Steemson v State of Queensland (Queensland Health)

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:	Steemson v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2025] QIRC 282
PARTIES:	Steemson, Farida Chandra (Appellant) v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) (Respondent)
CASE NO:	PSA/2025/112
PROCEEDING:	Public Sector Appeal – Fair treatment appeal
DELIVERED ON:	22 October 2025
MEMBER: HEARD AT:	O'Neill IC On the papers
ORDERS:	The orders contained in paragraph [126] of these reasons for decision.
CATCHWORDS:	PUBLIC SECTOR – EMPLOYEES AND SERVANTS OF THE CROWN GENERALLY – where the appellant is employed by the respondent as a senior psychologist – where the appellant was subject to a performance improvement plan – where the appellant did not meet the requirements of the performance improvement plan – where allegations against appellant are substantiated - whether the decision to substantiate the allegations was fair and reasonable – the decision was fair and reasonable – where the decision appealed against is confirmed.
LEGISLATION: CASES:	Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 562B, s 562C Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) s 91, s 92 Discipline Directive 05/23 cl 9 Positive Performance Management Directive 02/24 cl 9.1, cl 10.5 Benn v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2025] QIRC 236 Colebourne v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) (No 2) [2022] QIRC 16 Goodall v State of Queensland (Unreported decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland, Dalton J, 10 October 2018) Hunt v State of Queensland (Department of Agriculture and Fisheries) [2022] QIRC 162 Malcolm v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2024] QIRC 97 Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH (2015) 256 CLR 326 Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1 Page v John Thompson and Lesley Dwyer, As Chief Executive Officer, West Moreton Hospital and Health Service [2014] QSC 252 Pope v Lawler [1996] FCA 1446 Schubert v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2024] QIRC 128 State of Queensland (Queensland Health) v Hume (No. 3) [2024] ICQ 3 Wirth v Mackay HHS & Anor [2016] QSC 39

Reasons for Decision
Introduction

Ms Farida Steemson ('the Appellant') is currently employed as a Senior Psychologist within the Secure Mental Health and Rehabilitation Unit at West Moreton Hospital and Health Service ('WMHHS').

By letter dated 29 January 2025, the Appellant was advised that information was received alleging that she had failed to meet the agreed performance objectives of her Performance Improvement Plan ('PIP') and she was invited to show cause as to why disciplinary findings should not be made against her. The sole allegation contained in that correspondence was in the following terms:
… between 26 August 2024 and 31 October 2024, you failed to meet the agreed performance objectives of your performance improvement plan when undertaking your duties as a Psychologist – Senior within the SMHR business unit at WMH.

After providing her response, the Appellant was provided with a letter dated 29 May 2025 in which Dr Butcher ('the delegated decision-maker') informed Ms Steemson that her response had been considered and he determined that the allegation against the Appellant was substantiated.
On 17 June 2025, the Appellant lodged an Appeal Notice in the Industrial Registry, appealing the decision of 29 May 2025.
The issue to be determined in this appeal is whether the disciplinary finding decision dated 29 May 2025, which found the allegation to be substantiated, was fair and reasonable.
For the reasons that follow I am satisfied that the decision to find the allegation to be substantiated was fair and reasonable and that pursuant to s 562C(1)(a) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ('the IR Act'), the decision appealed against is confirmed.
Appeal Principles
Section 562B(3) of the IR Act provides that a public sector appeal is to be decided by reviewing the decision appealed against and 'the purpose of the appeal is to decide whether the decision appealed against was fair and reasonable'.[1]
[1] Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 562B(3).
The IR Act provides that for an appeal against a disciplinary decision, the commission:[2]

(a) must decide the appeal having regard to the evidence available to the decision maker when the decision was made; but
(b) may allow other evidence to be taken into account if the commission considers it appropriate.

[2] Ibid, 562B(4).

A public sector appeal is not a fresh hearing, but rather, a review of the decision arrived at by the decision-maker.[3]

[3] Goodall v State of Queensland (Supreme Court of Queensland, Dalton J, 10 October 2018), 5 as to the former, equivalent provisions in s 201 of the Public Service Act 2008 (Qld).
The issue for my determination is whether the decision appealed against was fair and reasonable.[4]
[4] Page v John Thompson and Lesley Dwyer, As Chief Executive Officer, West Moreton Hospital and Health Service [2014] QSC 252, [60]-[61] (Byrne SJA).
What decisions can the Commission make?
Section 562C(1) of the IR Act prescribes that the Commission may determine to either:
·confirm the decision appealed against;
·set the decision aside and return the matter to the decision maker with a copy of the decision on appeal and any directions considered appropriate; or
·set the decision aside and substitute another decision.

Is the Appellant entitled to appeal?

A disciplinary finding decision that allegations have been substantiated is not a disciplinary decision as defined in s 129 of the Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) ('the PS Act'). In the present case disciplinary action has not yet been taken against the Appellant.
The Appellant in responding to Question 3 in the Form 89 Appeal notice has ticked the box indicating that the appeal is from a disciplinary decision. Pursuant to s 132(4)(b) of the PS Act, a fair treatment appeal is available regarding a finding made pursuant to s 91 of the PS Act that a disciplinary ground exists for the person.[5]

[5] Section 32(4)(b) of the Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld); see also O'Hearn v State of Queensland (Queensland Health)[2023] QIRC 283, [31] (Industrial Commissioner Power).

Section 131 of the PS Act lists the types of decisions against which an appeal may be made. Section 131(1)(d) of the PS Act outlines that a fair treatment decision may be appealed.
Fair treatment decisions are defined within s 129 of the PS Act, which relevantly states:
129 Definitions for part
…
fair treatment decision means a decision a public sector employee believes is unfair and unreasonable.
Given the above, I will treat the Appellant's Appeal Notice as being an appeal of a fair treatment decision.
The Appellant has been employed by the Respondent at all times relevant to this appeal.

I am satisfied that the disciplinary finding decision contained in the decision letter is one that can be appealed pursuant to s 131 of the PS Act, and further, that the Appellant is entitled to appeal.

Time limit for appeal
Section 564(3) of the IR Act requires that the appeal be lodged in the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission within 21 days after the decision being appealed against is made.

The decision letter is dated 29 May 2025 and the Appellant confirms in the Appeal Notice that she received the decision the same day, that is, 29 May 2025. This meant that the appeal had to be filed on or before 19 June 2025.

