BDO15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BDO15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 619

Appeal from: BDO15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 72
File number: WAD 26 of 2018
Judge: BANKS-SMITH J
Date of judgment: 12 September 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – role of Refugee Review Tribunal – speculation as to the future and so called 'what if I am wrong' test – whether Tribunal satisfied with no real doubts – whether well-founded fear of persecution due to alleged Taliban accusations of un-Islamic conduct – application to raise new ground of appeal
Cases cited:

Hossam v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1161

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo [1997] HCA 22; (1997) 191 CLR 559

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; (1996) 185 CLR 259

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam [1999] FCA 719; (1999) 93 FCR 220

MZXSA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCAFC 123; (2010) 117 ALD 441

NAJT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 134; (2005) 147 FCR 51

VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158; (2004) 238 FCR 588

Date of hearing: 10 May 2018
Registry: Western Australia
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 60
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr GS Crowley
Solicitor for the Appellant: AUM Legal
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr PR MacLiver
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

WAD 26 of 2018
BETWEEN:

BDO15

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

BANKS-SMITH J

DATE OF ORDER:

12 SEPTEMBER 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Leave is granted to amend the notice of appeal to include proposed ground 1A.

2.Leave is refused to raise the new ground of appeal 1A.

3.The appeal is dismissed.

4.The appellant pay the first respondent's costs to be assessed if not agreed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BANKS-SMITH J:

  1. The appellant appeals from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court made 18 January 2018 to dismiss an application for judicial review of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (Tribunal) to affirm the decision of the delegate of the first respondent (Minister) to refuse a protection visa:  BDO15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 72.

  2. The issue for consideration on the appeal is the application of the so-called 'what if I am wrong' test.

    Background

  3. The appellant is a citizen of Afghanistan who arrived in Australia as an irregular maritime arrival in July 2012.

  4. The appellant applied for a Protection (Class XA) visa on 14 December 2012.  The application was supported by a…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 619
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of BDO15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant, an Afghan national who arrived in Australia as an irregular maritime arrival, appeals the decision of the Federal Circuit Court to refuse his application for judicial review of a decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal (Tribunal) to affirm the delegate's refusal to grant him a Protection (Class XA) visa. The appellant's application for leave to raise a new ground of appeal on this Court's appeal was heard simultaneously with the appeal. The central issue before the court was whether the Tribunal adequately considered the possibility that its findings of fact might be incorrect, as required by the 'what if I am wrong' test.

The court examined the reasoning of the Tribunal and found that a fair reading of its reasons demonstrated that the Tribunal had no real doubt about the correctness of its findings on material questions of fact. The court held that if the Tribunal had such doubts, it might be required to consider the possibility that the events in question might have occurred. However, the court concluded that the Tribunal had no real doubt and thus did not need to consider this possibility. Consequently, the court found that the proposed ground of appeal lacked sufficient merit and denied leave to raise it. The appeal was ultimately dismissed, with the appellant ordered to pay the costs of the respondent.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave is granted to amend the notice of appeal to include proposed ground 1A.

2. Leave is refused to raise the new ground of appeal 1A.

3. The appeal is dismissed.

4. The appellant pay the first respondent's costs to be assessed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The issue for consideration on the appeal is the application of the so-called 'what if I am wrong' test.Background The appellant is a citizen of Afghanistan who arrived in Australia as an irregular maritime arrival in July 2012. The appellant applied for a Protection (Class XA) visa on 14 December 2012. The application was supported by a statutory declaration. On 8 October 2013 a delegate of the Minister interviewed the appellant and submissions were made on his behalf by his representative. On 27 March 2014 the delegate refused to grant the appellant a visa. The appellant applied to the Refugee Review Tribunal (Tribunal) for review of the delegate's decision. The appellant's representative provided submissions in support on his behalf. The appellant attended the Tribunal hearing and gave evidence with the assistance of his migration agent and an interpreter. On 30 May 2015 the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate to refuse the application for a protection visa. The appellant applied to the Federal Circuit Court for judicial review of the Tribunal's decision, but on 18 January 2018 the application was refused. The appellant now appeals to this Court.The protection claims The appellant's protection claims are accurately summarised in the Minister's submissions to the following effect:(a)he is an Afghani citizen of Pasthun ethnicity and a follower of the Sunni Islamic religion, and lived illegally in Pakistan from 1988 until he departed for Australia in 2011;(b)his parents married without his mother's family's consent and were killed by his maternal uncles as a result of this and a property dispute; (c)following this he went to live with his paternal uncle in Peshawar in Pakistan and stayed there until he travelled to Australia;(d)his paternal uncle established a business delivering petrol from Pakistan to American and Coalition forces near Kabul. The appellant's brother helped in this business. The Taliban warned them to stop supplying fuel. In 2009 his paternal uncle and brother went missing on a fuel delivery trip;(e)the appellant opened a video shop and billiards hall in partnership with a friend. In October 2011 they received a letter from the Taliban accusing them of un‑Islamic activity (selling alcohol, allowing gambling and selling inappropriate videos), following which their shop was burned down and they were taken and detained by the Taliban for 15 days;(f)they eventually escaped but his business partner was shot and killed by the Taliban while they were running away;(g)the appellant fears returning to Afghanistan because he will be in danger of being killed by his maternal uncles to stop him claiming the land which had belonged to his parents; because he will be killed by the Taliban because of his perceived religious and political views as an enemy of Islam for supporting foreign troops by delivering fuel to them; and because he will be killed by the Taliban because of the allegations that he was selling alcohol, allowing gambling in his billiards business and for distributing 'Islamically inappropriate' videos in his business.The Taliban letters

