FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BDO15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 619
Appeal from: BDO15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 72 File number: WAD 26 of 2018 Judge: BANKS-SMITH J Date of judgment: 12 September 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – role of Refugee Review Tribunal – speculation as to the future and so called 'what if I am wrong' test – whether Tribunal satisfied with no real doubts – whether well-founded fear of persecution due to alleged Taliban accusations of un-Islamic conduct – application to raise new ground of appeal Cases cited: Hossam v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1161
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo [1997] HCA 22; (1997) 191 CLR 559
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; (1996) 185 CLR 259
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam [1999] FCA 719; (1999) 93 FCR 220
MZXSA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCAFC 123; (2010) 117 ALD 441
NAJT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 134; (2005) 147 FCR 51
VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158; (2004) 238 FCR 588
Date of hearing: 10 May 2018 Registry: Western Australia Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 60 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr GS Crowley Solicitor for the Appellant: AUM Legal Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr PR MacLiver Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs ORDERS
WAD 26 of 2018 BETWEEN: BDO15
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
BANKS-SMITH J
DATE OF ORDER:
12 SEPTEMBER 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Leave is granted to amend the notice of appeal to include proposed ground 1A.
2.Leave is refused to raise the new ground of appeal 1A.
3.The appeal is dismissed.
4.The appellant pay the first respondent's costs to be assessed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BANKS-SMITH J:
The appellant appeals from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court made 18 January 2018 to dismiss an application for judicial review of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (Tribunal) to affirm the decision of the delegate of the first respondent (Minister) to refuse a protection visa: BDO15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 72.
The issue for consideration on the appeal is the application of the so-called 'what if I am wrong' test.
Background
The appellant is a citizen of Afghanistan who arrived in Australia as an irregular maritime arrival in July 2012.
The appellant applied for a Protection (Class XA) visa on 14 December 2012. The application was supported by a…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 619
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the reasoning of the Tribunal and found that a fair reading of its reasons demonstrated that the Tribunal had no real doubt about the correctness of its findings on material questions of fact. The court held that if the Tribunal had such doubts, it might be required to consider the possibility that the events in question might have occurred. However, the court concluded that the Tribunal had no real doubt and thus did not need to consider this possibility. Consequently, the court found that the proposed ground of appeal lacked sufficient merit and denied leave to raise it. The appeal was ultimately dismissed, with the appellant ordered to pay the costs of the respondent.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Leave is granted to amend the notice of appeal to include proposed ground 1A.
2. Leave is refused to raise the new ground of appeal 1A.
3. The appeal is dismissed.
4. The appellant pay the first respondent's costs to be assessed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Court is aware of what may be at stake for claimants with genuine claims, and so must be properly cautious in refusing applications solely on the basis of the need for finality of litigation: NAJT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 134; (2005) 147 FCR 51 at [165]. In this case, I do not consider there is any real prejudice to the Minister (and his counsel properly did not contend otherwise). It is not clear to me why the appellant's solicitors chose to raise the new ground on appeal when they could have raised it before the Federal Circuit Court. However, in the end the question of leave in this matter cannot properly be answered without consideration of the merits of the proposed ground.Consideration of the ground of appeal The appellant's ground of appeal relies on what has been termed the 'what if I am wrong' analysis. In MZXSA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCAFC 123; (2010) 117 ALD 441 at [95]‑[96], Keane CJ, Perram and Yates JJ summarised the principles as follows:In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam (1999) 93 FCR 220 Sackville J (with whom North J agreed) analysed the question of decision-making in migration cases. His Honour considered Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259, Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 and Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Ex Parte Abebe (1999) 197 CLR 510, for the purpose of addressing the requirement of whether an applicant for a protection visa has a well-founded fear of persecution. His Honour (at [60]-[67]) distilled a number of principles from those decisions, including the following:(a)There are circumstances in which the Tribunal must take into account the possibility that alleged past events occurred even though it finds those events probably did not occur. This is because the Tribunal must not foreclose reasonable speculation about the chances of a hypothetical future event occurring.(b)In this connection it is not always possible for the decision-maker to be satisfied as to whether alleged past events have occurred with certainty or even confidence. Therefore, if the Tribunal is uncertain as to whether an alleged event occurred, or finds that, although the probabilities are against it, the event might have occurred, it may be necessary to take into account the possibility that the event took place in considering whether the applicant has a well‑founded fear of persecution.(c)Reasonable speculation may require the decision-maker to take into account the chance that past events might have occurred, even though the decision‑maker thinks that they probably did not.(d)There is no reason in principle and nothing in the reasoning of the High Court in those cases that the Tribunal must express findings as to whether alleged past events actually occurred in a manner that makes explicit its degree of convictional confidence that the findings are correct.(e)Similarly there is nothing in the reasoning of the High Court which permits a Court exercising powers of judicial review to "impute" to the Tribunal a lack of conviction or confidence in its findings of fact, such as to warrant a holding that the Tribunal should not or could not have relied on those findings to hold that the applicant's fear of persecution was not well-founded. To do so would be to engage in merits review.(f)In general, the question whether the Tribunal should have considered the possibility that its findings of fact might not have been correct is to be determined by reference to the Tribunal's own reasons. If a fair reading of the reasons as a whole shows that the Tribunal itself had no real doubt that claimed events had not occurred, there is no warrant for holding that it should have considered the possibility that its findings were wrong.As to the last of these principles, his Honour said (at [67]):… Reasonable speculation as to whether the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution does not require a possibility inconsistent with the [Tribunal's] own findings to be pursued. A "fair reading" of the reasons incorporates the principle that the [Tribunal's] reasons should receive a "beneficial construction" and should not be "construed minutely and finely with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error": Wu Shan Liang, at 271-272, quoting Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 280, at 287. Only if a fair reading of the reasons allows the conclusion that the [Tribunal] had a real doubt that its findings on material questions of fact were correct, might error be revealed by the [Tribunal's] failure to take account of the possibility that the alleged events might have occurred (or the possibility that an event said not to have occurred did not in fact occur). If the fair reading allows of such a conclusion, the failure to consider the possibilities might demonstrate that the [Tribunal] had not undertaken the required speculation about the chances of future persecution.