Pyke v State of Queensland (Queensland Health)

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:	Pyke v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2025] QIRC 306
PARTIES:	Pyke, Craig Appellant v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) Respondent
CASE NO:	PSA/2025/130
PROCEEDING:	Public Sector Appeal – Appeal against a fair treatment decision
DELIVERED ON:	10 November 2025
MEMBER: HEARD AT:	O'Neill IC On the papers
ORDER:	The Orders contained in paragraph [120] of these reasons for decision.
CATCHWORDS:	INDUSTRIAL LAW – PUBLIC SECTOR – EMPLOYEES AND SERVANTS OF THE CROWN GENERALLY – appeal against a fair treatment decision – where appellant requested flexible work arrangement – where flexible work arrangement was partially approved – where appellant requested an internal review – where internal review decision not provided within 14 days resulting in a deemed confirmation of the local action decision – whether the deemed review decision was fair and reasonable – deemed review decision confirmed.
LEGISLATION: CASES:	Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ss 27, 28, 562B, 562C Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld), ss 40, 129, 131, 133 Individual Employee Grievances Directive 11/20 cls 5, 8 and 9 Queensland Public Health Sector Certified Agreement (No. 11) 2022 Queensland Health C5 Flexible working arrangements policy (QH-POL-242) Benn v State of Queensland (Department of Education) WZAR Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [1995] HCA 10 Colebourne v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) (No 2) [2022] QIRC 16 Dudley v State of Queensland (Office of Industrial Relations) [2023] QIRC 212 Goodall v State of Queensland (Unreported decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland, Dalton J, 10 October 2018) Hardy v Queensland (Dept of Environment and Science) [2022] QIRC 480 Hunt v State of Queensland (Department of Agriculture and Fisheries) [2022] QIRC 162 Malcolm v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2024] QIRC 97 Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH (2015) 256 CLR 326
Page v John Thompson and Lesley Dwyer, As Chief Executive Officer, West Moreton Hospital and Health Service [2014] QSC 252 Pope v Lawler [1996] FCA 1446 Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1 Schubert v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2024] QIRC 128 State of Queensland (Queensland Health) v Hume (No. 3) [2024] ICQ 3 Sutaria v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 326 Wirth v Mackay HHS & Anor [2016] QSC 39

Reasons for Decision

Introduction and background

Craig Pyke ('the Appellant') is employed full-time as a Procurement Officer, Systems Procurement with Queensland Health ('the Respondent').
The Appellant has been working under a Flexible Work Arrangement ('FWA') since October 2022 pursuant to which he works Monday to Thursday for 10 hours a day with a 30 minute lunch break. This enabled the Appellant to take Friday off each week as a flex day.
The FWA was reviewed on a number of occasions, but kept in place. On 28 January 2025, the Appellant was requested to resubmit his FWA application. The fresh application was supported by a medical certificate from Dr Claire Stewart, Lighthouse General Practice dated 20 January 2023, which had been submitted with an earlier application.
The Appellant was asked to provide an updated medical certificate and he subsequently provided a new medical certificate from Dr Stewart dated 21 February 2025, which strongly recommended the continuation of the existing arrangement.
On 13 March 2025 the Appellant's line manager, Ms Lynne Best approved the Appellant's FWA request, specifying:
·fixed hours of 6:00 AM to 4:00 PM, Monday to Thursday;
·work from home day to be Thursday;
·with one Accrued Day Off (ADO) per week; and
·for this work pattern to be formalised in myHR.[1]

[1] Respondent's submissions filed 8 August 2025, Attachment 6.
On 14 March 2025, Ms Best issued a formal letter confirming approval of the Appellant's FWA on the same conditions set out in the preceding paragraph.[2]

[2] Ibid, Attachment 7.
On 26 March 2025, the Appellant lodged a Stage 1 grievance under the Individual Employee Grievances Directive 11/20 ('the Grievance Directive'), relating to the operational implementation of the approved FWA.[3] The grievance characterised the decision as an unfair and unreasonable refusal of his FWA, and cited changes to previously understood arrangements.

[3] Ibid, Attachment 11.
The Appellant objected to the FWA becoming a structured compressed hours arrangement as opposed to the pre-existing arrangement whereby the Appellant utilised flex time to take Friday off.
A Stage 1- Local Action decision was released to the Appellant on 3 June ('the LAD') in response to the Appellant's grievance.[4] The decision-maker, Mr Glen Mann, Chief Procurement Officer confirmed the decision of Ms Best and he specifically observed:
[4] Ibid, Attachment 16.
·He had decided that the Appellant's approved FWA and compressed working hours, must be formally recorded in myHR.
·He further confirmed that:

o He did not support the FWA continuing as it had been (using flex to accrue a day off), and instead the approved compressed working hours must be formally recorded in myHR.
o He was supportive of the FWA being made on an ongoing basis, subject to review.

o Ms Best and Mr Hanscomb hold the appropriate delegation to approve flexible work arrangements for employees occupying positions at other classification levels. Mr Mann further confirmed that he supported Ms Best and Mr Hanscomb to make the decision on the Appellant's FWA.

