BFM18 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship
[2025] FedCFamC2G 825
•4 June 2025
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
BFM18 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 825
File number(s): MLG 630 of 2018 Judgment of: JUDGE CORBETT Date of judgment: 4 June 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION - Safe Haven Enterprise (Class XE) (Subclass 790) visa – Application for judicial review – Whether Immigration Assessment Authority failed to consider a relevant fact – Whether information was new information that met the exceptional circumstances criteria in s 473DD of the Act – Whether well-founded fear of persecution – No jurisdictional error – Application dismissed. Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), Part 7AA, ss 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa) 473CB, 473DD Cases cited: AAI20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2024] FCA 1223
Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184
Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 26
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611
NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263
NAVK v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1695
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 56 Date of last submission/s: 10 April 2025 Date of hearing: 10 April 2025 Place: Melbourne Counsel for the Applicant Mr G Foster Solicitor for the Applicant Sentil Solicitors Solicitor for the Respondents Ms P Durham, Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
MLG 630 of 2018 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: BFM18
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE CORBETT
DATE OF ORDER:
4 JUNE 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The name of the first respondent is amended to ‘Minister for Immigration and Citizenship’;
2.The name of the second respondent is amended to ‘Administrative Review Tribunal’;
3.The further amended application for judicial review filed 26 March 2025 be dismissed; and
4.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs and disbursements of and incidental to the proceeding fixed in the sum of $8,371.30.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE CORBETT
The applicant seeks judicial review pursuant to s 476(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (Authority) dated 13 February 2018. The Authority affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) to refuse to grant the applicant a Safe Haven Enterprise (Class XE) (Subclass 790) visa (visa).
Reference in these reasons to “CB” pages are references to the Court Book that was tendered and admitted as evidence at the hearing before this Court and designated exhibit “R1”.
BACKGROUND
The applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka, born in Kilinochchi, Northern Province of Sri Lanka in 1984 and is of Tamil and Hindu ethnicity (CB 15). The applicant arrived by sea to Australia at Cocos Island on 2 April 2013 as an unauthorised maritime arrival.
On 21 May 2013, the applicant participated in an Irregular Maritime Arrival Entry Interview (Arrival Interview) and was assisted by an interpreter fluent in the English and Tamil languages (CB 13-29). The applicant claimed to fear harm from the Sri Lankan Criminal Investigation Department (CID), the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) and the Karuna Group (a paramilitary group supporting the SLA) as a Tamil with suspected links to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
The applicant claimed that his father worked as a Secretary to the Farmers’ Association in Santhipuram in Eastern Province and through this work, his father had regular contact with members of the LTTE (CB 24). The applicant’s father also helped displaced persons find accommodation in their village. This relationship contributed to the CID’s suspicion of the family and the subsequent arrest and detention of the applicant’s mother in December 2008 (CB 115). The applicant’s mother was arrested when two grenades were found in the family home. It was alleged that two boys who were subcontractors of the applicant’s father and living in the family home, had suspected links to the LTTE and concealed the grenades (CB 24, 114-5). The grenades were later found by the police and the two boys were also arrested and detained (CB 24, 31, 32 and 115). The mother was detained for several months and then released in September 2009 (CB 115).
On 25 April 2009, the applicant’s father and two of his friends were found shot dead at the family home. Medical reports reveal that the father died from a single gunshot wound to the head (CB 60, 61, 64 and 115). Another person who was not in the house at the time and was a friend of the applicant’s father, was also shot dead on the same day. The perpetrators were never identified or prosecuted (CB 115-8). The applicant believes it was the SLA or Karuna Group (CB 115-6).
In May 2012, the applicant fled Sri Lanka to India where he lived until he departed by boat in March 2013 bound for Australia (CB 27-8). The boat was intercepted by the Australian Navy and the passengers and crew were taken to Cocos Island.
On 26 February 2016, the applicant was invited to apply for the visa with the assistance of a Primary Application and Information Service advisor (CB 68-9).
