Benn v State of Queensland (Department of Education)

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:	Benn v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2025] QIRC 236
PARTIES:	Benn, Ed Appellant v State of Queensland (Department of Education) Respondent
CASE NO:	PSA/2024/193
PROCEEDING:	Appeal of a fair treatment decision
DELIVERED ON:	5 September 2025
HEARING DATE:	On the papers
MEMBER: HEARD AT:	Pratt IC Brisbane
ORDERS:	1. The appeal is dismissed. 2. The decision is confirmed.
CATCHWORDS:	INDUSTRIAL LAW – PUBLIC SECTOR – EMPLOYEES AND SERVANTS OF THE CROWN GENERALLY – fair treatment decision appeal – employee grievances considered in a Stage 1 Local Action Decision pursuant to the Public Service Commission Directive 11/20: Individual employee grievances ('LAD') – where the appellant sought a Stage 2 internal review of the Stage 1 LAD – where the appellant appeals the internal review decision – whether the decision was fair and reasonable – decision was fair and reasonable
LEGISLATION: CASES:	Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) s 13 Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 562B(3) Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) s 130 Public Service Commission Directive 11/20: Individual employee grievances Baker v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2025] QIRC 99 Colebourne v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) (No 2) [2022] QIRC 16 Goodall v State of Queensland [2018] QSC 319 Hardy v State of Queensland (Department of Environment and Science) [2022] QIRC 480 Hunt v State of Queensland (Department of Agriculture and Fisheries) [2022] QIRC 162 Malcolm v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2024] QIRC 97 Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH (2015) 256 CLR 326 Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1 Schubert v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2024] QIRC 128 State of Queensland (Queensland Health) v Hume (No. 3) [2024] ICQ 3 Wirth v Mackay HHS & Anor [2016] QSC 39

Reasons for Decision

Mr Ed Benn ('Appellant') has filed an appeal pursuant to s 130 of the Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) ('PS Act'). The Appellant is a teacher at the Mount Gravatt State High School ('School'). He received a decision advising of the outcome of a grievance ('Grievance') that he lodged on 21 June 2024. That outcome decision, made by the then Acting Principal of the School, was issued on 28 August 2024. That earlier decision was what is described as a Local Action Decision ('LAD'). It was also what is commonly referred to as a 'Stage 1' decision pursuant to the Public Service Commission Directive 11/20: Individual employee grievances ('Directive').
The Appellant sought an internal review of the Stage 1 LAD on 9 September 2024. The process for doing so is set out in the Directive. It involves a review of the LAD, the test being whether it was fair and reasonable. That review is referred to in the Directive as a 'Stage 2' process and in this case it resulted in a second written decision that was released to the Appellant on 4 November 2024. That review decision is ostensibly the subject of this appeal ('Decision').
The Decision

By way of background, the Appellant's Grievance concerned the management of student behaviours within the Industrial Technology and Design Department at the School. The Grievance also took issue with the conduct of several staff members at the School, including:
(a)Mr Ross Robertson, Principal;
(b)Ms Francine Potts, Deputy Principal and Return to Work Coordinator;
(c)Mr Kyle Jones, Deputy Principal; and
(d)Mr Dan Hollis, Head of Department.
The decision-maker for the Stage 1 LAD, Mr Ross McNichol, Acting Principal, determined that no further action ought to be taken on the Grievance. Mr McNichol found that the allegations against Ms Potts, Mr Jones, and Mr Hollis were not substantiated, while the allegations against Mr Robertson could not be finalised because he was on extended personal leave. Mr McNichol further found that any breach of the Human Rights Act 2019 ('HR Act') was insufficiently particularised to be actionable and that, in any case, any alleged impingement upon the Appellant's human rights that might have occurred was justified in the circumstances.
The Appellant disagreed with the outcome of the Stage 1 LAD and requested a Stage 2 internal review of the LAD. The Appellant argued that the behaviour and conduct of all the abovementioned staff members was not appropriately addressed in the Stage 1 LAD. The Appellant also disagreed with the outcome as to his human rights and the management of student behaviours.