The Appellant was dissatisfied with this decision and lodged a Stage 2- Internal review of the LAD on 9 June 2025.[5]
[5] Respondent's submissions (n 1), Attachment 17.
Through an administration error, the delegated decision-maker for the internal review, Mr Damian Green (Deputy Director-General, Corporate Services Division) failed to provide the internal review decision within 14 days of receipt of the internal review request.[6] Pursuant to clause 9.2(g) of the Grievance Directive, the failure to provide an internal review decision is treated as a deemed confirmation of the LAD.
[6] See clause 9.2(f) of the Grievance Directive.
The Appellant filed an Appeal Notice in the Industrial Registry on 7 July 2025 seeking to challenge the deemed confirmation of the LAD.
The Respondent belatedly provided an internal review decision on 9 July 2025.[7] As this document post-dated the filing of the Appeal Notice, I have not given this decision any consideration in determining the appeal.
[7] Respondent's submissions (n 1), Attachment 18.
I am satisfied that the deemed confirmation of the LAD local action decision was fair and reasonable.
My reasons follow.

Is the Appellant entitled to appeal?
Section 131(1)(d) of the Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) ('the PS Act') provides that an appeal may be made against a fair treatment decision. Section 133(d) of the PS Act provides that for fair treatment decisions, it is the public sector employee who is aggrieved by the decision who may appeal.
I am satisfied that the Appellant was aggrieved by the decision.
Section 129 of the PS Act relevantly provides:
129 Definitions for part
In this part—
…
fair treatment decision means a decision a public sector employee believes is unfair and unreasonable.
I am satisfied that the decision is one that is able to be appealed pursuant to s 131 of the PS Act, and further, that the Appellant is entitled to appeal.
Section 564(3) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 ('IR Act') requires an appeal to be lodged within 21 days after the day the decision appealed against is given.
The internal review decision should have been provided on or before 23 June 2025. The Appellant therefore had 21 days from 23 June 2025 to lodge his Appeal Notice.
The Appeal Notice was filed in the Industrial Registry on 7 July 2025 well within the 21 day period. I am satisfied that the appeal has been brought within the required time.

What decisions can the Commission make?

Section 562C(1) of the IR Act prescribes that the Commission may determine to either:
·confirm the decision appealed against;
·set the decision aside and return the matter to the decision maker with a copy of the decision on appeal and any directions considered appropriate; or
·set the decision aside and substitute another decision.

Appeal Principles

Section 562B(2) and (3) of the IR Act provides that the appeal is decided by reviewing the decision appealed against "to decide whether the decision appealed against was fair and reasonable".

The appeal is not conducted by way of re-hearing,[8] but rather involves a review of the decision arrived at by the decision-maker and the associated decision-making process.[9] Because the word 'review' has no settled meaning, it must take its meaning from the context in which it appears.[10]
[8] Goodall v State of Queensland (Supreme Court of Queensland, Dalton J, 10 October 2018), 5; Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 567(1).
[9] Ibid; Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 562B(2).
[10] Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [1995] HCA 10.
Findings made by the decision-maker, which are reasonably open to them, should not be disturbed on appeal. Even so, in reviewing the decision appealed against, the Commission member may allow other evidence to be taken into account.[11]

[11] Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 567(2).
The issue for my determination is whether the deemed decision which is the subject of the appeal was fair and reasonable.[12]
[12] Page v John Thompson and Lesley Dwyer, As Chief Executive Officer, West Moreton Hospital and Health Service [2014] QSC 252, [60]-[61] (Byrne SJA).
Relevant Legislation
Section 27 of the IR Act relevantly provides:
27      Request for flexible working arrangements
(1)      An employee may ask the employee's employer for a change in the way the employee works, including –
(a)the employee's ordinary hours of work; and
(b)the place where the employee works; and
(c)a change to the way the employee works, for example, the use of different equipment as a result of a disability illness or injury.
(2)      The request must –
(a)be in writing; and
(b)state the change in the way the employee works in sufficient detail to allow the employer to make a decision about the request; and
(c)state the reasons for the change.
(Emphasis added)

Section 28 of the IR Act contemplates the employer's decision about an employee's request under s 27. It provides:
28      Decision about request for flexible working arrangements
(1)      The employer may decide to –
(a)grant the request; or
(b)grant the request in part or subject to conditions; or
(c)refuse the request.
(2)      The employer may grant the request in part or subject to conditions, or refuse the request, only on reasonable grounds.
(3)      The employer must give the employee written notice about its decision within 21 days after receiving the request.
(4)      If the employer decides to grant the request in part or subject to conditions or to refuse the request, the written notice about the decision must state –
(a)the written reasons for the decision, outlining the reasonable grounds for granting the request in part or subject to conditions or for the refusal; and
(b)that the commission has jurisdiction to hear and decide a dispute over the request under chapter 6.
(Emphasis added)
Relevant Directive and Policies
Directive 11/20: Individual employee grievances policy

Directive 11/20: Individual employee grievances policy ('Directive 11/20') relevantly states:

5. Matters that can be subject of an individual employee grievance
5.1 An individual employee grievance under this directive is a grievance submitted by a current public service employee who has an honest belief, based on reasonable grounds, that:
…
(b) the conduct or behaviour of an employee, agent or contractor is unfair and unreasonable
(c) the conduct or behaviour of an employee, agent or contractor constitutes bullying in the workplace, sexual harassment, racial vilification, religious vilification or vilification on the grounds of gender identity or sexuality
(d) the conduct or behaviour of an employee is a breach of the Code of Conduct
…

8. Individual employee grievance resolution principles
…
8.2 Individual employee grievances are to be managed and resolved using a three-step process:
(a) local action (the first stage of the individual employee grievance process)
(b) internal review of a decision made following local action (the second stage of the individual employee grievance process), and
(c) where applicable, external review of a decision made at internal review (the third stage of the individual employee grievance process).