On 3 August 2016, the applicant applied for the visa (CB 72-142). The applicant provided a Statement of protection claims dated 14 May 2016 (Statement) (CB 114-9). The Statement elaborated on the applicant’s protection claims made in the Arrival Interview including:
(1)That his father had been arrested on two prior occasions by the CID on suspicion that he was a member of the LTTE, once before the applicant was born and again when the applicant was a young child;
(2)The arrests prompted the family to flee to India from 1990 to 1994;
(3)That his father was the real target of the Sri Lankan police and CID when his mother and the two boys were arrested in 2008;
(4)On 25 April 2009, the applicant suspects that his father and three of his friends had been shot and killed by the SLA, CID or Karuna Group;
(5)That following his father’s death, his family were accused of terrorism and outcast from their village by local Sinhalese forcing them to relocate to Trincomalee; and
(6)He believes that if he returns to Sri Lanka, he will be suspected of being associated with the LTTE and will be targeted, abducted, interrogated, tortured and killed.
On 20 December 2016, the applicant attended a SHEV interview with a delegate of the Minister (CB 177). Following that interview, the applicant’s agent submitted further submissions on 23 January 2017 in support of the applicant’s application for the visa (CB 179-201). The submissions repeated and expanded the claimed grounds for protection.
On 29 June 2017, a delegate of the Minister refused to grant the applicant the visa (CB 206–221). The delegate was not satisfied that the applicant was a refugee or a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Act.
On 11 July 2017, the decision of the delegate was referred to the Authority for a fast-track review under Part 7AA of the Act (CB 222-235).
On 27 July 2017, the applicant’s agent sent further submissions to the Authority for consideration (CB 241-5).
On 28 July 2017, the applicant’s agent sought to rely on new information submitted to the Authority (CB 246–274). The information provided contained various media articles and country information regarding Tamil refugees and the risk of harm on return to Sri Lanka.
On 13 February 2018, the Authority affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicant the visa (CB 282-303) (Decision).
AUTHORITY DECISION
The Decision was comprehensive and detailed. The Authority considered the post-interview submissions provided to the delegate on 23 January 2017 and the submissions provided after the delegate’s decision (CB 283 [3]-[4]). The Authority was not satisfied that all of the information provided on 27 and 28 July 2018 was not new information that met the exceptional circumstances criteria in s 473DD of the Act. The Authority considered the submissions as argument but refused to consider the additional information provided on 28 July 2017 and found that it was new information that did not satisfy the exceptional circumstances test. Therefore, the Authority did not consider that information.
The Authority did not accept that the applicant was a person of any interest to the Sri Lankan Authorities when he departed Sri Lanka in May 2012 using his passport (CB 292 [26]). The Authority was not satisfied that the applicant would be subject to adverse treatment if he were now to return to Sri Lanka (CB 273 [27]). At [32] and [33] the Authority found (CB 294):
[32] I do not consider that the applicant is a person with family links to persons who the UNCHR regarded at the time of his departure as being at risk. Whilst his parents may have, at different times and for different reasons, been suspected of LTTE support, I do not consider that such past suspicion led to the applicant being at risk at that time. In any event, more recent country information indicates that there are a limited number of persons who remain of continuing interest to the authorities.
[33]…In respect of low profile LTTE members, including former combatants, those employed in administrative or other roles and those who have provided a high level of non-military support to the LTTE during the conflict, DFAT reports that since the end of the war, they have been arrested and detained in rehabilitation centres. Although the great majority of these low-profile (‘low-risk) former members have already been released following their rehabilitation, any other low-profile LTTE members who came to the attention of the Sri Lankan authorities, would on DFAT’s assessment, be detained and may be sent to the remaining rehabilitation centres, and following their release, may be monitored but are generally not prosecuted. The applicant was never an LTTE member or suspected of having any involvement in the LTTE, and I am not satisfied that his and his family’s past experiences in Sri Lanka would lead to a real chance of him being placed in rehabilitation upon his return to Sri Lanka.
