BBE15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BBE15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 111

Appeal from: BBE15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 2281
File number: QUD 742 of 2016
Judge: BARKER J
Date of judgment: 16 February 2017
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for protection (class XA) visa – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether primary judge erred by failing to find Tribunal committed jurisdictional error – whether Tribunal failed to consider an aspect of appellant’s claim – whether Tribunal made a finding in respect of which there was no evidence
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 91R(1)(a), 91R(1)(b), 91R(1)(c)
Cases cited:

BBE15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 2281

Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 197 ALR 389; [2003] HCA 26

NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No. 2) [2004] FCAFC 263

NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) FCAFC 10

Date of hearing: 16 February 2017
Registry: Queensland
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 78
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms E Tattersall
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers

ORDERS

QUD 742 of 2016
BETWEEN:

BBE15

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

BARKER J

DATE OF ORDER:

16 FEBRUARY 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent to be taxed, if not agreed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BARKER J:

  1. This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the former Refugee Review Tribunal affirming a decision of a delegate of the former Minister for Immigration and Citizenship not to grant the appellant a protection (class XA) visa.

  2. The appellant is a male citizen of Sri Lanka of Tamil ethnicity and Christian faith. He arrived in Australia in July 2012 without a visa.

  3. The appellant applied for a protection (class XA) visa in December 2012. In his application, the appellant claimed that from 2005 to 2007 his mother operated a small grocery business, from which the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) would sometimes purchase groceries without paying.

  4. The appellant claimed his uncle was shot in 2006 and he believed it was because his uncle was suspected of helping the LTTE.

  5. The appellant further claimed that in 2006 he was taken by the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and suspected of being involved in the LTTE. He said he was detained by the CID for seven days, during which period he was asked to identify people from pictures and questioned about assisting the LTTE. The appellant said the officers beat…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 111
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, who had previously been denied a protection visa by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, appealed to the Federal Circuit Court and subsequently to the High Court. The appellant sought to argue that the Tribunal failed to consider certain aspects of his claim and made findings without sufficient evidence. The Minister responded by arguing that the appeal should be dismissed and costs awarded. The court examined the appeal to determine if the primary judge had erred in not finding that the Tribunal had made a jurisdictional error or failed to consider aspects of the appellant's claim.

The court considered the appellant's claim that the Tribunal had failed to identify or assess an integer of his claim that was apparent from the material before it. This included the claim that the appellant was suspected of links with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) due to his storage of groceries for them or his family links. The court found that the primary judge had correctly concluded that there was no substantial claim concerning these matters, and the Tribunal had adequately addressed the appellant's claims. The court also reviewed the appellant's argument that his profile would fall within the categories of Tamils returning to Sri Lanka who would be subjected to detention and/or torture and/or ill-treatment. The court found that the primary judge had correctly concluded that the appellant's profile did not fit these categories.

The court concluded that the appellant had not demonstrated that the primary judge had erred in failing to find that the Tribunal had made a jurisdictional error or failed to consider aspects of his claim. The court noted that the issues raised by the appellant in the oral submissions were not part of the judicial review proceeding before the primary judge and would require leave to be raised, which was not warranted in this case. The court found that the Tribunal had adequately considered the appellant's claims and the primary judge had correctly assessed the issues.

The court dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to pay the costs of the first respondent, to be taxed if not agreed. This decision affirmed the Minister's decision to deny the appellant a protection visa.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent to be taxed, if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant, who had entered Australia by boat, applied for a protection (class XA) visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The delegate considered the appellant's application and noted discrepancies in the information provided by the appellant in his entry interview and statutory declaration compared to his protection visa interview. The appellant claimed he feared harm due to his support and activities for the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) during the 2010 election and suspected he was detained in 2010 because of his political involvement. The delegate found that the appellant was not politically active in Sri Lanka, was not detained or harmed for this reason, and did not hold any profile that would attract attention from the Sri Lankan authorities or paramilitary groups. The delegate was satisfied that the appellant feared harm for reasons including his race, imputed political opinion in support of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), membership of the particular social group of "young Tamil males," and membership of the particular social group of "returnees from a Western country." However, the delegate did not find these fears to be based on any real chance of persecution under the Convention grounds.