8.3 Agencies, including managers and supervisors, must manage individual employee grievances:
(a) in accordance with principles of natural justice, including timely decisions and the provision of adequate reasons
…
(c) in accordance with the procedures in clause 9.
(Emphasis added)
…

9. Procedures for managing and resolving individual employee grievances
9.1 Stage 1–local action
…
(b) An individual employee grievance submitted by an employee must be resolved in accordance with the agency’s individual employee grievance policy and procedures. This action may include, but is not limited to, one or more of the following:
(i) conducting preliminary enquiries to determine appropriate options for resolution of the individual employee grievance
(ii) ADR strategies, including, facilitated discussion, mediation, conciliation or negotiation
(iii) gathering information, including from witnesses, and/or
(iv) other reasonable action in the circumstances.
…

(f) After a decision has been made about an individual employee grievance– including a decision to take no action under clause 9.1(c)–the agency must provide a written decision to the employee who submitted the grievance. The decision must:
(i) outline the action taken to manage the individual employee grievance and the outcome of this action
(ii) provide the reasons for the decision, or the decision to take no action
(iii) outline any action that the agency proposes to take, or will take, as a result of the decision; and
(iv) inform the employee of their internal review rights outlined in Stage 2– internal review, including any relevant timeframes.
…

9.2 Stage 2–internal review
(a) If an employee is dissatisfied with a decision made through local action, the employee may make a written request to the agency chief executive for an internal review.
…
(d) An internal review is to be completed by the chief executive or their delegate. The chief executive or delegate is to determine whether the decision made through local action was fair and reasonable in the circumstances.
…
(h) At the completion of internal review, including a decision to take no further action under clause 9.2(e), the chief executive or delegate must provide a written decision The Reto the employee. This decision must:
(i) outline the action taken to review the decision made through local action
(ii) outline the reasons for the decision, or the decision to take no further action
(iii) outline any action that the chief executive or delegate proposes to take, or will take, as a result of the internal review, and
(iv) outline any avenues of external review that may be available to the employee, including any relevant timeframes.
(Emphasis added)

Queensland Health C5 Flexible working arrangements policy

Clause 3 of the Queensland Health C5 Flexible working arrangements policy ('the FWA policy') relevantly provides:
3 Submitting a request to access flexible working arrangements
…
Any decision to grant a request in part or subject to conditions, or to refuse a request, is to be made only on reasonable grounds and communicated to the employee in writing, and must:
•        contain details of the part approval and/or conditions (e.g. timeframe for the arrangement to be reviewed)
•        provide clear reasons as to why a part approval or condition has been applied, or the reason for refusal
•        state the employees’ entitlement to lodge an industrial dispute with the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission.
Section 29 of the Industrial Relations Act notes that if the employer does not give the written notice within 21 days after receiving this request, the employer is taken to have decided to refuse the request. The Queensland Industrial Relations Commission has jurisdiction to hear and decide a dispute over the request.
Grounds of Appeal
In his Appeal Notice, the Appellant outlines a number of appeal grounds in an attached schedule. I summarise these grounds as follows:
·Since October 2022 the Appellant through an approved FWA has worked compressed hours Monday to Thursday 6:00 am to 4:00 pm with Friday as a flexible accrued day.

·The Respondent has decided that the FWA is conditional and the Respondent's myHR system should record the Appellant's hours of work to reflect the FWA with the same hours on Monday to Thursday with Friday recorded as a "rostered day off". This does not fit the criteria of compressed hours or an agreed FWA.

·Changing the Appellant's entitlements in the myHR System disadvantages the accrual entitlements to annual leave and sick leave. It also removes eligibility to flexible time accruals and also removes eligibility to public holidays that may fall on a Friday.

·Since resubmitting his FWA in January 2025 management have continually tried to block or to find reasons to deny the Appellant's FWA request. This is despite the Respondent's Guidelines: Flexible working arrangements stating under clause 5.3, the process for the decision maker (delegate):
It is the position of Queensland Health that employees have access to flexible working arrangements where this is operationally feasible. As a result, where possible, decision makers (delegates) should be looking for reasons to say ‘yes’, rather than ‘no’ without grounds.

·The excuses provided by the Respondent for not approving the FWA together with the request to permanently change the Appellant's roster is unjust and goes against all HR policies.

·The Appellant's expected outcome from submitting his grievance was for his managers to realise what they were doing was unreasonable and to accept that they may have made a mistake and to agree to continue his FWA for a further 3-6 months and then review it again.

·A fair and reasonable outcome for everyone is to have the Appellant's FWA continue for the reasons stated above, with a review every 3-6 months.
Proceedings in the Commission
A Directions Order was issued to the parties on 11 July 2025, inviting the provision of written submissions as follows:
·Appellant's outline of submissions filed on 23 July 2025.

·Respondent's outline of submissions filed on 8 August 2025.
·Appellant's reply submissions filed on 14 August 2025.
I have considered all of the submissions and attached evidence provided by the parties although they may not be specifically referred to in these reasons.

Appellant's Submissions

The Appellant commenced working on the FWA Monday to Thursday (as detailed above) in October 2022. In January 2023 the Appellant was requested to resubmit the FWA application with supporting medical evidence, which was provided by his treating General Practitioner, Dr Claire Stewart. Dr Stewart confirmed the FWA arrangement was beneficial for the Appellant's mental and physical wellbeing.