Based on country information, the Authority was not satisfied that there was a real chance that the applicant would suffer harm from the Sri Lankan authorities or any other group because of his Tamil ethnicity or for any other reasons claimed (CB 297 [41]).
The Authority also found that because the applicant departed Sri Lanka legally, he was unlikely to be prosecuted for illegal departure should he now return (CB 298 [49]).
The Authority found that there was no real risk or real chance that the applicant would face any harm on return to Sri Lanka and therefore he was not a refugee or entitled to protection under s 36(2)(a) or complementary protection under s 36(2)(aa) of the Act (CB 298-9 [50]-[54]).
PROCEEDINGS IN THIS COURT
On 14 March 2018, the applicant filed an application for judicial review in this Court (CB 1–8). The application for judicial review contained five grounds of review, as follows:
1. The Immigration Assessment Authority (the Authority) denied me procedural fairness.
2. The Authority failed to properly consider my claims.
3. The Authority didn't give me an opportunity to comment on an issue that was in dispute.
4. The Authority failed to properly apply the 'exceptional circumstances' test under s 437DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) to my case.
5. The Authority failed to properly and reasonably apply its discretion under s 473FB of the Act by not considering certain information provided by me to the Authority.
The application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the applicant on 14 March 2018 which simply annexed a copy of the Decision (CB 10-11).
On 26 March 2025, the applicant filed a further amended application for judicial review in which the applicant abandoned the previous grounds of review and substituted the following new grounds:
GROUND 1: The IAA erred when it failed to consider the Applicant's claim that he faced a real chance of persecution upon return to Sri Lanka from the Sri Lankan authorities, Karuna group or any persons associated with that group or any other persons because of his father's association with members of the LTTE.
Particulars
(i)Paragraph 41
(ii)The Applicant claimed that his father was associating with LTTE members during the 2002-2004 ceasefire period [22];
(iii)The Applicant claimed that after 2004, the breakaway Karuna group warned people who were associating with the LTTE members and commenced targeting those who were assisting the LTTE [22];
(iv)The IAA accepted his father was killed on 25 April, 2009 by unknown persons [24];
(v)The Applicant did not know who killed his father but suspected it was Karuna persons [24];
(vi)The IAA stated: 'I therefore have doubts as to the veracity of the applicant's evidence that the Karuna group was targeting the applicant's father because he had associated with the LTTE members back in the 2002-2004 ceasefire period.' [22]
(vii)The IAA was 'not satisfied there is a real chance the applicant will suffer harm from the Sri Lankan authorities or the Karuna group or any persons associated with that group or any other persons because of his Tamil ethnicity and/ or his origin from a former LTTE controlled area in the northern province, or because his father was arrested on LTTE suspicion on 2 occasions, or because of his mother's detention on suspicion of assisting the LTTE, or because of the discovery of weapons (grenades) on his family's property, or because of his father's work as secretary of the farmers' association or because of the shooting murder of his father.' [41] (block inserted);
(viii)Notwithstanding the doubts the IAA concerning the applicant’s evidence that the Karuna group was targeting the applicant’s father because he had associated with the LTTE members back in 2002-2004 ceasefire period, the IAA did not specifically address this aspect of the Applicant’s claim at [41] nor made a dipositive finding, the key aspect of the applicant’s claim being the father’s ‘association’ with LTTE during the 2002-2004 ceasefire period other than while he was working as secretary to the farmer’s association;
(ix)Accordingly the IAA failed to address a key aspect of the Applicant's claims, leading to a jurisdictional error.
