Battunga Country Lions Club v Paues

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Court of Appeal: Civil)

BATTUNGA COUNTRY LIONS CLUB v PAUES

[2021] SASCA 72

Judgment of the Court of Appeal  

(The Honourable President Kelly, the Honourable Justice Doyle and the Honourable Justice Bleby)

29 July 2021

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE DAMAGES - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - PERSONAL INJURY OR DEATH CASES

The respondent and his family were spectators at a go-kart race organised by the appellant.  During the course of the race, an out-of-control go-kart broke through the bunting at the edge of the racetrack and injured the respondent.

The respondent sued the appellant in negligence, claiming damages for the injuries he sustained by reason of the accident.  Following a trial which, in light of admissions made by the appellant, was confined to the issues of causation and quantum, the trial judge entered a judgment in favour of the respondent for $478,617.23.  This sum included an award for future loss of earning capacity of $330,000. 

The appellant appeals the judgment entered in favour of the respondent.  Its grounds of appeal are limited to a challenge to the allowance made by the trial judge for future loss of earning capacity, and essentially amount to a complaint of manifest excess.  The appellant identifies three contended errors in the trial judge’s approach to this head of damages, namely in using a multiplier that assumed the respondent would work to 65 years of age; in confining the reduction for contingencies to 15 per cent; and in assuming a reduction of $532 per week (or 28 per cent) in earnings that would commence immediately following the trial and continue throughout the respondent’s working life.

Held, per the Court, allowing the appeal:

1.      The trial judge did not make any error of principle or fact.  However, given the trial judge’s findings that it was likely the respondent would have worked to age 60 and possibly slightly longer, and the likelihood that the respondent’s injury would not be productive of financial loss for at least a few years following trial, the use of a multiplier from the date of trial through to age 65, with a relatively standard reduction of 15 per cent for contingencies, has resulted in an award for future loss of earning capacity that is excessive in the relevant sense.

2.      The judgment in favour of the respondent is set aside.  An award of $250,000 for future loss of earning capacity is substituted, and a reduced judgment in favour of the respondent in the amount of $398,617 is entered.

Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co (1880) 5 App Cas 25; CSR Ltd v Eddy (2005) 226 CLR 1; Amaca Pty Ltd v Latz (2018) 264 CLR 505; Graham v Baker (1961) 106 CLR 340; Husher v Husher (1999) 197 CLR 138; Medlin v State Government Insurance Commission (1995) 182 CLR 1; Todorovic v Waller (1981) 150 CLR 402; Malec v J.C. Hutton Pty Ltd (1990) 169…

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Details
Case
[2021] SASCA 72
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal concerned an assessment of damages for future loss of earning capacity. The appellant, Battunga Country Lions Club, challenged the quantum of damages awarded to the respondent, Paues, by the trial judge.

The central legal issue before the appellate court was whether the trial judge's assessment of the respondent's future loss of earning capacity was excessive, notwithstanding that the trial judge had made no error of principle or fact. Specifically, the court had to consider the combined effect of the trial judge's findings regarding the respondent's likely working life, the delayed commencement of financial loss, and the method used to calculate future losses.

The appellate court acknowledged the restraint an appellate court should exercise when reviewing a trial judge's assessment of damages. While not finding any error of principle or fact in the trial judge's findings, the court concluded that the award for future loss of earning capacity was excessive in the relevant sense. This excess was attributed to the use of a multiplier from the date of trial to age 65, with a 15 per cent contingency reduction, which the court found resulted in too high an award. The court undertook a fresh assessment, considering the likely delay in the commencement of significant financial loss and the eventual cessation of work.

The appeal was allowed. The judgment in favour of the respondent was set aside, and an award of $250,000 for future loss of earning capacity was substituted. The total judgment in favour of the respondent was reduced to $398,617.

Orders

Orders of the court

Held, per the Court, allowing the appeal:

1. The trial judge did not make any error of principle or fact. However, given the trial judge’s findings that it was likely the respondent would have worked to age 60 and possibly slightly longer, and the likelihood that the respondent’s injury would not be productive of financial loss for at least a few years following trial, the use of a multiplier from the date of trial through to age 65, with a relatively standard reduction of 15 per cent for contingencies, has resulted in an award for future loss of earning capacity that is excessive in the relevant sense.

2. The judgment in favour of the respondent is set aside. An award of $250,000 for future loss of earning capacity is substituted, and a reduced judgment in favour of the respondent in the amount of $398,617 is entered.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In summary, there is some force in the challenges made to the trial judge’s use of an assumed weekly loss of earnings of 28 per cent, or $532 net per week, throughout the period from trial to the end of the respondent’s working life. While we do not think the use of these figures was necessarily erroneous, it remains for us to address the combined effect of all of the matters that we have canvassed to this point. Conclusion We have mentioned earlier the restraint that an appellate court should exercise when considering whether to interfere with a trial judge’s assessment of damages. We are not persuaded that the trial judge in the present case made any error of principle or fact. However, having regard to the combined effect of the various matters raised by the appellant in support of its challenge to his Honour’s assessment of the respondent’s future loss of earning capacity, we are satisfied that the sum awarded was excessive in the relevant sense. In our view, the use of a multiplier from the date of trial through to age 65, with a reduction of 15 per cent for contingencies, has resulted in an award for future loss of earning capacity that is too high. We would set aside this component of the trial judge’s assessment of damages and undertake a fresh assessment. On the trial judge’s own findings, the profile of the loss to be suffered was such that there was likely to be a delay of several years after trial before the loss commenced to be productive of any significant financial loss. It is to be expected that that loss will then increase over subsequent years, with the respondent ultimately reaching the point where he is likely to have to cease working earlier than he would otherwise have done so. On the basis that the best estimate of when the plaintiff would otherwise have ceased working was at 60 years of age, the loss flowing from this being brought forward by a period of four years (to a point about 15 years after the trial, when the respondent will be 56 years of age) would be approximately $150,000. We would reduce this to $110,000 (which corresponds to the loss referable to a three year foreshortening of the respondent’s working life) to reflect the prospect that the respondent will be able to defer having a knee replacement beyond this point in time. In addition to this, we consider it appropriate to allow an amount of $180,000 on account of the loss to be suffered by the respondent ahead of that point in time. In arriving at that figure, we have not used any particular weekly rate or multiplier. Rather, we have assumed a delay of several years in the commencement of the loss, with the loss then increasing steadily over the period until the respondent requires a knee replacement or otherwise ceases to work. In arriving at a figure for this component of the respondent’s loss, we have of course had regard to the time value of money, and the consequential need to discount more heavily the greater losses suffered later in this period.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established