The FWA was reviewed, and approved, by Category Director, James Doyle in February 2023. The FWA was subsequently reviewed and continued in May 2023. During this period the Appellant worked compressed hours on Monday to Thursday and took a flex day on Friday. Where public holidays fell in the week or sick leave was taken, the Appellant would negotiate with his line manager to work a Friday and therefore incur no deficit to his ordinary weekly hours (38 hours per week).
Annual leave entitlements were also recorded and taken as Monday to Friday, 7.36 hours per day. Since 2016 the Appellant has also purchased leave in blocks of 5 days Monday to Friday as per HR Policy C21 – Purchased leave.
On 28 January 2025 the Appellant was asked by his new line manager to resubmit his FWA. He was subsequently requested to provide updated medical evidence to support the application.
On 13 March 2025, the FWA was informally agreed with the conditions that:
·        Hours to be fixed 6 am – 4 pm = 10 hours with half an hour for lunch = 9.5 hours Monday to Friday each week being the accrued day off myHR System back end to be fixed up, so entitlements are accrued at the appropriate rate and taken at the appropriate rate. Work from home day to be Thursday, subject to change in line with business needs.
·        Employees who participate in accrued days off in accordance with cl 15(1)(e) of HHSGEA can work a maximum of 10 hours but do not participate in flex/accrued time.
·        Notwithstanding the working arrangements recorded in clauses 15. 1 (a) (b) and (h), an employer and an employee or group of employees may agree that the ordinary hours of work are to exceed 8 hours on any day, thus enabling more than one accrued day off during a particular work cycle. However, the ordinary hours of work shall not exceed 10 hours on any one day.

On 13 March 2025 the Appellant emailed Ms Best stating that he was not comfortable with agreeing to a permanent change in his employment contract and the myHR system.
On 24 March 2025 a meeting was held involving the Appellant, managers and payroll. When the matter could not be resolved locally, the Appellant lodged a formal grievance on 26 March 2025 in accordance with the Respondent's policy E12 QH-POL-140.
The Appellant submits that his former FWA was premised on him accruing flex-time outside of the ordinary 7.36 hours ordinary days to enable him to take a flex day on Friday. In being a flexible work arrangement, there may be weeks where a public holiday (7.36 hours) falls, or sick leave is accessed (7.36 hours per day). An arrangement was in place with previous managers for these hours to be normally made up on a Friday.
There is no evidence since his FWA has been in place from October 2022, that there has been any impact on the Appellant's recorded timesheets or that the FWA has resulted in any significant leave deficits.
Since Ms Best has been appointed, she has not agreed to the Appellant working a Friday or agreed to other suggestions of working his ordinary hours plus additional hours as required in circumstances of public holidays or sick leave days that have left the Appellant's debit balance as a minus value.
Ms Best maintains that the Appellant is not entitled to work on a Friday as it is a rostered day off. Ms Best also interprets the correspondence from Dr Stewart dated 21 February 2025 to reflect the Respondent's belief that the Appellant must not work on Friday. The Appellant contends that he has demonstrated that he is flexible and able to work on a Friday when required.
The Appellant states that he is not expecting this FWA to be permanent and he is prepared to have it reviewed every 3- 6 months as long as it is considered fairly and in line with other team members and any related policies to FWAs.
The Appellant contends that the detriments of the proposed changes by the Respondent's FWA conditions to him are:
·The ability to be flexible with his work pattern.
·The myHR System records his work pattern and employment conditions as Monday to Thursday with no entitlement to ordinary hours across the spread of Monday to Friday.
·He loses any entitlement to any public holidays that may fall on a Friday, and possibly the yearly concessional day.
·No entitlement to Fridays for ordinary hours of sick or annual leave entitlements.

·Precluded from purchase leave (must be taken in blocks of 5 days Monday - Friday only).

·The proposed work pattern will be permanently recorded in myHR System, and he loses all capability of working flexible and the ability to request changes to his work pattern.
·The possibility of implications to his entitlements like superannuation and any leave entitlements, the Respondent's payroll could not confirm or deny if there would be any future implications.
·The Respondent's interpretation of Dr Stewart's correspondence dated 21 February 2025 reflecting the belief he is not able to work any Fridays.

Respondent's Submissions

The Respondent notes that following the Appellant lodging the grievance, on 14 April 2025 a meeting occurred with the Appellant, his support person, Mr Mann (the Delegate), and a representative from HR Advisory Services. The Appellant raised concerns around the handling of his FWA, the rationale and communication of conditions applied, and his interactions with his line manager and Category Director.
Between April and June 2025, Mr Mann undertook a review of all relevant documentation and engaged with both the Appellant and the line manager to clarify issues and obtain a balanced understanding of the events and processes.
On 14 May 2025, a further meeting was convened with the same attendees as the meeting on 14 April 2025. At the meeting, Mr Mann provided a summary of key themes arising from the grievance, and the Appellant was provided the opportunity to provide further comment and clarification.
The Respondent submits that the LAD to approve the Appellant's FWA subject to the formalisation of the arrangement in the myHR system was fair and reasonable. Both when initially made by the line manager and when also confirmed by Mr Mann.
Section 27 of the IR Act permits an employee to request an FWA. Section 28(1) of the IR Act provides that an employer may decide to grant the request, grant the request in part (or subject to conditions), or refuse the request. Section 28(2) of the IR Act provides that a decision to refuse the request or part of the request may only be on reasonable grounds.
Schedule 3, clause 3.1 of the Queensland Public Health Sector Certified Agreement (No.
11) 2022 ('EB 11') relevantly provides, among other things, that:
i.employees will at all times obey directions given by their Supervisor regarding hours of work during the spread of hours; and
ii.all staff will give first priority to the maintenance of acceptable workflows; and
iii.there will be cooperation in planning employees' working times.
The Respondent submits that the Commission has previously found that FWAs remain a matter for mutual agreement between an employer and employee and that, provided the grounds of refusal are not unreasonable, the discretion to grant an FWA remains with the employer.[13]