In the Stage 2 review, Ms Kym Shreeve, Executive Director, Business Partnering and Workplace Health and Safety, Human Resources, found Mr McNichol's decision in the Stage 1 LAD to be fair and reasonable. The conclusions in, and the reasoning underpinning, the Decision can be summarised as follows:
(a)Mr McNichol concluded that it would be impossible to reliably finalise an investigation into the alleged conduct of Mr Robertson because he was on extended leave. Upon review, Ms Shreeve found that conclusion to be fair and reasonable because it would not be appropriate to make findings about any alleged conduct without affording Mr Robertson procedural fairness. Consequently, Ms Shreeve agreed: the investigation could not be finalised whilst Mr Robertson was on extended leave. Ms Shreeve observed, however, that it remained open to the relevant local management team to further investigate the allegations once Mr Robertson returned from leave.
(b)Ms Shreeve agreed with Mr McNichol's finding that Ms Potts had not bullied the Appellant. Mr McNichol interviewed Ms Potts and relied on her account of the relevant interactions. In doing so, Mr McNichol determined that the behaviour did not constitute bullying and that Ms Potts was reasonably managing staff and resources at the school. Mr McNichol also observed that it was not possible to conclude that Ms Potts' communication style was inappropriate on each alleged occasion and found that the allegations did not necessarily indicate a pattern of bullying. Ms Shreeve found that conclusion to be fair and reasonable based on Mr McNichol's reasoning.
(c)Ms Shreeve found that Mr McNichol's conclusion that Ms Potts was justified in requesting medical information from the Appellant was fair and reasonable. Mr McNichol reached that conclusion because the request was made in response to the Appellant's proposed return to work after an extended absence and because Ms Potts, being the Rehabilitation and Return to Work Coordinator for the School, was the appropriate person to make that request. Mr McNichol reasoned that it was appropriate that the Rehabilitation and Return to Work Coordinator consult with an injured employee, as well as any treating doctors and other healthcare professionals, in order to plan for an appropriate return to work, including developing an appropriate suitable duties plan. Ms Shreeve accepted that line of reasoning and agreed with Mr McNichol's finding that Ms Potts' request for medical information was appropriate.
(d)Ms Shreeve concurred with Mr McNichol's conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to substantiate the Appellant's allegation that Mr Jones had failed to appropriately respond to the Appellant's correspondence about various student behaviours. Mr McNichol drew that conclusion based on facts found after interviewing Mr Jones. Mr McNichol also reached that conclusion having regard to the different perspectives on dealing with student behaviour management concerns between the Appellant, being a teacher, and Mr Jones being a Deputy Principal. Ms Shreeve found there was not sufficient information to overturn Mr McNichol's decision.
(e)The Appellant's concerns about Mr Hollis bore strong similarities to his concerns about Mr Jones. Ms Shreeve found that there was no basis upon which to overturn Mr McNichol's conclusion that Mr Hollis' conduct was fair and reasonable. The Appellant had alleged that Mr Hollis, like Mr Jones, had not responded appropriately when he was copied in on the above-mentioned correspondence concerning the student behaviour. Mr McNichol relied on Mr Hollis' account of events, concluding that there was insufficient information to find that Mr Hollis' conduct was not fair and reasonable. Mr McNichol observed again that there are different perspectives on managing student behaviour concerns as between a teacher and a Head of Department. In the Decision, Ms Shreeve agreed for the same reasons.
(f)The Appellant alleged that his right to freedom of expression was unreasonably impinged by a direction to maintain confidentiality. Ms Shreeve concluded that the direction was reasonable, referring to s 13 of the HR Act. That section provides the circumstances under which a human right may be limited. Ms Shreeve found that it was reasonable in the circumstances to direct the Appellant to maintain confidentiality. She reached this conclusion because the wider disclosure by the Appellant of these matters may impinge on the human rights of other individuals, particularly their right to privacy and reputation and their right to a fair hearing.
(g)Ms Shreeve made a number of conclusions regarding the Appellant's broader concerns about the management of student behaviours within the Industrial Technology and Design Department of the School. Ms Shreeve noted that the Appellant did not consider that the leadership team at the School supported him appropriately in managing his concerns about student behaviour, and took heed of the paramountcy of student safety and workplace health and safety. In light of these concerns Ms Shreeve recommended that all staff involved, including the Appellant, should review the relevant student management practices and complete the relevant safety and induction course. Ms Shreeve also recommended that the management team develop and communicate clear guidance on appropriate escalation procedures to handle student behaviour concerns and the relevant health and safety management process. However, Ms Shreeve noted that it was still reasonable for those in positions of leadership to performance manage staff members where the processes and procedures for managing student concerns are not followed.