The appeal was filed in the Industrial Registry on 17 June 2025 and it has therefore been filed within time. I am satisfied that the Appellant is entitled to appeal the decision.
Performance Expectations
The Appellant was placed on a PIP in relation to her role as a Senior Psychologist and the following performance expectations were identified:

(a)KP11: Delivers high level psychological services, in accordance with the Australian Psychological Society Code of Ethics and other relevant professional standards and legislative requirements to a complex and varied patient load;
(b)KPI2: Undertakes comprehensive psychological assessment/s appropriately and skilfully to a complex and varied patient load;
(c)KPI3: Delivers high level ability to deliver evidenced based psychological interventions to a complex and varied patient load which are informed by well-developed clinical formulations; and
(d)KPI4: Communicates and relates to others effectively, appropriately and to a high standard.
Prior to the PIP being implemented the evidence available to the Commission indicates that concerns had been raised with the Appellant regarding her performance by Ms Rosalind Cole, Psychology Lead Forensic and Secure Services. Those concerns primarily related to record keeping and what was required to be included in consultation notes.
The Appellant did not agree with the views expressed by Ms Cole and sought a second opinion regarding the concerns raised by Ms Cole. As a consequence, arrangements were made for Dr Rebecca Sebastian, Acting Director Psychology for West Moreton Health to meet with the Appellant and then shadow the Appellant whilst she worked for two days to make an independent assessment of the Appellant's performance.
Prior to Dr Sebastian observing the Appellant's work, meetings occurred between Dr Sebastian and the Appellant on 21 March 2024, 4 April 2024, 21 May 2024.[6] Dr Sebastian shadowed the Appellant for two of her rostered shifts on 28 May 2024 and 4 June 2024.[7]

[6] Invitation to Show Cause dated 29 January 2025 – Attachments 6,7 and 9.
[7] Ibid, page 5.
A further meeting between Dr Sebastian and the Appellant occurred on 13 June 2024.[8] At this meeting Ms Sebastian provided the Appellant feedback from her observations of the Appellant's interactions with four patients and Dr Sebastian's review of the clinical notes for those patients.
[8] Ibid, Attachment 10 – File note dated 13 June 2024.
Dr Sebastian concluded that she did not consider that the Appellant was meeting the required performance expectations of a senior psychologist across all areas.
A further meeting between the Appellant, Dr Sebastian and Ms Tamara Smith, Team Leader occurred on 17 June 2024. At this meeting Dr Sebastian advised the Appellant that as a result of her observations, she did not consider the Appellant to be meeting the level of performance expected of a senior psychologist in the following areas:
·     Record keeping and documentation;
·     Diagnosis and clinical assessment;
·     Case conceptualisation and interventions;
·     Effectiveness and skilful assessment and intervention;
·     Relational communication; and
·     Ethical practice.[9]
[9] Ibid, page 6, and Attachment 11 – File note dated 17 June 2024.

As a consequence, the decision was made to initiate a PIP to address the Appellant's alleged performance issues.

The Decision Letter

The delegated decision-maker provided the disciplinary finding decision in the letter dated 29 May 2025. In the decision letter the decision-maker made the following findings:
·The decision-maker disagreed with the Appellant's contention that there had been a breach of the Positive Performance Management Directive 02/24 ('Directive 02/24') because the alleged 'gap' in the Appellant's performance was unclear. The decision letter notes that the decision-maker reviewed the PIP and he considered that the process had been undertaken in a structured and cohesive manner. He further found that the PIP was clear in its objectives and the Appellant had been consistently supported throughout the process by Dr Sebastian.

·There was no ambiguity in respect to what the performance concerns were and what the Appellant was required to improve on. The decision-maker disagreed that Dr Sebastian's view regarding the progress of the PIP was based on incorrect assumptions, wrong interpretations and was not evidence based. He noted that the Appellant had not provided him with any evidence to support that position.

·Dr Sebastian's views regarding the Appellant's competency in her role was made independently following an evaluation of the Appellant's performance during the PIP. Dr Sebastian's assessment process was validated by a variety of different assessment methods, specifically direct observation, the use of critical reflection tools, weekly tasks and support meetings.

·The decision-maker also noted that in her role as the Acting Director of Psychology for West Moreton Health, Dr Sebastian had the relevant experience and understanding of the Appellant's role to monitor and evaluate the Appellant's performance. The decision-maker concluded that Dr Sebastian's assessments were independent and supported by the available material.

In substantiating the allegation, the decision-maker reviewed the first show cause notice dated 29 January 2025 and the 28 attachments. In the course of the review the decision-maker considered the concerns raised by the Appellant in her show cause response and referenced the various file notes prepared by Dr Sebastian both pre and post the implementation of the PIP.
The decision letter notes that to support the Appellant during the PIP Dr Sebastian provided her with additional resources, weekly supervision and reduced the Appellant's clinical workload to allow her to engage in activities that would assist her to understand and improve on the key competencies for her role. The decision-maker noted that the PIP commenced on 26 August 2024 and it was implemented over a period of approximately nine weeks, concluding on 31 October 2024.
The decision-maker considered the Appellant had been afforded a sufficient opportunity to improve her performance and that any reasonable additional time would not be sufficient to enable the Appellant to improve on the key competencies of her role.
The decision letter further records that the decision-maker had reviewed and accepted Dr Sebastian's assessment regarding the outcome of the PIP[10] which he considered to be sound, logical and consistent with her recorded observations throughout the PIP, together with the matters Dr Sebastian had discussed with the Appellant in the various meetings.

[10] Invitation to Show Cause dated 29 January 2025 – Attachment 25 – File note dated 17 June 2024.
On the basis of that review of the evidence the decision-maker stated that he had serious concerns about the Appellant's ability to perform safely and meet the key competencies in her role as a Senior Psychologist.
The decision-maker also considered that the Appellant's response lacked insight into the seriousness of the concerns raised and was largely deflective. He found that the Appellant's performance had fallen below the standards expected of her role and posed a risk to herself and patients. The decision-maker concluded:
The position description for the Senior Psychologist, does require the incumbent to be capable of providing services to a complex and varied caseload. Providing high standard of psychological assessments and interventions to complex patients is an inherent requirement of the role. I agree with the assessment of Dr Sebastian and find that you have not met the agreed performance objectives of the PIP.
The decision letter notes that on the basis of the finding in relation to Allegation One, the decision-maker determined pursuant to s 91(1)(a) of the PSA, that the Appellant had engaged in repeated unsatisfactory performance or serious under performance of her duties, including for example, by performing duties carelessly, incompetently or inefficiently.

