FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BGK15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 630
Appeal from: Application for extension of time: BGK15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 2605 File number: NSD 2245 of 2017 Judge: GRIFFITHS J Date of judgment: 11 May 2018 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for an extension of time to appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether the proposed appeal has merit – held: application dismissed, with costs Legislation: Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), r 36.03
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), reg 2.05
Cases cited: AOT15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1085
ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 174; 154 ALD 221
BBW15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 128
CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146; 70 AAR 413
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; 240 CLR 611
SZTRY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86
Date of hearing: 9 May 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 23 Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person, with the assistance of an interpreter Solicitor for the Respondent: Ms C Saunders of DLA Piper ORDERS
NSD 2245 of 2017 BETWEEN: BGK15
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Respondent
JUDGE:
GRIFFITHS J
DATE OF ORDER:
11 MAY 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for an extension of time be refused.
2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
GRIFFITHS J
The applicant seeks on extension of time to appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA). The judgment is dated 27 October 2017 and is reported as BGK15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 2605.
The application for extension of time was filed on 20 December 2017 and was supported by an affidavit affirmed by the applicant on 20 December 2017.
The 21 day period within which the appeal should have been brought expired on 18 November 2017 (see r 36.03 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)). Accordingly, the applicant seeks an extension of time to bring the appeal. The Minister opposed time being extended on the ground that the explanation for the delay is unsatisfactory and the proposed grounds of appeal lack merit.
Summary of background matters
The applicant is a citizen of Egypt. He arrived in Australia on 7 January 2013 and held a visa which had a condition to the effect that he would not, after entering Australia, be entitled to be granted a substantive visa, other than a protection visa, while he remained in Australia. The applicant applied for a protection visa on 13…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 630
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for an extension of time be refused.
2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Many of the applicant’s oral submissions were directed to the merits of his case. He was unable to identify any arguable error in the primary judge’s reasons for judgment despite being repeatedly invited by the Court to do so. He complained that the delegate had failed to take into account the fact that he feared persecution if he were returned to Egypt. It was pointed out to him that while he had made such a claim in his first waiver request he did not repeat that claim in the second waiver request and it is the delegate’s decision in respect of the latter which is the subject of this proceeding. It is a matter for the applicant to determine whether or not he wishes to make an appropriate application to the Department if he considers that circumstances have changed since his first protection visa application was refused and he is at risk of persecution or, alternatively, that that risk is relevant to any further request to waive the condition. Consideration and disposition of the application Considerations relevant to the exercise of the Court's discretion to extend time include, but are not limited to, whether the Court is satisfied that there is an acceptable explanation for the delay, whether there would be any undue prejudice to the respondent if the Court were to grant an extension of time, and whether there is any merit in the proposed appeal (see SZTRY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86 at [6]; AOT15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1085 and BBW15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 128). I am prepared to accept that the applicant has provided an acceptable explanation for the delay in making this application. In doing so, I take into account that the applicant is a litigant in person. The Minister did not claim that he would suffer any undue prejudice if an extension of time were granted. The difficulty, however, with the application for an extension of time is the absence of merit in the proposed appeal. In substance, the proposed grounds of appeal reflect the three grounds of judicial review which were unsuccessful below. There is no arguable error on the part of the primary judge raised by any of the three proposed grounds of appeal. The first proposed ground effectively consolidates the three judicial review grounds run unsuccessfully below. No arguable appealable error has been demonstrated in relation to the primary judge’s reasons for rejecting each of those grounds, as summarised in [9] to [11] above. Indeed, I consider that his Honour’s reasoning is correct. The first proposed ground is misconceived if it relates to matters which occurred in relation to the applicant’s first waiver request, which was not the subject of his judicial review proceeding below, and so, in those circumstances, it cannot be the subject of the proposed appeal. It is evident from the Department’s decision record dated 3 August 2016 that the second waiver request was rejected on the basis that the decision-maker was not satisfied that the circumstances described in the second request were substantially different from those previously considered. The decision-maker acknowledged that the applicant had provided a list of medications and conditions that affected his partner, but she was not satisfied that this additional information “represents substantially different circumstances”. That finding was reasonably open on the evidence.