[13] Citing Dudley v State of Queensland (Office of Industrial Relations) [2023] QIRC 212 at [46].
The request to provide updated medical evidence as part of reassessing the existing FWA, was reasonable in circumstances where the Appellant was seeking to rely on medical evidence from 2023 to support the further request.
The approved conditions, being a 9.5 hour workday Monday to Thursday with Friday as the accrued day off, formalised the Appellant's compressed working week, enabling accurate payroll processing and system alignment. The Respondent submits that this arrangement preserved the Appellant's working preferences while ensuring entitlements such as public holidays and leave accruals would be correctly recorded and managed once formalised.
The Respondent has identified that discrepancies can arise with the Appellant's timekeeping records, and in fact did arise on occasions, where the informal arrangements lacked system configuration.
The Appellant's line manager and Mr Mann appropriately addressed those issues by requiring the FWA to be formalised in myHR.
The Respondent refutes the Appellant's suggestion that the proposed FWA will affect his leave entitlements, access to public holidays and ability to purchase leave. The Respondent notes that the Appellant will continue to accrue leave on a full-time basis and there is no impediment to his ability to purchase leave.
As regards leave and public holidays, Mr Mann specifically considered that under the current arrangements, when the appellant either took leave or where there was a public holiday, the Appellant was only paid 7.36 hours which then lead to an insufficient flex accrual during the week to then not work on a Friday.
In light of the medical evidence from Dr Stewart regarding the need for the Appellant to not work on a Friday, the Respondent notes that it has a primary duty of care to ensure, so far as reasonably practicable, the health and safety of its workers. The Respondent did not consider it appropriate for the Appellant to undertake work on Fridays in the absence of further medical evidence.
The approach taken by Mr Mann of approving the FWA subject to the conditions requiring formalisation of the FWA in myHR was consistent with the medical evidence provided by the Appellant and was also consistent with the FWA Policy and EB11, which provide that flexible working arrangements must be operationally feasible and subject to formal approval.
The Respondent concludes that it has carefully considered the Appellant's individual circumstances and has provided the Appellant with multiple opportunities to raise concerns, attend grievance meetings, and submit supporting materials for his FWA.
The requirement to formalise the FWA represented a balanced and sustainable resolution that respected the Appellant's preferences while addressing the Respondent's operational requirements and obligations to ensure proper system integration.
The Respondent submits that it has acted in accordance with the FWA Policy and that Mr Mann's decision was fair and reasonable in the circumstances.

Appellant's submissions in reply

The Appellant notes that at no time has Dr Stewart declared him medically unfit to work on Fridays.
In instances where a public holiday (equivalent to 7 hours and 36 minutes), or sick leave occurred during a work week, the Appellant would revert to a standard Monday to Friday working 7 hours and 36 minutes each day. The Appellant submits that this approach ensured his compliance with the 38-hour weekly requirement. He notes that this method has been in place since October 2022.
The Appellant has provided a timesheet for Easter 2025 showing how public holidays have been regularly completed on his fortnightly timesheets.
The Appellant then largely repeats his earlier submissions regarding the Respondent's proposal not being flexible and causing him the detriments highlighted in paragraph [48] above.
In relation to the Respondent's citation of Dudley v State of Queensland (Office of Industrial Relations),[14] the Appellant seeks to distinguish the decision on the basis that he is not requesting his full-time hours be reduced and nor is he requesting that the days that he works in the office be reduced.
[14] [2023] QIRC 212.
The Appellant references an email from the Respondent's internal employee relations dated 16 April 2025,[15] which recommended against the maintenance of the FWA based on the use of flex-time. The Appellant alleges that this email was not a true and accurate reflection of his current FWA request or background.
[15] Appellant's reply submissions filed 14 August 2025: Attachment 4; Respondent's submissions, Attachment 13.
The Appellant also notes that under the Queensland Health Guideline: Flexible working arrangements in clause 5.4 Flexible Working Arrangements and Agreement Form, it is stated:
Employees who access variable working hours/flex-time as part of their normal working arrangements, available in an industrial instrument, are not required to complete the Flexible Working Arrangements Application and Agreement form.
The Appellant questions whether this means that he will not be on an FWA and the benefits that come with an FWA will not apply to him.
Consideration
I am required to decide this appeal by assessing whether or not the deemed decision appealed against is fair and reasonable. This would usually involve a review of the decision-making process that has been utilised, and the decision arrived at.
Clause 9.2(g) of the Grievance Directive in effect creates a legal fiction that the failure to address the internal review request constitutes a confirmation of Mr Mann's LAD. It is therefore necessary to consider the LAD and whether that decision was fair and reasonable.
Deputy President Merrell in Colebourne v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) (No 2)[16] ('Colebourne') considered the meaning of 'fair and reasonable' and concluded that it should be construed within the ordinary meaning of the phrase as used in the context of s 562B of the IR Act.[17]