Grounds of Appeal
Within her Appeal Notice filed on 17 June 2025, the Appellant outlined the following Grounds of Appeal:

a.The decision-maker did not adequately consider my concerns in relation to the lack of clarity relating to the 'gaps' between actual and expected performance. I have consistently raised this as a concern throughout the PIP.
b.The decision-maker incorrectly states that 'I did not need to review your past performance in order to commence this disciplinary process'.

c.It is unfair and unreasonable for an observation to be the salient consideration when determining whether the initiation of a PIP. The decision-maker did not consider the fact that there was no opportunity provided to myself to agree or disagree with observations or to even clarify the discerned meaning of an observation.

d.It is submitted that the decision-maker relied on inaccurate information when determining whether the decision to initiate a PIP was reasonable.

e.I have attempted to address the performance concerns and have raised multiple complaints with no adequate response being rendered. Rather, that very generic responses on positive performance principles, with no specific gaps being identified.

f.In accordance with the Positive Performance Principles, there was no ability to self-correct.

g.The decision-maker did not adequately consider my show cause response where it was demonstrated that the performance concerns lacked objective concerns.

Relevant Legislation and Policies

Section 91 of the PS Act relevantly provides as follows:

91 Grounds for discipline
(1)A public service employee's chief executive may discipline the employee if the chief executive is reasonably satisfied the employee has—
(a)engaged in repeated unsatisfactory performance or serious under performance of the employee’s duties, including, for example, by performing duties carelessly, incompetently or inefficiently; or
…

(2)A disciplinary ground arises when the act or omission constituting the ground is done or made.

The Discipline Directive 05/23 ('Directive 05/23') operated from 1 March 2023 and its purpose is to outline the process for managing disciplinary action in accordance with the PS Act.

Clause 9 of Directive 05/23 sets out the disciplinary process. Clause 9.3 sets out the show cause process for a disciplinary finding, and cl 9.4 sets out the process of making a disciplinary finding as follows:
9.3Show cause process for disciplinary finding
(a)the chief executive is to provide the employee with written details of each allegation and invite the employee to show cause why a disciplinary finding should not be made in relation to each allegation (a show cause notice on disciplinary finding)
(b)written details of each allegation in clause 9.3(a) must include:
i.the allegation
ii.the particulars of the facts considered by the chief executive for the allegation
iii.the disciplinary ground under section 91 of the Act that applies to the allegation

(c)when providing the written details required at clause 9.3, a chief executive should not include more than two possible disciplinary grounds for the same allegation. In making a disciplinary finding at clause 9.4, a chief executive must choose the most suitable ground for discipline as no more than one disciplinary ground is to apply to an individual substantiated allegation
(d)a copy of all evidence relevant to the facts considered by the chief executive for each allegation in clause 9.3(a) must be provided to the employee, including, where relevant, specific reference to page or paragraph numbers that comprise the relevant evidence
(e)the chief executive must provide the employee with a minimum of 14 days from the date of receipt of a show cause notice on disciplinary finding to consider and respond to the notice, having regard to the volume of material and complexity of the matter. The chief executive may grant, and must consider any request for, an extension of time to respond to a show cause notice on disciplinary finding if there are reasonable grounds for extension
(f)if the employee does not respond to a show cause notice on disciplinary finding, or does not respond within the nominated timeframe in clause 9.3(e) and has not been granted an extension of time to respond, the chief executive may make a decision on grounds based on the information available to them.
9.4 Decision on grounds (disciplinary finding)
(a)the chief executive must review all relevant material, including any submissions from the employee, and make a decision on the disciplinary finding on the balance of probabilities
(b)the chief executive must advise the employee of the chief executive’s finding in relation to each allegation included in the show cause notice on disciplinary finding
(c)for each finding in clause 9.4(a) the chief executive must clearly explain their finding of fact on the balance of probabilities, including the evidence relied on to reach the finding, and state if the disciplinary ground to which the allegation was applied has been established
(d)the employee is to be informed of the finding and explanation of the finding in writing, including information that the employee may appeal the disciplinary finding. The employee should also be informed of the time limits for starting an appeal provided for in the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (IR Act) and the directive relating to appeals
(e)if the chief executive determines that discipline ground/s have been established, the chief executive may consider whether disciplinary action should be proposed (clause 9.5) and/or management action implemented, or to take no further action. No more than one disciplinary ground is to apply to an individual substantiated allegation
(f)if the chief executive determines that no ground/s for discipline have been established, the chief executive may consider whether any management action is required and advise the employee in writing.
Proceedings in the Commission

A Directions Order was issued to the parties on 27 June 2025, inviting the provision of written submissions as follows:
·Appellant's outline of submissions filed on 10 July 2025.

·Respondent's outline of submissions filed on 25 July 2025.
·Appellant's reply submissions filed on 31 July 2025.
I have considered all of the submissions and attached evidence provided by the parties although they may not be specifically referred to in these reasons.

Appellant submissions

The Appellant's submissions are summarised as follows:

·The Appellant contends that she is a Senior Psychologist who works 0.5 FTE, however, her workload is equivalent to a full-time psychologist.
·The Appellant submits that she has worked for Queensland Health for approximately 20 years. During her employment, the Appellant submits that she never had any complaints relating to her quality of work and had many successful psychological interventions for consumers.

Concerns relating to PIP

·The Appellant contends she has attempted to clarify the vague expectations and the concerns with the observations. The Appellant contends that all responses have lacked clarity in relation to the gaps between her actual and expected performance. The Appellant submits that she provided a summary of her concerns relating to the PIP feedback to Dr Sebastian on 30 October 2024. She contends that the decision-maker did not adequately consider these concerns that were expressed throughout the PIP period and provided in writing.
·The Appellant contends that Dr Sebastian's written observations were based on only two days of work shadowing and a review of the Appellant's clinical notes. The Appellant submits the observations are unfounded as they did not take into account earlier discussions that were had in the Multi-Disciplinary Team ('MDT') meeting.

·The Appellant submits that the decision-maker relied on inaccurate information when determining whether to initiate a PIP including a heavy reliance on the observations of Dr Sebastian in relation to patient JK. The Appellant contends that Dr Sebastian advised that the Appellant had no understanding on why the patient may have disorganised thinking.

·The submission then details the Appellant's specific interventions with patient JK and goes on to explain that she tends to delay making formal conceptualisations until all information has been collected. The Appellant submits that Dr Sebastain has mischaracterised this by stating that her conceptualisations are 'all in her head'.

·The Appellant submits that Dr Sebastian has misinterpreted her intervention plan when she observed the Appellant's discussion with the Positive Behaviour Support Practitioner. The Appellant submits that Dr Sebastian failed to recognise that the intervention's aim was to give JK the best skills needed without losing further support network.

·In relation to concerns regarding the Appellant's communication with the MDT, she submits that she consulted the MDT prior to providing the intervention plan for JK as it is part of her role and responsibility to discuss and notify the MDT regarding intervention plans.