(h)Ms Shreeve observed that issues within the Grievance were difficult to deal with, owing in part to the Appellant's allegations being approximately two years old and related to management of specific students.
Ms Shreeve concluded that Mr McNichol's decision in the Stage 1 LAD was fair and reasonable. However, Ms Shreeve recommended that the concerns about Mr Robertson be considered for further investigation when he returned from extended leave. Ms Shreeve also reiterated the above-mentioned recommendations.
Relevant law
Public service appeals are reviews, not re-hearings, of the relevant decision.[1] The test to be applied pursuant to s 562B(3) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 ('IR Act') is whether the decision appealed against was fair and reasonable. The words 'fair and reasonable' must be interpreted according to their ordinary meaning and not according to the strict legal test of reasonableness in the sense of the lawfulness or legality of a decision.[2]
[1] Goodall v State of Queensland [2018] QSC 319,4-5, cited by Dwyer IC in Hardy v State of Queensland (Department of Environment and Science) [2022] QIRC 480, [7].
[2] Colebourne v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) (No 2) [2022] QIRC 16, [25].
For a decision to be fair and reasonable, the conclusions underpinning it must be reasonably open to be reached. If the conclusions were reasonably open to the decision-maker to reach, it is not the Commission's role to disturb that decision, even if the Commission would have reached a different conclusion.[3] However, if the decision is flawed by conclusions that were not fairly and reasonably open to the decision-maker to reach, then that decision is prone to being overturned on appeal.[4]
[3] State of Queensland (Queensland Health) v Hume (No. 3) [2024] ICQ 3, [78]-[79] ('Hume'); Schubert v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2024] QIRC 128, [8].
[4] Malcolm v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2024] QIRC 97, [195]-[200].
Mere disappointment with the outcome of a decision is not enough to establish that it was not fair and reasonable.[5] The decision must create some practical injustice before an appeal of this nature can succeed.[6]
[5] Hunt v State of Queensland (Department of Agriculture and Fisheries) [2022] QIRC 162, [79]-[83], [85], citing Wirth v Mackay HHS & Anor [2016] QSC 39, [25], Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH (2015) 256 CLR 326, [35]-[36], [57], [61]; Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1.
[6] Ibid.
After reaching a conclusion on whether a decision is fair and reasonable, the Commission may, under s 562C of the IR Act, either confirm the decision or set it aside. If the latter, the Commission may either substitute the decision with another or return the matter to the decision-maker with a copy of the decision on appeal and any directions considered appropriate.
In Baker v State of Queensland (Department of Education),[7] Industrial Commissioner O'Neill recently dealt with a similar situation to this one. In that decision, the appellant sought to ostensibly appeal a Stage 2 internal review decision.[8] But it was, in reality, an appeal of a Stage 1 LAD.[9] O'Neill IC observed that this way of appealing an earlier Stage 1 LAD:[10]
…presents a difficulty because the decision under review in this appeal is the internal review of the earlierlocal action decision dealing with the complaints by the Appellant that make up the Grievance. The Commission cannot review how the Grievance was dealt with at the first instance in this appeal, or the complaints within the Grievance. The issue before the Commission is confined to whether the decision by Ms Shreeve was fair and reasonable.
[7] [2025] QIRC 99.
[8] Ibid [1]-[6].
[9] Ibid [17]-[18].
[10] Ibid [19].
Summary and consideration of the parties' arguments
The parties put on submissions in support of their respective cases, which I have read and considered in their entirety. I summarise them below and consider each in turn.
The Respondent argues generally that the Appellant is really seeking a rehearing of the original issues. It submits that the correct test is whether the Decision was fair and reasonable and cites the decision of State of Queensland (Queensland Health) v Hume (No. 3)[11] in support of that submission. I accept that is the correct approach for the reasons I have set out above. The Respondent also submits that the Appellant has misunderstood the internal review process by confusing it with a reinvestigation of the original Grievance. I consider this to be a correct assessment by the Respondent.