[16] [2022] QIRC 16.
[17] Ibid, at [25], citing Pope v Lawler [1996] FCA 1446.
In Colebourne his Honour further noted that assessing whether a decision was 'fair and reasonable' is not an assessment of whether the decision was unreasonable only by reference to the legal standard.[18] His Honour concluded that assessing whether a decision was 'fair and reasonable' permitted a review of both the factual merits and legal reasonableness of both the decision itself and the process of making that decision.[19] (emphasis added)

[18] Colebourne (at [21]-[22] and [25].
[19] Ibid, at [23] citing Goodall v State of Queensland (Unreported decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland, Dalton J, 10 October 2018), 5 as to the former, equivalent provisions in s 201 of the Public Service Act 2008.
In the recent decision of Benn v State of Queensland (Department of Education),[20] Industrial Commissioner Pratt provided the following observations as to the process in determining whether a decision is fair and reasonable:[21]
[20] [2025] QIRC 236.
[21] Ibid, [9] and [10].
·        For a decision to be fair and reasonable, the conclusion underpinning it must be reasonably open to be reached. If the conclusions were reasonably open to the decision-maker to reach, it is not the Commission's role to disturb that decision, even if the Commission would have reached a different conclusion.[22]

·        If the decision is flawed by conclusions that were not fairly and reasonably open to the decision-maker to reach, then that decision is prone to being overturned on appeal.[23]

·        Mere disappointment with the outcome of a decision is not enough to establish that it was not fair and reasonable.[24]

·        The decision must create some practical injustice before an appeal of this nature can succeed.[25]
[22] Citing: State of Queensland (Queensland Health) v Hume (No. 3) [2024] ICQ 3, [78]-[79] ('Hume'); Schubert v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2024] QIRC 128, [8].
[23] Citing: Malcolm v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2024] QIRC 97, [195]-[200].
[24] Citing: Hunt v State of Queensland (Department of Agriculture and Fisheries) [2022] QIRC 162, [79]-[83], [85], which cited Wirth v Mackay HHS & Anor [2016] QSC 39, [25], Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH (2015) 256 CLR 326, [35]-[36], [57], [61]; Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1.
[25] Ibid.

In the Appeal Notice, the Appellant has failed to set out clear grounds of appeal which set out his contentions as to why the decision of Mr Mann was not fair and reasonable.
Instead of this, the Appellant has set out a timeline of his various applications for FWAs and the basis upon which they were granted. He then has set out the various difficulties he has experienced in having his new application for an FWA in January 2025 approved to his satisfaction.
In adopting this approach, the Appellant has focussed on issues that he has experienced with his line manager, Ms Best, and his dissatisfaction with various statements he alleges that Queensland Health have made. The Appellant then mentions disadvantages he contends that he will experience as a consequence of the compressed hours arrangement being formalised in myHR.
This approach is largely repeated in the Appellant's submissions in support of the appeal.
In summary, the Appellant's position appears to be that the previous arrangement that had been in place since October 2022 of the Appellant working longer hours on Monday to Thursday to accrue sufficient flex-time to take Friday off as a flex day was working to his satisfaction, and as far as he was aware, the Respondent's satisfaction.
The issues of him going into debit in his flex hours due to sick leave or public holidays was not a significant issue and was addressed by the Appellant working on a Friday when required.
The Appellant's submissions then focus on the various disadvantages that he will experience in the future if the Respondent's proposed FWA is operationalised and recorded formally in myHR. It is those disadvantages that the Appellant appears to rely upon to establish that Mr Mann's decision (and the decision of Ms Best prior to that) are not fair and reasonable.
In the FWA application dated 28 January 2025,[26] the Appellant requests the continuation of his current arrangement of working compressed hours Monday to Thursday and taking Friday off from work. The Appellant also requests to work from home every Thursday.

[26] Respondent's submissions (n 1): Attachment 2.
In addressing potential issues, the Appellant states:
There should be no issues to this arrangement as this is for my mental health and is supported by my doctor.
As stated above I have been doing compressed hours since the beginning of October 2022 and at no time as (sic) any of my line managers in this time advised me that this is impacting my work performance or my team in any way.
(Emphasis added)

The Appellant attached the medical certificate from Dr Stewart dated 20 January 2023 which was provided to support an earlier FWA application.
In light of the Appellant's reference to the arrangement being for his mental health, and in light of him attaching the 2023 medical certificate, I am satisfied that it was fair and reasonable for the Respondent to seek updated medical information from the Appellant when considering his FWA application.
In the updated medical certificate dated 21 February 2025,[27] Dr Claire Stewart confirms that the Appellant continues to suffer from difficulties with his mental health related to situational stressors within his family and workplace challenges. Dr Stewart strongly recommends that the Appellant continue working compressed hours and has Friday off for the benefit of his mental health and physical wellbeing.