Misinterpretation of interaction with consumers

·The Appellant submits that her interaction with DB was misinterpreted. This is suggested to be due to the Appellant's good rapport with DB and during the interaction of concern that was raised by Dr Sebastian, no confidential information was discussed in the public space. The Appellant contends that it is important that she is able to maintain her rapport with DB in order to assist with managing their symptoms and stop self-harming behaviour.
False allegations regarding withholding of information and breaching confidentiality

·This relates to a meeting that the Appellant was invited to at short notice to address the behaviour of a patient's partner. The patient did not attend the meeting and criticism was made of the Appellant by Dr Sebastian regarding her failure to inform the patient of her involvement in the meeting.

·The Appellant submits that the performance objective in relation to 'balancing MDT obligations and role responsibilities' was vague and no solid assistance was provided in relation to how the balancing should practically occur.
·The Appellant contends that Dr Sebastian falsely accused her of breaching confidentiality and withholding information. The Appellant submits that allied health were not initially supposed to attend the meeting but were called on short notice after the consultant psychiatrist was unavailable. The Appellant contends that it is not her responsibility to inform the consumer of the meeting attendance.

Lack of support

·The Appellants contends that the decision maker was incorrect when stating:
Dr Sebastian provided you with additional resources, weekly supervision and reduced your clinical workload to allow you to engage in activities that would assist you to understand and improve on the key competencies of your role.

·The Appellant submits she wrote to Dr Sebastian on 30 October 2024 requesting assistance with understanding the expected practical level of performance, specifically what was required in terms of note taking and whether a template existed.
·The Appellant contends that the reduction to her workload was in the form of prohibiting contact with patients regardless of their needs and resulted in JK looking for the Appellant in the canteen area. The Appellant submits that she respectfully advised JK that she was not providing direct clinical support and to speak with the MDT if help was required. In response to this interaction, the Appellant contends that Dr Sebastian criticised her for advising the patient of the above. The Appellant contends that this criticism implies that she was expected to ignore the patient which may trigger her emotional dysregulation.

·The Appellant contends that an ethical, patient centred approach was not in mind when Dr Sebastian raised concerns with the interaction.

·Finally, the Appellant contends that the decision-maker did have a duty to review and give full consideration to her past performance.

Respondent Submissions

The Respondent's submissions are summarised as follows:
·In response to the Appellant's contention that her 0.5 FTE role had a workload 'equivalent to a full-time psychologist' the Respondent denies this and submits it is unsupported by any evidence.
·The Respondent contends that it was fair and reasonable for Dr Butcher (the Decision Maker) to have regard to Dr Sebastian's professional assessment in the circumstances. It is submitted that Dr Butcher also has considerable mental health clinical experience.
·In relation to the Appellant's contest of the decision to implement the PIP, the Respondent submits that this decision is not one which is subject to the current Public Sector Appeal.
The PIP
·In response to the Appellant's contentions that she received vague feedback despite numerous attempts to clarify the expectations, the Respondent relies on the points raised by Dr Butcher in the decision letter. The decision-maker informed the Appellant that the PIP was reviewed and he considered that it was clear in its objectives, the Appellant was consistently supported and Dr Sebastian had relevant experience and understanding of the role to evaluate Ms Steemson's performance.
·In relation to the Appellant's email dated 30 October 2024, the Appellant in her submissions states that in that email she expressed concerns with Dr Sebastian's ability to provide operational and practical steps in meeting what was expected. The Respondent notes that the email of 30 October 2024 and the Appellant's concerns contained within that email were not raised by the Appellant in her response to the First Show Cause Notice. The Respondent goes on to submit that the concerns raised in that email are very similar to points raised in her response. Therefore, the Respondent is satisfied that the concerns have been addressed by Dr Butcher in the decision letter.
The basis for implementing the PIP
·In response to the Appellant's assertions that Dr Sebastian's written observations were based on only two days of observation and a review of clinical notes and that this was inadequate, the Respondent submits that two days is an appropriate observation period which does not diminish the validity of Dr Sebastian's observations.
·The Respondent rejects the contentions raised by the Appellant that Dr Sebastian's observations in the 13 June 2024 meeting were unfounded. The Respondent submits that Dr Sebatian was appropriately qualified to conduct the assessment.
·In response to the Appellant suggesting that she delays in making formal conceptualisations until all information is collected and that this was misunderstood as 'being all in her head', the Respondent submits that if information is not documented in the patient chart, it effectively did not occur due to the lack of proper recording of the information. Further, the Respondent contends that it was Dr Sebastian's recollection that the Appellant was not able to identify one conceptualisation for any of her patients.
·The Respondent submits that in relation to patient JK, Dr Sebastian noted that a psychologist must undertake a comprehensive assessment and develop and formulate a treatment plan that is then documented in the medical record. It is further submitted that Dr Sebastian explained to the Appellant that had these steps been taken, she would have a better understanding of JK and why they were engaging in the way that they were.
·The Respondent submits that based on the observations made by Dr Sebastian, it was clear that the Appellant was not properly documenting matters in the patient's records. The submission further notes that whilst the complexity of patient JK is important it does not negate the importance of good documentation in the patient's medical record. They further submit that the Appellant's claim that documentation was kept in CIMHA and MDT meetings also does not negate her need to update patient medical records.
·The Respondent concludes that for those reasons, it was fair and reasonable for the concerns regarding Patient JK to be relied upon as a basis to commence the PIP. The Respondent submits that the maintenance of accurate patient notes was an issue identified in the subsequent PIP as a matter requiring improvement, and the Appellant was provided with an opportunity to address the identified deficiencies.
·In relation to the interaction with DB and the Appellant's contention that no confidential information was disclosed, the Respondent submits and emphasises that the concern relates to the appropriateness of addressing the patient in a public setting in the manner that she did.
·In relation to the MDT meeting on 13 June 2024 the Respondent submits that Dr Butcher acknowledged that the meeting was initiated on short notice however, agreed with Dr Sebastian's view that having regard to professional ethical responsibilities, the Appellant should have informed patient TJ that she had attended the meeting with TJ's partner and assisted with drafting the agreement. It is further submitted that the Appellant's contention that it was not her responsibility to inform TJ of the meeting, shows a concerning lack of insight into her responsibilities as a treating psychologist and her duty of care.
Support provided
·In response to the Appellant's contention that she was not provided with resources despite requesting templates for note taking, the Respondent submits that in a meeting on 21 May 2024, Dr Sebastian explained that templates did not override the Appellant's responsibilities in her role and indicated that as a Senior Psychologist, the Appellant should be able to clearly outline the process and reasoning of her treatment plan and intervention and document this within the patient's records.
·The Respondent contends that the Appellant was provided with the Queensland Health Clinical Documentation Guideline during the PIP which outlines that the process for accurately and contemporaneously recording patient information. The Respondent further submits that Ms Steemson was supplied with two deidentified examples of psychological reports and discharge summaries.
·The Respondent rejects the Appellant's contention that she was prohibited from seeing patients regardless of their needs.
·In response to the Appellant's contention that Dr Butcher's decision to not review her past performance was incorrect and unfair, the Respondent submits that the decision maker reasonably considered that the disciplinary process was commenced because of information that the Appellant had failed to meet the performance objectives of the PIP. The Respondent contends that Dr Sebastian had the relevant experience to evaluate Ms Steemson's performance against the PIP and a review of past performance was not necessary.
·The Respondent concludes the submissions by contending that the decision was open to be made by Dr Butcher having regard to the evidence available and was fair and reasonable in the circumstances.
Appellant Reply Submissions
The Appellant's submissions in reply are summarised as follows:
·In relation to the contention that her workload is equivalent to a fulltime employee whilst being 0.5 FTE, the Appellant submits that SMHRU operates two clinical teams each supporting 17 consumers. The Appellant contends that the other team is supported by a psychologist employed at 1.0 FTE while she is the sole psychologist of her team, with the same number of consumers to support.
·In response to the Respondent's submission that she was given adequate support throughout the PIP process, the Appellant contends that rather than receiving constructive guidance during meetings with Dr Sebastian, meetings were 'characterised by criticism'.
·The Appellant contends that she submitted comprehensive psychology reports in October 2024 to Dr Sebastian, however, these were ignored. The Appellant further contends submits that she was then criticised for lack of documentation despite being prohibited from uploading the reports to CIMHA (the official Queensland Health record system).
·The Appellant submits that this sequence of actions highlights a contradiction and a lack of procedural fairness: she was barred from documenting on CIMHA but was subsequently faulted for not documenting.
·In relation to the interaction with DB, the Appellant submits that this occurred within a psychiatric ward (in fact adjacent to the nursing station) and not a public area like a shopping centre. The Appellant further submits that the event was observed by nursing staff who were familiar with DB's mental health condition and the purpose of the interaction. The Appellant contends that Dr Sebastian's interpretation of this interaction as inappropriate lacks context ad undermines the therapeutic rapport the Appellant had built up with DB over time.
·In relation to the meeting with TJ's partner, the Appellant contends that she was held responsible for not informing consumer TJ of a meeting with her partner, yet she had no role in planning the meeting and was only informed of it shortly before the meeting started. The Appellant contends that holding her accountable under those circumstances was factually incorrect and unfair.
·The Appellant contends she requested a standardised report template which was not provided. She submits that the lack of clear expectations and consistent standards led to confusion and subjected her to avoidable scrutiny.
·In relation to the Respondent's assertion that past performance does not need to be considered, the Appellant submits that it is unreasonable and the disregard for her established clinical history undermines both procedural fairness and the objectivity of the disciplinary process.
·The Appellant submits that she was required to attend at least 10 meetings from June to October 2024 which she contends is an unreasonable frequency given her 0.5 FTE workload and the high-stress environment. The Appellant further submits that the meetings were dominated by criticism rather than support which negatively impacted her mental health and led to multiple instances of sick leave.
·The final matter raised by the Appellant in her reply submission was that at the outset of the PIP process, she alleges that Dr Sebastian instructed her to cease all direct patient contact.
Consideration
I am required to decide this appeal by assessing whether or not the decision appealed against is fair and reasonable. This involves a review of the decision-making process that has been utilised, and the decision arrived at.
Deputy President Merrell in Colebourne v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) (No 2)[11] ('Colebourne') considered the meaning of 'fair and reasonable' and concluded that it should be construed within the ordinary meaning of the phrase as used in the context of s 562B of the IR Act.[12]