GROUND 2
The IAA erred when it was satisfied there is no evidence or information in the review material supporting the Applicant’s suspicion that the authorities were behind the shooting murder of his father, which the IAA accepted occurred. 24 [CB291]
The IAA further erred when it was not satisfied that the Applicant’s father was shot dead at that time because of any perceived LTTE links or because he has too may have been suspected of assisting the LTTE because of the weapons found on his property. 24 [CB291]
The IAA erred when it did not consider the Applicant’s father was the Secretary for the local Agricultural/farmers association as at 23 December 2008 when determining the issues above.
Such errors led to unreasonable irrational and illogical findings.
Particulars
(i)24 [CB291]
(ii)The IAA noted the Applicant’s claims at 15 [CB287], which included:
•From 2002 to 2004 he and his family lived in a UNHCR Refugee camp, Alles Garden in Trincomalee. During this time, his father, as Secretary for the local Agricultural/farmers association, assisted displaced Tamils to find homes and associated with return LTTE members;
•His father often received contracts to do work in the community such as digging canals. In December 2008 the two young boys who were working as subcontractors for his father were living with the applicant’s family. Unbeknown to the applicant’s family, the subcontractors had hidden grenades at their home.
(iii)The Applicant’s statement at Para 20 [CB117] stated “I fear I will be killed if I return to Sri Lanka due to my perceived family-links to the LTTE.”
(iv)The Applicant’s statement at Para 22 [CB 117] stated “I will be suspected of bring associated with the LTTE if I return and will be targeted, abducted, detained, interrogated, tortured, and killed by the Army and CID if I return. This is due to the suspicion against my family for many years.”
(v)The Applicant expressed his belief that his father was the real target of the police and CID investigation relating to the grenades at the house 22 [CB290];
(vi)The Applicant expressed his belief that after 2004 the Karuna group were targeting those who were assisting the LTTE, and so his father was targeted 22 [CB290]; and that the CID were targeting to arrest or kill the father bit didn’t have a reason to arrest him when the grenades were found 23 [CB291];
(vii)The IAA noted that the Applicant gave evidence at his PV interview that because of his father’s work as secretary of the farmers association during the 2002-2004 ceasefire period, his father was associating within the LTTE members as they were returning to live in normal villages and organisations 22 [CB290];
(viii)The IAA accepted that as a result of the father’s work position as Secretary of the farmers association, he had interactions with LTTE members during the 2002-2004 ceasefire period 20 [CB 289];
(ix)The IAA was not satisfied the authorities had maintained any real suspicion that the applicant’s father was involved with the LTTE because of his work as Secretary of the farmers association in 2002-2004. 20 [CB289/290]
(x)The IAA was not satisfied the Applicant’s father was shot dead because of any perceived LTTE links or because he too may have been suspected of assisting the LTTE because of the weapons found on his property 24 [CB291]
(xi)However the IAA neglected to address the Applicant’s claim at para 8 [CB115] that his father was the Secretary for the local Agricultural/farmers association as at 23 December 2008 which likely meant he was still associating with the LTTE;
(xii)The IAA neglected to consider whether the authorities maintained any suspicion that the applicant’s father was still involved with the LTTE because of his work as Secretary of the farmers association at the time in 2008 when the grenades were discovered at his home and when the Applicant’s mother was arrested.
(xiii)The Applicant’s father was shot dead by unknown gunmen in April 2009, a time in close proximity to the events in late 2008;
(xiv)The IAA found plausible that the Applicant’s mother was arrested because of LTTE suspicion in circumstances where grenades were found on her property, she was housing the boys who had hidden the grenades on her property, and there were no other males at the property at the time 21 [CB290];
(xv)The finding relating to the suspicion attaching to mother (above) equally applies to the Applicant’s father who was the Secretary for the local Agriculture Society which enabled him to associate with the LTTE, who resided at the property (‘not at home’ – 11 [CB115]) and who was therefore also housing the boys who lived on the property.
(xvi)The IAA accordingly failed to properly consider the material before it, failed to consider the fact that the father was Secretary for the local Agricultural/farmers association as at 23 December 2008 was a relevant matter in deciding the Applicant’s claims, failed to consider the matters which made the mother’s arrest plausible applied equally to the father, and so made unreasonable irrational and illogical findings thereby committing jurisdictional error.
