BBB18 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

BBB18 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 748

File number(s): MLG 549 of 2018
Judgment of: JUDGE CORBETT
Date of judgment: 23 May 2025
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Safe Haven Enterprise (Class XE) (Subclass 790) visa – Whether an unreasonable failure to exercise discretion under s 473DC(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – Whether jurisdictional error material - Authority unreasonably exercised discretion – Informational gap – Jurisdictional error - Application allowed - Writs to issue.
Legislation:

Immigrants and Emigrants Act 1949 (Sri Lanka)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5H(1), 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 473CB, 473CB(1), 473DC, 473DC(1), 473DC(3), 473DD, Div 3, Part 7AA

Cases cited:

ABT17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2020) 259 CLR 439; [2020] HCA 34

ADN17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1037

Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184

AWV18 v Minister for Home Affairs (No 3) [2019] FCA 365

BVC20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 565

EVS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 20

LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16

Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v AWT19 [2021] FCAFC 58

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259; [1996] HCA 6

MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2021] HCA 17

NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263

Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 26

SGBB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 199 ALR 364

Singh v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 3

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 103
Date of last submission/s: 1 May 2025
Date of hearing: 1 May 2025
Place: Melbourne
Solicitor for the Applicant:  Mr G Arujunan, AUM Legal
Solicitor for the Respondents: Mr A Gardner, Mills Oakley

ORDERS

MLG 549 of 2018

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

BBB18

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE CORBETT

DATE OF ORDER:

23 MAY 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The name of the first respondent is amended to ‘Minister for Immigration and Citizenship’;

2.The decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority made 9 February 2018 be quashed;

3.A writ of mandamus issue requiring the second respondent to determine the applicant’s application for review according to law; and

4.The Court will hear from the parties as to the appropriate disposition of costs.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal…

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Details
Case
[2025] FedCFamC2G 748
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of BBB18 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, the applicant, a citizen of Sri Lanka, sought judicial review of a decision by the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship to refuse his application for a Safe Haven Enterprise (Class XE) (Subclass 790) visa. The applicant, who had arrived in Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival, claimed fear of persecution due to his Tamil ethnicity and association with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The primary issue before the court was whether the delegate and the Minister had exercised their discretion unreasonably under section 473DC(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). Additionally, the court had to determine if any jurisdictional errors made were material and whether the Authority unreasonably exercised its discretion by not considering additional information submitted post-delegation.

The court found that the Authority had not unreasonably exercised its discretion in declining to consider additional information submitted after the delegate’s decision. The court emphasised that while the Authority had accepted the applicant's claims regarding his past involvement with the LTTE and his experiences of conflict, it was not satisfied that the new information provided exceptional circumstances warranting reconsideration. The court also highlighted that the reasons given by the Authority were sufficient and did not reveal any jurisdictional errors. In particular, the court underscored the importance of adhering to the principles of judicial review, which avoid the reconsideration of the merits of administrative decisions and focus instead on legality and procedural fairness. The court noted that the Authority had appropriately balanced the applicant's claims with the country information available, and had not ignored or misunderstood any material facts.

In conclusion, the court dismissed the application for judicial review, affirming the decision of the Minister to refuse the visa application. The court found no jurisdictional errors and no unreasonable exercise of discretion by the Minister or the Authority. Therefore, the writs of certiorari and mandamus sought by the applicant were denied.

Background

Background to the litigation

References in these reasons to “CB” pages are references to the Court Book that was tendered and admitted as evidence at the hearing before this Court and designated exhibit “A1”.BACKGROUND The applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka. The applicant arrived in Australia on 9 September 2012 as an unauthorised maritime arrival (CB 193-4). He claims to be from the Vavunyia District of the Northern Province of Sri Lanka (CB 236). On 25 May 2016, the applicant filed an application for a Temporary Protection (Class XD) (Subclass 785) visa. The applicant claimed he feared harm from the Sri Lankan authorities and unidentified paramilitary groups due to his Tamil ethnicity and his association with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) (CB 4-78). On 3 February 2017, the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (Department) invited the applicant to attend an interview scheduled for 27 February 2017 (CB 87-9). On 24 February 2017, the applicant’s then representative informed the Department that the applicant intended to withdraw his application for the Temporary Protection visa and instead make an application for the visa (CB 99). On 27 February 2017, the applicant attended the interview (CB 194) (A2, Annexure NG1, Transcript). The applicant raised an additional protection claim that he feared being harmed and killed by the Sri Lankan Government because of his participation in a Heroes’ Day march in Perth, Australia on 27 November 2016 (CB 196-7). During the course of that interview, the applicant revealed to the interviewing officer a scar on the applicant’s chest which he claimed was from an injury he received during “crossfire” between Sri Lankan Army (SLA) troops and the LTTE (CB 237). The officer described the scar as a “mark on your chest” but did not seek a photograph or otherwise to record what the officer saw (A2, Transcript p 21). On 15 March 2017, the applicant’s representative submitted further written submissions dated 13 March 2017 to the Department (CB 100-24). Those submissions explained in detail the claims for protection and fear of persecution should the applicant be required to return to Sri Lanka. One of those claims was a fear that upon return the applicant will be detained and questioned as to his reasons for departing Sri Lanka illegally in 2012. Annexed to those submissions were a completed Temporary visa withdrawal form (CB 125-8) and an application for the visa (CB 129-172). On 3 June 2017, the delegate refused to grant the visa (CB 190-209). The delegate found that the applicant had provided “low level support” to the LTTE for a short period of time and therefore did not have a profile of ongoing interest to the Sri Lankan authorities (CB 204). The delegate was not satisfied that the applicant would face a real risk of serious or significant harm if he returned to Sri Lanka. The delegate found that the applicant was not a refugee as defined by s 5H(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) and was not a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under ss 36(2)(a) or 36(2)(aa) of the Act (CB 193-209).