[11] [2022] QIRC 16.
[12] Ibid, at [25], citing Pope v Lawler [1996] FCA 1446.
In Colebourne his Honour further noted that assessing whether a decision was 'fair and reasonable' is not an assessment of whether the decision was unreasonable only by reference to the legal standard.[13] His Honour concluded that assessing whether a decision was 'fair and reasonable' permitted a review of both the factual merits and legal reasonableness of both the decision itself and the process of making that decision.[14]

[13] Colebourne (n 15) at [21]-[22] and [25].
[14] Ibid, at [23] citing Goodall v State of Queensland (Unreported decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland, Dalton J, 10 October 2018), 5 as to the former, equivalent provisions in s 201 of the Public Service Act 2008.
In the recent decision of Benn v State of Queensland (Department of Education),[15] Industrial Commissioner Pratt provided the following observations as to the process in determining whether a decision is fair and reasonable:[16]
[15] [2025] QIRC 236.
[16] Ibid, [9] and [10].
·        For a decision to be fair and reasonable, the conclusion underpinning it must be reasonably open to be reached. If the conclusions were reasonably open to the decision-maker to reach, it is not the Commission's role to disturb that decision, even if the Commission would have reached a different conclusion.[17]

·        If the decision is flawed by conclusions that were not fairly and reasonably open to the decision-maker to reach, then that decision is prone to being overturned on appeal.[18]

·        Mere disappointment with the outcome of a decision is not enough to establish that it was not fair and reasonable.[19]

·        The decision must create some practical injustice before an appeal of this nature can succeed.[20]
[17] Citing: State of Queensland (Queensland Health) v Hume (No. 3) [2024] ICQ 3, [78]-[79] ('Hume'); Schubert v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2024] QIRC 128, [8].
[18] Citing: Malcolm v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2024] QIRC 97, [195]-[200].
[19] Citing: Hunt v State of Queensland (Department of Agriculture and Fisheries) [2022] QIRC 162, [79]-[83], [85], which cited Wirth v Mackay HHS & Anor [2016] QSC 39, [25], Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH (2015) 256 CLR 326, [35]-[36], [57], [61]; Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1.
[20] Ibid.

