr Mu presented as having a good level of comprehension and speaking capacity in the English language. He made his submissions forcefully. There was no suggestion from him that the failure to obtain the “knowledge” they sought was due to any linguistic, or financial, difficulty. Further, Mr Mu submitted that he had arranged the sponsorship for his mother (Mrs Bi). In context, he appeared to claim some business acumen (see also [55] below).
Six, as set out above, the applicants demonstrated some understanding of the need to provide evidence to support any application to the Court. However they provided no evidence to support their attempt to amend their application, and sought to provide “evidence” at the final hearing. This was in circumstances where they had three years to seek any amendment and file evidence.
The Minister’s counsel submitted that it is not appropriate that after three years of relevant inactivity, the applicants, without reasonable explanation, let alone evidence to explain their inactivity, can arrive at a final hearing and seek to raise complaints that should have, and importantly could have, been raised at an appropriate earlier date. I agree with that submission.
No formal application was made by the applicants to amend the grounds of their application at this time. To the extent that such an application can be inferred from what they submitted before the Court, that application is refused for the reasons set out above. Nonetheless, I did consider the matters raised by way of complaint before the Court (see further below).
In any event, as subsequently became apparent, the “further grounds” that the applicants initially referred to were, in essence, submissions in relation to the complaints referred to in the grounds of the application already before the Court. That is, except for a further matter dealt with below (see [73]).
Ground one makes a general assertion of “error”. Without particulars, it is meaningless and cannot succeed.
At the final hearing before the Court, the complaint in relation to ground one appeared to be that the Tribunal member “queried” Mrs Bi’s “intention” in coming to Australia in the first place (noting the application for the visa the subject of the delegate’s decision was made onshore).
The applicants directed attention to [105] – [109] (at CB 297) of the Tribunal’s decision record. Mrs Bi had come to Australia on a temporary visitor visa. The Tribunal found that ([107] at CB 297):
“… [h]er main purpose was to come and remain here and commence working in her business beyond the limits of any visitor visa, and to arrange her sponsorship and ultimately permanent residency.”
The applicants submitted that they had “evidence” that that was not her intention. Mrs Bi submitted that her intention was to visit her son, Mr Mu, who had appendicitis.
The Tribunal’s finding in this regard was reasonably open to it on what was before it. That is, the Tribunal’s finding was based on Mrs Bi’s own evidence to it (see especially at [62] – [64] at CB 291
and [71] – [77] at CB 292). The Tribunal specifically considered the explanation proffered now by Mrs Bi and Mr Mu, that Mrs Bi’s intention was to visit her ill son (see in particular at [72] at CB 292).
In all, the “explanation” to ground one does not reveal jurisdictional error.
Ground two asserts that interpretation errors occurred at the Tribunal hearing. No particulars are provided. As set out above, there is no evidence before the Court, despite the opportunity given to the applicants to provide such evidence, to support the ground. As pleaded, ground two does not succeed. The only relevant evidence before the Court of the Tribunal hearing is the Tribunal’s decision record and the material in the Court Book. Nothing in that evidence supports the premise of the ground. Nor was any evidence (by way of affidavit) relevant to this provided with the applicants’ Application in a Case (“AIC”) filed on 9 March 2018 (see Bi& Anor).
Before the Court, Mr Mu complained that the Tribunal member interrupted him and would not allow him to speak. His submission to the Court was:
“I want to explain legal with more backgrounds so this business I set up myself”.
He stated to the Court that he should have been able to give his explanation because he knew more than his mother did.
In context, as best as I understood, this was a reference to his having set up a business which sought to provide the sponsorship for his mother.
On the evidence before the Court, the Tribunal was entitled to concentrate on Mrs Bi. After all, she was the principal applicant for the visa. Mr Mu was an applicant as her dependant. On the evidence, Mrs Bi was given a meaningful opportunity to give her evidence to the Tribunal.
In any event, the reason that the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision was that Mrs Bi, the principal applicant, had made a misleading statement in relation to her application for the visa, and therefore did not satisfy PIC 4020 of Schedule 4 to the Regulations in relation to her onshore visa application. This was reasonably open to the Tribunal on what was before it. The Tribunal’s decision did not include any direct assessment of the sponsor’s business.
At the hearing when it was pointed out to Mr Mu that the applicants had not provided any evidence of what occurred at the Tribunal hearing, he also stated that he had a “CD” of the Tribunal hearing.
It is important to note the following.
One, the reference was made in the context of Mr Mu’s claim that the Tribunal did not give him the opportunity to speak. Given that Mr Mu did not require the services of an interpreter at the Tribunal hearing then any interpretation errors (as alleged in ground two) could not be relevant.
Two, even in the context of the allegation as stated in ground two, as it related to Mrs Bi (who was the only one to use the services of an interpreter), the CD, of itself, would not be sufficient to reveal any errors in interpretation. The Court does not understand the Mandarin language.