[27] Respondent's submissions (n 1): Attachment 4.
On 6 March 2025, Ms Best approves the FWA and includes the following conditions on the FWA application form:[28]

•        2 accrued days off per pay cycle ,in line with corporate timesheet rules (attached)
•        Hours to be fixed 6am until 4pm = 10 hours with half hour for lunch 09.5 hours Monday to Thursday with Friday each week being the accrued day off MYHR back end to be fixed up so entitlements are accrued at the appropriate rate and taken at the appropriate rate.
•        Work from home day to be a Thursday: subject to change in line with business need
Employees who participate in accrued days off in accordance with cl15.1 (e) of HHSGEA can work a maximum of 10 hours but do not participate In flex/accrued time.
(e) Notwithstanding the working hours arrangements recorded in clauses 15.1 (a), (b) and (h), an employer and an employee or group of employees may agree that the ordinary hours of work are to exceed 8 hours on any day, thus enabling more than one accrued day off to be taken off during a particular work cycle. However, the ordinary hours of work shall not exceed 10 hours on any one day.
[28] Ibid: Attachment 6.

In the formal correspondence sent by Ms Best dated 14 March 2025,[29] it was confirmed that the pre-existing arrangement had led to various issues with the Appellant's timesheets as follows:
This has led to various issues with your timesheet. For example, when you take leave Monday - Thursday, you input 7:36 hours of leave in your timesheet and no 'flex time' is accrued on this day, as you were away, therefore, leaving hours owing (deficit). You then worked hours to make up this time a (above 10 hours a day- without approval). As detailed in the business rules for Timesheets (previously sent to you). Employees must seek agreement from their line manager when the daily hours on any given day will not be performed.
Employees may go into debit hours from time to time, but must not carry over greater than 4 hours in debit at the end of the pay period. Upon reviewing previous timesheets, this debit balance for you often surpassed this rule, and you currently have a deficit of over 10 hours which is not acceptable to the organisation.

[29] Respondent's submissions (n 1): Attachment 7.
Ms Best further noted that as the errors in the Appellant's timesheet had now been identified as incorrect and investigated, this highlighted that his FWA was not correctly reflecting the EA and business rules conditions, and required updating to ensure that the compressed hours the Appellant had requested and was undertaking, were correctly processed in line with EA and business rules.
It is necessary in my view to note that in the FWA application lodged by the Appellant in January 2025 he sought the ability to work compressed hours on Monday to Thursday from 6:00 am to 4:00 pm with half an hour for lunch as he had been doing since October 2022. This was approved.
The Appellant sought to work from home every Thursday. This was approved.
The Appellant sought to have every Friday off from work. This was approved. The difference being the Appellant sought to utilise flex time to achieve this, whereas the decision taken by the Respondent was that the Appellant would have a rostered day off in accordance with a more formal structure.
Shortly after this on 26 March 2025 the Appellant lodged his grievance because of the issue identified in the preceding paragraph.
The LAD was provided to the Appellant by Mr Mann on 3 June 2025.
In terms of the process leading up to that decision, as noted earlier in these reasons for decision, Mr Mann held meetings with the Appellant and his support person on 14 April 2025 and 14 May 2025. In those meetings the Appellant was afforded the opportunity to provide additional information, and ask questions. Further, Mr Mann was able to clarify the information that the Appellant had provided in support of the grievance.
In addition, Mr Mann made enquiries with relevant business units to seek information relevant to the issues raised by the Appellant in the grievance. I am satisfied that the process undertaken by Mr Mann leading to the LAD being provided to the Appellant was fair and reasonable.
In Sutaria v State of Queensland (Queensland Health)[30] Industrial Commissioner Pidgeon relevantly observed:
[58] While the FWA policy is framed in positive terms and places an onus on decision-makers to attempt where possible to accommodate reasonable requests, the priority of the organisation must be to balance FWA requests with the need to meet clinical responsibilities and ensure that any FWA does not result in a negative impact on the workplace or service provision.[31]
(Emphasis added)

[30] [2023] QIRC 326.
[31] Ibid, [58] per Industrial Commissioner Pidgeon.
In the LAD, Mr Mann confirms that the compressed working hours that had been approved, and that a compressed hours arrangement was a flexible work option that fell within the scope of the Flexible working arrangements HR Policy C5 and the Guideline for Flexible Working Arrangements ('the Guideline').
I note that in clause 2.1 of the Guideline, examples of flexible work options are provided. These include the following:

Type

Option

Description

When we work Compressed working hours
A formal arrangement where normal, full-time hours are worked (e.g. 36 hours 15 minutes or 38 hours per week) over fewer than normal days.

This arrangement is often used to work a nine-day fortnight.

Fatigue should be considered when implementing this arrangement.

Given that example, the conclusion of Mr Mann to the same effect, was fair and reasonable.

In the LAD, Mr Mann addressed the fundamental grievance of the Appellant, that being not being able to utilise flex time on Friday and instead having this recorded as a rostered day off. Mr Mann noted as follows:
As discussed with you in the meeting on 14 May 2025, I have received advice from HR Advisory Services and from Workplace Relations and Policy team that confirms the most appropriate course of action for compressed working hours is to ensure the system aligns with the work hours and days recorded on your FWA for the following reasons:
•        To ensure you are paid correctly in line with the days and hours you are actually working. Currently:
o     you are paid 7:36 hours Monday to Thursday, when you actually work 9:30 hours on each of those days.
o     you are paid 7:36 hours on a Friday, however you do not work Fridays.
•        To ensure you are paid correctly when you take leave and on public holidays.
o     Currently, when you take leave or there is a public holiday, you are only paid 7:36 hours, which then leads to insufficient flex accrual during the week to take the Friday off.
•     This has resulted in you accumulating a flex deficit on your timesheet of greater than the allowed four hours.
•     It is then very difficult for you to resolve the deficit because the hours you work during the week only accrue enough to take the Friday off.[32]

