Barton (a pseudonym) v The King; Director of Public Prosecutions v Barton (a pseudonym)

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SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COURT OF APPEAL
S EAPCR 2023 0249
CRAIG BARTON (A PSEUDONYM)[1] Applicant
v
THE KING Respondent

[1]To avoid the possibility of identifying the alleged victim of a sexual offence, these reasons for judgment have been anonymised by the adoption of a pseudonym in place of the name of the applicant.

S EAPCI 2024 0027
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS Plaintiff
v
CRAIG BARTON (A PSEUDONYM) First Respondent
and
THE COUNTY COURT OF VICTORIA Second Respondent

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JUDGES: PRIEST, BOYCE and KAYE JJA
WHERE HELD: Melbourne
DATE OF HEARING: 6 February 2025
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11 April 2025
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: [2025] VSCA 74
JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: DPP v Barton (a pseudonym) [2023] VCC 707 (Conviction); DPP v Barton (a pseudonym) [2023] VCC 2205 (Sentence) (Judge Riddell)

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CRIMINAL LAW – Appeal – Conviction – Rape and related sexual offending – Whether judge should have taken into account in manner adverse to complainants’ credibility and reliability their failure to give evidence in accordance with prosecution opening – Open to judge to find complainant generally truthful and reliable – Application granted – Appeal dismissed.

CRIMINAL LAW – Appeal – Sentence – Rape and related sexual offending – Total effective sentence of 24 years and 4 months’ imprisonment – Whether manifestly excessive – Application granted – Appeal allowed – Applicant resentenced accordingly.

CRIMINAL LAW – Judicial Review – Judge erred in fixing duration of order under Sex Offenders Registration Act 2004 at 28 years – Having been found guilty of a registrable offence became subject to reporting conditions for life – Orders set aside, unnecessary to make orders in proceeding for judicial review and struck out with no determination on the merits and no order for costs.  

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Counsel

Applicant/First Respondent: Ms S Flynn KC with Ms M Deighton
Respondent/Plaintiff: Ms E Ruddle KC with Mr L McAuliffe

Solicitors

Applicant/First Respondent: Doogue + George
Respondent/Plaintiff: Ms A Hogan, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions

PRIEST JA:

Introduction

  1. An indictment filed in the County Court charged ‘Craig Barton’ (for convenience, ‘the applicant’) with sexual and other offences against two adult female complainants, ‘LV’ and ‘CM’, with both of whom, at different times, he was in a domestic, sexual relationship.  A deal of the sexual offending against both complainants was alleged to have occurred in a ‘bondage’ setting, accompanied by the use of restraints and sex devices.  The charges of rape included penile-vaginal, penile-anal and penile-oral penetration, together with vaginal ‘fisting’ and penetration of the vagina and anus with objects.

  2. In total, the indictment contained 27 charges: 18 charges of rape; four charges of indecent assault; two charges of false imprisonment; two charges of making a threat to kill; and one charge of common assault.  Those involving LV included one of common assault (charge 1); one of false imprisonment (charge 3); and 10 of rape (charges 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12), in a period between 1 November 2011 and 8 January 2014; and those involving CM include one…

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Details
Case
[2025] VSCA 74
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Barton (a pseudonym) v The King; Director of Public Prosecutions v Barton (a pseudonym) involved an appeal against conviction and sentence as well as an application for judicial review of a registration order. The applicant, Barton, was convicted of various sexual offences and sentenced to a lengthy prison term, with a registration order under the Sex Offenders Registration Act 2004 extending for 28 years. Barton sought to challenge the conviction, sentence, and registration order on various grounds. The legal issues before the court encompassed the admissibility of credibility evidence in relation to the complainants' failure to testify in accordance with the prosecution's opening, the severity of the sentence imposed, and the legality of the registration order's duration.

The court found that the trial judge had not erred in concluding that the complainants were generally truthful and reliable despite their failure to give evidence in accordance with the prosecution opening. The judge was not obligated to find the complainants' credibility and reliability diminished on that basis alone. Furthermore, the court held that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive, warranting a reduction. The registration order's duration was also deemed unlawful, as Barton became subject to reporting conditions for life upon being found guilty of a registrable offence, rendering the 28-year order unnecessary.

In light of these findings, the appeal against conviction was dismissed, but the appeal against sentence was allowed, resulting in a resentencing. The registration order was set aside, and the orders in the judicial review proceeding were struck out without a determination on the merits, and no order for costs was made. The court's decision underscored the importance of adhering to statutory directives when directing a judge in trials by judge alone and highlighted the need for proper consideration of sentencing and registration orders in sexual offence cases.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Section 101A of the Evidence Act 2008 (‘EA’) defines credibility evidence:101A Credibility evidenceCredibility evidence, in relation to a witness or other person, is evidence relevant to the credibility of the witness or person that—(a) is relevant only because it affects the assessment of the credibility of the witness or person; or(b) is relevant—(i)because it affects the assessment of the credibility of the witness or person; and(ii)for some other purpose for which it is not admissible, or cannot be used, because of a provision of Parts 3.2 to 3.6. The Dictionary to the EA further provides that: ‘credibility of a witness means the credibility of any part or all of the evidence of the witness, and includes the witness’s ability to observe or remember facts and events about which the witness has given, is giving or is to give evidence’. Given that the definition embraces matters that go to reliability, it is clear that the EA does not draw a distinction between credibility and reliability.[47][47]IMM v The Queen (2016) 257 CLR 300, 315–6 [53] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ). See also Dupas v The Queen (2012) 40 VR 182, 255 [265]–[266] (Warren CJ and Maxwell P and Nettle, Redlich and Bongiorno JJA). Notably, s 101A(a) is restricted to evidence that is relevant only because it affects the assessment of the credibility of a witness or person. Thus, if evidence is relevant under s 55 for some other reason, it will not fall within the definition of credibility evidence.[48][48]See also EA, s 55(2)(a). An exception to the credibility rule is to be found in s 103(1), which provides that the credibility rule ‘does not apply to evidence adduced in cross-examination of a witness if the evidence could substantially affect the assessment of the credibility of the witness’. In the present case, the attack that defence counsel sought to launch on the credibility and reliability of the complainants was not based on any evidence-in-chief given by LV or CM, or anything adduced in cross-examination. Instead, the attack on the complainants’ credibility and reliability relied on the contention that they had failed to give evidence in accordance with the prosecution opening. Defence counsel had, however, deliberately avoided cross-examining the complainants upon their failure to give evidence in accordance with the opening, and upon any reasons there might have been for that failure. Certainly, there was nothing put directly before the trial judge upon which she could have made any assessment as to why the complainants’ evidence did not accord with the prosecution opening, still less whether the failure of their evidence to accord with the opening might properly impinge upon their credibility and reliability. For these reasons, the credibility rule (with exceptions) in Part 3.7 of the EA was not engaged. At this point it is convenient to note that, at the time that the applicant’s trial was conducted, s 420ZG of the CPA (since repealed) provided that s 4A of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (‘JDA’) applied to a trial by judge alone. Hence, the trial judge’s ‘reasoning’ was required to be consistent with how a jury would be directed in accordance with the Act; and the judge could not ‘accept, rely on or adopt’ a statement or suggestion that the Act prohibited a trial judge from making, or a direction that the Act prohibited a trial judge from giving.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established