Grounds of Appeal

Unfortunately, the grounds of appeal set out in the Appeal Notice do not fully correlate to the submissions that the Appellant has filed in support of her appeal. Given this I intend to primarily concentrate on the concerns or issues identified by the Appellant in her submissions.
Appeal grounds (a), (c) and (d) all appear to relate to the decision to initiate the PIP and the basis of that decision. This is addressed by the Respondent in its submissions under the heading of 'The basis for implementing the PIP'.
Appeal ground (e) appears to relate to what occurred during the PIP. This is respectively dealt with by the Appellant under the heading of 'Concerns relating to the PIP' and by the Respondent under the heading of 'The PIP'.
Finally, the Appellant also raises an allegation of a lack of support by Dr Sebastian which is not specifically raised as an appeal ground in the Appeal Notice.
Appeal Grounds (a), (c) and (d) – Initiation of the PIP

The Appellant contends that there was a lack of clarity relating to the 'gaps' between actual and expected performance which was consistently raised by her as a concern. The Appellant further contends that it is unfair and unreasonable for an observation to be the salient consideration when determining the initiation of a PIP.
In the Appellant's submissions, she submits that the observations made by Dr Sebastian were unfounded as they did not take into account information available prior to her observation period and what had been discussed and agreed in the MDT meeting. The Appellant also contends that the decision-maker's heavy reliance on Dr Sebastian's opinion was unfair and unreasonable.
The Appellant also contends that inaccurate information was relied upon when the proposal for the PIP was made. In her submissions the Appellant makes reference to her involvement with the patient JK. The Appellant regards the suggestion that her approach to case formulation which involves considering a range of information prior to confirming the case formulation and intervention strategy has being 'all in her head' is a mischaracterisation of her approach.
In the Respondent's submissions regarding these appeal grounds, the Respondent submits that two days was an appropriate observation period, and in any event, does not diminish the validity of Dr Sebastian's observations. The Respondent further notes that Dr Sebastian also reviewed the clinical notes prepared by the Appellant for patients.
The Respondent also submits that Dr Sebastian was appropriately qualified to conduct the assessment and the findings she made were open to be made on the information available to her.
I do not consider that the evidence supports a conclusion that Dr Sebastian only considered the two days of observation in reaching a decision that there were areas of the Appellant's clinical practice that required improvement, and ultimately that it was necessary to commence a PIP process.
Firstly, as noted by the Respondent, Dr Sebastian had also undertaken a review of the Appellant's clinical notes which revealed significant concerns with the Appellant's documentation of her sessions, and the documentation of her assessment of the patients and her plans for psychological treatment/intervention.
Secondly, prior to shadowing the Appellant on the two days, Dr Sebastian had undertaken meetings with the Appellant either alone or with her support person, and on other occasions other attendees, on 11 March 2024, 21 March 2024, 4 April 2024 and on 21 May 2024. I confirm that I have read each of the file notes from those meetings.
Thirdly, in addition to those meetings, Dr Sebastian requested that the Appellant respond to a series of questions regarding her views on the role, competencies and approach of a psychologist within a Forensic and Secure Service environment. The Appellant provided that information to Dr Sebastian which was also considered by her.
Finally, Dr Sebastian afforded the Appellant the opportunity to provide her with feedback after the Appellant had been provided with the file notes of the meetings.
The Appellant was provided with Dr Sebastian's feedback of her observations in a meeting held on 13 June 2024. Following that meeting, there were an additional four meetings with the Appellant prior to the PIP being implemented.
I am satisfied that the decision-maker's finding that there were valid concerns raised regarding the Appellant's performance and that it was necessary for a PIP to be implemented was more than open on the evidence available to me. As a consequence, I am satisfied that the decision was fair and reasonable as it relates to this appeal ground.
In relation to the matters raised in the Appellant's submissions about the patients JK, DB and the meeting relating to the patient TJ's partner, I have carefully considered the Appellant's submissions and those made by the Respondent. I have also reviewed all of the relevant file notes where those patients and the relevant meeting were considered by Dr Sebastian. I am satisfied that the conclusions reached by the decision-maker about the Appellant's interactions with those three patients were open on the evidence.
I am not satisfied that the Appellant has established that the decision was not fair and reasonable on any of these appeal grounds.

Appeal Ground (b) - The Decision Maker incorrectly states that 'I did not need to review your past performance in order to commence this disciplinary process'
This appeal ground takes a statement made by the decision-maker in the decision letter in isolation and ignores the context provided by the preceding statement made by Dr Butcher.
In the decision letter, Dr Butcher acknowledges the Appellant's past contributions to the provision of psychological services through Queensland Health. He then noted that the disciplinary process was not seeking to challenge the Appellant's clinical successes or contributions.
Dr Butcher confirmed that the disciplinary process had been commenced because he was in receipt of information alleging that the Appellant had failed to meet the agreed performance objectives of her PIP.
In her submissions the Appellant in relation to this ground of appeal merely notes that it is inferred from the statement of Dr Butcher that although the Respondent has an ability to conduct a disciplinary process, the Appellant contends that the nature of the allegations require full consideration of her past performance.
The Respondent rejects the Appellant's contention and submits that the decision-maker reasonably considered that the disciplinary process was commenced because he received information (from Dr Sebastian) that the Appellant had failed to meet the agreed performance objectives of the PIP.
The Respondent further submits that Dr Sebastian had the relevant experience and understanding of the Appellant's role to monitor and evaluate the Appellant's performance as against the PIP. In light of this, the Respondent submits it was not necessary for Dr Butcher to review the Appellant's past performance.
The Appellant's insistence of there being a need to consider her past performance, (either in determining whether to initiate the PIP, or to determine that her performance had not improved during the PIP), appears to be premised on flawed reasoning. The fact that the Appellant has had historically good or appropriate performance in the role does not mean that her performance could not have diminished or deteriorated in more recent times.
The evidence establishes that concerns were originally raised about the Appellant's performance by her line manager, Dr Cole. Those concerns related to the quality and content of progress notes being produced by the Appellant following consultations with consumers/patients. The Appellant requested a second opinion and this gave rise to the involvement of Dr Sebastian and the eventual implementation of the PIP.
Following Dr Sebastian conducting a series of meetings with the Appellant and shadowing the Appellant for two days, Dr Sebastian formed the view that there were clear gaps or deficiencies in the Appellant's work performance. There is no indication that Dr Sebastian was biased, or that she was anything other than an independent observer.
In light of Dr Sebastian's observations, I also consider that the Appellant's historical performance in her role was not relevant to the determination that she was not adequately performing her role during the relevant period in 2024.
Fundamentally, it appears that at no stage has the Appellant accepted that there were deficiencies in her performance either before or during the PIP. This may have been a factor giving rise to the Appellant's inability to understand what the gaps in her performance were. As noted above, mere disappointment with the outcome of a decision is not enough to establish that it was not fair and reasonable.
The Appellant has failed to establish that the decision was not fair and reasonable on this ground.
Appeal Ground (e): Despite complaints the Respondent has failed to adequately identify the gaps in the Appellant's performance
This appeal ground appears to be significantly premised on the Appellant's belief that there were no issues with her performance to either justify the initial criticisms by Dr Cole, or the subsequent gaps identified by Dr Sebastian.
The Respondent in its submissions addresses this ground by repeating and relying upon the decision in which Dr Butcher informed the Appellant of the following:
(a)     that he had reviewed the PIP and considered that it was undertaken in a structured and cohesive manner;
(b)     the PIP was clear in its objectives and Ms Steemson was supported consistently throughout the process, including by having regular correspondence with Dr Sebastian and Ms Smith; and
(c)      as the Acting Director of Psychology for WMH, Dr Sebastian had the relevant experience and understanding of Ms Steemson's role to monitor and independently evaluate her performance during the PIP.[21]
[21] Respondent's submissions filed 24 July 2025, (18).
Having reviewed all of the relevant file notes, including the PIP meeting file notes, and also the actual PIP itself,[22] I am satisfied that genuine gaps or issues had been identified in the Appellant's performance as a Senior Psychologist.

