BC v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BC v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 221

IMMIGRATION – Tribunal originally refused applicant’s claim for protection visa based on fear of persecution in native Pakistan due to Christian religious beliefs – thereafter complex course of litigation pursued – initial application to Federal Court challenged Tribunal decision solely under s 476(1)(e) of Migration Act – asserted that Tribunal decision involved error of law being an incorrect application of law to facts as found – application for review so framed dismissed – further proceedings then instituted in original jurisdiction of High Court under s 75(v) of Constitution seeking constitutional writs – those proceedings still on foot albeit that single judge of High Court remitted part of proceedings to Federal Court – in remitted proceedings appellant sought to argue point not raised before original primary judge that Tribunal decision so unreasonable that no reasonable person could form that view so as to constitute jurisdictional unreasonableness – primary judge in remitter proceedings dismissed application, inter alia on ground that questions as to errors of jurisdictional fact not reviewable under s 476(2) of Act following earlier Full Federal Court decision in Gamaethige – also held that appellant estopped from arguing jurisdictional error because of Anshun principal – then followed present Appeal to Full Court – whether “special circumstances” exist to permit of departure from Anshun principle so as to allow argument on the jurisdictional error point – whether Full Court decision in Gaemethige to be followed - appeal dismissed.

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) subss 476(1)(e), 476(2)(b)
Constitution s 75(v)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 44

“BC” v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 393 referred to
BC v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1669 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611 referred to
Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589 referred to
Gamaethige v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 183 ALR 59 followed
House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499 referred to
Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun (No 2) [1981] VR 81 applied

Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare at 115 cited
Macquarie Bank Ltd v National Mutual Life Association of Australia Ltd (1996) 40 NSWLR 543 referred to
Bryant v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1995) 57 FCR 287 cited
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 180 ALR 1 referred to
Stuart v Sanderson (2000) 100 FCR 150 considered

Fernando v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 436 referred to
Telstra Corporation v Treloar (2000) 102 FCR 595 cited
Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1994) 47 FCR 300 cited
Brooks v Commissioner of Taxation (2000) 100 FCR 117 cited

BC v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

N1590 of 2001

CARR, TAMBERLIN & CONTI JJ
23 JULY 2002
SYDNEY 

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N1590 OF 2001

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCAFC 221
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This appeal concerns a challenge to the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal affirming a decision of a delegate of the respondent not to grant a protection visa to the appellant, BC. The appellant, who arrived in Australia from Indonesia, applied for a protection visa on the grounds of a well-founded fear of persecution in Pakistan due to his religious conversion and past marriage to a Roman Catholic woman. The Tribunal rejected his application, and BC sought judicial review of that decision. The primary judge dismissed the application, finding that the Tribunal's decision was not legally flawed and that there were no special circumstances to warrant reconsideration.

The legal issues in this case revolved around the Tribunal's application of the law to the facts and whether there were jurisdictional errors in its decision-making process. Specifically, the appellant argued that the Tribunal did not properly consider the persecutory application of blasphemy laws against converts from Islam to Christianity. Additionally, the appellant contended that the Tribunal's decision was unreasonably made, amounting to jurisdictional unreasonableness. The primary judge examined these arguments and concluded that the Tribunal's decision was legally sound and that there were no special circumstances to reconsider the matter.

The primary judge's reasoning was grounded in the understanding that the Tribunal had considered the appellant's claims within the context of potential false blasphemy charges rather than focusing on the persecutory application of blasphemy laws. The judge found that the Tribunal's distinction between trumped-up charges and genuine blasphemy charges was reasonable, and the finding that the Tribunal was not satisfied about the seriousness of the alleged apostate claims was not reviewable. Furthermore, the primary judge held that the jurisdictional unreasonableness argument was precluded by a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court, which held that certain grounds of review were not applicable to decisions of the Tribunal.