The hearing of the application for judicial review was listed for hearing in person at Melbourne on 10 April 2025.
Mr Foster of counsel appeared for the applicant and Ms Durham, solicitor, appeared for the Minister.
APPLICANT’S SUBMISSIONS
The applicant filed an outline of amended written submissions on 26 March 2025.
Mr Foster submitted that the Authority failed to consider relevant evidence and the applicant’s claim for protection because of his father’s association with members of the LTTE. He also submitted that the Decision was illogical and unreasonable.
Reliance was place on the well-known authorities of NAVK v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1695 (NAVK); NABEvMinister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263 (NABE) and Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 26 at [24] as authority for the proposition that a decision-making tribunal must consider claims clearly raised or clearly arising from the evidence to complete the statutory task. A failure to consider a clearly raised claim is a jurisdictional error that may be material.
The claim which the applicant says was not considered was that the applicant feared persecution from Sri Lankan authorities, the Karuna Group or persons associated with them because the applicant’s father associated with the LTTE over an extended period of time and not just during the 2002-2004 ceasefire. The Authority also misunderstood the applicant’s evidence that the applicant’s father was the Secretary of the Farmer’s Association at the time of his death and this led the Authority to illogical and unreasonable findings. The finding at CB 289 [20] was erroneous because it omitted reference to the fact that the applicant said his father’s association with the LTTE did not end with the ceasefire. In paragraph [20], the Authority made the following findings (CB 289):
[20]…because of his father’s work as secretary of the farmer’s association during the 2002-2004 ceasefire period, he was associating with LTTE members as they were returning to live in normal villages and organisations such as the farmer’s association were assisting displaced persons to find housing.
…
I accept that as a result his father’s work position as secretary of the farmer’s association at that time, he had interactions with LTTE members during the 2002-2004 ceasefire period.
It was submitted that the Authority could and should have reasonably inferred that the applicant’s father had a continuing association with members of the LTTE, and it was this continuing association that meant that the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution should he return to Sri Lanka. The finding made by the Authority at paragraph [22] of the Decision that the applicant’s father was not targeted because of an association in the period 2002-2004, was against the evidence illogical and unreasonable (CB 290 [22]).
Mr Foster submitted that, given the widespread nature of the secretarial work, it is likely that the applicant’s father was conducting other work for the LTTE members that was engaged in through his role as Secretary, but not only for the purpose of fulfilling his duties as Secretary. This other work is a key aspect of the applicant’s protection claims that the Authority failed to consider in reaching its conclusions at paragraph [41] of the Decision (CB 297). The Authority found (CB 297 [41]):
[41]…I am not satisfied there is a real chance the applicant will suffer harm from the Sri Lankan authorities or the Karuna group or any persons associated with that group or any other persons because of his Tamil ethnicity and/or his origin from a former LTTE controlled area in the Northern Province, or because his father was arrested on LTTE suspicion on 2 occasions, or because of his mother’s detention for 9 months on suspicion of assisting the LTTE, or because of the discovery of weapons (grenades) on his family’s property, or because of his father’s work as secretary of the farmer’s association or because of the shooting murder of his father.
The phrase “because of his father’s work as secretary of the farmer’s association” was said to be critical. The applicant’s claim does not confine his father’s work as Secretary but extended to an association with members of the LTTE. Mr Foster conceded that the applicant had not articulated claims that his father actually supported or assisted the LTTE in any other way other than in his role as Secretary (CB 289 [20]). However, it was reasonably open to the Authority to infer that the applicant ‘s fear was that Sri Lankan authorities would persecute him because the father supported or assisted the LTTE in other ways apart from his work arising from his role as Secretary. This association or relationship meant that there was a real chance that the applicant would suffer serious harm if he was to be returned to any part of Sri Lanka. Mr Foster pointed to the evidence of the applicant in the Statement at CB 115 [8], [11] and 117 [20], [21]-[26] to support the proposition that the findings of the Authority at [20], [22], [23] and [41] of the Decision were contrary to the evidence and that the Authority misunderstood the evidence. There was a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction. Alternatively, the Decision was illogical and unreasonable.