Decision

Reasons for decision

In any event, I prefer the Minister's submission that it is artificial to view what is said about the letters divorced from the claim that the Taliban then raided the appellant's shop and took him and his partner into detention. The reasons are to be read fairly and are to be read as a whole: MZXSA at [95]. Read as a whole, it is clear that the Tribunal carefully considered the matters relevant to whether the appellant has a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of his religion as a person who is declared by the Taliban as a non‑believer or infidel, based on un‑Islamic activities. For the reasons already expressed (at [51]-[53]), I consider that a fair reading of the reasons as a whole shows that the Tribunal had no real doubt that there was no such well-founded fear and had no real doubt about its relevant findings, and so it was not required to consider the possibility that its findings were wrong.Conclusion It follows that in the circumstances I consider the ground of appeal lacks sufficient merit and therefore leave to raise it on the appeal is refused. Accordingly, the appeal should be dismissed with costs to follow the event.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court is aware of what may be at stake for claimants with genuine claims, and so must be properly cautious in refusing applications solely on the basis of the need for finality of litigation: NAJT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 134; (2005) 147 FCR 51 at [165]. In this case, I do not consider there is any real prejudice to the Minister (and his counsel properly did not contend otherwise). It is not clear to me why the appellant's solicitors chose to raise the new ground on appeal when they could have raised it before the Federal Circuit Court. However, in the end the question of leave in this matter cannot properly be answered without consideration of the merits of the proposed ground.Consideration of the ground of appeal The appellant's ground of appeal relies on what has been termed the 'what if I am wrong' analysis. In MZXSA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCAFC 123; (2010) 117 ALD 441 at [95]‑[96], Keane CJ, Perram and Yates JJ summarised the principles as follows:In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam (1999) 93 FCR 220 Sackville J (with whom North J agreed) analysed the question of decision-making in migration cases. His Honour considered Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259, Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 and Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Ex Parte Abebe (1999) 197 CLR 510, for the purpose of addressing the requirement of whether an applicant for a protection visa has a well-founded fear of persecution. His Honour (at [60]-[67]) distilled a number of principles from those decisions, including the following:(a)There are circumstances in which the Tribunal must take into account the possibility that alleged past events occurred even though it finds those events probably did not occur. This is because the Tribunal must not foreclose reasonable speculation about the chances of a hypothetical future event occurring.(b)In this connection it is not always possible for the decision-maker to be satisfied as to whether alleged past events have occurred with certainty or even confidence. Therefore, if the Tribunal is uncertain as to whether an alleged event occurred, or finds that, although the probabilities are against it, the event might have occurred, it may be necessary to take into account the possibility that the event took place in considering whether the applicant has a well‑founded fear of persecution.(c)Reasonable speculation may require the decision-maker to take into account the chance that past events might have occurred, even though the decision‑maker thinks that they probably did not.(d)There is no reason in principle and nothing in the reasoning of the High Court in those cases that the Tribunal must express findings as to whether alleged past events actually occurred in a manner that makes explicit its degree of convictional confidence that the findings are correct.(e)Similarly there is nothing in the reasoning of the High Court which permits a Court exercising powers of judicial review to "impute" to the Tribunal a lack of conviction or confidence in its findings of fact, such as to warrant a holding that the Tribunal should not or could not have relied on those findings to hold that the applicant's fear of persecution was not well-founded. To do so would be to engage in merits review.(f)In general, the question whether the Tribunal should have considered the possibility that its findings of fact might not have been correct is to be determined by reference to the Tribunal's own reasons. If a fair reading of the reasons as a whole shows that the Tribunal itself had no real doubt that claimed events had not occurred, there is no warrant for holding that it should have considered the possibility that its findings were wrong.As to the last of these principles, his Honour said (at [67]):… Reasonable speculation as to whether the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution does not require a possibility inconsistent with the [Tribunal's] own findings to be pursued. A "fair reading" of the reasons incorporates the principle that the [Tribunal's] reasons should receive a "beneficial construction" and should not be "construed minutely and finely with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error": Wu Shan Liang, at 271-272, quoting Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 280, at 287. Only if a fair reading of the reasons allows the conclusion that the [Tribunal] had a real doubt that its findings on material questions of fact were correct, might error be revealed by the [Tribunal's] failure to take account of the possibility that the alleged events might have occurred (or the possibility that an event said not to have occurred did not in fact occur). If the fair reading allows of such a conclusion, the failure to consider the possibilities might demonstrate that the [Tribunal] had not undertaken the required speculation about the chances of future persecution.