[11] Hume (n 3).
The Appellant argues that the mere fact differing perceptions on student behaviour exists does not amount to proof or evidence that would militate against the veracity of his allegations. I construe this argument to be alleging that Ms Shreeve did not weigh the facts before her correctly. I note that Ms Shreeve accepted that Mr McNichol observed that there were differing perceptions on dealing with student behaviours in reaching his conclusions and that he based his conclusions upon each relevant interview. I do not see that Ms Shreeve misunderstood the basis on which Mr McNichol reached his conclusion, and the Appellant has not pointed to any such misunderstanding. Ms Shreeve found that it was open to Mr McNichol to rely on each interview as to the facts.
I find it was fair and reasonable for Ms Shreeve's to conclude that Mr McNichol was justified in relying on the facts drawn from the interviews. Ms Shreeve's acceptance of Mr McNichol's observation of the differing perspectives is a recognition of the fact that, when it comes to student behaviour, reasonable minds may disagree on what the correct approach is. Merely failing to respond in a particular way is, therefore, not necessarily tantamount to responding inappropriately. Consequently, Ms Shreeve accepted, correctly in my view, that Mr McNichol was justified in observing the facts through the lens of differing perspectives when finding that Mr Jones and Mr Hollis had not acted inappropriately, but rather, simply had different perspectives. I do not see any error in the way Ms Shreeve assessed this part of Mr McNichol's decision. The conclusions Ms Shreeve reached were open to her to reach in my opinion.
The Appellant also makes numerous arguments that the outcome of the Decision was not fair and reasonable because of his dissatisfaction and disappointment with the outcome. For example, Ms Shreeve accepted Mr McNichol's conclusion that it was not possible to finalise the investigation into allegations concerning Mr Robertson because doing so whilst Mr Robertson was on leave would deny him procedural fairness. The Appellant argues that this was not fair and reasonable because it left him with no prospect of an adequate resolution to this issue. That is clearly an expression of mere disappointment with the outcome. It does not identify how, for example, it was not open to Ms Shreeve to conclude that the Stage 1 LAD was fair and reasonable when it determined that the investigation could not properly continue without Mr Robertson's involvement. As noted above, any arguments that are actually just expressions of disappointment have no bearing on the test of whether the Decision was fair and reasonable.
The Appellant also argued that the Decision was not fair and reasonable because Ms Shreeve and Mr McNichol ignored his concerns about Mr Robertson. More specifically, the Appellant says they both ignored the Appellant's concerns about Mr Robertson yelling at him in a meeting and returning students back to class when the Appellant deemed those students an unreasonable workplace health and safety risk.
I see no error with Ms Shreeve's conclusions on this issue. Mr McNichol found, and Ms Shreeve agreed, that this was not a matter that could have fairly been progressed while Mr Robertson was on extended leave. This plainly means that the issue was not ignored in either the Stage 1 LAD by Mr McNichol or the Stage 2 review Decision by Ms Shreeve. In fact, Ms Shreeve noted that it remained open to the local management team to further investigate the allegations against Mr Robertson once he returned from leave. The Respondent also points out that it was prevented from directing Mr Robertson to engage in an investigation whilst he was on extended leave. The Respondent says that Ms Shreeve agreed, for the same reasons found in the Stage 1 LAD, that it was impossible to fully investigate the allegations against Mr Robertson in those circumstances. It is also noted that the Respondent did interview others concerned but was still unable to conclude the matter without the evidence that could only be fairly derived from Mr Robertson.
In those circumstances, the Respondent argues, it was appropriate for Ms Shreeve to reach the conclusion she did. That is, that it was fair and reasonable to conclude, as Mr McNichol did, that the matter could not be progressed or closed out until Mr Robertson returned from leave. I agree. Subject to the facts of each case, it is generally not appropriate, or fair, to continue with and finalise an investigation into the conduct of an individual without giving that individual a fair opportunity to present their version of events.