[22] Invitation to Show Cause dated 29 January 2025 – Attachment 25.
I am also satisfied that in the meetings conducted with the Appellant both pre and post the period of observation of her performance by Dr Sebastian, there was discussion between Dr Sebastian and the Appellant in which the Appellant was informed of the areas where her performance required improvement.
Having also reviewed the terms of the PIP I am satisfied that the PIP was clear in its objectives and the plan put in place by the PIP to address the Appellant's performance issues was structured.
The conclusions reached by the decision-maker about the need for the implementation of the PIP, the gaps that existed in the Appellant's performance, and the cohesive and structured nature of the PIP were all factual findings that were open to Dr Butcher on the evidence before him.
This appeal ground also fails.

Appeal Ground (f): In accordance with the Positive Performance Principles, there was no ability to self-correct

The Appellant does not address this ground of appeal in her submissions. Equally the Respondent's submissions are silent on this appeal ground.
The Positive Performance Management Directive 02/24 ('Directive 02/24') relevantly provides in clause 9.1:
9. Process for managing employee work performance
9.1 A chief executive must incorporate the positive performance management principles into their entity’s processes about managing employee work performance, to ensure that public sector managers:
…
(c) promptly communicate and document any gaps between actual and expected work performance of an employee and allow reasonable time for the employee to self-correct
…
Clause 10.5 of Directive 02/24 relevant provides:
10.5 Prior to determining whether it is fair and reasonable to initiate a PIP, the chief executive must:
…
(c) ensure the following conditions have been met:
…
(iii) the unacceptable work performance or personal conduct, or the gap between actual and expected work performance or personal conduct, was previously raised, discussed with the employee and documented
(iv) the employee was offered support that was reasonable in the circumstances and allowed a reasonable period of time to self-correct.
As noted above, concerns with the Appellant's performance were raised on more than one occasion by Dr Cole. The Appellant in her show cause response dated 19 February 2024 confirms that she and Dr Rose disagreed with what should be included in progress notes. In her show cause response the Appellant confirms that those issues had been ongoing for some time. In that document the Appellant further confirms that Dr Cole had provided feedback to the Appellant and had clearly indicated to the Appellant her expectations as to what was to be included in a patient's progress note.[23]

[23] Respondent's submissions filed 24 July 2025: Attachment 2 – Appellant's show cause response dated 19 February 2025, pp. 4-5.
Following the decision to have an independent review conducted by Dr Sebastian, I note that there were meetings between the Appellant and Dr Sebastian on 11 March 2024, 21 March 2024 and 4 April 2024.[24] Each of those meetings were the subject of a file note prepared by Dr Sebastian.

[24] (n 6 and 7).
I note that the file note of the meeting on 4 April 2024 indicates a detailed discussion between the Appellant and Dr Sebastian regarding the Appellant's role as a Senior Psychologist, her approach to that role, reflections on her strengths as a Psychologist, discussions about her learning plan and a detailed discussion about the Appellant's clinical approach to two cases.
The Appellant provided a detailed email response to Dr Sebastian following her receiving the file note dated 4 April 2024.[25] I note that there was some delay in the Appellant providing the email dated 7 May 2024 due to her work commitments. In that email the Appellant recorded her points of disagreement and provided further information to Dr Sebastian.

[25] Invitation to Show Cause dated 29 January 2025 – Attachment 8 – Email from the Appellant dated 7 May 2024.
Prior to Dr Sebastian shadowing the Appellant at work, there was one further meeting between the Appellant and Dr Sebastian on 21 May 2024. That meeting was also the subject of a file note by Dr Sebastian.[26]

[26] Ibid, Attachment 9, File note dated 21 May 2024.
The above evidence confirms in my view that the Appellant was appropriately informed of the gaps in her work performance and she had been afforded more than ample time to self-correct prior to the PIP being implemented.
This appeal ground is also not made out.

Appeal Ground (g): The Decision Maker did not adequately consider the show cause response

The Appellant provided a detailed ten page response dated 19 February 2025 to the Show Cause Notice.
In the decision letter Dr Butcher specifically notes at the outset in summarising the Appellant's show cause response that he had not summarised the entirety of the Appellant's responses for the purposes of the disciplinary finding decision letter, although he had reviewed all of the information the Appellant had provided in her response and the accompanying documents.

[100]Over 1.5 pages the decision-maker then summarises the general submissions made by the Appellant and addresses those submissions.

[101]Dr Butcher then goes on to address Allegation One. He summarises the submissions made by the Appellant in her show cause response over three pages in the decision. He then goes on to consider his findings in light of the evidence and the Appellant's submissions over a further two pages.

[102]I am therefore satisfied that the decision-maker has given lengthy consideration to the Appellant's show cause response. Having considered the decision letter, I am also satisfied the decision-maker has given appropriate consideration to the arguments raised by the Appellant in her show cause response.

[103]As a consequence, the Appellant has failed to establish this appeal ground and has further not established on this appeal ground that the decision was not fair and reasonable.

Lack of Support

[104]In her submissions under this heading the Appellant references an email she sent to Dr Sebastian on 30 October 2024 requesting assistance with the expected practical level of performance by way of clarifying what was specifically required in terms of notes and whether any template could be provided.

[105]As noted by the Respondent, the Appellant's email of 30 October 2024 has not been put before the decision-maker. In light of this, the Appellant's ability to establish that the decision was not fair and reasonable premised on the contents of this email is somewhat limited.