ORDERS:
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an appeal from a judgment of a Judge of this Court dismissing the appellant’s application for an order of review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal affirming a decision of a delegate of the respondent not to grant a protection visa to the appellant. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The following description of the factual and procedural background of this matter is taken largely from the reasons for judgment of the learned primary judge. The appellant arrived in Australia by boat, from Indonesia, on 17 December 1999. He subsequently applied for a protection visa. The appellant claimed to have a well-founded fear of persecution in Pakistan by reason of religion. He had been raised as a Roman Catholic in that country and married a Roman Catholic. He said that his brothers-in-law (all of whom were Muslim) had strongly disapproved of the marriage and had perpetrated outrages, including kidnapping his wife and children. The appellant claimed to have converted to Islam in order to obtain protection from the local Muslim community against his wife’s family. The conversion had received publicity in local newspapers. The appellant said that he ultimately located his wife and children, with the assistance of the Muslim community, and they resumed living together. In 1998, the appellant was rebaptised into the Christian faith by Christian missionaries. Thereafter he continued to live like a Muslim for all outward purposes, but secretly adhered to Christianity (although his son attended a Roman Catholic school). He said that he feared that false blasphemy charges would be brought against him and also that he feared harm from Muslims by reason of his reconversion to Christianity. On 25 October 2000 the appellant’s application for a protection visa was rejected by the Minister’s delegate. The Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) affirmed that decision on 20 December 2000, finding that the appellant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of religion. On 9 January 2001, the appellant filed an application for review of the Tribunal’s decision in this Court. His amended application, filed on 15 March 2001, contained a single ground, as follows:“S 476(1)(e) of the Migration Act 1958 – decision involved an error of law being an error involving an incorrect application of the law to the facts as found. Particulars The RRT considered the applicant’s case in the context of Moslem extremists making false charges of blasphemy against individuals. The RRT did not consider the applicant’s case in the context of the applicant having satisfied the grounds for charges to be laid against him, on account of his reconversion from Islam to Christianity and the persecutory application of that law, nor did the RRT consider the law as persecutory per se against converts from Islam to Christianity.” Madgwick J heard the first application for review of the Tribunal’s decision on 16 March 2001. The appellant was represented at the hearing by the same counsel who appeared on his behalf both at first instance and on the appeal in the present proceedings. His Honour delivered an ex-tempore judgment dismissing the application (published as “BC” v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 393). As Sackville J, the primary judge in the second Federal Court application (reported as BC v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1669) observed, the core of Madgwick J’s reasoning is contained in the following passages at [13-16]:“Mr Killalea, for the applicant, in a careful argument submitted in essence that the factual finding that “[t]he Tribunal is not satisfied that anyone would take claims made by the applicant’s brother[s]-in-law about him being an apostate seriously” could only reasonably have been made on the assumption that, when the finding was made, the Tribunal was only considering potential false blasphemy charges. This is because the applicant was truly guilty of some blasphemy or apostasy type offence for his actual apostasy, and would so obviously be gravely at risk from the likely outraged Moslem community, who came to his aid, if word of his reconversion should reach them, and that the Tribunal could not have had a true blasphemy type charge, or the community’s reaction to true allegations, in mind.I have considered this carefully. It is a matter of impression and turns on how one reads the decision of the Tribunal. In my opinion, the Tribunal distinguished between on the one hand trumped-up non-blasphemy charges, of which the applicant had also complained and, on the other hand, authentic blasphemy type charges and trouble which the applicant might face on account of his actual apostasy.The finding that “[t]he Tribunal is not satisfied that anyone would take claims made by the applicant’s brother[s]-in-law about him being an apostate seriously” was properly conceded by counsel for the respondent Minister to be a somewhat heroic one. However, it does not seem to me that, on that account alone, it is reviewable in this Court, and counsel for the applicant, who is experienced in these matters, has not attempted to place any reliance in this Court on the possible unreasonableness of that finding. That finding, it seems to me, really disposes of the applicant’s case. So does the finding that he could safely relocate and live in a Christian community. Again, with all due respect to the Tribunal, that is not a finding that would compel unanimous agreement. However, in my opinion it is not possible to say that the Tribunal approached the question of relocation wrongly in a relevant legal sense…”.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 8 June 2001, Gummow J made an order pursuant to s 44 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) remitting a portion of the High Court proceedings to this Court, and thereafter the resultant application was heard by Sackville J. Adapted to take account of the removal of the second and third respondents initially named in the High Court proceedings and the substitution of the Tribunal as the second respondent, the grounds remitted to this Court were as follows: “(a)The Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to make the decision affirming the decision of the Minister’s delegate refusing to grant the appellant a protection visa; (b)The decision of the Tribunal was not authorised by the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Migration Act”) or the Migration Regulations; and (c)The decision involved an error of law involving an incorrect application of the law to the facts as found by the Tribunal.”THE PROCEEDINGS AND JUDGMENT AT FIRST INSTANCE The appellant’s “second” case at first instance was based on the reasoning, obiter, of Gummow J in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611, at 650-659. That is, jurisdictional error on the Tribunal’s part in reaching the state of non-satisfaction that the applicant was a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol. The jurisdictional error asserted was that the Tribunal reached that state of satisfaction so unreasonably that no reasonable decision-maker could properly have arrived at it. It is convenient to refer to that ground, as the primary judge did, as “jurisdictional unreasonableness”. The respondent put forward some five responses to the appellant’s arguments. As matters transpired, his Honour decided only three issues. The first was whether the appellant was precluded from pursuing the matters remitted to this Court by the High Court, by reason of the res judicata doctrine or the principle explained in Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589. Sackville J held that the appellant was not barred by res judicata or cause of action estoppel from pursuing the remitted proceedings. However, his Honour held that it was unreasonable for the appellant not to have relied, in the earlier proceedings before Madgwick J, on the jurisdictional unreasonableness argument. The appellant does not dispute that conclusion. The primary judge then considered whether there were special circumstances which warranted the Court declining to apply the Anshun principle to the remitted proceedings. His Honour’s conclusion was that there were no such special circumstances. The appellant challenges that conclusion. Sackville J appreciated that, having concluded that there were no special circumstances, it was not strictly necessary to consider the two further issues, but he proceeded to do so. First, his Honour held that he was bound by a decision of the Full Court of this Court in Gamaethige v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 183 ALR 59 where it was held (by a majority) that s 476(2)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) precludes an applicant for judicial review of a decision of the Tribunal relying on jurisdictional unreasonableness in this Court. That subsection provides that two specified grounds of review are not grounds upon which an application may be made under s 476(1). The second ground, specified in subsection 476(2)(b), is:“(b)That the decision involved an exercise of a power that is so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have so exercised the power.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.