The Appellant also argues that the Decision was not fair and reasonable because, from what I surmise, there was no evidence provided at any stage that relevant employees had met their WHS obligations or had supported the Appellant as part of their role responsibilities. In the Grievance, this allegation of workplace health and safety obligations not being adequately discharged was embedded within complaints about Mr Robertson's alleged conduct, or alleged lack thereof. Those allegations could not be further investigated or closed out, rightly in my view, because Mr Robertson was on extended leave.

On this workplace health and safety point, the Respondent also submits that the Appellant's concerns were in fact escalated by the relevant employees to the Principal, who held the delegation to deal with such concerns. I accept the Respondent's submissions on this point. This was addressed by Ms Shreeve in the Decision in the form of her recommendations and by finding that it was fair and reasonable of Mr McNichol to find the investigation could not proceed due to Mr Roberston being away on leave. Ms Shreeve also recommended that the investigation could be resumed once Mr Robertson returned from leave. That was a fair and reasonable assessment and conclusion in my opinion.
The Appellant repeats his complaints of bullying concerning Ms Potts, citing examples as apparent propensity evidence. As I have noted above, the Stage 1 LAD found facts based on interviews. In the Decision, Ms Shreeve set out how the Stage 1 LAD considered Ms Potts's evidence of the relevant interactions after interviewing her and concluded that the allegation was not substantiated based on the evidence.
The Respondent argues that the Appellant's complaints about whether Ms Potts' conduct amounted to bullying are a re-agitation of those elements of the original Grievance. References by the Appellant to unparticularised "documented behaviour" of Ms Potts, or equally nebulous references to "accepted definitions" of bullying (which did not initially cite any statutory or other definition), are justifiably criticised by the Respondent in its submissions. In reply, the Appellant referred to the IR Act's s 272(1) description of bullying. That does not assist, however. This argument is still just a reagitating of the bullying allegations. It fails to raise any legitimate basis upon which the Decision could be overturned. The Appellant's attempts to take the argument forward by seeking to introduce hearsay of propensity against Ms Potts does not assist either. Even if this were a rehearing of the bullying allegations, which it is not, such evidence would be of questionable value.
Ms Shreeve considered the conclusion of the Stage 1 LAD with respect to the bullying complaints against Ms Potts to be a fair and reasonable conclusion to reach in the circumstances. I agree. Where Mr McNichol had not much to go off except for two different witness accounts, it was open to him to decide which account he preferred. I am pointed to nothing persuasive that would suggest that Ms Shreeve should have not accepted Mr McNichol's preference for Ms Potts' account over the Appellant's. In these circumstances, I find that the conclusions about Ms Potts were fair and reasonable because it was open to Ms Shreeves to conclude as she did. There is nothing before me that persuades me otherwise.
The Appellant also re-agitates his arguments around being asked by Ms Potts to provide medical information when returning to work after a lengthy health-related absence. The Appellant says that what his general practitioner provided (a medical certificate noting he had a "medical condition") was sufficient medical information. The Respondent highlights in its submissions that it was Ms Potts' role as the Return to Work Coordinator to request such information in order to facilitate a safe return to work after the Appellant's substantial health-related absence. The Respondent argues that it was reasonable for Ms Potts to seek the medical information that she did in the circumstances.
In my view, depending on the facts of the case, a generic medical certificate may be enough for proving genuine use of sick leave, but it is far from adequate information for facilitating a safe to return to work after a lengthy absence. After a lengthy absence for health reasons, an employer seeking medical advice from an appropriately briefed and qualified medical practitioner about how to safely return the employee to work is entirely unremarkable. I would venture to say that it should be expected. Employers need the assistance of medical advice, which is generally obtained from either independent medical advisers or treating medical practitioners, to plan for employees returning to work after a significant health-related absence. Every case is unique. However, a medical certificate certifying an employee's incapacity to work for a lengthy period due to a "medical condition" is, on its own, virtually useless to an employer discharging its duty of care by safely planning for an employee's return to work after such an absence. On my assessment, no ground of appeal arises here. Ms Shreeve's conclusion that the request for medical information was fair and reasonable was open to her to make.