[32] Respondent's submissions: Attachment 16 Local Action Decision dated 3 June 2025.
I further note, as recorded in the correspondence from Ms Best sent by email on 14 March 2025, that at that time the Appellant had a debit balance (deficit) of ten hours in his flex time.
Mr Mann also confirmed that changing the Appellant's hours in the system to accurately reflect the days and hours worked was not a permanent change to the Appellant's employment contract. Mr Mann noted that the Appellant's employment contract with Queensland Health and his employment conditions remained the same. The information provided by Mr Mann was in my view completely correct and was fair and reasonable.
The LAD further noted that the change to the Appellant's work pattern within myHR was to support his approved FWA and that he could request changes to the FWA and the work pattern in the future if required, in consultation with the Appellant's line manager.
Mr Mann ultimately reached the following conclusion in the LAD:
After considering all of the information before me, I have decided that your approved FWA and compressed working hours, consisting of Monday to Thursday 6am to 4pm with Fridays off, must be formally recorded in myHR. I will arrange for Ms Best to process the appropriate form in myHR.
In relation to the outcomes you were seeking, I confirm that:

•        I do not support the FWA to continue as it has been (using flex to accrue a day off) and as per my decision above, the compressed working hours must be formally recorded in myHR.
•        I am supportive of the FWA being made on an ongoing basis, subject to review.
•        Ms Best and Mr Hanscomb hold the appropriate delegation to approve flexible work arrangements for employees occupying positions at other classification levels as per delegation 17.2 of the Department of Health HR Delegations Manual. Based on this and given my decision above, I support Ms Best and Mr Hanscomb to make the decision on your FWA.
In Dudley v State of Queensland (Office of Industrial Relations),[33] Industrial Commissioner Dwyer noted in relation to s 27 of the IR Act:
[45] There is a right of employees contained in s 27 of the IR Act to ask for an FWA. There is no right (in the IR Act or elsewhere) to be given an FWA. That legal reality must be borne in mind as the starting point for any submission made by an employee dissatisfied with an employer's decision to refuse their specific FWA request.[34]
[33] [2023] QIRC 212.
[34] Ibid, [45] per Industrial Commissioner Dwyer.
Industrial Commissioner Dwyer went on to confirm that whilst FWAs are an increasingly popular and accessible feature in employment relationships, they remain a matter for mutual agreement between an employer and employee and the discretion to grant or deny an FWA remains with the employer.[35]

[35] Ibid, [46] per Industrial Commissioner Dwyer.
I do not accept the Appellant's attempt to distinguish Dudley on its facts. The observations of Industrial Commissioner Dwyer highlighted immediately above, are of general application and very much arise from the clear wording of s 27 and s 28 of the IR Act.
In Hardy v Queensland (Dept of Environment and Science)[36] Industrial Commissioner Dwyer once again in determining a public sector appeal arising from the refusal of an FWA application by Ms Hardy confirmed that the right of an employee to ask for an FWA is enshrined in the IR Act. Dwyer IC went on to note that beyond the obligation to consider the request and not unreasonably refuse it, there was no obligation for a request to be granted.[37]

[36] [2022] QIRC 480.
[37] Hardy v Queensland (Dept of Environment and Science) [2022] QIRC 480, [35].
There was evidence available to both the original decision-maker, Ms Best, and also to Mr Mann that confirmed that there had been issues with the Appellant's timesheets because of the current arrangements and the use of flex. There was evidence available to both decision-makers that this had caused the Appellant to have an excessive debit flex balance.
The medical certificate from Dr Stewart did in my view indicate that it may be problematic in terms of the Appellant's mental health functioning if he was required to work on Fridays. Because of this, there was a genuine work, health and safety issue involved with the Appellant working on Fridays that had to be addressed by the Respondent in approving the FWA in the form sought by the Appellant.
Ms Best in the correspondence dated 14 March 2025 also identifies that the Appellant had on occasions been working in excess of ten hours a day in order to decrease his debit flex balance. This in my view also represented a health and safety risk for the Respondent that was required to be addressed.
The decision to formalise the FWA arrangement in myHR as a compressed working hours arrangement was in my view a fair and reasonable decision. Further, given the difficulties that had been experienced with the flex arrangement, I am satisfied that it was fair and reasonable for the FWA to be approved with the conditions identified in paragraphs [90] and [107] above. I am satisfied that the Respondent has appropriately balanced the Appellant's FWA requests with the Respondent's interests and obligations as an employer.
I am satisfied that the Respondent, and Mr Mann in particular, have given proper, careful and in-depth consideration to the FWA proposed by the Appellant.
Mr Mann's decision appropriately informed the Appellant of his appeal rights and also appropriately addressed the Appellant's human rights. Finally, the LAD also informed the Appellant about how to access employee assistance.
It is clear that the Appellant is disappointed with the outcome of his FWA request and that he perceives that he will be disadvantaged by some aspects of the decision to formalise his compressed working hours arrangement. This is not enough to establish that the LAD was unfair and unreasonable.
In all of the circumstances, and for the reasons set out above, I am satisfied that the deemed decision was fair and reasonable.
Order
I make the following orders:
1.Pursuant to s 562C(1)(a) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), the deemed review decision is confirmed.
2. The appeal is dismissed.

[2025] QIRC 306

10 November 2025