The appellant's application for a protection (class XA) visa was initially refused by a delegate under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The appellant then applied for judicial review of the delegate's decision in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the appellant's application for judicial review. The appellant subsequently appealed the decision of the Federal Circuit Court to the High Court of Australia. The appeal was heard and determined by the High Court, which found that the primary judge did not err in dismissing the appellant's judicial review application. The High Court dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to pay the costs of the first respondent.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellant now appeals from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court by a notice of appeal filed 23 September 2016. DELEGATE’S DECISION The delegate noted significant discrepancies between the information the appellant provided in his entry interview and statutory declaration, and in his protection visa interview. The delegate said that during the protection visa interview, the appellant claimed he feared harm because of his support and activities campaigning for the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) during the 2010 election. The delegate further noted that the appellant suspected he was detained on the two occasions in 2010 because of his political involvement. The delegate stated the appellant’s failure to indicate any political involvement or fear of harm relating to political involvement in his entry interview and statutory declaration was significant. The delegate found the appellant was not politically active in Sri Lanka and was not detained or harmed for this reason, or personally singled out as a target, in 2010. The delegate also found there was no indication that the appellant had any outstanding issues with the Sri Lankan authorities, or was of personal interest to the authorities or paramilitary groups, or held any kind of elevated profile locally or nationally for any reason. The delegate was satisfied the appellant feared harm for the essential and significant reasons of race, imputed political opinion in support of the LTTE, membership of the particular social group of “young Tamil males” and membership of the particular social group of “returnees from a Western country”, as required by s 91R(1)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). However, the delegate considered the matter of the appellant fearing harm as a result of his name being included on a list of people who had been in an area where a dead body was found was unrelated to any of the Convention grounds, and so did not consider the matter further. The delegate was satisfied that, having regard to recent country information and advice from the UNHCR, no aspect of the appellant’s circumstances, including his race, in combination with any other issue, would lead the Sri Lankan authorities to believe or suspect he was affiliated with the LTTE. Consequently, the delegate found there was no real chance that the appellant would be persecuted because of an imputed political opinion in support of the LTTE. The delegate was satisfied that young Tamil males may face harassment, but was not satisfied that this amounted to persecution under s 91R(1)(b) and (c) of the Act. Accordingly, the delegate did not accept the appellant faced a real chance of persecution from the Sri Lankan authorities or paramilitary groups by reason of his membership of the particular social group of “young Tamil males” in the reasonably foreseeable future. The delegate also considered the country information on the treatment of returnees to Sri Lanka and concluded that the appellant did not hold any profile which put him at risk of arbitrary detention or torture, or bring him to the adverse attention of the Sri Lankan authorities, if he was returned. The delegate did not accept the appellant faced a real chance of persecution for being a returnee from a Western country in the reasonably foreseeable future.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Accordingly, the Minister seeks an order that the appeal be dismissed, with costs.CONSIDERATION The single ground of the appeal, that the primary judge erred by failing to find that the Tribunal had erred lacks any appropriate specificity or particularisation. As noted above, at the hearing of the appeal, the appellant was self-represented and made the oral submissions referred to above. Construed beneficially, the appellant effectively sought by his ground of appeal to repeat the two grounds of his judicial review application in the Court below. However, as to ground 1, that the Tribunal had committed jurisdictional error by failing to identify or assess an integer of the appellant’s claim, which was apparent on the material before the Tribunal, there was, in my view, no error made by the judge in concluding that there was no substantial, clearly articulated claim that relied upon established facts, concerning the appellant having a profile of a person suspected of links with the LTTE as a result of the supplied storage of groceries for the LTTE, or on the basis of having family links with any such persons. I also consider that the primary judge’s finding that, to the extent it could be said that such a claim or claims were made, they were dealt with by the Tribunal’s findings including that the Tribunal did not accept the appellant was suspected of or perceived to be a member of the LTTE now, or would be in the future, or that he was wanted by or faced harm from the authorities. As to the second ground, as particularised and dealt with by the primary judge on that basis, no error is disclosed in the primary judge’s finding that the appellant’s profile would not come within any of the categories of Tamils returning to Sri Lanka who would be subjected to detention and/or torture and/or ill‑treatment. In these circumstances, the appellant has failed to make out the sole ground of appeal in this Court that the primary judge erred in failing to find that the Tribunal had erred in law. As to the oral submissions made by the appellant at the hearing, they are not issues that were raised as part of the judicial review proceeding before the primary judge. Undoubtedly, leave to raise them now would be required. There is nothing about the merits of any of the matters that the appellant would now raise that could justify the grant of such leave. At [34] of the Tribunal’s reasons, it dealt expressly with the question of the interpreter used at the Tribunal hearing, and the Tribunal noted that the appellant was satisfied with the interpretation process. It is clear from the Tribunal record that no issue concerning interpretation was identified at that hearing. As I have noted, nor was any question of interpretation raised in the judicial review proceedings before the primary judge. The other questions raised by the appellant concerning the nature of the hearing he had before the Tribunal, the fact that findings were made against him, the suggestion that there may have been some bias by the Tribunal member, and the like, all go to the merits of the case that the appellant presented. The Tribunal found against the appellant on questions of credibility and also on the primary questions raised under the Act, having regard to the facts of the case. In effect, the appellant sought to reargue the case that he presented at the Tribunal, before the Court on the appeal. No questions of law are obviously raised in that regard.