The Appellant also argues that the Decision was not fair and reasonable because, effectively, nothing was done about his complaints despite Ms Shreeve acknowledging wrongdoing against the Appellant. It is patently not the case that nothing was done; recommendations were made for further training and the development of clear standards for escalating concerns. It is also not true to suggest that Ms Shreeve agreed or acknowledged that the Appellant was wronged. I do not see any such finding and the Appellant does not point to one. The recommendations themselves do not constitute a finding of fact as to wrongdoing towards the Appellant if that is the basis upon which this assertion is made. The recommendations lend themselves to no such inference being drawn on my assessment of them. For one thing, it was recommended that the Appellant also sit the training, so the fact that others were the subject of this recommendation does not support an inference that those who were the subject of the recommendation engaged in any wrongdoing towards the Appellant. Nor is it safe to infer a finding of wrongdoing from the recommendation that guidance on dealing with escalating student behaviour issues be prepared. A finding that there is some benefit in clear guidance being set out in an enduring form does not constitute a finding of wrongdoing towards the Appellant.

As to the Appellant's complaints that he was not provided with all of the information derived from interviews of other employees through the investigation of the Grievance, the Respondent, rightly in my view, observes that there is no requirement to furnish employees with such information. The Appellant is unable to point to where such an entitlement exists within the relevant grievance process. The Respondent submits that the Appellant has simply argued that the Stage 1 LAD be overruled and that the Appellant's version of events be accepted. I accept this submission. The Appellant has not properly engaged with the appropriate test of an appeal of this nature, despite using the phrase "fair and reasonable". Upon closer inspection, those purported grounds of appeal do not actually address the elements of the correct test.
The Appellant raised an argument that he had been unjustly accused of being tardy in addressing student behaviours. This relates to a reference in the Decision that the Appellant waited almost two years before formally escalating his concerns in the form of the Grievance. In reply to that argument, the Respondent makes it clear that the issue of timeliness concerns when the Grievance was lodged, not the original handling of the alleged student safety concerns. The Respondent further observes that clause 8.1 of the Directive states "[e]mployees are required to ensure that individual employee grievances are submitted as soon as reasonably possible after the administrative decision, alleged conduct or alleged behaviour has occurred". The Respondent argues that the Appellant has failed to reasonably comply with clause 8.1 of the Directive. The Respondent, rightly in my view, expressed concern about the practical utility of the Grievance lodged two years after relevant student behaviours have occurred. Due to the effluxion of such a lengthy amount of time, the Respondent was deprived of the opportunity to reasonably address those allegations in a timely manner.
Finally, it is not raised in the submissions but part of the Decision did consider alleged limitations of the Appellant's human rights. That is because that was one of the Appellant's complaints about Mr McNichol's decision that Ms Shreeve reviewed. The Appellant alleged that his right to freedom of expression was unreasonably limited by a direction to maintain confidentiality. As noted above, Ms Shreeve found no error. She referred correctly to s 13 of the HR Act as to when a human right may lawfully be reasonably limited. Ms Shreeve observed that not directing the Appellant to maintain confidentiality in the circumstances would allow impinging upon the human rights of other individuals. In particular, the right to privacy and reputation and the right to a fair hearing held by those individuals. The conclusion was that any limitation of the Appellant's right to freedom of expression was justified on balance of these considerations. I find it was fair and reasonable of Ms Shreeve to come to that conclusion because in doing so, Ms Shreeve correctly applied the facts to s 13 of the HR Act and reached a sound conclusion, which was open to reach based on those facts as applied to the law.

After considering the Decision and the submissions on it, I find it to be entirely fair and reasonable. This appeal is not a reinvestigation of the original Grievance. It is limited to only a review of the Decision. Specifically, a review of Ms Shreeve's conclusions in the Decision. Each conclusion, and therefore the Decision, was fair and reasonable in my opinion.
Conclusion
I consider the appeal to be somewhat misconceived. The Appellant seems to have mistaken the appeal process as a process for re-agitating his original Grievance. There is nothing in the Appellant's appeal submissions that appropriately argues how it was that the review Decision by Ms Shreeve was not fair and reasonable having regard to the appropriate test. Upon my review of the Decision, I consider that it was open to Ms Shreeve to reach the conclusions therein for the reasons I have set out above. I therefore find that the Decision was fair and reasonable. The Appellant's submissions are rejected and the appeal must be dismissed. I order accordingly.
Orders
1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. The Decision is confirmed.

[2025] QIRC 236

5 September 2025