Three, it is of note that in this context, even a transcript of the Tribunal hearing would not have assisted the applicants. That is because further evidence would be required from a person with Mandarin and English speaking skills, to indicate what errors in interpretation had occurred.
Four, Mr Mu gave no indication whatsoever that he had such a transcript of the Tribunal hearing, let alone evidence of the alleged interpretation errors.
Five, as set out elsewhere in the judgment, the applicants have had a reasonable opportunity to prepare for the final hearing. The applicants knew, at least as at 29 September 2016, that the matter had been listed for final hearing (on 4 October 2016) as they requested an adjournment of that hearing date, which the Court granted (see [18] - [20] above). On 17 October 2017, the parties were notified that the matter had been re-listed for hearing on 31 January 2018. Therefore, the applicants have had since at least 29 September 2016 to prepare their case.
I agree with the Minister’s counsel that it is not appropriate that having been aware that their matter had been listed for final hearing since at least 29 September 2016, the applicants, in the current circumstances, simply arrive at the rescheduled final hearing having taken no steps to properly prosecute their case.
Six, in any event, Mr Mu made no attempt to even indicate what the claimed interpretation errors may have been.
Ground two is not made out.
Ground three asserts that the Tribunal’s decision was made “on insufficien[t] and incomplete evidence”. No particulars are provided.
Before the Court, the applicants directed attention to [81] (at CB 293) of the Tribunal’s decision record, which is as follows:
“The Tribunal notes that the applicant’s evidence on what occurred is apparently inconsistent. In her first letter dated 8 August 2013 to the Department she states as follows:
Firstly, I have to declare that I did not provide any false or misleading information to the Department of Immigration in relation to my visa application. The reason I did not inform my current agent about the refusal of 676 Tourist visa was I did not take it as refused clearly…”
The submission was that the “false statement” provided in Mrs Bi’s visa application, was the fault of the migration agent she had engaged.
This same complaint was put to the Tribunal in a detailed letter provided by Mrs Bi (CB 266 to CB 269). In short, the letter explained that her migration agent was responsible for the visa information, and that she was not involved. Before the Court, Mr Mu submitted that the migration agent was “totally” responsible for the “mistake”.
The Tribunal did consider Mrs Bi’s explanation in this regard ([21] at CB 284 to [31] at CB 285). It did not accept it. It gave reasons for this probative of the evidence before it. As the Minister submitted, the Tribunal is not obliged to unequivocally accept an applicant’s explanation. In the circumstances, the applicants’ ground seeks impermissible merits review. It is also important to note the Tribunal did not “ignore”, as the applicants asserted before the Court, their “explanation”. It simply, with reasons given, did not accept it.
It is clear that the additional grounds that the applicants said that they wanted to raise before the Court were really particulars of the three grounds in their application already before the Court. However, the applicants also complained before the Court that there was some irrationality or illogicality in the Tribunal’s decision. As best as this complaint could be understood, it appears that the applicants submitted that the decision was illogical and irrational because the Tribunal “ignored relevant materials” and just tried to “prove” Mrs Bi was a “liar” (this is the term used by Mr Mu before the Court).
On what is before the Court, the Tribunal’s decision was not irrational or illogical in the sense explained by relevant authorities (Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611, CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146; (2016) 70 AAR 413, Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZUXN [2016] FCA 516; (2016) 69 AAR 210, Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317; (2013) 212 FCR 99 and SZOOR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCAFC 58; (2012) 202 FCR 1).
The Tribunal’s relevant findings which informed its conclusion were reasonably open on the material before it. The Tribunal gave reasons probative of that material. The applicants’ complaint really is no more than an expression of disagreement with the Tribunal’s findings. No legal error is apparent in this regard.
I note for the sake of completeness that no allegation of fraud was made by Mrs Bi or Mr Mu against the migration agent. With Trivedi v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 42; (2014) 220 FCR 169 in mind (and see also Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 52), there was no indication of any desire to provide any evidence at the final hearing, or at the hearing of the AIC (see Bi & Anor), that the agent had acted in a fraudulent manner. At its highest, the complaint goes no higher than the agent made a “mistake” (see above at [71]).
The applicants also complained that they had “sufficient evidence” but were “not allowed” to provide this evidence to the Tribunal. The applicants did not explain what this evidence was. In any event, the Tribunal gave the applicants the opportunity to give their evidence and address its concerns. It did not accept Mrs Bi’s explanation. No legal error arises in the circumstances.
Conclusion
There is no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision as it is said to arise from the grounds of the application, nor as the applicants sought to explain before the Court. It is appropriate to dismiss the application. I will make the appropriate order.
I certify that the preceding seventy-eight (78) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Nicholls
Associate:
Date: 16 April 2018
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