MINISTER’S SUBMISSIONS
The Minister filed an outline of written submissions on 3 April 2025. The Minister’s position was firstly that at no point did the applicant claim that his father had any association with members of the LTTE beyond his role as Secretary of the Farmers’ Association. Secondly, that the Decision was logical, rational and reasonable (see Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 at [128]-[130] per Crennan and Bell JJ).
In relation to ground one, it was submitted that the applicant first set out his claims in the Statement provided with his visa application (CB 114-8). In the Statement, the applicant refers to his father’s role as Secretary at paragraph [8], but there is no claim in the Statement that the father interacted with the LTTE through the Farmer’s Association or otherwise (CB 115 [8]). The first mention of the applicant’s father having any association with the LTTE was in the interview with the delegate. The delegate recorded that the applicant believed that the Sri Lankan authorities were involved in his father’s death because they suspected his father of LTTE connections, because his father’s work may have been perceived as assisting the LTTE (CB 210-1).
It was submitted that the totality of the evidence, when construed properly, indicates that it was apparent that the applicant claimed that his father was targeted because of previous involvement/association with the LTTE, then when explosives were found at the family home, this was the catalyst to the death of the father. This claim was rationally and logically considered by the Authority. The Authority did properly consider the evidence in its context and drew logical inferences from the evidence. It was submitted that nothing turns on whether the Authority found or considered whether the father was Secretary in 2008, or at the time of his death. The Authority was only required to consider a claim of fear by the applicant based on the articulated claims and those that clearly arose from the evidence (NABE at [61]).
The Decision was also logical rational and reasonable. The Authority concluded that there was no evidence to conclude that the father was shot by the Sri Lankan authorities because of perceived LTTE links. The applicant’s evidence was that his father did not have any links to the LTTE except when he assisted displaced persons during the period 2002-2004, and therefore the Authority was entitled to conclude that the father’s association was in fact limited to that period. The findings at paragraph [24] of the Decision were also logical and rational, where the Authority found that there was no evidence that the father was shot dead in April 2009 because of perceived LTTE links or because he too may have been suspected of assisting the LTTE because of the weapons found on his property (CB 291 [24]). The inference that the authorities could have arrested the father after arresting the mother but did not because there was no suspicion of him, was also available from the evidence. The reasons given by the Authority for reaching the conclusion that there was not a real chance of persecution was based on available facts and inferences that and were reasonably made.
REPLY
Mr Foster repeated that the Authority failed to consider as relevant the fact that the applicant’s father was Secretary of the Association in 2008 and that necessarily meant he had an association or relationship with members of the LTTE. Reference was made to the findings at paragraph [22] of the Decision that the applicant’s evidence was that his father had association with the LTTE members in his work as Secretary (CB 290 [22]). Therefore, at the time of his death it was likely that his role as Secretary meant he was associating with the LTTE in 2008 and this was a relevant fact that the Authority failed to consider.
CONSIDERATION
In NAVK at [15] Allsop J (as he then was) observed:
[15] …A practical and common sense approach to everyday decision-making requires the unarticulated claim to arise tolerably clearly from the material itself, since the statutory task of the Tribunal is to assess the claims by reference to all the material, not to undertake an independent analytical exercise of the material for the discovery of potential claims which might be made, but which have not been, and then subjecting them to further analysis to assess their legitimacy.