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 9 February 2018, the Authority affirmed the delegate’s decision to refuse to grant the visa (Decision) (CB 234-54).AUTHORITY’S DECISION In the Decision, the Authority considered the material referred by the Secretary which included a recording of the interview conducted on 27 February 2017. The Authority also referred to the Letter submitted on behalf of the applicant. It acknowledged that the Letter post-dated the delegate’s decision and sought to confirm the applicant’s previous claims that the Sri Lankan Army, unknown men and police continue to search for him. The Authority found that the Letter was “devoid of any detail” concerning the events referred to therein, and it was not satisfied that the Letter contained credible information or was of any real probative value. The Authority was not satisfied that there were exceptional circumstances to justify considering the Letter under s 473DD of the Act. (CB 236 [5]). The Authority then considered the further written submissions which in substance echoed the earlier submissions provided by the applicant’s representative to the delegate (CB 101-124). The Authority acknowledged that the submissions referred to country information and reports which, although published prior to the delegate’s decision, were not before the delegate and therefore constituted “new information” (CB 236 [6]). It considered that the new country information did not contain personal information that could not have been provided prior to the date of the delegate’s decision. The Authority was also not satisfied that there were exceptional circumstances to justify considering that new information (CB 236-7 [6]). The Authority accepted the applicant’s evidence that he is of Tamil ethnicity and Hindu faith from the Northern Province of Sri Lanka (CB 238 [10]). It also accepted his claims that he sustained an injury in crossfire during conflict between the SLA and LTTE in 2008 and was hospitalised (CB 238-9 [11]). After his release from hospital the applicant and his family were displaced by the conflict in the Mannar District (CB 238-9 [11]). After displacement the applicant made his home in the Mullaitivu District prior to the ceasefire. The Authority accepted the applicant’s evidence that the areas in which the applicant lived were under LTTE control and that the Tamils in those areas were forced (by compulsion) to dig bunkers and cook food for the LTTE. This occurred from 1994 to 2008. The Authority considered the applicant’s interview evidence and found that the applicant was only forced to dig bunkers during a two-to-three-month period whilst in Kilinochchi in 2008. The Authority accepted the applicant’s claim that he hid and managed to avoid most other occasions when the LTTE demanded assistance from him (CB 239 [12]). The Authority acknowledged the applicant’s claim that he was interrogated about his life and LTTE involvement and was tortured. It considered country information which indicated that immediately after the war, authorities sought to identify LTTE cadres and supporters amongst Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) who had fled the northern conflict zones and who were being held at IDP camps. The applicant was a displaced person who fled with his family from the northern conflict zones in 2009 and was taken by the SLA to the IDP camp in Vavunyia (CB 239 [13]). The Authority accepted that the applicant may have been mistreated and beaten during this time (CB 240 [14]-[15]).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The solicitor for the applicant accepted that a scar may be taken to be the result of some form of torture. Mr Arujunan again submitted that the likelihood of the applicant being detained, and strip searched upon return to Sri Lanka was high and not low as the Authority found and Minister contended. He again emphasised that the Home Office Report acknowledged that a scar may put a person at risk if that person is likely to be detained and interrogated and “if the scarring was likely to be such as to raise suspicions” (CB 243-4 [22]).CONSIDERATION In this case the Court is mindful of the warning in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259; [1996] HCA 6 (Wu Shan Liang), where the High Court said at 272:In the present context, any court reviewing a decision upon refugee status must beware of turning a review of the reasons of the decision-maker upon proper principles into a reconsideration of the merits of the decision. This has been made clear many times in this Court. For example, it was said by Brennan J in Attorney General (NSW) v Quinn (26):“The duty and jurisdiction of the court to review administrative action do not go beyond the declaration and enforcing of the law which determines the limits and governs the exercise of the repository’s power. If, in so doing, the court avoids administrative injustice or error, so be it; but the court has no jurisdiction simply to cure administrative injustice or error. The merits of administrative action, to the extent that they can be distinguished from legality, are for the repository of the relevant power and, subject to political control, for the repository alone.” The Court in Wu Shan Liang also noted the practical constraints on judicial review. It was also said at 272 that:…a court should not be “concerned with looseness in the language …nor with unhappy phrasing” of the reasons of the administrative decision-maker. …the reasons of the decision under review are not to be construed minutely and finely with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error. In LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12 (LPDT) the plurality said at [3]:[3]…Jurisdictional error on the part of a statutory decision-maker in making a decision can include: misunderstanding the applicable law; asking the wrong question; exceeding the bounds of reasonableness; identifying a wrong issue; ignoring relevant material; relying on irrelevant material; in some cases, making an erroneous finding or reaching a mistaken conclusion; or failing to observe some applicable requirement of procedural fairness. The Court in LPDT then explained at [9] and [10]:[9] Where it is alleged in an application for judicial review that a decision is affected by jurisdictional error constituted by a breach of an express or implied condition of a conferral of decision-making authority by a statute which incorporates a requirement of materiality, there are two questions: has an error occurred; and, if so, was that error material.[10] The inquiry posited by each question is wholly backward-looking. Both questions are to be answered by reference to the decision that was made and, depending on the nature of the error, how that decision was made. Those are facts in respect of which the applicant for judicial review bears the onus of proof on the balance of probabilities. Proof of these facts ought to be neither difficult nor contentious.