[106]By the time of the Appellant's email on 30 October 2024, the Appellant and Dr Sebastian had met on ten occasions, commencing on 11 March 2024 through to 5 August 2024. All of those meetings occurred prior to the implementation of the PIP. In addition, were the meetings that occurred during the PIP process.
[107]I have read each of the detailed file notes from those meetings. In the course of the meetings Dr Sebastian was critical of aspects of the Appellant's clinical practice as a Senior Psychologist. I am also satisfied however that in many of those meetings Dr Sebastian also provided support to the Appellant and advice or coaching as to how her approach to clinical sessions with patients, and her documentation of those sessions could be improved.
[108]One example of this is the file note of the meeting on 5 August 2024 in which discussion occurred regarding the Appellant's documentation of sessions, in particular in relation to her formulation, treatment plan, how she engaged the patient in decision making or informed consent processes and the clinical reasoning that supported her decision making.[27]
[27] Invitation to Show Cause dated 29 January 2025 – Attachment 14 – File note of meeting dated 5 August 2024.
[109]The PIP itself sets out the assistance that was to be provided to the Appellant and the additional resources that would be made available to the Appellant to enable her to successfully negotiate the PIP. [28] The assistance and additional resources were to include:
[28] Ibid, Attachment 15 – Performance Improvement Plan.
·Access to relevant resources and frameworks such as APS Code of Ethics, Psychology Board of Australia Standards, Human Rights legislation, Mental Health Act;

·Provision of relevant resources listed in the National Psychology Exam reading list;

·Examples of the application of ethical and professional scenarios and case studies;

·Access to supervision;

·Provision of relevant templates for clinical documentation and psychological assessments;

·Feedback to be provided by Professional Lead on a weekly basis during review.

[110]The file notes from the PIP meetings dated 27 August 2024,[29] 3 September 2024,[30] 10 September 2024,[31] record the support, advice and coaching being provided by Dr Sebastian to the Appellant along with the additional resources that Dr Sebastian made available to the Appellant.

[29] Invitation to Show Cause dated 29 January 2025, Attachment 17 – File note of first PIP meeting dated 27 August 2024.
[30] Ibid, Attachment 18 – File note of second PIP meeting dated 3 September 2024.

[31] Ibid, Attachment 19 – File note of third PIP meeting dated 10 September 2024.
[111]As an example, the file note from the second PIP meeting held on 3 September 2024 confirms that a number of relevant text books and resources (listed in the file note) were to be provided to the Appellant on Thursday 5 September 2024.

[112]In an email to the Appellant dated 10 September 2025,[32] Dr Sebastian provided the Appellant with links to the APS Code of Ethics and the Psychology Board of Australia – Registration.

[32] Ibid, Attachment 20 – Email from Dr Sebastian dated 10 September 2024.
[113]A list of the additional resources provided by Dr Sebastian to the Appellant during the first three weeks of the PIP were listed in the PIP Extended Week Four Period Intensive Structured Learning Plan.[33]

[33] Ibid, Attachment 23a.
[114]In terms of templates, during Week 2 of the PIP, the Appellant was provided with a FSS de-identified Comprehensive Psychological Report, FSS de-identified Psychological Report, Ipswich Psychology Service – Referral Acknowledgement.[34] In Week 4 of the PIP Dr Sebastian provided the Appellant with two examples of de-identified Discharge Summaries.[35]

[34] Invitation to Show Cause dated 29 January 2025, Attachment 25 – email from Dr Sebastian to the Appellant dated 31 October 2024 setting out summary of PIP Process.
[35] Ibid.
[115]I am satisfied that the Appellant was provided with significant support by Dr Sebastian both prior to the decision to implement the PIP and post the implementation of the PIP, during the weekly PIP meetings. I am also satisfied that Dr Sebastian provided the Appellant with the additional resources that had been promised in the PIP documentation.

[116]The Appellant under this heading in her submission also contends that the reduction in her workload during the PIP was in the form of prohibiting her from seeing patients, regardless of patients' needs. I do not accept the Appellant's contention.

[117]I note that the file note from the meeting between the Appellant and Dr Sebastian held on 20 August 2024,[36] which also included the Appellant's support person, Ms Tamara Smith, Team Leader and Ms Suzanna Trayling, HR Business Partner, WMHHS, addressed the issue of a reduction in the Appellant's patient load.

[36] Ibid, Attachment 16 – File note of meeting held on 20 August 2024.
[118]The file note records that during the meeting Dr Sebastian states that to support the Appellant in focusing on the provision of psychological services for the four open patients, arrangements would be put in place for other patients of the Red Team. Dr Sebastian records her intention to communicate the plan that the Appellant would be continuing to work with and continuing to be the point of contact for these four patients (only).

[119]Dr Sebastian further indicates in the file note that she explained to the Appellant that she would not be responsible or expected to be involved with any other Red Team patients and that she could redirect enquiries regarding psychology for all other Red Team patients to Dr Cole. The file note records that the Appellant indicated that she was agreeable with this plan and the relevant consultant Psychiatrist also being informed of the plan.

[120]Given the above, I am not satisfied that all of the Appellant's patient load was removed as alleged by her. I consider the approach taken to reduce the Appellant's workload to be fair and reasonable.

[121]I am not satisfied that the Appellant has established that there was a lack of support provided to her and has consequently failed to establish that the decision was not fair and reasonable on this basis.

Other matters

[122]I am satisfied that the Appellant has been afforded procedural fairness during the show cause process. The Appellant was provided with a detailed show cause notice setting out the allegation and which summarised in some detail the evidence relied upon by the decision-maker in reaching the conclusion that the Appellant may be liable for discipline.

[123]The show-cause notice also considered the Appellant human rights as required by the Human Rights Act 2019. Further, the show cause notice also informed the Appellant of her ability to seek assistance from the Respondent's Employee Assistance Provider.

[124]To similar effect, the decision letter dated 29 May 2025 also considered the Appellant's human rights and confirmed her ability to access the Employee Assistance Provider if she required assistance. The decision letter also clearly informed the Appellant of her appeal rights and provided her with a contact email address if she had any questions relating to the letter.

Conclusion
[125]For the reasons set out above:
·I am satisfied that the Appellant has failed to establish any of her appeal grounds and consequently has failed to establish that the decision by Dr Butcher to find the allegation to be substantiated was not fair and reasonable.

·I am further satisfied that there was a significant body of evidence available to the decision-maker, and that the various findings made by the decision-maker were open on that evidence.

[126]The decision was fair and reasonable. I make the following orders:
Orders:
1. Pursuant to s 562C(1)(a) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), the decision appealed against is confirmed.
2.Pursuant to s 566(1)(b) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), the stay of the decision appealed against, made on 27 June 2025, is revoked.

[2025] QIRC 282

22 October 2025