In NABE at [53] the Court said:
[53] It is desirable first to restate the uncontroversial proposition that mere factual error by the Tribunal will not ground judicial review unless it relates to a jurisdictional fact or is a manifestation of some error of law, substantive or procedural, which constitutes jurisdictional error and thereby vitiates the purported decision. This is evident from the discussion, in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323, of jurisdictional error as a ground for the review of Tribunal decisions under the former Pt 8 of the Migration Act. If the Tribunal identifies a wrong issue or poses the wrong question for itself or does not have regard to relevant material or takes into account irrelevant material, so as to affect the exercise of its powers, error of law and/or jurisdictional error may be identified (at 351–352 per McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ). An error of fact in the course of a decision is unlikely to be a jurisdictional error unless the fact is a jurisdictional fact:
‘Courts should be slow to find that an erroneous finding of fact or an error of reasoning in finding a fact, made in the course of making a decision, demonstrates that an administrative tribunal so misunderstood the question it had to decide that its error constituted a jurisdictional error.’
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Cohen (2001) 177 ALR 473 at 481 [35] per McHugh J.
In Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184 at [45] The Court said:
[45] If the Tribunal fails to consider a contention that the applicant fears persecution for a particular reason which, if accepted, would justify concluding that the applicant has satisfied the relevant criterion, and if that contention is supported by probative material, the Tribunal will have failed in the discharge of its duty, imposed by s414, to conduct a review of the decision. This is a matter of substance, not a matter of the form of the Tribunal's published reasons for decision.
In the Decision, the Authority identified the claims raised by the applicant at paragraph [15] (CB 287). At dot point three of that paragraph, the Authority identified the claim that from 2002 to 2004 the applicant’s father, as Secretary for the local Agricultural/farmer’s Association “assisted displaced Tamils to find homes and associated with returning LTTE members”. At dot point seven, the Authority recorded the applicant’s strong suspicion that the authorities were responsible for the murder of his father. At dot point twelve, the Authority records the applicant’s fear that if he returns, to Sri Lanka he will be suspected of being associated with the LTTE due to suspicion against his family for “many years” and also because of his Tamil ethnicity. This risk of harm was perceived to be worse because the applicant fled to Australia.
The summary of claims or issues made in that paragraph identifies a broad general claim by the applicant that the association of the applicant’s family with the LTTE over an extended period and events involving both his mother and father over an extended period led various Sri Lankan authorities (namely the SLA,CID and Karuna Group), to suspect that the family was involved with the LTTE, and this suspicion was the cause of a well-founded fear of persecution by the applicant. That claim was considered and address by the Authority in paragraphs [19] to [24] inclusive of the Decision (CB 289-291).
No specific claim arose from the evidence that the applicant’s father was directly associated with the LTTE at any time other than during 2002 to 2004. The general claim made was that there were sufficient underlying factors for the Sri Lankan authorities to suspect and infer that the applicant and the applicant’s family had links to or supported members of the LTTE. That was the claim that the Authority considered and was not satisfied on the evidence was genuine fear or that there was a real chance of persecution by familial association.
The fact that the applicant’s father may have had other associations with the LTTE (other than in his capacity as Secretary during the ceasefire in 2002-2004), or that he remained Secretary in 2008 and 2009 which may or may not have involved him in association with the LTTE, was not squarely raised as a claim but in any event the Authority did consider the more general claim as basis for the applicant’s fear as described in paragraph [41] (CB 297). Simply to omit from the list of events in [41] that the applicant’s chance of harm was real because his father’s association with members of the LTTE (generally), did not mean that the Authority erred in failing to consider a relevant claim or failed to perform the statutory task.
It was not for the Authority to analyse the evidence to discover potential or specific claims within the wider general claims. By omitting reference to the two additional facts now relied on by the applicant there was not a failure to consider a jurisdictional fact or constitute a material jurisdictional error by the Authority. There was no omission to consider a critical aspect of the applicant’s claims by not finding that the applicant’s father was the Secretary of the Farmers’ Association in 2008 and/or 2009 nor did it give greater substance to the credibility of the applicant’s claim to fear persecution and serious harm because of the perception that his family may have been associated with the LTTE. It was the perception of suspicion that the Authority considered and found to be missing. A mere factual error is not a ground for review unless it related to a jurisdictional fact and in this case, there was no error in considering the jurisdictional fact of whether there was a well-founded fear of persecution.
Nor did the Authority ignore a material fact or claim raised squarely or clearly from the materials. There was no evidence of the father’s association with the LTTE other than in the limited circumstances identified by the applicant in the Statement and his interview with the delegate. The applicant’s concern and claim as expressed by his evidence was the fear of suspicions of involvement. There was no evidence of actual involvement, nor could it be inferred from the fact that the applicant’s father was Secretary of the Farmer’s Association that he had actual involvement or association with the LTTE for which the applicant’s fear was therefore genuine. It was not reasonably open to the Authority to infer that there was a connection and in the absence of evidence provided to the delegate the Authority was entitled to infer, as it did, that there was in fact only limited association that was not a reason to alert the Sri Lankan authorities or give credibility to the applicant’s claim of suspicion.
The Decision was also logical, rational and reasonable. It was not a decision that no rational or logical decision-maker could arrive on the same evidence (SZMDS at [130]). Simply because reasonable minds may differ as to the findings and conclusions reached does not make the Decision unreasonable. This is not a case where it could be said that the Decision was beyond the power to review, properly construed, having regard to the scope, purpose and objects of that power or that the power has been abused by the decision-maker. The result was not one so unreasonable that it could not have been reached if proper reasoning had been applied in the exercise of statutory power in the circumstances (see AAI20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2024] FCA 1223 at [73] per Feutrill J).
The Authority considered the applicant’s evidence and claims as they were presented and before the delegate as given to the Authority by the Secretary pursuant to s 473CB of the Act. The Authority also considered further submissions provided on behalf of the applicant (but not new country information or media reports, which it found was new information). It was not contended at the hearing in this Court that there was an error by the Authority in taking that course. The Authority identified each of the claims clearly arising from the materials but was not satisfied by the evidence and the weight of the evidence that the applicant was a refugee or required complimentary protection. It did so by explaining that it accepted plausible claims but rejected the implausible where there was an absence of evidence. The Authority considered country information and applied it rationally to the claims made when weighing the applicant’s evidence and in determining the objective criteria required by ss 36(2)(a) and (aa) of the Act. Simply because the applicant contends that the Authority failed to consider two facts which could or could not be inferred from the applicant’s evidence does not establish that the Decision was legally unreasonable.
The further amended application for judicial review filed 26 March 2025 is dismissed.
OTHER MATTERS
The name of the Minister was changed on 13 May 2025 to ‘Minister for Immigration and Citizenship’. The name of the first respondent and the title of the proceeding will be changed to refer to the first respondent as ‘Minister for Immigration and Citizenship’.
Following the passage of the Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No 1) Act 2024 (Cth), the name of the second respondent is to be amended to the ‘Administrative Review Tribunal’. An order will be made amending the name of the second respondent and the title to the proceeding.
COSTS
In the outline of written submissions filed 3 April 2025 the Minister seeks an order for costs if the application for judicial review is dismissed fixed in the sum of $8,371.30 which is the scale figure for a contested application prescribed in Sch 2, Pt 2 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules2021 (Cth). That amount is fair and reasonable and should follow the event of this application. The applicant is ordered to pay the Minister’s costs and disbursements of and incidental to this proceeding fixed in the sum of $8,371.30.
ORDERS
The name of the first respondent is amended to ‘Minister for Immigration and Citizenship’.
The name of the second respondent is amended to ‘Administrative Review Tribunal’.
The further amended application for judicial review filed 26 March 2025 be dismissed.
The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs and disbursements of and incidental to the proceeding fixed in the sum of $8,371.30.
I certify that the preceding fifty-six (56) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Corbett. Associate:
Dated: 4 June 2025
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